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THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


The 

BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 
A Psychological  Study 


hy 

Everett  Dean  Martin 

Lecturer  in  Social  Philosophy  and  Director  of  the  Cooper 
Union  Forum  of  the  People’s  Institute  of  New  York 


HARPER  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 

N EW  YORK  AND  LONDON 


The  Behavior  of  Crowds 


Copyright,  1920.  by  Harper  & Brothers 
Printed  in  the  'United  States  of  America 


S-W 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Fohewoed vii 

I.  The  Crowd  and  the  Social  Problem  of  To-day  . . 1 

II.  How  Crowds  Abe  Formed 11 

III.  The  Crowd  and  the  Unconscious 5V^ 

IV.  The  Egoism  of  the  Crowd-Mind 73 

V.  The  Crowd  a Creature  of  Hate 92 

VI.  The  Absolutism  of  the  Crowd-Mind 133 

VII.  The  Psychology  of  Revolutionary  Crowds  . . . 166 

VIII.  The  Fruits  of  Revolution — New  Crowd-Tyrannies 

FOR  Old 219  | 

IX.  Freedom  and  Government  by  Crowds 233  j 

X.  Education  as  a Possible  Cure  for  Crowd-Thinking  281N 

Index 305 


FOREWORD 


Since  the  publication  of  Le  Ron’s  book. 
The  Crowd,  little  has  been  added  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  mechanisms  of  crowd- 
behavior.  As  a practical  problem,  the  habit 
of  crowd-making  is  daily  becoming  a more 
serious  menace  to  civilization.  Events  are 
making  it  more  and  more  clear  that,  pressing 
as  are  certain  economic  questions,  the  forces 
which  threaten  society  are  really  psychological. 

Interest  in  the  economic  struggle  has  to  a 
large  extent  diverted  attention  from  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  problems  of  social  psychology. 
Social  psychology  is  still  a rather  embryonic 
science,  and  this  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  psychiatry  has  recently  provided  us  with 
a method  with  which  we  may  penetrate  more 
deeply  than  ever  before  into  the  inner  sources 
of  motive  and  conduct. 

The  remedy  which  I have  suggested  in 
Chapter  X deserves  a much  more  extended 
treatment  than  I have  given  it.  It  involves 
one  of  the  great  mooted  questions  of  modern 
philosophical  discussion.  It  is,  however,  not 
within  the  province  of  this  book  to  enter  upon 


FOREWORD 


a discussion  of  the  philosophy  of  Humanism. 
The  subject  has  been  thoroughly  thrashed  over 
in  philosophical  journals  and  in  the  writings 
of  James,  Schiller,  Dewey,  and  others.  It  is 
sufficient  for  my  purpose  merely  to  point  out 
the  fact  that  the  humanist  way  of  thinking 
may  provide  us  with  just  that  educational 
method  which  will  break  up  the  logical  forms 
in  which  the  crowd-mind  intrenches  itself. 

Those  who  expect  to  find  a prescribed  for- 
mula or  ideal  scheme  of  organization  as  a rem- 
edy for  our  social  ills  may  feel  that  the  solution 
to  which  I have  come — namely,  a new  educa- 
tional method — is  too  vague.  But  the  problem 
of  the  crowd  is  really  concerned  with  the  things 
of  the  mind.  And  if  I am  correct  in  my  thesis 
that  there  is  a necessary  connection  between 
crowd-thinking  and  the  various  traditional 
systems  of  inteUectualist,  absolutist,  and  ra- 
tionalist philosophy,  the  way  out  must  be 
through  the  formation  of  some  such  habits  of 
thinking  as  I have  suggested. 

E.  D.  M. 

New  York,  October  10, 1919. 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


I 

THE  CROWD  AND  THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  OF 
TO-DAY 

Every  one  at  times  feels  himself  in  the 
grip  of  social  forces  over  which  he  has 
no  control.  The  apparently  impersonal  na- 
ture of  these  forces  has  given  rise  to  various 
mechanistic  theories  of  social  behavior.  There 
are  those  who  interpret  the  events  of  history 
as  by-products  of  economic  evolution.  Others, 
more  idealistic  but  determinists,  nevertheless, 
see  in  the  record  of  human  events  the  working 
out  of  a preordained  plan. 

There  is  a popular  notion,  often  shared  by 
scholars,  that  the  individual  and  society  are 
essentially  irreconcilable  principles.  The  in- 
dividual is  assumed  to  be  by  nature  an  anti- 
social being.  Society,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
opposed  in  principle  to  all  that  is  personal  and 
private.  The  demands  of  society,  its  welfare 
and  aims,  are  treated  as  if  they  were  a tax 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


imposed  upon  each  and  every  one  by  some- 
thing foreign  to  the  natural  will  or  even  the 
happiness  of  all.  It  is  as  if  society  as  “thing- 
in-itself”  could  prosper  in  opposition  to  the 
individuals  who  collectively  constitute  it. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  both  the  individual 
and  the  social,  according  to  such  a view,  are 
empty  abstractions.  The  individual  is,  in 
fact,  a social  entity.  Strip  him  of  his  social 
interests,  endowments,  and  habits,  and  the 
very  feeling  of  self,  or  “social  me”  as  William 
James  called  it,  vanishes  and  nothing  is  left 
but  a Platonic  idea  and  a reflex  arc.  The 
social  also  is  nothing  else  than  the  manner 
in  which  individuals  habitually  react  to  one 
another.  Society  in  the  abstract,  as  a prin- 
ciple opposed  to  individual  existence,  has  no 
more  reality  than  that  of  the  grin  which  Alice 
in  Wonderland  sees  after  the  famous  Cheshire 
cat  has  vanished.  It  is  the  mere  logical  con- 
cept of  others  in  general,  left  leering  at  us 
after  all  the  concrete  others  have  been  thought 
away. 

Much  social  thinking  is  of  this  cat-grin  sort. 
Having  abstracted  from  the  thought  of  self 
everything  that  is  social,  and  from  the  idea 
of  the  social  all  that  has  to  do  with  concrete 
persons,  the  task  remains  to  get  pure  grin  and 
pure  cat  together  again  in  such  a way  that 
neither  shall  lose  its  identity  in  the  other.  It 
is,  of  course,  impossible  to  reconcile  these 


THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  OF  TO-DAY 


mutually  exclusive  abstractions  either  in 
theory  or  in  practice.  It  is  often  difficult 
enough,  even  with  the  aid  of  empirical  think- 
ing, to  adjust  our  relations  with  the  other 
people  about  us.  But  on  the  Cheshire-cat 
hypothesis,  the  social  problem  can  never  be 
solved,  because  it  is  not  a real  problem 
at  all. 

Since  the  individual  is  therefore  a social  r 
being  as  such,  and  the  social  is  just  a way  of 
acting  together,  the  social  problem  does  not 
grow  out  of  a conflict  between  the  self  and 
an  impersonal  social  principle.  The  conflicts 
are,  in  fact,  clashes  among  certain  individuals 
and  groups  of  them,  or  else — and  this  is  a 
subject  to  which  social  psychology  has  paid 
insulB&cient  attention — the  social  struggle  is 
in  certain  of  its  phases  a conflict  within  the 
personal  psyche  itself.  Suppose  that  the  ap- 
parently impersonal  element  in  social  behavior 
is  not  impersonal  in  fact,  but  is,  for  the  most 
part,  the  result  of  an  impersonal  manner  of 
thinking  about  ourselves.  Every  psychic  fact 
must  really  be  an  act  of  somebody.  There  are 
no  ideas  without  thinkers  to  think  them,  no 
impersonal  thoughts  or  disembodied  impulses, 
no  “independent”  truths,  no  transcendental 
principles  existing  in  themselves  and  outside 
of  human  heads.  Life  is  everywhere  reaction; 
it  is  nowhere  a mere  product  or  a passive 
registering  of  impersonal  forces.  It  is  the 

3 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


organism’s  behavior  in  the  presence  of  what 
we  call  environment. 

Individual  opinions  cannot  be  tossed  into  a 
common  hat,  like  small  coins.  Though  we 
may  each  learn  from  the  others,  there  is  no 
magic  by  which  our  several  thoughts  can  sum 
themselves  up  into  a common  fund  of  public 
opinion  or  super-personal  whole  which  thinks 
itself,  there  being  no  collective  head  to  think 
it.  No  matter  how  many  people  think  and 
behave  as  I do,  each  of  us  knows  only  his  ovm 
thought  and  behavior.  My  thought  may  be 
about  you  and  what  I judge  you  are  thinking, 
but  it  is  not  the  same  as  your  thought.  To 
each  the  social  is  nil  except  in  so  far  as  he 
experiences  it  himself,  and  to  each  it  is  some- 
thing unique  when  viewed  from  within.  The 
uniformity  and  illusion  of  identity — in  shprt, 
the  impersonal  aspect  of  social  thinking  and 
activity  appears  only  when  we  try  to  view 
social  behavior  from  without — that  is,  as 
objectively  manifest  in  the  behavior  of  others. 

What  then  is  the  secret  of  this  impersonal 
view  of  the  social.?  WTiy  do  we  think  of  our- 
selves socially  in  the  same  impersonal  or 
external  way  that  we  think  of  others?  There 
is  an  interesting  parallel  here  in  the  behavior 
of  certain  types  of  mental  pathologj".  There 
are  neurotics  who  commonly  feel  that  certain 
aspects  of  their  behavior  are  really  not  of 
their  own  authorship,  but  come  to  them  as  the 


THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  OF  TO-DAY 


result  of  influences  acting  from  without.  It 
was  such  phenomena  in  part  that  led  psy- 
chologists of  a generation  ago  to  construct  the 
theory  of  “multiple  personality.”  It  is  known 
now  that  the  psychic  material  which  in  these 
cases  appears  to  be  automatic,  and  impersonal, 
in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  consciously  willed, 
is  really  motivated  by  unconscious  mechan- 
isms. The  apparently  “impersonal”  behavior 
of  the  neurotic  is  psychologically  determined, 
though  unconsciously. 

May  there  not  be  a like  unconscious  psychic 
determination  of  much  that  is  called  social 
behavior.?  It  is  my  thesis  that  this  is  so,  and 
that  there  are  certain  types  of  social  behavior 
which  are  characterized  by  unconscious  moti- 
vation to  such  a degree  that  they  may  be  placed 
in  a definite  class  of  psychological  phenomena. 
This  group  of  phenomena  I have,  following  to 
some  extent  the  terminology  of  Le  Bon, 
called  “The  Crowd.”  I wish  there  were  a 
more  exact  word,  for  it  is  very  difficult  to  use 
the  word  crowd  in  its  psychological  sense 
without  causing  some  confusion  in  the  mind  of 
the  reader.  In  ordinary  speech  “a  crowd”  is 
any  gathering  of  people.  In  the  writings  of  ]^. 
Le  Bon,  as  we  shall  see,  the  word  has  a special 
meaning,  denoting  not  a gathering  of  people 
as  such,  but  a gathering  which  behaves  in  a 
certain  way  which  may  be  classified  and  de- 
scribed psychologically  as  “crowd  mentality.” 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CRO^\DS 


Not  every  gathering  of  people  shows  this 
crowd-mentality.  It  is  a characteristic  which 
/appears  under  certain  circumstances.  In  this 
1 discussion  the  word  “crowd”  must  be  under- 
! stood  to  mean  the  peculiar  mental  condition 
which  sometimes  occurs  when  people  think 
and  act  together,  either  immediately  where  the 
members  of  the  group  are  present  and  in  close 
contact,  or  remotely,  as  when  they  afiPect  one 
another  in  a certain  way  through  the  medium 
of  an  organization,  a party  or  sect,  the  press, 
etc. 

The  crowd  while  it  is  a social  phenomenon 
diflPers  greatly  from  the  social  as  such.  People 
may  be  social — the  family  is  an  example  of 
this — without  being  a crowd  either  in  thought 
• or  action.  Again  a crowd — a mob  is  an  ex- 
ample of  this — may  be  distinctly  antisocial, 
if  we  attach  any  ethical  meaning  to  the  term. 
f Both  the  individual  and  society  suffer,  as  we 
/ shall  see,  from  crowd-behavior.  I know  of 
\ nothing  which  to-day  so  menaces  not  only 
V the  values  of  civilization,  but  also — it  is  the 
same  thing  in  other  words,  perhaps — the 
achievement  of  personality  and  true  knowl- 
edge of  self,  as  the  growing  habit  of  behaving 
as  crowds. 

Our  society  is  becoming  a veritable  babel  of 
gibbering  crowds.  Not  only  are  mob  out- 
breaks and  riots  increasing  in  number,  but 
every  interest,  patriotic,  religious,  ethical. 


THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  OF  TO-DAY 


political,  economic,  easily  degenerates  into  a, 
confusion  of  propagandist  tongues,  into  ex- 
travagant partisanship,  and  intemperance. 
Whatever  be  the  ideal  to  which  we  would 
attain,  we  find  the  path  of  self-culture  too 
slow;  we  must  become  army  worms,  eating  our 
way  to  the  goal  by  sheer  force  of  numbers. 

The  councils  of  democracy  are  conducted  on 
about  the  psychological  level  of  commercial 
advertising  and  with  about  the  same  degree  of 
sincerity.  While  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
habit  of  crowd-making  is  peculiar  to  our 
times — other  ages,  too,  have  indulged  in  it — it 
dbes  seem  that  the  tendency  to  crowd- 
mindedness  has  greatly  increased  in  recent 
years. 

Whether  it  is  temperance,  or  justice,  or 
greater  freedom,  moral  excellence  or  national 
glory,  that  we  desire — whether  we  happen  to 
be  conservatives  or  radicals,  reformers  or 
liberals,  we  must  become  a cult,  write  our 
philosophy  of  life  in  flaming  headlines,  and 
sell  our  cause  in  the  market.  No  matter  if 
we  meanwhile  surrender  every  value  for  which 
we  stand,  we  must  strive  to  cajole  the  majority 
into  imagining  itself  on  our  side.  For  only 
with  the  majority  with  us,  whoever  we  are, 

can  we  live.  It  is  numbers,  not  values, 

that  count  — quantity  not  quality.  Every 

body  must  “moral-crusade,” “agitate,” “press-  — ^ 
agent,”  play  politics.  Everyone  is  forced  to 

7 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


speak  as  the  crowd,  think  as  the  crowd,  under- 
stand as  the  crowd.  The  tendency  is  to  V 
smother  all  that  is  unique,  rare,  delicate,  se- 
cret. If  you  are  to  get  anywhere  in  this  pro- 
gressive age  you  must  be  vulgar,  you  must  add 
to  your  vulgarity  unction.  You  must  take 
sides  upon  dilemmas  which  are  but  half  true, 
change  the  tempo  of  your  music  to  ragtime, 
eat  your  spiritual  food  with  a knife,  drape, 
yourself  in  the  flag  of  the  dominant  party. 

In  other  words,  you  must  be  “one  hundred 
per  cent”  crowd  man. 

The  effect  of  all  this  upon  the  individual  is 
that  he  is  permitted  neither  to  know  nor  to 
^ belong  to  himself.  He  becomes  a mere  banner 
toter.  He  must  hold  himself  ever  in  readiness 
to  wiggle-waggle  in  the  perpetual  Simon-says- 
thumbs-up  game  which  his  crowd  is  playing. 
He  spends  his  days  playing  a part  which 
others  have  written  for  him;  loses  much  of 
his  genuineness  and  courage,  and  pampers 
himself  with  imitation  virtues  and  second- 
hand truths. 

Upon  the  social  peace  the  effect  is  equally 
bad.  Unnecessary  and  meaningless  strife  is 
engendered.  An  idolatry  of  phrases  is  en- 
throned. A silly  game  of  bullying  and  de- 
ception is  carried  on  among  contending  crowds, 
national,  religious,  moral,  social.  The  great 
truths  of  patriotism,  morality,  and  religion 

become  hardly  more  than  caricatures — mere 

8 


THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  OF  TO-DAY 


instruments  of  crowds  for  putting  their  rivals 
on  the  defensive,  and  securing  obeisance  from 
the  members  of  the  crowd  itself,  easily  repudi- 
ated in  the  hour  of  the  crowd’s  victory.  The 
social  harmony  is  menaced  by  numerous 
cliques  and  parties,  ranging  in  size  all  the  way 
from  the  nation-crowd  down  to  the  smallest 
sect,  each  setting  out  like  a band  of  buc- 
caneers "bent  uponnothing  but  its  own  dom.- 
iiiance,  and  seeking  to  justify  its  piratical 
conduct  by  time-worn  platitudes. 

That  which  is  meant  by  the  cry  of  the 
Russian  Revolution,  “All  power  to  the  so- 
viets,” is  peculiar  neither  to  Russia  nor  to  the 
working  class.  Such  in  spirit  is  the  cry  of 
every  crowd,  for  every  crowd  is,  psychologi- 
cally considered,  a soviet.  The  industrial  and 
political  danger  of  the  soviet  would  amount  to 
little  or  nothing,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that 
the  modern  world  is  already  spiritually  sovi- 
etized.  The  threatened  soviet  republic  is 
hardly  more  than  the  practical  result  of  a 
hundred  years  of  crowd-thinking  on  almost 
every  subject.  Whether  capitalist  or  prole- 
tarian, reformer  or  liberal,  we  have  all  along 
been  behaving  and  thinking  in  soviet  fashion. 
In  almost  every  important  matter  in  life  we 
have  ignored  Emerson’s  warning  that  we 
must  rely  upon  ourselves,  and  have  permitted 
ourselves  to  behave  and  think  as  crowds, 
fastening  their  labels  and  dogmas  upon  our 

2 9 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


spirits  and  taking  their  shibboleths  upon  our 
tongues,  thinking  more  of  the  temporary  tri- 
umph of  our  particular  sect  or  party  than  of 
the  efiPect  of  our  behavior  upon  ourselves  and 
others. 

There  is  certainly  nothing  new  in  the  dis- 
covery that  our  social  behavior  is  not  what  it 
ought  to  be.  Mediaeval  thinkers  were  as 
much  aware  of  the  fact  as  we  are,  but  they 
dismissed  the  social  problem  with  the  simple 
declaration  of  the  “sinfulness  of  human  na- 
ture.” Nineteenth-century  utilitarians  felt 
that  the  social  problem  could  be  solved  by 
more  enlightened  and  more  reasonable  be- 
havior on  the  part  of  individuals.  Recent 
social  psychology — of  which  the  writings  of 
Prof.  William  McDougall  are  probably  the 
best  example,  has  abandoned  the  theory  that 
social  behavior  is  primarily  governed  by  reason 
or  by  considerations  of  utility.  A better  ex- 
planation of  social  phenomena  is  found  in  in- 
stinct. It  is  held  that  the  true  motives  of 
social  behavior  are  pugnacity,  the  instinct  of 
self-appreciation  or  seK-debasement,  of  sex, 
gregariousness,  and  the  like.  Each  instinct 
with  its  “affective  emotion”  becomes  organ- 
ized through  various  complex  reactions  to  the 
social  environment,  into  fairly  well  established 
“sentiments.”  These  sentiments  are  held  to 
be  the  controlling  social  forces.  As  McDougall 
says: 


10 


THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  OF  TO-DAY 


We  may  say  then  that  directly  or  indirectly  the  in- 
stincts are  the  prime  movers  of  all  human  activity;  by 
the  conative  or  impulsive  force  of  some  instinct  (or  of 
some  habit  derived  from  an  instinct),  every  train  of 
thought,  however  cold  and  passionless  it  may  seem,  is 
borne  along  toward  its  end,  and  every  bodily  activity 
is  initiated  and  sustained.  The  instinctive  impulses 
determine  the  ends  of  all  activities  and  supply  the 
driving-power  by  which  all  mental  activities  are 
sustained;  and  all  the  complex  intellectual  apparatus 
of  the  most  highly  developed  mind  is  but  a means 
toward  those  ends,  is  but  the  instrument  by  which 
these  impulses  seek  their  satisfactions.  . . . These  im- 
pulses are  the  mental  forces  that  maintain  and  shape 
all  the  life  of  individuals  and  societies,  and  in  them  we 
are  confronted  with  the  central  mystery  of  life  and 
mind  and  will. 

This  is  all  very  good  so  far  as  it  goes.  But 
I confess  that  I am  somewhat  at  loss  to  know 
just  what  it  explains  so  far  as  crowd-behavior 
is  concerned  * Do  these  instincts  and  senti- 
ments operate  the  same  under  all  social  condi- 
tions? Are  some  of  them  suppressed  by  so- 
ciety and  forced  to  seek  their  satisfaction  in 
roundabout  ways?  If  so,  how?  Moreover,  I 
fail  to  find  in  present-day  social  psychology, 
any  more  than  in  the  writings  of  Herbert 
Spencer,  Sumner,  Ward,  and  others,  any  clear 
distinction  between  the  characteristic  behavior 
of  crowds  and  other  forms  of  social  activity. 
Only  the  school  of  Le  Bon  has  shown  any 
definite  appreciation  of  these  facts.  It  is  to 

Le  Bon,  therefore,  in  spite  of  the  many  and 

11 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


just  criticisms  of  his  work,  that  we  must  turn 
for  a discussion  of  the  crowd  as  a problem 
apart  from  social  psychology  in  general.  Le 
Bon  saw  that  the  mind  of  the  crowd  demanded 
special  psychological  study,  but  many  of  the 
psychological  principles  which  he  used  in 
solving  the  problem  were  inadequate  to  the 
task.  Certain  of  his  conclusions  were,  there- 
fore, erroneous.  Since  the  close  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  however,  psychology  has 
gained  much  insight  into  the  secret  springs 
of  human  activity.  Possibly  the  most  sig- 
nificant achievement  in  the  history  of  this  sci- 
ence is  Freud’s  work  in  analytical  psychology. 

So  much  light  has  been  thrown  upon  the  un- 
conscious by  Freud  and  other  analytical  psy- 
chologists, that  psychology  in  all  its  branches 
is  beginning  to  take  some  of  Freud’s  discover- 
ies into  account.  Strictly  speaking,  psycho- 
analysis is  a therapeutic  method.  It  has, 
however,  greatly  enriched  our  knowledge  of 
mental  pathology,  and  thus  much  of  its  data 
has  become  indispensable  to  general  psychology 
and  to  social  psychology  in  particular. 

In  his  book  the  Inter'pretation  of  Dreams, 
Freud  has  shown  that  there  exist  in  the  wish- 
fulfilling  mechanisms  of  dream  formation 
certain  definite  laws.  These  laws  undoubtedly 
underlie  and  determine  also  many  of  our 
crowd-ideas,  creeds,  conventions,  and  social 

ideals.  In  his  book.  Totem  and  Taboo,  Freud 

12 


THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  OF  TO-DAY 


has  himself  led  the  way  to  the  application  of 
the  analytical  psychology  to  the  customs  and 
ideas  of  primitive  groups.  I am  sure  that  we 
shall  find,  as  we  proceed,  that  with  the  ana- 
lytical method  we  shall  gain  an  entirely  new 
insight  into  the  causes  and  meaning  of  the 
behavior  of  crowds. 


n 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 

IN  his  well-known  work  on  the  psychology’ 
of  the  crowd  Le  Bon  noted  the  fact  that 
the  unconscious  plays  a large  part  in  determin- 
ing the  behavior  of  crowds.  But  he  is  not 
clear  in  his  use  of  the  term  “unconscious.” 
In  fact,  as  Graham  Wallas  justly  points  out, 
his  terminology  is  very  loose  indeed.  Le  Bon 
seems  to  have  made  little  or  no  attempt  to 
discover  in  detail  the  processes  of  this  uncon- 
scious. In  company  with  most  psychologists 
of  his  time,  he  based  his  explanation  upon  the 
theory  of  “suggestion  and  imitation.”  He 
saw  in  the  unconscious  merely  a sort  of 
mystical  “common  humanity,”  from  which  he 
derived  his — also  mystical — idea  of  a common 
crowd-mind  which  each  * individual  in  the 
crowd  in  some  unexplained  manner  shared. 
He  says: 

The  most  striking  peculiarity  presented  by  a psycho- 
logical crowd  is  the  following:  ^lioever  be  the  individ- 
uals that  compose  it,  however  like  or  unlike  be  then- 
mode  of  life,  their  occupations,  their  character  or  their 

14 


HOYv  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


intelligence,  the  fact  that  they  have  been  transformed 
into  a crowd  puts  them  in  possession  of  a sort  of  col- 
lective mind  which  makes  them  feel,  think,  and  act  in 
a manner  quite  different  from  that  in  which  each  in- 
dividual of  them  would  feel,  think,  and  act  were  he  in 
a state  of  isolation.  . . . 

It  is  easy  to  prove  how  much  the  individual  forming 
part  of  a crowd  differs  from  the  isolated  individual,  but 
it  is  less  easy  to  discover  the  causes  of  this  difference. 

To  obtain,  at  any  rate,  a glimpse  of  them  it  is  neces- 
sary in  the  first  place  to  call  to  mind  the  truth  estab- 
lished by  modern  psychology,  that  unconscious  phe- 
nomena play  an  altogether  preponderating  part,  not 
only  in  organic  life,  but  also  in  the  operations  of  intel- 
ligence. . . . Our  conscious  acts  are  the  outcome  of  an 
unconscious  substratum  created  in  the  mind  in  the 
main  by  heredity.  This  substratum  consists  of  in- 
numerable characteristics  handed  down  from  generation 
to  generation  which  constitute  the  genius  of  the  race.  . . . 

It  is  more  especially  with  respect  to  those  uncon- 
scious elements  which  constitute  the  genius  of  a race 
that  all  the  individuals  belonging  to  it  resemble  each 
other. ...  It  is  precisely  these  general  qualities  of  charac- 
ter, governed  by  forces  of  which  we  are  unconscious  and 
possessed  by  the  majority  of  normal  individuals  of  a 
race  in  much  the  same  degree — it  is  precisely  these 
qualities,  I say,  that  in  crowds  become  common  prop- 
erty. In  the  collective  mind  the  intellectual  aptitudes 
of  the  individuals,  and  in  consequence  their  individ- 
uality, are  weakened.  The  heterogeneous  is  swamped  in 
the  homogeneous  and  the  unconscious  qualities  obtain 
the  upper  hand. 

It  may  safely  be  said,  I think,  that  this 
assumed  impersonal  collective  mind  of  the 
crowd  has  no  existence  in  a sound  psychology. 

15 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


People’s  minds  show,  of  course,  innumerable 
mutual  influences,  but  they  do  not  fuse  and 
run  together.  They  are  in  many  respects 
very  similar,  but  similarity  is  noT  identity, 
even  wheh~people  are  crowded  toother.  ^Our 
author  has  doubtless  borrowed  here  rather  un- 
critically from  Herbert  Spencer’s  organic  con- 
ception of  society — his  later  statement,  not 
quoted  here,  that  the  alleged  merging  of  the 
heterogeneous  in  the  homogeneous  would 
logically  imply  a regression  to  a lower  stage  in 
evolution,  is  another  bit  of  Spencerian  jargon 
commonly  accepted  in  Le  Bon’s  day. 

WTien,  however,  Graham  Wallas,  in  The 
Greed  Society,  states  that  Le  Bon  is  not  “him- 
self clear  whether  he  means  that  crowds  have 
no  collective  consciousness,  or  that  every  in- 
dividual in  a crowd  is  completely  uncon- 
scious,” it  seems  to  me  that  Wallas  is  a little 
unfair.  Neither  Le  Bon  nor  the  relation  of 
the  unconscious  to  the  crowd-mind  may  be 
dismissed  in  Wallas’s  apparently  easy  manner. 
Le  Bon  has  established  two  points  which  I 
think  cannot  be  successfully  denied:  first, 
that  the  crowd  is  essentially  a psychological 
phenomenon,  people  behaving  differently  in 
a crowd  from  the  way  they  behave  when 
isolated;  and  second,  that  the  unconscious 
has  something  to  do  with  crowd-thinking  and 
acting. 

Wallas  says  of  Le  Bon: 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


Tarde  and  Le  Bon  were  Frenchmen  brought  up  on 
vivid  descriptions  of  the  Revolution  and  themselves 
apprehensive  of  the  spread  of  socialism.  Political 
movements  which  were  in  large  part  carried  out  by 
men  conscious  and  thoughtful,  though  necessarily  ill 
informed,  seemed  therefore  to  them  as  they  watched 
them  from  the  outside  to  be  due  to  the  blind  and  un- 
conscious impulses  of  masses  “incapable  both  of  re- 
flection and  of  reasoning.” 

There  is  some  truth  in  this  criticism.  In 
spite  of  the  attempt  of  the  famous  author  of 
crowd-psychology  to  give  us  a really  scien- 
tific explanation  of  crowd-phenomena,  his 
obviously  conservative  bias  robs  his  work  of 
much  of  its  power  to  convince.  We  find  here, 
just  as  in  the  case  of  Gobineau,  Nietzsche, 
Faguet,  Conway,  and  other  supporters  of  the 
aristocratic  idea,  an  a priori  principle  of  dis- 
trust of  the  common  people  as  such.  In 
many  passages  Le  Bon  does  not  sufficiently 
distinguish  between  the  crowd  and  the  masses. 
Class  and  mass  are  opposed  to  each  other  as 
though,  due  to  their  superior  reasoning  pow- 
ers, the  classes  were  somehow  free  from  the 
danger  of  behaving  as  crowd.  This  is  of  v 
course  not  true.  Any  class  may  behave  and  V 
think  as  a crowd — in  fact  it  usually  does  so 
in  so  far  as  its  class  interests  are  concerned. 
Anyone  who  makes  a study  of  the  public 
mind  in  America  to-day  will  find  that  the 
phenomena  of  the  crowd-mind  are  not  at  all 

17 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


confined  to  movements  within  the  working 
class  or  so-called  common  people. 

It  has  long  been  the  habit  of  conservative 
writers  to  identify  the  crowd  with  the  pro- 
letariat and  then  to  feel  that  the  psychology 
of  the  situation  could  be  summed  up  in  the 
statement  that  the  crowd  was  simply  the 
creature  of  passion  and  blind  emotion.  The 
psychology  which  lies  back  of  such  a view — 
if  it  is  psycholog;}^  rather  than  class  prejudice 
— is  the  old  intellectualism  w^hich  sought  to 
isolate  the  intellect  from  the  emotional  nature 
and  make  the  true  mental  life  primarilj’^  a 
knowledge  affair.  The  crowd,  therefore,  since 
it  was  regarded  as  an  affair  of  the  emotions, 
was  held  to  be  one  among  many  instances  of 
the  natural  mental  inferiority  of  the  common 
people,  and  a proof  of  their  general  unfitness 
for  self-government. 

I do  not  believe  that  this  emotional  theory"  is 
the  true  explanation  of  crowd-behavior.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  people  in  a crowd  be- 
come strangely  excited.  But  it  is  not  only 
in  crowds  that  people  show  emotion.  Feel- 
ing, instinct,  impulse,  are  the  dynamic  of  all 
mental  life.  The  crowd  doubtless  inhibits 
as  many  emotions  as  it  releases.  Fear  is 
conspicuously  absent  in  battle,  pity  in  a 
lynching  mob.  Crowds  are  notoriously  anaes- 
thetic toward  the  finer  values  of  art,  music, 
and  poetry.  It  may  even  be  argued  that  the 

IS 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


feelings  of  the  crowd  are  dulled,  since  it  is 
only  the  exaggerated,  the  obvious,  the  cheaply 
sentimental,  which  easily  moves  it. 

There  was  a time  when  insanity  was  also 
regarded  as  excessive  emotion.  The  insane 
man  was  one  who  raved,  he  was  mad.  The 
word  “crazy”  still  suggests  the  condition  of 
being  “out  of  one’s  mind” — that  is,  driven  by 
irrational  emotion.  Psychiatry  would  accept 
no  such  explanation  to-day.  Types  of  in- 
sanity are  distinguished,  not  with  respect  to 
the  mere  amount  of  emotional  excitement  they 
display,  but  in  accordance  with  the  patient’s 
whole  psychic  functioning.  The  analyst  looks 
for  some  mechanism  of  controlling  ideas  and 
their  relation  to  impulses  which  are  operating 
in  the  unconscious.  So  with  our  understand- 
ing of  the  crowd-mind.  Le  Bon  is  correct  in 
maintaining  that  the  crowd  is  not  a mere 
aggregation  of  people.  It  is  a state  of  mind. 
A peculiar  psychic  change  must  happen  to  a 
group  of  people  before  they  become  a crowd. 
And  as  this  change  is  not  merely  a release  of 
emotion,  neither  is  it  the  creation  of  a col- 
lective mind  by  means  of  imitation  and  sug- 
gestion. My  thesis  is  that  the  crowd-mind  is 
a phenomenon  which  should  best  he  classed  with 
dreams,  delusions,  and  the  various  forms  of 
automatic  behavior.  The  controlling  ideas  of 
the  crowd  are  the  result  neither  of  reflection 
nor  of  “suggestion,”  but  are  akin  to  what,  as 

19 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


we  shall  see  later,  the  psychoanalysts  term 
“complexes.”  The  crowd-self — if  I may  speak 
of  it  in  this  way — is  analogous  in  many  re- 
spects to  “compulsion  neurosis,”  “somnam- 
bulism,” or  “paranoiac  episode.”  Crowd  ideas 
are  “fixations”;  they  are  always  symbolic; 
they  are  always  related  to  something  re- 
pressed in  the  unconscious.  They  are  what 
Doctor  Adler  would  call  “fictitious  guiding 
lines.” 

There  is  a sense  in  which  all  our  thinkmg 
consists  of  symbol  and  fiction.  The  laws, 
measurements,  and  formulas  of  science  are  all 
as  it  were  “shorthand  devices” — instruments 
for  relating  ourselves  to  reality,  rather  than 
copies  of  the  real.  The  “truth”  of  these 
working  ideas  is  demonstrated  in  the  satis- 
factoriness of  the  results  to  which  they  lead 
us.  If  by  means  of  them  w^e  arrive  at  desired 
and  desirable  adaptations  to  and  within  our 
environment,  we  say  they  are  verified.  If, 
however,  no  such  verification  is  reached,  or 
the  result  reached  flatly  contradicts  our 
hypothesis,  the  sane  thinker  holds  his  conclu- 
sions in  abeyance,  revises  his  theories,  or 
candidly  gives  them  up  and  clings  to  the  real 
as  empirically  known. 

Suppose  now  that  a certain  hypothesis,  or 
J “fiction,”  instead  of  being  an  instrument  for 
dealing  with  external  reality,  is  unconsciously 

designed  as  a refuge  from  the  real.  Suppose 

20 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


it  is  a symbolic  compromise  among  conflicting 
desires  in  the  individual’s  unconscious  of 
which  he  cannot  rid  himself.  Suppose  it  is  a 
disguised  expression  of  motives  which  the 
individual  as  a civilized  being  cannot  admit 
to  his  own  consciousness.  Suppose  it  is  a 
fiction  necessary  to  keep  up  one’s  ego  con- 
sciousness or  self-appreciative  feeling  without 
which  either  he  or  his  world  would  instantly 
become  valueless.  In  these  latter  cases  the 
fiction  is  not  and  cannot  be,  without  outside 
help,  modified  by  the  reality  of  experience. 
The  complex  of  ideas  becomes  a closed  system, 
a world  in  and  of  itself.  Conflicting  facts  of 
experience  are  discounted  and  denied  by  all 
the  cunning  of  an  insatiable,  unconscious  will. 
The  fiction  then  gets  itself  substituted  for 
the  true  facts  of  experience;  the  individual 
has  “lost  the  function  of  the  real.”  He  no 
longer  admits  its  disturbing  elements  as  eor- 
rectives.  He  has  become  mentally  unadjusted 
— pathological. 

Most  healthy  people  doubtless  would  on 
analysis  reveal  themselves  as  nourishing  fic- 
tions of  this  sort,  more  or  less  innocent  in  their 
effects.  It  is  possible  that  it  is  by  means  of 
such  things  that  the  values  of  living  are  main- 
tained for  us  all.  But  with  the  healthy  these 
fictions  either  hover  about  the  periphery  of 
our  known  world  as  shadowy  and  elusive  in- 
habitants of  the  inaccessible,  or  else  they  are 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


socially  acceptable  as  religious  convention, 
race  pride,  ethical  values,  personal  ambition, 
class  honor,  etc.  The  fact  that  so  much  of 
the  ground  of  our  valuations,  at  least  so  far  as 
these  affect  our  self-appreciation,  is  explicable 
by  psychologists  as  “pathological”  in  origin 
need  not  startle  us.  William  James  in  his 
Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  you  will  re- 
member, took  the  ground  that  in  judging  of 
matters  of  this  kind,  it  is  not  so  much  by 
their  origins — even  admitting  the  pathological 
as  a cause — but  by  their  fruits  that  we  shall 
know  them.  There  are  “fictions”  which  are 
neither  innocent  nor  socially  acceptable  in 
their  effects  on  life  and  character.  Many  of 
our  crowd-phenomena  belong,  like  paranoia, 
to  this  last  class. 

As  I shall  try  to  show  later,  the  common 
confusion  of  the  crowd  with  “society”  is  an 
error.  The  crowd  is  a social  phenomenon  only 
in  the  sense  that  it  affects  a number  of  per- 
sons at  the  same  time.  As  I have  indicated, 
people  may  be  highly  social  without  becoming 
a crowd.  They  may  meet,  mingle,  associate 
in  all  sorts  of  ways,  and  organize  and  co- 
operate for  the  sake  of  common  ends — in 
fact,  the  greater  part  of  our  social  life  might 
normally  have  nothing  in  common  with  crowd- 
behavior.  Crowd -behavior  is  pseudo -social 
— if  social  organizations  be  regarded  as  a 
means  to  the  achievement  of  realizable  goods. 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


The  phenomena  which  we  call  the  crowd- 
mind,  instead  of  being  the  outgrowth  of  the 
directly  social,  are  social  only  in  the  sense 
that  all  mental  life  has  social  significance; 
they  are  rather  the  result  of  forces  hidden  in 
the  personal  and  unconscious  psyche  of  the 
members  of  the  crowd,  forces  which  are 
merely  released  by  social  gatherings  of  a 
certain  sort. 

Let  us  notice  what  happens  in  a public 
meeting  as  it  develops  into  a crowd,  and  see  if 
we  can  trace  some  of  the  steps  of  the  process. 
Picture  a large  meeting-hall,  fairly  well  filled 
with  people.  Notice  first  of  all  what  sort  of 
interest  it  is  which  as  a rule  will  most  easily 
bring  an  assemblage  of  people  together.  It 
need  not  necessarily  be  a matter  of  great  im- 
portance, but  it  must  be  something  which 
catches  and  challenges  attention  without  great 
effort.  It  is  most  commonly,  therefore,  an 
issue  of  some  sort.  I have  seen  efforts  made 
in  New  York  to  hold  mass  meetings  to  discuss 
affairs  of  the  very  greatest  importance,  and  I 
have  noted  the  fact  that  such  efforts  usually 
fail  to  get  out  more  than  a handful  of  specially 
interested  persons,  no  matter  how  well  adver- 
tised, if  the  subject  to  be  considered  happens 
not  to  be  of  a controversial  nature.  I call 
especial  attention  to  this  fact  because  later 
we  shall  see  that  it  is  this  element  of  conflict, 
directly  or  indirectly,  which  plays  an  over- 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


whelming  part  in  the  psychology  of  every 
crowd. 

It  is  the  element  of  contest  which  makes 
baseball  so  popular.  A debate  will  draw  a 
larger  crowd  than  a lecture.  One  of  the 
secrets  of  the  large  attendance  of  the  forum  is 
the  fact  that  discussion — “talking  back” — is 
permitted  and  encouraged.  The  evangelist 
Sunday  undoubtedly  owes  the  great  attend- 
ance at  his  meetings  in  no  small  degree  to  the 
fact  that  he  is  regularly  expected  to  abuse  some 
one. 

If  the  matter  to  be  considered  is  one  about 
which  there  is  keen  partisan  feeling  and  popu- 
lar resentment — if  it  lends  itself  to  the  spec- 
tacular personal  achievement  of  one  w^hose 
name  is  known,  especially  in  the  face  of  oppo- 
sition or  difficulties — or  if  the  occasion  per- 
mits of  resolutions  of  protest,  of  the  airing  of 
wrongs,  of  denouncing  abuse  of  some  kind,  or 
of  casting  statements  of  external  principles  in 
the  teeth  of  “enemies  of  humanity,”  then, 
however  trivial  the  occasion,  we  may  count 
on  it  that  our  assembly  will  be  well  attended. 
Now  let  us  watch  the  proceedings. 

The  next  thing  in  importance  is  the  speaker. 
Preferably  he  should  be  an  “old  war  horse,” 
a victor  in  many  battles,  and  this  for  a psy- 
chological reason  which  we  shall  soon  examine. 
\Mioever  he  is,  every  speaker  with  any  skill 
knows  just  when  this  state  of  mind  which  we 

24 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


call  “crowd”  begins  to  appear.  My  work  has 
provided  me  with  rather  unusual  opportunities 
for  observing  this  sort  of  thing.  As  a regular 
lecturer  and  also  as  director  of  the  forum  which 
meets  three  nights  a week  in  the  great  hall  of 
Cooper  Union,  I have  found  that  the  intel- 
lectual interest,  however  intense,  and  the 
development  of  the  crowd-spirit  are  accom- 
panied by  wholly  different  mental  processes. 
Let  me  add  in  passing  that  the  audiences  which 
gather  at  Cooper  Union  are,  on  the  whole,  the 
most  alert,  sophisticated,  and  reflective  that 
I have  ever  known.  I doubt  if  in  any  large 
popular  assembly  in  America  general  discus- 
sion is  carried  on  with  such  habitual  serious- 
ness. When  on  rare  occasions  the  spirit  of 
the  crowd  begins  to  manifest  itself — and  one 
can  always  detect  its  beginnings  before  the 
audience  is  consciously  aware  of  it — I have 
noticed  that  discussion  instantly  ceases  and 
people  begin  merely  to  repeat  their  creeds  and 
hurl  cant  phrases  at  one  another.  All  then 
is  changed,  though  subtly.  There  may  be 
laughter  as  at  first;  but  it  is  different.  Be- 
fore, it  was  humorous  and  playful,  now  there 
is  a note  of  hostility  in  it.  It  is  laughter  at 
some  one  or  something.  Even  the  applause 
is  changed.  It  is  more  frequent.  It  is  more 
vigorous,  and  instead  of  showing  mere  ap- 
proval of  some  sentiment,  it  becomes  a means 
of  showing  the  numerical  strength  of  a group 

3 25 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


of  believers  of  some  sort.  It  is  as  if  those 
who  applaud  were  unconsciously  seeking  to 
reveal  to  themselves  and  others  that  there  is 
a multitude  on  their  side. 

I have  heard  the  most  exciting  and  contro- 
versial subjects  discussed,  and  seen  the  dis- 
cussion listened  to  with  the  intensest  difference 
of  opinion,  and  all  without  the  least  crowd- 
phenomena — so  long  as  the  speaker  refrained 
Irom  indulging  in  generalities  or  time-worn 
forms  of  expression.  So  long  as  the  matter 
discussed  requires  close  and  sustained  effort 
of  attention,  and  the  method  of  treatment  is 
kept  free  from  anything  which  savors  of  ritual, 
even  the  favorite  dogmas  of  popular  belief 
may  be  discussed,  and  though  the  interest  be 
intense,  it  will  remain  critical  and  the  audience 
does  not  become  a crowd.  But  let  the  most 
trivial  bit  of^thos  be  expressed  in  rhythmical 
cadences  and  in  platitudinous  terms,  and  the 
most  intelligent  audience  will  react  as  a crowd. 
Crowd-making  oratory  is  almost  invariably 

platitudinous.  In  fact,  w’e  think  as  a crowed 

only  in  platitudes,  propaganda,  ritual,  dogma, 
and  symbol.  Crowd-ideas  are  ready-made, 
Ihey  possess  finality  and  universality.  They 
are  fixed.  They  do  not  develop.  They  are 
ends  in  themselves.  Like  the  obsessions  of 
the  insane,  there  is  a deadly  inevitability  in 
the  logic  of  them.  They  are  “compulsions.” 

During  the  time  of  my  connection  with  the 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


Cooper  Union  Forum,  we  have  not  had  a 
crowd-demonstration  in  anything  more  than 
an  incipient  form.  The  best  laboratory  for 
the  study  of  such  a phenomenon  is  the  political 
party  convention,  the  mass  meeting,  or  the 
religious  revival.  The  orators  who  commonly 
hold  forth  at  such  gatherings  know  intuitively 
the  functional  value  of  ^thos,  ridicule,  and 
platitude,  and  it  is  upon  such  knowledge  that 
they  base  the  success  of  their  careers  in 
“getting  the  crowd.”  The  noisy  “demon- 
strations”  which  it  has  of  latenSecbme  the 
custom  to  stage  as  part  of  the  rigmarole  of  a 
national  party  conventibnlFa^ Ibeen  cited 
as  crowning  examples  of  the  stupidity  and 
excess  of~crowd  en1:husia^T'“3^ut’”this  is  a 
mistake,  ^iiyohe  who  has  from  the  gallery 
witnessed  one  or  more  of  these  mock  “stam- 
pedes” will  agree  that  they  are  exhibitions  of 
endurance  rather  than  of  genuine  enthusiasm 
or  of  true  crowd -mindedness.  They  are  so  ob- 
viously manipulated  and  so  deliberately  timed 
that  they  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  true 
crowd-movements  at  all.  They  are  chiefly  in- 
teresting as  revelations  of  the  general  insin- 
cerity of  the  political  life  of  this  republic. 

True  crowd-behavior  requires  an  element  of 
spontaneity — at  least  on  the  part  of  the  crowd. 
And  we  have  abundant  examples  of  this  in 
public  meetings  of  all  sorts.  As  the  audience 
becomes  crowd,  the  speaker’s  cadence  be- 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

comes  more  marked,  his  voice  more  oracular, 
his  gestures  more  emphatic.  His  message 
becomes  a recital  of  great  abstract  “prin- 
ciples.” The  purely  obvious  is  held  up  as 
transcendental.  Interest  is  kept  upon  just 
those  aspects  of  things  which  can  be  grasped 
with  least  effort  by  all.  Emphasis  is  laid 
upon  those  thought  processes  in  which  there 
is  greatest  natural  uniformity.  The  general, 
abstract,  and  superficial  come  to  be  exalted 
at  the  expense  of  that  which  is  unique  and 
personal.  Forms  of  thought  are  made  to 
stand  as  objects  of  thinking. 

It  is  clear  that  such  meaning  as  there  is  in 
those  abstract  names,  “Justice,”  “Right,” 
“Liberty,”  “Peace,”  “Glory,”  “Destiny,” 
etc.,  or  in  such  general  phrases  as  “Broth- 
erly Love,”  “Grand  and  Glorious,”  “Public 
Weal,”  “Common  Humanity,”  and  many 
others,  must  vary  with  each  one’s  personal 
associations.  Popular  orators  deal  only  with 
the  greatest  common  denominator  of  the 
meaning  of  these  terms — that  is,  only  those 
elements  which  are  common  to  the  associa- 
tions of  all.  Now  the  common  associations 
of  words  and  phrases  of  this  general  nature 
are  very  few — hardly  more  than  the  bare 
sound  of  the  words,  plus  a vague  mental  atti- 
tude or  feeling  of  expectancy,  a mere  turning 
of  the  eyes  of  the  mind,  as  it  were,  in  a certain 

direction  into  empty  space.  When,  for  in- 

28 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 

stance,  I try  now  to  leave  out  of  the  content 
of  “justice”  all  my  personal  associations  and 
concrete  experiences,  I can  discover  no  re- 
maining content  beyond  a sort  of  grand  empti- 
ness, with  the  intonations  of  the  word  booming 
in  my  auditory  centers  like  the  ringing  of  a 
distant  bell.  As  “public  property,”  the  words 
are  only  a sort  of  worn  banknote,  symbols  of 
many  meanings  and  intentions  like  my  own, 
deposited  in  individual  minds.  Interesting 
as  these  personal  deposits  are,  and  much  as 
we  are  mutually  interested  by  them  and  moved 
to  harmonious  acting  and  speaking,  it  is 
doubtful  if  more  than  the  tiniest  fragment  of 
what  we  each  mean  by  “justice”  can  ever  be 
communicated.  The  word  is  a convenient 
instrument  in  adjusting  our  conduct  to  that 
of  others,  and  when  such  adjustment  seems  to 
meet  with  mutual  satisfaction  we  say,  “That 
is  just.”  But  the  just  thing  is  always  a con- 
crete situation.  And  the  general  term  “jus- 
tice” is  simply  a combination  of  sounds  used 
to  indicate  the  class  of  things  we  call  just. 
In  itself  it  is  but  a form  with  the  content  left 
out.  And  so  with  all  other  such  abstractions. 

Now  if  attention  can  be  directed  to  this 
imaginary  and  vague  “meaning  for  every- 
body”— ^which  is  really  the  meaning  for  no- 
body— and  so  directed  that  the  associations 
with  the  unique  in  personal  experience  are 
blocked,  these  abstractions  will  occupy  the 

29 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


whole  field  of  consciousness.  The  mind  will 
yield  to  any  connection  which  is  made  among 
them  almost  automatically.  As  conscious 
attention  is  cut  away  from  the  psyche  as  a 
whole,  the  objects  upon  which  it  is  centered 
will  appear  to  have  a reality  of  their  own. 
They  become  a closed  system,  perfectly 
logical  it  may  be  in  itself,  but  with  the  fatal 
logic  commonly  found  in  paranoia — the  fiction 
may  become  more  real  than  life  itself.  It  may 
be  substituted,  while  the  spell  is  on,  for  the 
world  of  actual  experience.  And  just  as  the 
manifest  content  of  a dream  is,  according  to 
Freud,  the  condensed  and  distorted  symbol  of 
latent  dream-thoughts  and  desires  in  the  un- 
conscious, so,  in  the  case  we  are  discussing, 
the  unconscious  invests  these  abstract  terms 
with  its  own  peculiar  meanings.  They  gain 
a tremendous,  though  undefined,  importance 
and  an  irresistible  compelling  power. 

Something  like  the  process  I have  described 
occurs  when  the  crowd  appears.  People  are 
translated  to  a different  world — that  is,  a 
different  sense  of  the  real.  The  speaker  is 
transfigured  to  their  vision.  His  words  take 
on  a mysterious  importance;  something  tre- 
mendous, eternal,  superhuman  is  at  stake. 
Commonplace  jokes  become  irresistibly  amus- 
ing. Ordinary  truths  are  wildly  applauded. 
Dilemmas  stand  clear  with  all  middle  ground 
brushed  away.  No  statement  now  needs 

30 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


qualification.  All  thought  of  compromise  is 
abhorrent.  Nothing  now  must  intervene  to 
rob  these  moments  of  their  splendid  intensity. 

As  James  once  said  of  drunkenness,  “Eveg^- 
thing  is  just  utterly  utter.”  They  who  are 
not  for  us  are  against  u^ 

The  crowd-mind  consists,  therefore,  first  of 
all,  of  a disturbance  of  the  function  of  the  real.  U 
The  crowd  is  the  creature  of  Belief..  Every 
crowd  has  its  peculiar  “illusions,”  ideals, 
dreams.  It  maintains  its  existence  as  a 
crowd  just  so  long  as  these  crowd-ideas  con- 
tinue to  be  held  by  practically  all  the  members 
of  the  group — so  long,  in  fact,  as  such  ideas 
continue  to  hold  attention  and  assent  to  the 
exclusion  of  ideas  and  facts  which  contradict 
them. 

I am  aware  of  the  fact  that  we  could  easily 
be  led  aside  at  this  point  into  endless  meta- 
physical problems.  It  is  not  our  purpose  to 
enter  upon  a discussion  of  the  question,  what 
is  the  real  world.?  The  problem  of  the  real  is 
by  no  means  so  simple  as  it  appears  “to 
common  sense.”  Common  sense  has,  how- 
ever, in  practical  affairs,  its  own  criteria,  and 
beyond  these  it  it  not  necessary  for  us  now  to 
stray.  The  “illusions”  of  the  crowd  are 
almost  never  illusions  in  the  psychological 
sense.  They  are  not  false  perceptions  of  the 
objects  of  sense.  They  are  rather  akin  to  the 
delusions  and  fixed  ideas  commonly  found  in 

31 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


paranoia.  The  man  in  the  street  does  not 
ordinarily  require  the  technique  either  of 
metaphysics  or  of  psychiatry  in  order  to 
characterize  certain  individuals  as  “crazy.” 
The  “crazy”  man  is  simply  unadjustable  in 
his  speech  and  conduct.  His  ideas  may  be 
real  to  him,  just  as  the  color-blind  man’s 
sensations  of  color  may  be  as  real  as  those  of 
normal  people,  but  they  won’t  work,  and  that 
is  sufficient. 

It  is  not  so  easy  to  apply  this  criterion  of 
the  real  to  our  crowd-ideas.  Social  realities 
are  not  so  well  ordered  as  the  behavior  of  the 
forces  of  nature.  Things  moral,  religious,  and 
political  are  constantly  in  the  making.  The 
creative  role  which  we  all  play  here  is  greater 
than  elsewhere  in  our  making  of  reality. 
WTien  most  of  our  neighbors  are  motivated 
by  certain  ideas,  those  ideas  become  part  of 
the  social  environment  to  which  we  must 
adjust  ourselves.  In  this  sense  they  are 
“real,”  however  “crazy.”  Everj"  struggle- 
group  and  faction  in  society  is  constantly 
striving  to  establish  its  ideas  as  controlling 
forces  in  the  social  reality.  The  conflicts 
among  ideals  are  therefore  in  a sense  conflicts 
within  the  real.  Ideas  and  beliefs  which  seek 
their  verification  in  the  character  of  the  results 
to  which  they  lead,  may  point  to  very  great 
changes  in  experience,  and  so  long  as  the  be- 
liever takes  into  account  the  various  elements 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


with  which  he  has  to  deal,  he  has  not  lost  his 
hold  upon  reality.  But  when  one’s  beliefs 
or  principles  become  ends  in  themselves, 
when  by  themselves  they  seem  to  constitute 
an  order  of  being  which  is  more  interesting 
than  fact,  when  the  believer  saves  his  faith 
only  by  denying  or  ignoring  the  things  which 
contradict  him,  when  he  strives  not  to  verify 
his  ideas  but  to  “vindicate”  them,  the  ideas 
so  held  are  pathological.  The  obsessions  of 
the  paranoiac  are  of  this  sort.  We  shall  see 
later  that  these  ideas  have  a meaning,  though 
the  conscious  attention  of  the  patient  is 
systematically  diverted  from  that  meaning. 
Crowd-ideas  are  similar.  The  reason  why 
their  pathology  is  not  more  evident  is  the 
fact  that  they  are  simultaneously  entertained 
by  so  great  a number  of  people. 

JThere  are  many  ideas  in  which  our  faith  is 
sustained  chiefly  by  the  knowledge  that  every- 
one about  us  also  believes  them.  Belief  on 
such  ground  has  commonly  been  said  to  be 
due  to  imitation  or  suggestion.  These  do 
play  a large  part  in  determining  all  our  think- 
ing, but  I can  see  no  reason  why  they  should 
be  more  operative  in  causing  the  crowd-mind 
than  in  other  social  situations.  In  fact,  the 
distinctive  phenomena  which  I have  called 
crowd-ideas  clearly  show  that  other  causes 
are  at  work. 

Among  civilized  people,  social  relationships 

33 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


make  severe  demands  upon  the  individual. 
Primitive  impulses,  unchecked  eroticism,  ten- 
dencies to  perversions,  and  antisocial  de- 
mands of  the  ego  which  are  in  us  all,  are  con- 
stantly inhibited,  resisted,  controlled  and 
diverted  to  socially  acceptable  ends.  The 
savage  in  us  is  “repressed,”  his  demands  are 
so  habitually  denied  that  we  learn  to  keep  him 
down,  for  the  most  part,  without  conscious 
effort.  We  simply  cease  to  pay  attention  to 
his  gnawing  desires.  We  become  decently 
respectable  members  of  society  largely  at  the 
expense  of  our  aboriginal  nature.  But  the 
primitive  in  us  does  not  really  die.  It  asserts 
itself  harmlessly  in  dreams.  Psychomialysis 
ha^evealed~the  fact  that  every^ream  is  the 
realization  of  some  desire,  usually  hidden 
from  our  conscious  thought  by  our  habitual 
repression.  For  this  reason  the  dream  work 
consists  of  symbols.  The  great  achievement 
of  Freud  is  the  technique  which  enables  the 
analyst  to  interpret  this  symbolism  so  that 
his  own  unconscious  thought  and  desire  are 
made  known  to  the  subject.  The  dream  is 
harmless  and  is  normally  utilized  by  the  un- 
conscious ego  because  during  sleep  we  can- 
not move.  If  one  actually  did  the  things  he 
dreamed,  a thing  which  happens  in  various 
somnambulisms,  the  dream  would  become 
anything  but  harmless.  Every  psychosis  is 
really  a dramatized  dream  of  this  sort. 

34 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


Now  as  it  is  the  social  which  demands  the 
repression  of  our  primitive  impulses,  it  is  to 
be  expected  that  the  unconscious  would  on 
certain  occasions  make  use  of  this  same  social 
in  order  to  realize  its  primitive  desires. 
There  are  certain  mental  abnormalities,  such 
as  dementia  prsecox,  in  which  the  individual 
behaves  in  a wholly  antisocial  manner,  simply 
withdrawing  into  himself.  In  the  crowd  the  \ 
primitim  ego  achieves  its  wish  hy  actually 
g'dihing  the  assent  and  support  of  a section  of 
society.  The  immediate  social  environment  is 
all  pulled  in  the  same  direction  as  the  uncon- 
scious desire.  A similar  unconscious  impulse 
motivates  each  member  of  the  crowd.  It  is 
as  if  all  at  once  an  unspoken  agreement  were 
entered  into  whereby  each  member  might  let 
himself  go,  on  condition  that  he  approved  the 
same  thing  in  all  the  rest.  Of  course  such  a 
thing  cannot  happen  consciously.  Our  nor- 
mal social  consciousness  would  cause  us  each 
to  resist,  let  us  say,  an  exhibition  of  cruelty — 
in  our  neighbors,  and  also  in  ourselves.  The 
impulse  must  therefore  be  disguised. 

The  term  “unconscious”  in  the  psychology 
of  the  crowd  does  not,  of  course,  imply  that  the 
people  in  the  crowd  are  not  aware  of  the  fact 
that  they  are  lynching  a negro  or  demanding 
the  humiliation  or  extermination  of  certain 
of  their  fellows.  Everybody  is  perfectly  aware 
of  what  is  being  said  and  done;  only  the  moral 

35 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


significance  of  the  thing  is  changed.  The 
deed  or  sentiment,  instead  of  being  disap- 
proved, appears  to  be  demanded,  by  moral 
principle,  by  the  social  welfare,  by  the  glory 
of  the  state,  etc.  TVTiat  is  unconscious  is  the 
^ fact  that  the  social  is  actually  being  twisted 
around  into  giving^  ^proval  of  the  things 
which  it  normally  forbids.  Every  crowd  con- 
siders  that  it  is  vindicating  some  sacred  prin- 
ciple. The  more  bloody  and  destructive  the 
acts  to  which  it  is  impelled,  the  more  moral  are 
its  professions.  Under  the  spell  of  the  crowd’s 
logic  certain  abstract  principles  lead  inevitably 
to  the  characteristic  forms  of  crowd-behavior. 
They  seem  to  glorify  such  acts,  to  make  heroes 
and  martyrs  of  those  who  lead  in  their 
performance. 

The  attention  of  everyone  is  first  centered 
on  the  abstract  and  universal,  as  I have  indi- 
cated. The  repressed  wish  then  unconsciously 
gives  to  the  formulas  which  the  crowd  pro- 
fesses a meaning  different  from  that  which 
appears,  yet  unconsciously  associated  with  it. 
This  unconscious  meaning  is  of  course  an 
impulse  to  act.  But  the  motive  professed  is 
not  the  real  motive. 

Normally  our  acts  and  ideas  are  corrected 
by  our  social  environment.  But  in  a crowd 
our  test  of  the  real  fails  us,  because,  since  the 
attention  of  all  near  us  is  directed  in  the  same 
way  as  our  own,  the  social  environment  for  the 

36 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 
time  fails  to  check  us.  As  William  James  said : 

The  sense  that  anything  we  think  is  unreal  can  only 
come  when  that  thing  is  contradicted  by  some  other 
thing  of  which  we  think.  Any  object  which  remains 
uncontradicted  is  if  so  facto  believed  and  posited  as 
“absolute  reality.” 

Our  immediate  social  environment  is  all 
slipping  along  with  us.  It  no  longer  con- 
tradicts the  thing  we  want  to  believe,  and,  un- 
consciously, want  to  do.  As  the  uncontra- 
dicted idea  is,  for  the  time,  reality,  so  is  it 
a motor  impulse.  The  only  normal  reason 
why  we  do  not  act  immediately  upon  any  one 
of  our  ideas  is  that  action  is  inhibited  by  ideas 
of  a contradictory  nature.  As  crowd,  there- 
fore, we  find  ourselves  moving  in  a fictitious 
system  of  ideas  uncritically  accepted  as  real — 
not  as  in  dreams  realizing  our  hidden  wishes, 
merely  in  imagination,  but  also  impelled  to 
act  them  out  in  much  the  way  that  the  psycho- 
neurotic is  impelled  to  act  out  the  fixed  ideas 
which  are  really  the  symbols  of  his  suppressed 
wish.  In  other  words,  a crowd  is  a device  for  ^ / 
indulging  ourselves  in  a hind  of  temporary 
insanity  by  all  going  crazy  together. 

Of  the  several  kinds  of  crow^ds,  I have  se- 
lected for  our  discussion  the  mass  meeting, 
because  we  are  primarily  interested  in  the 
ideas  which  dominate  the  crowd.  The  same 
essential  psychological  elements  are  also  found 

in  the  street  crowd  or  mob.  Serious  mob  out- 

37 


THE  BEHAvTOH  OF  CROWDS 


breaks  seldom  occur  without  mass  meetiugs, 
oratory,  and  propaganda.  Sometimes,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  French  Revolution  and  of  the 
rise  of  the  soviets  in  Russia,  the  mass  meetings 
are  held  in  streets  and  public  places.  Some- 
times, as,  foi*  instance,  the  crowds  in  Berlin 
when  Germany  precipitated  the  World  War, 
a long  period  of  deliberate  cultivation  of  such 
crowd-ideas  as  happen  to  be  advantageous  to 
the  state  precedes.  There  are  instances,  such 
as  the  Frank  case,  which  brought  unenviable 
fame  to  Georgia,  when  no  mass  meeting  seems 
to  have  been  held.  It  is  possible  that  in  this 
instance,  however,  certain  newspapers,  and 
also  the  trial — which,  as  I remember,  was  held 
in  a theater  and  gave  an  ambitious  prose- 
cuting attorney  opportunity  to  play  the  role 
of  mob  leader — served  the  purpose  of  the 
mass  meeting. 

The  series  of  outbreaks  in  New  York  and 
other  cities,  shortly  after  the  War,  betw^een 
the  socialists  and  certain  returned  soldiers, 
seem  to  have  first  occurred  quite  unexpectedly, 
as  do  the  customary  negro  lynchings  in  the 
South.  In  each  case  I think  it  will  be  found 
that  the  complex  of  crowd-ideas  had  been  pre- 
viously built  up  in  the  unconscious.  A deep- 
seated  antagonism  had  been  unconsciously 
associated  with  the  self -appreciative  feel- 
ings of  a number  of  individuals,  all  of  which 
found  justification  in  the  consciousness  of 

38  , 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


these  persons  in  the  form  of  devotion  to  prin- 
ciple, loyalty,  moral  enthusiasm,  etc.  I sus- 
pect that  under  many  of  our  professed  prin- 
ciples there  lurk  elements  of  unconscious 
sadism  and  masochism.  All  that  is  then  re- 
quired is  an  occasion,  some  casual  incident 
which  will  so  direct  the  attention  of  a number 
of  these  persons  that  they  provide  one  another 
temporarily  with  a congenial  social  environ- 
ment. In  the  South  this  mob  complex  is 
doubtless  formed  out  of  race  pride,  a certain 
unconscious  eroticism,  and  will  to  power, 
which  unfortunately  has  too  abundant  oppor- 
tunity to  justify  itself  as  moral  indignation. 
With  the  returned  soldiers  the  unconscious 
desires  were  often  rather  thinly  disguised — 
primitive  impulses  to  violence  which  had  been 
aroused  and  hardly  satisfied  by  the  war,  a 
wish  to  exhibit  themselves  which  found  its 
opportunity  in  the  knowledge  that  their  law- 
lessness would  be  applauded  in  certain  influ- 
ential quarters,  a dislike  of  the  nonconformist, 
the  foreign,  and  the  unknown,  which  took  the 
outward  form  of  a not  wholly  unjustifiable 
resentment  toward  the  party  which  had  to  all 
appearances  unpatriotically  opposed  our  en- 
trance into  the  war. 

Given  a psychic  situation  of  this  nature, 
the  steps  by  which  it  leads  to  mob  violence 
are  much  alike  in  all  cases.  All  together  they 
simply  amount  to  a process  of  like  direction  of 

3S 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

the  attention  of  a suflBcient  number  of  persons 
so  affected  as  to  produce  a temporary  social 
environment  in  which  the  unconscious  im- 
pulses may  be  released  with  mutual  approval. 
The  presence  of  the  disliked  object  or  person 
gains  general  attention.  At  first  there  is 
only  curiosity;  then  amusement;  there  is  a 
bantering  of  crude  witticisms;  then  ridicule. 
Soon  the  joking  turns  to  insults.  There  are 
angry  exclamations.  A blow  is  struck.  There 
is  a sudden  rush.  The  blow,  being  the  act 
which  the  members  of  the  crowd  each  uncon- 
sciously wished  to  do,  gains  general  approval, 
“it  is  a blow  for  righteousness”;  a “cause” 
appears.  Casually  associated  persons  at  once 
become  a group,  brought  together,  of  course, 
by  their  interest  in  vindicating  the  principles 
at  stake.  The  mob  finds  itself  suddenly  doing 
things  which  its  members  did  not  know  they 
had  ever  dreamed  of. 

Different  as  this  process  apparently  is  from 
that  by  which  a meeting  is  turned  into  a crowd 
by  an  orator,  I think  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
two  are  essentially  alike. 

Thus  far  we  have  been  considering  crowd- 
movements  which  are  local  and  temporary' — 
casual  gatherings,  which,  having  no  abiding 
reason  for  continued  association,  soon  dis- 
solve into  their  individual  elements.  Fre- 
quently, after  participating  in  such  a move- 
ment, the  individual,  on  returning  to  his 

40 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 

habitual  relations,  “comes  to.”  He  wonders 
what  the  affair  was  all  about.  In  the  light 
of  his  re-established  control  ideas — he  will  call 
it  “reason” — the  unconscious  impulses  are 
again  repressed;  he  may  look  with  shame  and 
loathing  upon  yesterday’s  orgy.  Acts  which 
he  would  ordinarily  disapprove  in  his  neigh- 
bors, he  now  disapproves  in  himself.  If  the 
behavior  of  the  crowd  has  not  been  particu- 
larly atrocious  and  inexcusable  to  ordinary 
consciousness,  the  reaction  is  less  strong.  The 
voter  after  the  political  campaign  merely 
“loses  interest.”  The  convert  in  the  revival 
“backslides.”  The  striker  returns  to  work 
and  is  soon  absorbed  by  the  daily  routine  of 
his  task.  The  fiery  patriot,  after  the  war,  is 
surprised  to  find  that  his  hatred  of  the  enemy 
is  gradually  waning.  Electors  who  have  been 
swept  by  a wave  of  enthusiasm  for  “reform” 
and  have  voted  for  a piece  of  ill-considered  re- 
strictive legislation  easily  lapse  into  indif- 
ference, and  soon  look  with  unconcern  or 
amusement  upon  open  violations  of  their  own 
enactments.  There  is  a common  saying  that 
the  public  has  a short  memory.  Pick  up  an 
old  newspaper  and  read  about  the  great  move- 
ments and  causes  which  were  only  a short 
time  ago  stirring  the  public  mind,  many  of 
them  are  now  dead  issues.  But  they  were 
not  answered  by  argument;  we  simply  “got 
over”  them. 

4 


41 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Not  all  crowd-movements,  however,  are 
local  and  temporary.  There  are  passing  mo- 
ments of  crowd-experience  which  are  often 
too  sweet  to  lose.  The  lapse  into  everyday 
realism  is  like  “falling  from  grace.”  The 
crowd  state  of  mind  strives  often  to  keep 
itself  in  countenance  by  perpetuating  the 
peculiar  social-psychic  conditions  in  w’hich  it 
can  operate.  There  are  certain  forms  of  the 
ego  consciousness  which  are  best  served  by  the 
fictions  of  the  crowd.  An  analogy  here  is 
found  in  paranoia,  where  the  individual’s  mor- 
bid fixed  ideas  are  really  devices  for  the  pro- 
tection of  his  self-esteem.  The  repressed  in- 
fantile psyche  which  exists  in  us  all,  and  in 
certain  neurotics  turns  back  and  attaches 
itself  to  the  image  of  the  parent,  finds  also  in 
the  crowd  a path  for  expression.  It  provides 
a perpetual  interest  in  keeping  the  crowd- 
state  alive.  Notice  how’  invariably  former 
students  form  alumni  associations,  and  re- 
turned soldiers  at  once  effect  permanent  or- 
ganizations; persons  who  have  been  con- 
verted in  one  of  Mr.  Sunday’s  religious  cam- 
paigns do  the  same  thing — indeed  there  are 
associations  of  all  sorts  growing  out  of  these 
exciting  moments  in  people’s  common  past 
experience,  the  purpose  of  which  is  mutually 
to  recall  the  old  days  and  aid  one  another  in 
keeping  alive  the  enlarged  self-feeling. 

In  addition  to  this,  society  is  filled  with 

42 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


what  might  be  called  “struggle  groups” 
organized  for  the  survival  and  dominance  of 
similarly  constituted  or  situated  people.  Each 
group  has  its  peculiar  interests,  economic, 
spiritual,  racial,  etc.,  and  each  such  interest 
is  a mixture  of  conscious  and  unconscious  pur- 
poses. These  groups  become  sects,  cults,  par- 
tisan movements,  class  struggles.  They  de- 
velop propaganda,  ritual,  orthodoxies,  dogma, 
all  of  which  are  hardly  anything  more  than 
stereotyped  systems  of  crowd-ideas.  These 
systems  differ  from  those  of  the  neurosis  in 
that  the  former  are  less  idiosyncratic,  but 
they  undoubtedly  perform  much  the  same 
function.  The  primary  aim  of  every  such 
crowd  is  to  keep  itself  together  as  a crowd. 
Hardly  less  important  is  the  desire  of  its 
members  to  dominate  over  all  outsiders.  The 
professed  purpose  is  to  serve  some  cause  or 
principle  of  universal  import.  Thus  the  crowd 
idealizes  itself  as  an  end,  makes  sanctities  of 
its  own  survival  values,  and  holds  up  its  ideals 
to  all  men,  demanding  that  every  knee  shall 
bow  and  every  tongue  confess — which  is  to 
say,  that  the  crowd  believes  in  its  own  future 
supremacy,  the  members  of  the  group  knowing 
that  such  a belief  has  survival  value.  This 
principle  is  used  by  every  politician  in  pre- 
dicting that  his  party  is  bound  to  win  at  the 
next  election. 

Hence  the  crowd  is  a device  by  which  the 

43 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


individual’s  “right”  may  be  baptized  “right- 
eousness” in  general,  and  this  personality  by 
putting  on  impersonality  may  rise  again  to 
new  levels  of  self-appreciation.  He  “belongs 
to  something,”  something  “glorious”  and 
deathless.  He  himself  may  be  but  a miser- 
able clod,  but  the  glory  of  his  crowd  reflects 
upon  him.  Its  expected  triumph  he  already 
shares.  It  gives  him  back  his  lost  sense  of 
security.  As  a good  crowd  man,  true  be- 
liever, loyal  citizen,  devoted  member,  he  has 
regained  something  of  his  early  innocence. 
In  other  members  he  has  new  brothers  and 
sisters.  In  the  finality  of  his  crowd-faith 
there  is  escape  from  responsibility  and  further 
search.  He  is  willing  to  be  commanded.  He 
is  a child  again.  He  has  transferred  his  re- 
pressed infantilism  from  the  lost  family  circle 
to  the  crowd.  There  is  a very  real  sense  in 
which  the  crowd  stands  to  his  emotional  life 
in  loco  parentis. 

It  is  to  be  expected,  therefore,  that  wherever 
possible  the  crowd-state  of  mind  will  be  per- 
petuated. Everj-  sort  of  device  will  be  used 
to  keep  the  members  of  the  crowd  from 
coming  to.  In  almost  every  organization 
and  social  relationship  there  will  be  a tendency 
on  part  of  the  unconscious  to  behave  as  crowd. 
Thus  permanent  crowds  exist  on  everj”  hand — 
especially  wherever  political,  moral,  or  re- 
ligious ideas  are  concerned.  The  general 

44 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


and  abstract  character  of  these  ideas  makes 
them  easily  accessible  instruments  for  justify- 
ing and  screening  the  unconscious  piu^pose. 
Moreover  it  is  in  just  those  aspects  of  our  social 
life  where  repression  is  greatest  that  crowd- 
thinking is  most  common,  for  it  is  by  means 
of  such  thinking  and  behavior  that  the  uncon- 
scious seeks  evasions  and  finds  its  necessary 
compensations. 

The  modern  man  has  in  the  printing  press 
a wonderfully  effective  means  for  perpetuating 
crowd-movements  and  keeping  great  masses 
of  people  constantly  under  the  sway  of  certain 
crowd-ideas.  Every  crowd-group  has  its  mag- 
azines, press  agents,  and  special  “literature” 
with  which  it  continually  harangues  its  mem- 
bers and  possible  converts.  Many  books, 
and  especially  certain  works  of  fiction  of  the 
“best-seller”  type,  are  clearly  reading-mob 
phenomena. 

But  the  leader  in  crowd-thinking  par  excel- 
lence is  the  daily  newspaper.  With  few  excep- 
tions our  journals  emit  hardly  anything  but 
crowd-ideas.  These  great  “molders  of  public 
opinion,”  reveal  every  characteristic  of  the 
vulgar  mob  orator.  The  character  of  the 
writing  commonly  has  the  standards  and 
prejudices  of  the  “man  in  the  street.”  And 
lest  this  man’s  ego  consciousness  be  offended 
by  the  sight  of  anything  “highbrow” — that 
is,  anything  indicating  that  there  may  be  a 

45 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


superior  intelligence ' or  finer  appreciation 
than  his  own — newspaper-democracy  demands 
that  everything  more  exalted  than  the  level 
of  the  lowest  cranial  altitude  be  left  out.  The 
average  result  is  a deluge  of  sensational 
scandal,  class  prejudice,  and  special  pleading 
clumsily  disguised  with  a saccharine  smear  of 
the  cheapest  moral  platitude.''"  Consequently, 
the  thinking  of  most  of  us  is  carried  on  chiefly 
in  the  form  of  crowd-ideas.  A sort  of  public- 
meetmg  self  is  developed  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  individual  which  dominates  the  per- 
sonality of  all  but  the  reflective  few.  We 
editorialize  and  press-agent  ourselves  in  our 
inmost  musings.  Public  opinion  is  manufac- 
tured just  as  brick  are  made.  Possibly  a 
slightly  better  knowledge  of  mechanical  en- 
gineering is  required  for  making  public  opin- 
ion, but  the  process  is  the  same.  Both  can 
be  stamped  out  in  the  quantity  required,  and 
delivered  anywhere  to  order.  Our  thinking 
on  most  important  subjects  to-day  is  as  little 
original  as  the  mental  processes  of  the  men 
who  write  and  the  machines  which  print  the 
pages  we  read  and  repeat  as  our  own  opinions. 

Thomas  Carlyle  was  never  more  sound  than 
when  railing  at  this  “paper  age.”  And  paper, 
he  wisely  asked  us  to  remember,  “is  made  of 
old  rags.”  Older  writers  who  saw  the  ragged 
throngs  in  the  streets  were  led  to  identify  the 
mob  or  crowd  with  the  tattered,  illiterate 

46 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


populace.  Our  mob  to-day  is  no  longer 
merely  tramping  tlie  streets.  We  have  it  at 
the  breakfast  table,  in  the  subway,  alike  in 
shop  and  boudoir,  and  office — wherever,  in 
faet,  the  newspaper  goes.  And  the  raggedness 
is  not  exterior,  nor  is  the  mob  confined  to  the 
class  of  the  ill-clad  and  the  poor.  The  ragged- 
ness, and  tawdriness  have  now  become  spirit- 
ual, a universal  presence  entering  into  the 
fabric  of  nearly  all  our  mental  processes. 

We  have  now  reached  a point  from  which  we 
can  look  back  over  the  ground  we  have 
traversed  and  note  the  points  of  difference  be- 
tween our  view  and  the  well-known  theory  of 
Le  Bon.  The  argument  of  the  latter  is  as  fol- 
lows: (1)  From  the  standpoint  of  psychol- 
ogy, the  crowd,  as  the  term  is  here  defined, 
is  not  merely  a group  of  people,  it  is  the  ap- 
pearance within  such  a group  of  a special 
mental  eondition,  or  crowd-mind.  (2)  The 
sentiments  and  ideas  of  all  the  persons  in  the 
gathering  take  one  and  the  same  direction. 
(3)  Conscious  personality  vanishes.  (4)  A 
collective  mind  is  formed:  This  is  Le  Bon’s 
“Law  of  the  mental  unity  of  crowds.”  (5) 
This  collective  mind  consists  in  the  main  of 
“general  qualities  of  character”  which  are 
our  common  racial  inheritance.  It  is  an 
“unconscious  substratum”  which  in  the 
crowd  becomes  uppermost,  dominating  over 
the  unique  personal  consciousness.  (6)  Three 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


causes  determine  the  characteristics  of  the 
crowd-mind,  (a)  From  purely  numerical  con- 
siderations, the  individual  acquires  a senti- 
ment of  invincible  power  which  encourages 
him  in  an  unrestrained  yielding  to  his  in- 
stincts. (b)  Contagion,  or  imitation,  and  (c) 
hypnotic  suggestion  cause  the  individuals  in 
the  crowd  to  become  “slaves  of  all  the  uncon- 
scious activities  of  the  spinal  cord.”  (7)  The 
resulting  characteristics  of  the  crowd  are  (a)  a 
descent  of  several  rungs  in  the  ladder  of 
civilization,  (b)  a general  intellectual  inferi- 
ority as  compared  with  the  isolated  individual, 
(c)  loss  of  moral  responsibility,  (d)  impulsive- 
ness, (e)  credulity,  (f)  exaggeration,  (g)  in- 
tolerance, (h)  blind  obedience  to  the  leader  of 
the  crowd,  (i)  a mystical  emotionalism.  (8) 
The  crowd  is  finally  and  somewhat  incon- 
sistently treated  by  Le  Bon  as  being  identical 
with  the  masses,  the  common  people,  the  herd. 

Without  pausing  to  review  the  criticisms  of 
this  argument  which  were  made  at  the  begin- 
ning of  our  discussion,  our  own  view  may  be 
summarized  as  follows:  (1)  The  crowd  is  not 
the  same  as  the  masses,'or  any  class  or  gather- 
ing of  people  as  such,  but  is  a certain  mental 
condition  which  may  occur  simultaneously  to 
people  in  any  gathering  or  association.  (2) 
This  condition  is  not  a “collective  mind.” 
It  is  a release  of  repressed  impulses  which  is 
made  possible  because  certain  controlling 

48 


HOW  CROWDS  ARE  FORMED 


ideas  have  ceased  to  function  in  the  immediate 
social  environment.  (3)  This  modification  in 
the  immediate  social  environment  is  the  result 
of  mutual  concessions  on  the  part  of  persons 
whose  unconscious  impulses  to  do  a certain 
forbidden  thing  are  similarly  disguised  as 
sentiments  which  meet  with  conscious  moral 
approval.  (4)  Such  a general  disguising  of 
the  real  motive  is  a characteristic  phenomenon 
of  dreams  and  of  mental  pathology,  and  occurs 
in  the  crowd  by  fixing  the  attention  of  all 
present  upon  the  abstract  and  general.  At- 
tention is  thus  held  diverted  from  the  in- 
dividual’s personal  associations,  permitting 
these  associations  and  their  accompanying 
impulses  to  function  unconsciously.  (5)  The 
abstract  ideas  so  entertained  become  symbols 
of  meanings  which  are  unrecognized;  they 
form  a closed  system,  like  the  obsessions  of  the 
paranoiac,  and  as  the  whole  group  are  thus 
moved  in  the  same  direction,  the  “compul- 
sory” logic  of  these  ideas  moves  forward  with- 
out those  social  checks  which  normally  keep 
us  within  bounds  of  the  real.  Hence,  acting 
and  thinking  in  the  crowd  become  stereo- 
typed and  “ceremonial.”  Individuals  move 
together  like  automatons.  (6),  As  the  uncon- 
scious chiefly  consists  of  that  part  of  our 
nature  which  is  habitually  repressed  by  the 
social,  and  as  there  is  always,  therefore,  an 
unconscious  resistance  to  this  repressive  force, 

' ■ 49 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


it  follows  that  the  crowd  state,  like  the  neu- 
rosis, is  a mechanism  of  escape  and  of  com- 
pensation. It  also  follows  that  the  xEQwd- 
spirit  will  occur  most  commonly  in  reference 
to  jusl  those  social  forms  where  repression  is 
greatest — in  laiatters  political^  Ireligious,  an(d 
moral.  (7)  The  crowd-mind  is  then  not  a 
mere  excess  of  emotion  on  the  part  of  people 
who  have  abandoned  “reason”;  crowd- 
behavior  is  in  a sense  psychopathic  and  has 
many  elements  in  common  wdth  somnambu- 
lism, the  compulsion  neurosis,  and  even  para- 
noia. (8)  Crowds  may  be  either  temporary  or 
permanent  in  their  existence.  Permanent 
crowds,  with  the  aid  of  the  press,  determine 
in  greater  or  less  degree  the  mental  habits 
of  nearly  everyone.  The  individual  moves 
through  his  social  world  like  a popular  fresh- 
man on  a college  campus,  who  is  to  be  “spiked” 
by  one  or  another  fraternity  competing  for  his 
membership.  A host  of  crowds  standing  for 
every  conceivable  “cause”  and  “ideal”  hover 
constantly  about  him,  ceaselessly  screaming 
their  propaganda  into  his  ears,  bullying  and 
cajoling  him,  pushing  and  crowding  and  de- 
nouncing one  another,  and  forcing  all  willy- 
nilly  to  line  up  and  take  sides  with  them  upon 
issues  and  dilemmas  which  represent  the  real 
convictions  of  nobody. 


Ill 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 

Throughout  the  discussion  thus  far  I 
have  been  making  repeated  reference  to 
the  psychology  of  the  unconscious,  without 
going  into  detail  any  more  than  was  neces- 
sary. Let  us  now  take  a closer  look  at  some 
pf^  Freud’s  discoveries.  In  this  v/ay,  what 
Brill  would  call  the  “psychogenesis”  of  certain 
characteristic  ideas  and  practices  of  crowds 
will  be,  I think,  made  clear.  Up  to  this  point 
we  have  dealt  generally  with  those  mental 
processes  by  which  the  crowd  is  formed. 
There  are  certain  traits,  tendencies,  ways  of 
thinking 'which  crowds  so  uniformly  display 
that  one  is  justified,  in  want  of  other  explana- 
tion, in  assuming  them  to  be  unconsciously  de- 
termined. The  remarkable  blindness  of  or- 
ganized crowds  to  the  most  obvious  of  their 
own  performances  is  so  common  as  to  be  the 
regularly  expected  thing — that  is,  of  crowds 
other  than  our  own.  Longhand  extensive 
operations  may  be  carried  on  for  years  by 
crowds  whose  members  repeatedly  declare 

51 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

that  such  things  are  not  being  done.  The  way 
in  which  a nation  will  carefully  prepare  for 
war,  gradually  organizing  its  whole  life  on  a 
military  basis  with  tremendous  cost  and  effort, 
all  the  while  declaring  that  it  is  interested 
only  in  peace,  denying  its  warlike  intentions, 
and  even  in  the  moment  of  picking  a quarrel 
with  its  neighbors  declare  to  all  the  world  that 
it  had  been  wantonly  and  unexpectedly  at- 
tacked, is  all  a matter  of  general  comment. 
The  American  colonists,  during  the  decade 
before  the  signing  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, of  course  had  no  conscious  thought 
of  separating  from  Great  Britain.  Almost  to 
the  very  last  they  professed  their  loyalty  to 
the  King;  but  looking  back  now  it  is  clear 
that  Independence  was  the  motive  all  along, 
and  doubtless  could  not  have  been  achieved 
more  opportunely  or  with  greater  finesse  if  it 
had  been  deliberately  planned  from  the  start. 
The  Hebrew  Scriptures  contain  a story  which 
illustrates  this  aspect  of  crowd-behavior  every- 
where. The  Children  of  Israel  in  bondage  in 
Egypt  merely  wished  to  go  out  in  the  wilder- 
ness for  a day  or  so  to  worship  their  God.  All 
they  asked  was  religious  liberty.  How^  unjust 
of  the  authorities  to  assume  they  were  plan- 
ning to  run  away  from  their  masters!  You 
will  remember  that  at  the  last  moment  they 
incidentally  borrow  some  jew^elry  from  their 
Egj’^ptian  neighbors.  Of  course  they  will  pay 

5i 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


it  back  after  their  little  religious  holiday, 
but . . . later  a most  unforeseen  thing  happens 
to  that  jewelry,  a scandalous  thing — it  is 
made  into  an  idol.  Does  it  require  that  one 
be  a psychologist  to  infer  that  it  was  the  un- 
conscious intention  all  along  to  use  this  metal 
for  just  that,  the  first  good  chance  they  had — 
and  that,  too,  notwithstanding  repeated  pro- 
hibitions of  idolatry.?  The  motive  for  bor- 
rowing the  jewelry  is  evident. 

Certain  crowd-movements  in  America  to- 
day give  marked  evidence  of  this  unconscious 
motivation.  Notice  how  both  the  radical  and 
reactionary  elements  behave  when,  as  is  fre- 
quently the  case  with  both,  the  crowd-spirit 
comes  over  them.  Certain  radicals,  who  are 
fascinated  with  the  idea  of  the  Russian  Revo- 
lution, are  still  proclaiming  sentiments  of 
human  brotherhood,  peace,  and  freedom,  while 
unconsciously  they  are  doing  just  what  their 
enemies  accuse  them  of — ^playing  with  the 
welcome  ideas  of  violence,  class  war,  and 
proletarian  dictatorship.  And  conservative 
crowds,  while  ostensibly  defending  American 
traditions  and  ideals  against  destructive  for- 
eign influence,  are  with  their  own  hands  daily 
desecrating  many  of  the  finest  things  which 
America  has  given  to  the  world  in  its  struggle 
of  more  than  a century  for  freedom  and  jus- 
tice. Members  of  e^h  crowd,  while  blissfully 
unaware  of  the  incompatibility  of  their  own 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


motives  and  professions,  have  no  illusions 
about  those  of  the  counter-crowd.  Each 
crowd  sees  in  the  professions  of  its  antagonist 
convincing  proof  of  the  insincerity  and  hypoc- 
risy of  the  other  side.  To  the  student  of  so- 
cial philosophy  both  are  right  and  both 
wrong.  All  propaganda  is  lies,  and  every 
crowd  is  a deceiver,  but  its  first  and  worst  de- 
ception is  that  of  itself.  ,This  self-deception 
is  a necessary  step  in  crowd-formation  and  is 
a sine  qua  non  of  becoming  a crowd.  It  is 
only  necessary  for  members  of  a crowd  to 
deceive  themselves  and  one  another  for  the 
crowd-mind  to  function  perfectly;  I doubt  if 
they  are  often  successful  in  deceiving  anybody 
I else.  It  was  this  common  crowd-phenomenon 
j of  self-deception  which  led  Gobineau  and 
Nietzsche  to  the  conclusion  that  the  conmion 
people  are  liars.  But  as  has  been  said,  the 
crowd  is  by  no  means  peculiar  to  the  working 
class ; some  of  its  worst  features  are  exhibited 
these  days  among  employers,  law-makers,  and 
the  well-to-do  classes.  This  deception  is 
moreover  not  really  conscious  and  deliberate. 
If  men  deliberately  set  about  to  invent  lies  to 
justify  their  behavior  I have  little  doubt  that 
most  of  them  would  be  clever  enough  to  con- 
jure up  something  a little  more  plausible. 
These  naive  and  threadbare  “hjTJOcrisies”  of 
crowds  are  a commonplace  mechanism  of  the 
unconscious.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 

54 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


the  delusions  of  the  paranoiac  likewise  de- 
ceive no  one  but  himself,  yet  within  them- 
selves form  a perfectly  logical  a 'priori  system. 
They  also  serve  the  well-understood  purpose, 
like  that  of  crowd-ideas,  of  keeping  their  pos- 
sessor in  a certain  fixed  relation  toward  por- 
tions of  his  own  psychic  material.  As  Brill 
says,  they  are  “compromise  formations.” 

Those  who  have  read  Freud’s  little  book. 
Delusion  and  Dream,  an  analysis  of  a psycho- 
logical romance  written  by  Wilhelm  Jensen, 
will  recall  how  extensive  a fabric  of  plausi- 
bilities a delusion  may  build  up  in  its  defense 
in  order  at  the  same  time  to  satisfy  a repressed 
wish,  and  keep  the  true  meaning  of  the  sub- 
ject’s acts  and  thoughts  from  conscious  atten- 
fion.  In  the  story  which  Freud  has  here 
taken  as  his  subject  for  study,  a young 
student  of  archaeology  has  apparently  con- 
quered all  adolescent  erotic  interest  and  has 
devoted  himself  whole-heartedly  to  his  sci- 
ence. While  at  the  ruins  of  ancient  Pompeii, 
he  finds  a bas-relief  containing  the  figure  of  a 
young  woman  represented  in  the  act  of  walk- 
ing with  peculiar  grace.  A cast  of  this  figure 
he  brings  home.  His  interest  is  curiously 
aroused.  At  first  this  interest  appears  to  be 
scientific  only,  then  aesthetic,  and  historical. 
Finally  he  builds  up  about  it  a complete  ro- 
mance. He  becomes  restless  and  very  much 
of  a misogynist,  and  is  driven,  he  knows  not 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


why,  again  to  the  ruins.  Here  he  actually 
meets  the  object  of  his  dreams  in  the  solitude 
of  the  excavated  city.  He  allows  himself  to 
believe  that  the  once  living  model  of  his 
treasured  bas-relief  has  again  come  to  life. 
For  days  he  meets  and  talks  with  the  girl, 
living  all  the  while  in  a world  of  complete 
unreality,  until  she  finally  succeeds  in  re- 
vealing herself  as  the  young  woman  who  lives 
next  door  to  him.  It  also  appears  that  in 
their  childhood  he  and  this  girl  had  been 
playmates,  and  that  in  spite  of  all  his  conscious 
indifference  to  her  his  unconscious  interest 
was  the  source  of  his  interest  in  the  bas-relief 
and  the  motive  which  led  him  to  return  to 
Pompeii,  where  he  unconsciously  expected  to 
find  her.  The  interesting  thing  about  all  this 
for  our  present  study  is  the  series  of  devices, 
fictions,  and  compromises  with  reality  which 
this  repressed  interest  made  use  of  while  hav- 
ing its  way  with  him,  and  at  the  same  time 
resisting  whatever  might  force  it  upon  his 
conscious  attention,  where  a recognition  of 
its  significance  might  result  in  a deliberate 
rejection. 

We  shall  not  go  into  Freud’s  ingenious 
analysis  of  the  mental  processes  at  work  here. 
The  following  passage  is  sufficient  for  our 
purpose: 

There  is  a kind  of  forgetting  which  distinguishes  it- 
self by  the  difficulty  with  which  memory  is  awakened, 

56 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


even  by  strong  appeals,  as  if  a subjective  resistance 
struggled  against  the  revival.  Such  forgetting  has  re- 
ceived the  name  of  “repression”  in  psychopathology . . . 
about  repression  we  can  assert  that  certainly  it  does 
not  coincide  with  the  destruction,  the  obliteration  of 
memory.  The  repressed  material  can  not  of  itself  break 
through  as  memory,  but  remains  potent  and  effective. 

From  this,  and  from  what  was  said  in  our 
previous  chapter,  it  is  plain  that  the  term 
“unconscious”  as  used  in  psychology  does  not 
mean  total  absence  of  psychic  activity.  It  j,<^ 
refers  to  thoughts  and  feelings  which  have 
purposefully  been  forgotten  — to  experiences 
or  impulses  to  which  we  do  not  pay  attention 
nor  wish  to  attend  to,  but  which  influence 
us  nevertheless.  Everyone  of  us,  when  he 
dreams,  has  immediate  knowledge  of  the  un- 
conscious as  here  defined.  Certainly  we  pass 
into  unconsciousness  when  we  sleep.  Yet 
something  is  unquestionably  going  on  inside 
our  heads.  One  wakens  and  says,  “What 
strange,  or  exciting,  or  delightful  dreams  I 
have  had !”  Bergson  says  that  sleep  is  due  to 
the  relaxing  of  attention  to  our  environment. 

Yet  in  dreams  attention  is  never  turned  away 
from  ourselves.  Possibly  instead  of  the  word 
“^unconscious ” the  term  “unattended”  might 
be  used  with  less  danger  of  confusion. 

Consciousness  is,  therefore,  not  the  whole  of 
our  psychic  activity.  Much  of  our  behavior 
is  reflex  and  automatic.  James  used  to  be 

6 57 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


fond  of  showing  how  much  even  of  our  higher 
psychic  activity  was  reflex  in  its  nature.  We 
may  be  conscious  of  various  portions  of  our 
psychic  material,  but  never  of  all  of  it  at  once. 
Attention  is  like  a spotlight  thrown  on  a semi- 
darkened  stage,  moving  here  and  there,  re- 
vealing the  figures  upon  w hich  it  is  directed  in 
vivid  contrast  with  the  darkly  mo\dng  ob- 
jects which  animate  the  regions  outside  its 
circle.  A speaker  during  his  discourse  will 
straighten  his  tie,  make  various  gestures,  and 
toy  with  any  object  which  happens  to  be  lying 
on  the  desk,  all  wdthout  being  aware  of  his 
movements,  until  his  attention  is  called  to 
the  fact.  Absent-minded  persons  habitually 
amuse  us  by  frequently  performing  complete 
and  rather  complex  series  of  actions  while 
wholly  oblivious  to  what  they  are  doing. 
Everyone  can  recall  numerous  instances  of 
absent-mindedness  in  his  own  experience. 

Now  all  pathological  types  of  mental  life 
have  in  common  this  quality  of  absent-minded- 
ness, and  it  is  held  that  the  thing  said  or  done 
absent-mindedly  has  in  every  mstance,  even 
w'hen  normal,  a meaning  which  is  unconscious. 
But  the  unconscious  or  unattended  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  the  infrequent  and  the 
trivial.  As  temperament,  or  character,  its 
activity  is  a determining  factor  in  all  our 
thought  and  conduct.  Dream  fancies  do  not 
really  cease  when  we  awake;  the  dream 

58 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


acUvity  goes  on  all  about  our  conscious 
thougHts,  our  associations  now  hovering  near 
lohg-fbrgotten  memories,  now  pulled  in  the 
direction  of  some  unrecognized  bit  of  personal 
conceit,  now  skipping  on  tiptoe  over  some- 
thing forbidden  and  wicked  and  passing  across 
without  looking  in;  only  a part  of  our  mental 
processes  ever  directly  finding  expression  in 
our  conscious  acts  and  words.  The  unchosen 
and  the  illogical  run  along  with  the  desired  and 
the  logical  material,  only  we  have  learned  not 
to  pay  attention  to  such  things.  Under  all 
our  logical  structures  there  flows  a ceaseless 
stream  of  dream  stuff.  Our  conscious  thought 
is  like  little  planks  of  attention  laid  end  to  end 
on  the  stones  which  here  and  there  rise  above 
the  surface  of  our  thinking.  The  mind  skips 
across  to  a desired  conclusion,  not  infre- 
quently getting  its  feet  wet,  and,  on  occasion, 
upsetting  a plank  or  slipping  off  and  falling  in 
altogether. 

We  have  only  to  relax  our  attention  a little 
to  enter  the  world  of  day  dreams,  of  art,  and 
religion ; we  can  never  hold  it  so  rigid  as  to  be 
wholly  rational  for  long. 

Those  interested  in  the  general  psychology 
of  the  unconscious  are  referred  to  the  writings 
of  such  authorities  in  this  field  as  Freud,  Jung, 
Adler,  Dr.  A.  A.  Brill,  and  Dr.  William  White. 
In  fact,  the  literature  dealing  with  psycho- 
analysis is  now  so  widely  read  that,  unless  the 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

reader  has  received  his  information  about  this 
branch  of  science  from  hostile  sources  alone, 
it  is  to  be  assumed  that  he  has  a fairly  accurate 
acquaintance  with  its  general  history  and 
theory.  We  must  confine  our  discussions  to 
those  aspects  of  unconscious  behavior  which 
can  be  shown  by  analogy  with  the  psycho- 
neurosis to  be  determinants  of  crowd-thinking. 
As  the  details  and  technical  discussions  of 
psychoanalytical  material  belong  strictly  to 
the  psychiatric  clinic,  any  attempt  at  criticism 
by  the  medical  layman  of  the  scientific  proc- 
esses by  which  they  are  established  is 
of  course  impossible.  Consequently,  I have 
\ /sought  to  make  use  of  only  those  principles 
I which  are  now  so  w^ell  established  as  to  become 
rather  generally  accepted  commonplaces  of 
psychopathology. 

All  analysis  reveals  the  fact  that  the  uncon- 
scious of  the  individual  is  concerned  primarily 
with  himself.  This  is  true  in  the  psychosis, 
and  always  in  dreams.  Freud  says: 

Every  dream  is  absolutely  egotistical;  in  every 
dream  the  beloved  ego  appears,  even  though  it  be  in  a 
disguised  form.  The  wishes  that  are  realized  in 
dreams  are  regularly  the  wishes  of  this  ego;  it  is  only 
a deceptive  appearance  if  interest  in  another  person  is 
thought  to  have  caused  the  dream. 

Freud  then  proceeds  to  give  analyses  of 

several  dreams  in  w^hich  the  naive  egoism  of 

60 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


childhood  which  lies  at  the  core  of  the  un- 
conscious psyche  is  apparently  absent,  and 
shows  that  in  each  and  every  case  it  is  there. 
The  hero  of  our  dreams,  notwithstanding  all 
appearances  to  the  contrary,  is  always  ourself. 

Brill,  in  his  book.  Psychoanalysis,  says  of  the 
neurosis : 

Both  hysteria  and  compulsion  neurosis  belong  to  the 
defense  neuropsychoses;  their  symptoms  originate 
through  the  psychic  mechanism  of  defense,  that  is, 
through  the  attempt  to  repress  a painful  idea  which 
was  incompatible  with  the  ego  of  the  patient.  There 
is  still  another  more  forceful  and  more  successful  form 
of  defense  wherein  the  ego  misplaces  the  incompatible 
idea  with  its  emotions  and  acts  as  though  the  painful 
idea  had  never  come  to  pass.  When  this  occurs  the 
person  merges  into  a psychosis  which  may  be  called 
“hallucinatory  confusion.” 

Thus  the  psychoneurosis  is  in  all  its  forms, 
I believe,  regarded  as  a drama  of  the  ego  and 
its  inner  conflicts.  The  egoism  of  the  uncon- 
scious belongs  alike  to  the  normal  and  the 
unadjusted.  The  mental  abnormalities  ap- 
pear when  the  ego  seeks  to  escape  some  such 
conflict  by  means  of  a closed  system  of  ideas 
or  symbolic  acts  which  will  divert  attention 
from  the  unwelcome  psychic  material.  Adler, 
in  The  Neurotic  Constitution,  is  even,  if  possi- 
ble, more  emphatic  in  affirming  the  egoism  of 
the  unconscious  as  revealed  in  neurotics.  His 

thesis  is  that  the  mainspring  of  all  the  efforts 

61 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


of  achievement  and  the  source  of  all  the  vicis- 
situdes of  the  psyche  is  a desire  to  be  im- 
portant, or  will  to  “be  above,”  not  wholly 
unlike  Nietzsche’s  theory  of  the  “will  to 
power.”  The  neurosis  goes  back  to  some  or- 
ganic defect  or  other  cause  of  childish  humilia- 
tion. As  a result,  the  cause  of  such  hu- 
miliation, a defective  bodily  organ, or  whatever 
it  may  be,  gains  special  attention.  The 
whole  psyche  is  modified  in  the  process  of 
adjustment.  In  cases  where  the  psyche  re- 
mains normal,  adjustment  is  achieved  through 
stimulation  to  extra  effort  to  overcome  the 
disadvantage,  as  in  the  triumph  of  Demos- 
thenes, Byron,  Pope. 

On  the  contrary,  this  disadvantage  may 
result  in  a fixed  feeling  of  inferiority.  Such 
a feeling  may  be  brought  about  in  the  sensi- 
tive child  by  a variety  of  circumstances, 
physical  facts  such  as  smallness  of  stature, 
adenoids,  derangements  of  the  alimentary 
organs,  undersized  genitals,  homeliness  of 
feature,  or  any  physical  deformity  or  weak- 
ness; again  by  such  circumstances  as  domi- 
neering parents  or  older  brothers  and  sisters. 
The  child  then  thinks  always  of  himself. 
He  forms  the  habit  of  comparing  himself 
with  others.  He  creates,  as  a protection 
against  the  recognition  of  this  feeling  of  in- 
feriority, what  Adler  calls  the  “masculine 
protest.” 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


The  feeling  which  the  individual  has  of  his  own  in- 
feriority, incompetency,  the  realization  of  his  smallness, 
of  his  weakness,  of  his  uncertainty,  thus  becomes  the 
appropriate  working  basis  which,  because  of  the  intrin- 
sically associated  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  furnishes 
the  inner  impulse  to  advance  toward  an  imaginary 
goal.  ... 

In  all  similar  attempts  (and  the  human  psyche  is 
full  of  them),  it  is  the  question  of  the  introduction  of 
an  unreal  and  abstract  scheme  into  actual  life.  . . . 
No  matter  from  what  angle  we  observe  the  psychic 
development  of  a normal  or  neurotic  person,  he  is  al- 
ways found  ensnared  in  the  meshes  of  his  particular 
fiction — a fiction  from  y^ich  the  neurotic  is  unable  to 
find  his  way  back  to  reality  and  in  which  he  believes, 
while  the  sound  and  normal  person  utilizes  it  for  the 
purpose  of  reaching  a definite  goal  . . . the  thing  which 
impels  us  all,  and  ^especially  the  neurotic  and  the  child, 
to  abandon  the  direct  path  of  induction  and  deduction 
and  use  such  devices  as  the  schematic  fiction,  originates 
in  the  feeling  of  uncertainty,  and  is  the  craving  for 
security,  the  final  purpose  of  which  is  to  escape  from 
the  feeling  of  inferiority  in  order  to  ascend  to  the  full 
height  of  the  ego  consciousness,  to  complete  manliness, 
to  attain  the  ideal  of  being  “above.”  . . . 

Even  our  judgments  concerning  the  value  of  things 
are  determined  according  to  the  standard  of  the  imag- 
inary goal,  not  according  to  “real”  feelings  or  pleasur- 
able sensations. 

That  repressed  sexuality  plays  an  important 
part  in  the  conflicts  of  the  ego  is  well  known 
to  all  who  are  acquainted  with  analytical 
psychology.  According  to  Freud,  the  sexual 
impulse  dates  from  earliest  childhood  and  is  an 
essential  element  in  every  stage  of  self-appre- 

63 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


ciation.  A summary  of  the  process  by  which 
the  infantile  ego  develops  to  maturity  is  as 
follows:  The  child  is  by  nature  “polymor- 
phous perverse” — that  is,  both  physically  and 
psychically  he  possesses  elements  which  in  the 
mature  individual  would  be  considered  per- 
versions. Physiologically,  what  are  knovm  as 
“erogenous  zones” — tissue  which  is  capable  of 
what  in  mature  life  is  sexual  excitation — are 
diffused  through  the  organism.  As  the  child 
passes  through  the  “latent  period”  of  later 
childhood  and  adolescence,  these  “erogenous 
zones”  are  concentrated  as  it  w'ere  in  the 
organs  which  are  to  serve  the  purpose  of  repro- 
duction. If  for  any  reason  this  process  of 
concentration  is  checked,  and  remains  in  later 
life  incomplete,  the  mature  individual  will  be 
afflicted  with  certain  tendencies  to  sex 
perversion. 

Similarly  the  psychosexual  passes  through  a 
metamorphosis  in  normal  development.  The 
erotic  interest  of  the  child,  at  first  quite  with- 
out any  object  at  all,  is  soon  attached  to  one 
or  the  other  of  the  parents,  then,  in  the  “nar- 
cissus period  ” is  centered  upon  the  individual 
himself,  after  which,  normally,  but  not  with- 
out some  storm  and  stress,  it  becomes  detached 
and  capable  of  “object  love” — that  is,  love  of 
a person  of  the  opposite  sex.  This  psychic 
process  is  by  no  means  a smooth  and  easy 
matter.  It  is  attended  at  every  stage  with 

64 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 

such  dangers  that  a very  large  number  of 
people  never  achieve  it  entire.  Various  kinds 
of  “shock”  and  wrong  educational  influence, 
or  overindulgence  on  the  part  of  the  parents, 
may  cause  the  psychosexual  interest  of  the 
ego — or  “libido” — to  remain  “fixed”  at  some 
point  in  its  course.  It  may  retain  vestiges  of 
its  early  undifferentiated  stage,  appearing 
then  in  the  perverted  forms  of  “masochism” 
— sexual  enjoyment  of  self-torture — or  “sad- 
ism”— sexual  pleasure  in  torturing  others. 
Or  the  libido  may  remain  fixed  upon  the 
parent,  rendering  the  individual  in  some 
degree  incapable  of  a normal  mature  love  life. 
He  has  never  quite  succeeded  in  severing  his 
infantile  attachment  to  his  mother  and  trans- 
ferring his  interest  to  the  world  of  social  rela- 
tions and  mature  experiences.  If  he  meets 
with  a piece  of  misfortune,  he  is  likely  to  seek 
imaginary  security  and  compensation  by  a 
“regression”  of  the  libido  and  a revival  of 
childlike  affection  for  the  mother  image.  As 
this  return  is,  in  maturity,  unconsciously  re- 
sisted by  the  horror  of  incest,  a conflict  results. 
The  individual  then  develops  certain  mechan- 
isms or  “complex  formations”  in  defense  of  his 
ego  against  this  painful  situation.  The  with- 
drawal of  the  libido  from  the  ordinary  affairs 
of  life  renders  the  latter  valueless.  Thoughts 
of  death  and  like  compulsory  mechanisms  en- 
sue. The  patient  has  become  a neurotic. 

65 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Psychoanalysts  make  much  of  this  latter 
situation.  Xhex_term  it  the  “(Edipus  com- 
plex.” They  assert  that  in  its  severer  forms 
it  is  a common  feature  of  psychoneurosis, 
while  in  less  marked  form,  according  to  Jung, 
it  underlies,  and  is  the  real  explanation  of  the 
“birth  of  tragedy,”  being  also  the  meaning 
of  much  religious  symbolism,  including  the 
Divine  Drama  of  Christian  tradition.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  only  the  psychoneurotic  whose 
unconscious  takes  the  form  of  the  “QEdipus 
complex.”  Under  certain  conditions  it  is 
manifest  in  normal  people.  I have  already 
indicated  that  the  crowd  is  one  of  those  con- 
ditions, and  shall  have  something  a little 
more  specific  to  say  about  this  later  on. 

Again  the  growing  libido  may  become  fixed 
in  the  “narcissus  stage.”  Between  the  period 
of  love  of  parents  and  object  love,  the  adoles- 
cent youth  passes  through  a period  when  he 
is  “ in  love  with  himself.”  The  fact  that  many 
people  remain  in  some  measure  fixed  in  this 
period  of  their  development  is  not  surprising 
when  we  remember  that  self-feeling  occupies  a 
central  place  in  the  unconscious  at  all  times. 
Many  of  the  world’s  greatest  men  have  doubt- 
less been  characters  in  which  there  was  a 
slightly  more  than  average  fixation  at  this 
point.  Inordinate  ambition  is,  I should  say, 
an  evidence  of  such  a fixation.  If  one  pos- 
sesses great  natural  ability  he  may  under 

66 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


such  circumstances  be  able  to  forge  ahead  to 
his  goal,  overcoming  the  conflicts  which  such  a 
fixation  always  raises,  and  show  no  greater 
evidence  of  pathology  in  his  career  than  is 
seen  in  the  usual  saying  that  “genius  is  always 
a little  queer.”  The  typical  crowd-leader 
would,  on  analysis,  I think,  show  something 
of  this  “narcissus  complex,”  as  would  doubt- 
less the  great  run  of  fanatics,  bigots,  and 
doctrinaires,  “hundred  per  cent”  crowd-men 
all. 

According  to  Brill,  these  “auto  erotic”  per- 
sons are  always  homosexual,  their  homosexu- 
ality manifesting  itself  in  various  ways.  The 
overt  manifestations  of  this  tendency  are 
known  as  perversions.  Certain  persons  who 
have  suppressed  or  sublimated  these  tenden- 
cies, by  means  of  certain  defense  mechanisms, 
or  “fictions,”  as  Adler  would  call  them, 
get  along  very  well  so  long  as  the  defense 
mechanism  functions.  There  are  cases  when 
this  unconsciously  constructed  defense  breaks 
down.  An  inner  conflict  is  then  precipitated, 
a marked  form  of  which  is  the  common  type 
of  insanity,  “paranoia.”  Persons  suffering 
with  paranoia  are  characterized  by  an  insati- 
able demand  for  love  along  with  a psychic 
incapacity  to  give  love.  They  have  an  exag- 
gerated sense  of  their  own  importance  which 
is  sustained  by  a wholly  unreal  but  deadly 
logical  system  of  a 'priori  ideas,  w’hich  consti- 

67 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


lute  the  “obsessions”  common  to  this  t\"pe  of 
mentality.  The  inner  conflict  becomes  ex- 
ternal— that  is,  it  is  “projected.”  The  para- 
noiac projects  his  own  inner  hostility  and 
lack  of  adjustment  upon  others — that  is,  he 
attributes  his  own  feeling  of  hostility  to  some 
one  else,  as  if  he  were  the  object,  not  the 
author,  of  his  hatred.  He  imagines  that  he  is 
persecuted,  as  the  following  example  will 
show.  The  passage  here  quoted  is  taken  from 
a pamphlet  which  was  several  years  ago  given 
to  me  by  the  author.  He  ostensibly  wished 
to  enlist  my  efforts  in  a campaign  he  believed 
himself  to  be  conducting  to  “expose”  the 
atrocious  treatment  of  persons,  like  himself, 
who  were  imprisoned  in  asylums  as  the 
innocent  victims  of  domestic  conspiracy.  By 
way  of  introducing  himself  the  author  makes 
it  known  that  he  has  several  times  been 
confined  in  various  hospitals,  each  time  by 
the  design  and  instigation  of  his  wife,  and 
after  stating  that  on  the  occasion  described 
he  was  very  “nervous  and  physically  ex- 
hausted” and  incidentally  confessing  that 
he  was  arrested  while  attempting  homicide 
“purely  in  self-defense,”  he  gives  this  account 
of  his  incarceration : 

I was  locked  in  a cold  cell,  and  being  in  poor  health, 
ttiy  circulation  was  poor,  and  the  officer  ordered  me  to 
go  to  bed  and  I obeyed  his  orders,  but  I began  to  get 
cold,  and  believing  then,  as  I still  believe,  that  the  coffee 

68 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


I got  out  of  the  coffee  tank  for  my  midnight  lunch  had 
been  “doped,”  and  fearful  that  the  blood  in  my  veins 
which  began  to  coagulate  would  stop  circulating  alto- 
gether, I got  out  of  bed  and  walked  the  floor  to  and  fro 
all  the  remainder  of  the  night  and  by  so  doing  I saved 
my  life.  For  had  I remained  in  bed  two  hours  I would 
have  been  a dead  man  before  sunrise  next  morning.  I 
realized  my  condition  and  had  the  presence  of  mind  to 
do  everything  in  my  power  to  save  my  life  and  put  my 
trust  in  God,  and  asked  his  aid  in  my  extremity.  But 
for  divine  aid,  I would  not  now  have  the  privilege  of 
writing  my  awful  experiences  in  that  hell-hole  of  a jail. 

The  officer  who  arrested  me  without  any  warrant  of 
law,  and  without  any  unlawful  act  on  my  part  was  the 
tool  of  some  person  or  persons  who  were  either  paid 

for  their  heinous  crime,  or  of  the  landlady  of  the 

hotel  (he  had  been  a clerk  there)  who  allowed  gambling 
to  go  on  nearly  every  night,  and  thought  I was  a de- 
tective or  spy,  and  so  was  instrumental  in  having  me 
thrown  into  jail. 

I begged  so  hard  not  to  be  locked  in  the  cell  that  I 
was  allowed  to  stay  in  the  corridor  in  front  of  the  cells. 
I observed  chloral  dripping  through  the  roof  of  the 
cell-house  in  different  places,  and  as  I had  had  some 
experience  with  different  drugs,  I detected  the  smell  of 
chloral  as  soon  as  I entered  the  cell-house. 

Sometime  after  midnight  some  one  stopped  up  the 
stovepipe  and  the  door  of  the  coal  stove  was  left  open 
so  that  the  coal  gas  issued  from  the  stove,  so  that 
breathing  was  difficult  in  the  jail.  The  gases  from  the 
stove  and  other  gases  poisoned  the  air  . . . and  your 
humble  servant  had  the  presence  of  mind  to  tear  up  a 
hair  mattress  and  kept  my  nostrils  continually  filled 
with  padding  out  of  the  mattress.  I would  often  and 
instantly  change  the  filling  in  one  nostril,  and  not 
during  the  long  hours  of  that  awful  night  did  I once 

69 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


open  my  mouth.  In  that  manner  I inhaled  very  little 
gases.  Why  in  my  weakened  condition  and  my  poor 
health  anyone  wanted  to  deprive  me  of  my  life  I am 
at  a loss  to  know,  but  failing  to  kill  me,  I was  taken 
after  nearly  three  days  of  sojourn  in  that  hell-hole  to 
the  courthouse  in . But  such  thoughts  as  an  inno- 

cent man  in  my  condition  would  think,  in  among 
criminals  of  all  sorts,  can  better  be  imagined  than  de- 
scribed. ...  I thought  of  Christ’s  persecutors  and  I 
thought  how  the  innocent  suffer  because  of  the  wicked. 

In  general  we  may  say  that  the  various 
forms  of  psychoneurosis  are  characterized  by 
a conflict  of  the  ego  with  primitive  impulses 
inadequately  repressed.  In  defense  against 
these  impulses,  which  though  active  remain 
unconsciously  so,  the  individual  constructs  a 
fictitious  system  of  ideas,  of  symbolic  acts,  or 
bodily  symptoms.  These  systems  are  at- 
tempts to  compromise  the  conflict  in  the  un- 
conscious, and  in  just  the  degree  that  they 
are  demanded  for  this  function,  they  fail  of 
their  function  of  adjusting  the  individual  to 
his  external  world.  Thought  and  behavior 
thus  serve  the  purpose  of  compensating  for 
some  psychic  loss,  and  of  keeping  up  the 
individual’s  self  feeling.  Though  the  uncon- 
scious purpose  is  to  enhance  the  ego  con- 
sciousness, the  mechanisms  through  which 
this  end  is  achieved  produce  through  their 
automatic  and  stereotyped  form  a shrinking 
of  personality  and  a serious  lack  of  adjustment 
to  environment. 


70 


THE  CROWD  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


Now  it  is  not  at  all  the  aim  of  this  argument 
to  try  to  prove  that  crowds  are  really  insane. 
Psychoanalysts  commonly  assert  that  the 
difference  between  the  normal  and  the  ab- 
normal is  largely  one  of  degree  and  of  success 
in  adjustment.  We  are  told  that  the  conflict 
exists  also  in  normal  people,  with  whom,  how- 
ever, it  is  adequately  repressed  and  “subli- 
mated”— that  is,  normal  people  pass  on  out 
of  the  stages  in  which  the  libido  of  the  neu- 
rotic becomes  fixed,  not  by  leaving  them 
behind,  but  by  attaching  the  interests  which 
emerge  in  such  stages  to  ends  which  are  useful 
in  future  experience.  The  neurotic  takes  the 
solitary  path  of  resolving  the  conflict  between 
his  ego  and  the  impulses  which  society  de- 
mands shall  be  repressed. 

It  is  altogether  conceivable  that  another 
'path  lies  open — that  of  occasional  compromise 
in  our  mutual  demands  on  one  another.  The 
force  of  repression  is  then  relaxed  by  an  un- 
conscious change  in  the  significance  of  social 
ideas.  Such  a change  must  of  course  be 
mutual  and  unconscious.  Compromise  mech- 
anisms will  again  be  formed  serving  a purpose 
similar  to  the  neurosis.  As  in  the  neurosis^ 
thought  and  action  will  be  compulsory,  sym- 
bolic, stereotyped,  and  more  or  less  in  conflict 
with  the  demands  of  society  as  a whole,  though 
functioning  in  a part  of  it  for  certain  purposes. 
Many  of  the  characteristics  of  the  uncon- \( 

71  ^ 


K 


I / 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

scious  will  then  appear  and  will  be  similar  in 
some  respects  to  those  of  neurosis.  It  is  my 
contention  that  this  is  what  happens  in  the 
crowd,  and  I will  now  point  out  certain  phases 
of  crowd-behavior  which  are  strikingly  anal- 
ogous to  some  of  the  phenomena  which  have 
been  described  above. 


IV 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 

HE  unconscious  egoism  of  the  individual 


1 in  the  crowd  appears  in  all  forms  of 
crowd-behavior.  As  in  dreams  and  in  the 
neurosis  this  self  feeling  is  frequently  though 
thinly  disguised,  and  I am  of  the  opinion  that 
with  the  crowd  the  mechanisms  of  this  dis- 
guise are  less  subtle.  To  use  a term  which 
Freud  employs  in  this  connection  to  describe 
the  proeess  of  distortion  in  dreams,  the  “cen- 
sor” is  less  active  in  the  crowd  than  in  most 
phases  of  mental  life.  Though  the  conscious 
thinking  is  carried  on  in  abstract  and  imper- 
sonal formula,  and  though,  as  in  the  neurosis, 
the  “eompulsive”  character  of  the  mechan- 
isms developed  frequently — espeeially  in  per- 
manent crowds — well  nigh  reduces  the  in- 
dividual to  an  automaton,  the  crowd  is  one  of 
the  most  naive  devices  that  can  be  employed  y 
for  enhancing  one’s  ego  consciousness.  The 
individual  has  only  to  transfer  his  repressed 
self  feeling  to  the  idea  of  the  crowd  or  group  of 
which  he  is  a member;  he  can  then  exalt  and 

6 73 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


exhibit  himself  to  almost  any  extent  without 
shame,  oblivious  of  the  fact  that  the  su- 
premacy, power,  praise,  and  glory  which  he 
claims  for  his  crowd  are  really  claimed  for 
himself. 

That  the  crowd  always  insists  on  being 
flattered  is  a fact  known  intuitively  by  every 
orator  and  editor.  As  a member  of  a crowd 
the  individual  becomes  part  of  a public.  The 
worship  with  which  men  regard  “The  Public,” 
simply  means  that  the  personal  self  falls  at 
the  feet  of  the  same  self  regarded  as  public, 
and  likewise  demands  that  obeisance  from  all. 
Vox  'po'puli  est  vox  Dei  is  obviously  the  apothe- 
osis of  one’s  own  voice  while  speaking  as 
crowd-man.  WTien  this  “god-almightiness” 
manifests  itself  along  the  solitary  path  of  the 
psychoneurosis  it  becomes  one  of  the  common 
symptoms  of  paranoia.  The  crow-d,  in  com- 
mon with  paranoia,  uniformly  shows  this 
quality  of  “megalomania.”  Every  crowd 
“boosts  for”  itself,  lauds  itself,  gives  itself 
airs,  speaks  wdth  oracular  finality,  regards 
itself  as  morally  superior,  and  will,  so  far  as 
it  has  the  powder,  lord  it  over  everyone.  No- 
tice how  each  group  and  section  in  society,  so 
far  as  it  permits  itself  to  think  as  crowd,  claims 
to  be  “the  people.”  To  the  w^orking-class 
agitator,  “the  cause  of  labor  is  the  cause  of 
humanity,”  workers  are  always,  “innocent 
exploited  victims,  kept  down  by  the  master 

74 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


class  whose  lust  for  gain  has  made  them 
enemies  of  Humanity  and  Justice.”  “Work- 
ers should  rule  because  they  are  the  only 
useful  people;  the  sole  creators  of  wealth; 
their  dominance  would  mean  the  end  of  social 
wrong,  and  the  coming  of  the  millennium  of 
peace  and  brotherhood,  the  Kingdom  of 
Heaven  on  the  Earth,  the  final  triumph  of 
Humanity!” 

On  the  other  hand,  the  wealthy  and  edu- 
cated classes  speak  of  themselves  as  “the 
best  people”;  they  are  “society.”  It  is  they 
who  “bear  the  burdens  of  civilization,  and 
maintain  Law  and  Order  and  Decency.” 
Racial  and  national  crowds  show  the  same 
megalomania.  Hebrews  are  “God’s  chosen.” 
“The  Dutch  Company  is  the  best  Company 
that  ever  came  over  from  the  Old  Country.” 
“The  Irish  may  be  ornery,  and  they  ain’t 
worth  much,  but  they  are  a whole  lot  better 

than  the Dutch.”  “Little  Nigger 

baby,  black  face,  and  shiny  eye,  you’re  just  as 
good  as  the  poor  white  trash,  an’  you’ll  git  thar 
by  and  by.”  “He  might  have  been  a Russian 
or  a Prussian,  . . . but  it’s  greatly  to  his  credit 
that  he  is  an  Englishman.”  The  German  is 
the  happy  bearer  of  Kultur  to  a barbarian 
world.  America  is  “The  land  of  the  free 
and  the  home  of  the  brave,”  and  so  on,  wher- 
ever a group  has  become  sufficiently  a crowd 
to  have  a propaganda  of  its  own.  Presby- 

75 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


terians  are  “the  Elect,”  the  Catholics  have  the 
“true  church  of  God,”  the  Christian  Scientists 
have  alone  attained  “Absolute  Truth.” 

/ A number  of  years  ago,  when  the  interest 
in  the  psychology  of  the  crowd  led  me  to 
attempt  a study  of  Mr.  Sunday’s  revival 
meetings,  then  in  their  earlier  stages,  certain 
facts  struck  me  with  great  force.  MTiatever 
else  the  revival  may  be,  it  provides  the  stu- 
dent of  psychology  with  a delightful  specimen 
for  analysis.  Every  element  of  the  mob  or 
crowd-mind  is  present  and  the  unconscious 
manifests  itself  with  an  easy  naivete  which  is 
probably  found  nowhere  else,  not  even  in  the 
psychiatric  clinic.  One  striking  fact,  which 
has  since  provided  me  with  food  for  a good  deal 
of  reflection,  was  the  place  which  the  revival 
holds  in  what  I should  like  tcvcall  the  spiritual 
economy  of  modern  democracy. 

It  is  an  interesting  historical  fact  that  each 
great  religious  revival,  from  Savonarola  down, 
has  immediately  followed — and  has  been  the 
resistance  of  the  man  in  the  street  to — ^a  pe- 
riod of  intellectual  awakening.  Mr.  Sunday’s 
meetings  undeniably  provided  a device  where- 
by a certain  psychic  type,  an  element  which 
had  hitherto  received  scant  recognition  in 
the  community,  could  enormously  enhance 
his  ego  consciousness.  It  would  be  mani- 
festly unfair  to  say  that  this  is  the  sole  motive 
of  the  religious  revival,  or  that  only  this  type 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


of  mind  is  active  in  it.  But  it  is  interesting  to 
see  whose  social  survival  values  stand  out  most 
prominently  in  these  religious  crowd-phenom- 
ena. The  gambler,  the  drunkard,  the  loafer, 
the  weak,  ignorant,  and  unsuccessful,  whose 
self-esteem  it  may  be  assumed  had  always 
been  made  to  suffer  in  small  communities, 
where  everyone  knew  everyone  else,  had  only 
to  yield  himself  to  the  pull  of  the  obviously 
worked-up  mechanism  of  the  religious  crowd, 
and  lo!  all  was  changed.  He  was  now  the 
repentant  sinner,  the  new  convert,  over  whom 
there  was  more  rejoicing  in  heaven,  and,  what 
was  more  visible,  also  for  a brief  time,  in  the 
Church,  than  over  the  ninety  and  nine  just 
persons.  He  was  “redeemed,”  an  object  now 
of  divine  love,  a fact  which  anyone  who  has 
studied  the  effects  of  these  crowd-movements 
scientifically  will  agree  was  at  once  seized 
upon  by  these  converts  to  make  their  own 
moral  dilemmas  the  standards  of  righteousness 
in  the  community,  and  hence  secure  some 
measure  of  dominance. 

This  self-adulation  of  crowds,  with  its  ac- 
companying will  to  be  important,  to  dominate, 
is  so  constant  and  characteristic  a feature  of 
the  crowd-mind  that  I doubt  if  any  crowd  can 
long  survive  which  fails  to  perform  this 
function  for  its  members.  Self-flattery  is 
evident  in  the  pride  with  which  many  people 
wear  badges  and  other  insignia  of  groups  and 

77 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


organizations  to  which  they  belong,  and  in 
the  pompous  names  by  which  fraternal  orders 
are  commonly  designated.  In  its  more  “ex- 
hibitionist” types  it  appears  in  parades  and 
in  the  favorite  ways  in  which  students  display 
their  “college  spirit.”  How  many  school  and 
college  “yells”  begin  with  the  formula,  “Who 
are  We.^”  obviously  designed  to  call  general 
attention  to  the  group  and  impress  upon 
people  its  importance. 

In  this  connection  I recall  my  ovti  student 
days,  which  are  doubtless  typical — the  pranks 
which  served  the  purpose  of  bringing  certain 
groups  of  students  into  temporary  prominence 
and  permitted  them  for  a brief  period  to 
regard  themselves  as  comic  heroes,  the  prac- 
tices by  which  the  different  classes  and  so- 
cieties sought  to  get  the  better  of  one  another, 
the  “love  feasts”  of  my  society  which  were 
hardly  more  than  mutual  admiration  gather- 
ings, the  “pajama”  parades  in  which  the  en- 
tire student  body  would  march  in  costume 
(the  wearing  of  which  by  an  isolated  individual 
would  probably  have  brought  him  before  a 
lunacy  commission)  all  through  the  town  and 
round  and  round  the  dormitories  of  the 
women’s  college  a mile  or  so  away,  in  order  to 
announce  a victory  in  some  intercollegiate 
contest  or  other.  There  was  the  brazenness 
—it  seems  hardly  credible  now — with  which 
the  victors  on  such  occasions  would  permit 

78 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


themselves  to  be  carried  on  their  comrades* 
shoulders  through  the  public  square,  also  the 
deportment  with  which  a delegation  of  stu- 
dents would  announce  their  arrival  in  a neigh- 
boring college  town  and  the  grinning  self- 
congratulation  with  which  we  would  sit  in 
chapel  and  hear  a wrathful  president  de- 
nounce our  group  behavior  as  “boorishness 
and  hoodlumism.”  There  was  the  unani- 
mous conviction  of  us  all,  for  no  other  reason 
I imagine  than  that  it  was  graced  with  our 
particular  presence,  that  our  own  institution 
was  the  most  superior  college  in  existence,  and 
I well  remember  the  priggishness  with  which 
at  student  banquets  we  applauded  the  senti- 
ment repeated  ad  nauseam,  that  the  great  aim 
of  education  and  the  highest  mark  of  excel- 
lence in  our  college  was  the  development  of 
character.  What  is  it  all  but  a slightly  exag- 
gerated account  of  the  egoism  of  all  organized 
crowds?  Persons  of  student  age  are  for  the 
most  part  still  in  the  normal  “narcissus” 
period,  and  their  ego-mania  is  naturally  less 
disguised  than  that  of  older  groups.  But 
even  then  we  could  never  have  given  such 
open  manifestation  to  it  as  isolated  individu- 
als; it^  required  the  CTOwd-spirit. 

The  egoism  of  thje'crdwd''cornnionly  takes 
the  form  of  the  will  to  social  dominance  and 
it  is  in  crowd  behavior  that  we  learn  how 
insatiable  the  repressed  egoism  of  mankind 

79 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

really  is.^  Members  of  the  crowd  are  always 
j^omismg  one  another  a splendid  future  tri- 
umph of  some  sort.  This  promise  of  victorj^ 
which  is  nearly  always  to  be  enjoyed  at  the 
expense,  discomfiture,  and  humiliation  of 
somebody  else,  is  of  great  advantage  in  the 
work  of  propaganda.  People  have  only  to 
be  persuaded  that  prohibition,  or  equal  suf- 
frage, or  the  single  tax  “is  coming,”  and  thou- 
sands whose  reason  could  not  be  moved  by 
argument,  however  logical  it  might  be,  will 
begin  to  look  upon  it  with  favor.  The  crowd 
is  never  so  much  at  home  as  “on  the  band 
wagon.”  Each  of  the  old  political  parties 
gains  strength  through  the  repeated  predic- 
tion of  victory  in  the  presidential  campaign  of 
1920.  The  Socialist  finds  warmth  in  the 
contemplation  of  the  “coming  dictatorship  of 
the  proletariat.”  The  Prohibitionist  intoxi- 
cates himself  by  looking  forward  to  a “dry 
world.”  So  long  as  the  German  crowds  ex- 
pected a victorious  end  of  the  war,  their  morale 
remained  unbroken,  the  Kaiser  was  popular. 

When  a crowd  is  defeated  and  its  hope  of 
victory  fades,  the  individual  soon  abandons 
the  unsuccessful  group.  The  great  cause, 
being  now  a forlorn  hope,  is  seen  in  a different 
light,  and  the  crowd  character  of  the  group 
vanishes.  When,  however,  certain  forces  still 
operate  to  keep  the  crowd  state  of  mind 

alive — forces  such  as  race  feeling,  patriotism, 

80 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


religious  belief,  or  class  consciousness — the  ego 
consciousness  of  the  individuals  so  grouped 
finds  escape  in  the  promise  of  heaven,  the 
Judgment  Day,  and  that  “far  off  divine  event 
toward  which  the  whole  creation  moves.” 
Meanwhile  the  hope  of  victory  is  changed  into 
that  “impotent  resentment”  so  graphically 
described  by  Nietzsche. 

Another  way  in  which  the  self  feeling  of  the 
crowd  functions  is  in  idealizing  those  who 
I succeed  in  gaining  its  recognition.  The  crowd 
always  makes  a hero  of  the  public  person, 
living  or  dead.  Regardless  of  what  he  really 
did  or  was,  he  is  transformed  into  a symbol  of 
what  the  crowd  wishes  to  believe  him  to  be. 
Certain  aspects  of  his  teaching  and  various 
incidents  w^hich  would  appear  in  his  biography 
are  glossed  over,  and  made  into  supports  for 
existing  crowd-ideas  and  prejudices.  Most  of 
the  great  characters  in  history  have  suffered 
in  this  way  at  the  hands  of  tradition.  The 
secret  of  their  greatness,  their  uniqueness  and 
spiritual  isolation,  is  in  great  part  ignored. 
The  crowd’s  owm  secret  is  substituted.  The 
great  man  now  appears  great  because  he  pos- 
sessed the  qualities  of  little  men.  He  is  repre- 
sentative man,  crowd  man.  Every  crowd  has 
a list  of  heroic  names  which  it  uses  in  its  propa- 
ganda and  in  its  self -laudation.  The  great- 
ness which  each  crowed  reveres  and  demands 

that  all  men  honor  is  just  that  greatness  which 

81 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


the  crowd  treasures  as  a symbol  of  itself,  the 
sort  of  superiority  which  the  members  of  the 
crowd  may  suck  up  to  swell  their  own  ego 
consciousness. 

Thus,  hero  worship  is  unconsciously  worship 
of  the  crowd  itself,  and  the  constituents  there- 
of. The  self-feeling  of  a crowd  is  always  en- 
hanced by  the  triumph  of  its  leader  or  repre- 
sentative. WTio,  at  a ball  game  or  athletic 
event,  has  not  experienced  elation  and  added 
self-complacency  in  seeing  the  home  team 
win?  What  other  meaning  has  the  excited 
cheering?  Even  a horse  on  a race  track  may 
become  the  representative  of  a crowd  and 
lift  five  thousand  people  into  the  wildest  joy 
and  ecstasy  by  passing  under  a wire  a few 
inches  ahead  of  a rival.  We  have  here  one  of 
the  secrets  of  the  appeal  which  all  such  ex- 
hibitions make  to  people.  Nothing  so  easily 
catches  general  attention  and  creates  a crowd 
as  a contest  of  any  kind.  The  crowd  uncon- 
sciously identifies  its  members  with  one  or 
the  other  competitor.  Success  enables  the 
winning  crowd  to  “crow  over”  the  losers. 
Such  an  occasion  becomes  symbolic  and  is 
utilized  by  the  ego  to  enhance  its  feeling  of 
importance. 

A similar  psychological  fact  may  be  ob- 
served in  the  “jollifications”  of  political 
parties  after  the  election  of  their  candidates 

for  high  office.  This  phenomenon  is  also 

82 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


seen,  if  I may  say  so  without  being  misunder- 
stood, in  the  new  spirit  which  characterizes 
a people  victorious  in  war,  and  is  to  no  small 
degree  the  basis  of  the  honor  of  successful 
nations.  It  is  seen  again  in  the  pride  which 
the  citizens  of  a small  town  show  in  the  fact 
that  the  governor  of  the  state  is  a native  of 
the  place.  This  same  principle  finds  place  in 
such  teachings  of  the  Church  as  the  doctrine 
of  the  “communion  of  the  saints,”  according 
to  which  the  spiritual  grace  and  superiority 
of  the  great  and  pure  become  the  common 
property  of  the  Church,  and  may  be  shared 
by  all  believers  as  a saving  grace. 

Every  organized  crowd  is  jealous  of  its  ^ 
dignity  and  honor  and  is  bent  upon  keeping 
up  appearances.  Nothing  is  more  fatal  to  it 
than  a successful  assault  upon  its  prestige. 
Every  crowd,  even  the  casual  street  mob, 
clothes  the  egoistic  desires  of  its  members  or 
participants  in  terms  of  the  loftiest  moral 
motive.  No  crowd  can  afford  to  be  laughed 
at.  Crowd  men  have  little  sense  of  humor, 
certainly  none  concerning  themselves  and 
their  crowd-ideas.  Any  laughter  they  indulge 
in  is  more  likely  to  be  directed  at  those  who 
do  not  believe  with  them.  The  crowd-man 
resents  any  suspicion  of  irreverence  or  criti- 
cism of  his  professions,  because  to  question 
them  is  to  weaken  the  claim  of  his  crowd  upon 
the  people,  and  to  destroy  in  those  professed 

83 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


ideals  their  function  of  directing  his  own 
attention  away  from  the  successful  compro- 
mise of  his  unconscious  conflicts  which  the 
crowd  had  enabled  him  to  make.  The  crowd 
would  perish  if  it  lost  its  “ideals.”  It  clings 
to  its  fixed  ideas  with  the  same  tenacity  as 
does  the  paranoiac.  You  can  no  more  reason 
w ith  the  former  than  you  can  w ith  the  latter, 
and  for  much  the  same  cause;  the  beliefs  of 
both  are  not  the  fruit  of  inquiry,  neither  do 
they  perform  the  normal  intellectual  function 
of  adjustment  to  environment;  they  are 
mechanisms  of  the  ego  by  which  it  keeps  itself 
m countenance. 

Much  of  the  activity  of  the  unconscious 
ego  is  viewed  by  psychologists  as  “compensa- 
tion.” Devices  which  serve  the  purpose  of 
compensating  the  ego  for  some  loss,  act  of  self- 
sacrifice,  or  failure,  are  commonly  revealed 
by  both  the  normal  and  the  unadjusted.  The 
popular  notion  that  unsatisfied  desires  sooner 
or  later  perish  of  starvation  is  at  best  but  a 
half  truth.  These  desires  after  we  have  ceased 
to  attend  them  become  transformed.  They 
frequently  find  satiety  in  some  substitute 
which  the  unconscious  accepts  as  a symbol  of 
its  real  object.  Dreams  of  normal  people 
contain  a great  deal  of  material  of  this  sort. 
So  do  day-dreams,  and  art.  Many  religious 
beliefs  also  serve  this  purpose  of  compensation. 
Jung  follows  Freud  in  pointing  out  as  a classic 

84 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


example  of  the  compensation  in  dreams,  that 
of  Nebuchadnezzar,  in  the  Bible. 

Nebuchadnezzar  at  the  height  of  his  power  had  a 
dream  which  foretold  his  downfall.  He  dreamed  of  a 
tree  which  had  raised  its  head  even  up  to  Heaven  and 
now  must  be  hewn  down.  This  was  a dream  which  is 
obviously  a counterpoise  to  the  exaggerated  feeling  of 
royal  power. 

According  to  Jung,  we  may  expect  to  find 
only  those  things  contained  in  the  uncon- 
scious which  we  have  not  found  in  the  eon- 
scious  mind.  Many  eonscious  virtues  and 
traits  of  character  are  thus  compensations  for 
their  opposite  in  the  unconscious. 

In  the  case  of  abnormal  people,  the  individual  entirely 
fails  to  recognize  the  compensating  influences  which 
arise  in  the  unconscious.  He  even  continues  to  ac- 
centuate his  onesidedness;  this  is  in  accord  with  the 
well-known  psychological  fact  that  the  worst  enemy  of 
the  wolf  is  the  wolfhound,  the  greatest  despiser  of  the 
negro  is  the  mulatto,  and  that  the  biggest  fanatic  is  the 
convert;  for  I should  be  a fanatic  were  I to  attack  a 
thing  outwardly  which  inwardly  I am  obliged  to  con- 
cede is  right. 

The  mentally  unbalanced  man  tries  to  defend  him- 
self against  his  own  unconscious — that  is  to  say,  he 
battles  against  his  own  compensating  influences.  In 
normal  minds  opposites  of  feeling  and  valuations  lie 
closely  associated;  the  law  of  this  association  is  called 
“ambivalence,”  about  which  we  shall  see  more  later. 
In  the  abnormal,  the  pairs  are  torn  asmider,  the  re- 
sulting division,  or  strife,  leads  to  disaster,  for  the  un- 

85 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


conscious  soon  begins  to  intrude  itself  violently  upon 
the  conscious  processes. 

An  especially  typical  form  of  unconscious  compen- 
sation ...  is  the  paranoia  of  the  alcoholic.  The  alco- 
holic loses  his  love  for  his  wife;  the  unconscious  com- 
pensation tries  to  lead  him  back  again  to  his  duty,  but 
only  partially  succeeds,  for  it  causes  him  to  become 
jealous  of  his  wife  as  if  he  still  loved  her.  As  we  know, 
he  may  go  so  far  as  to  kill  both  his  wife  and  himself, 
merely  out  of  jealousy.  In  other  words,  his  love  for 
his  wife  has  not  been  entirely  lost.  It  has  simply 
become  subliminal;  but  from  the  realm  of  conscious- 
ness it  can  now  only  reappear  in  the  form  of  jealousy. . . . 
We  see  something  of  a similar  nature  in  the  case  of  the 
religious  convert.  . . . The  new  convert  feels  himself 
constrained  to  defend  the  faith  he  has  adopted  (since 
much  of  the  old  faith  still  survives  in  the  unconscious 
associations)  in  a more  or  less  fanatical  way.  It  is 
exactly  the  same  in  the  paranoiac  who  feels  himself 
constantly  constrained  to  defend  himself  against  all 
external  criticism,  because  his  delusional  sj^stem  is  too 
much  threatened  from  within. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  enter  here  upon 
a discussion  of  the  processes  by  which  these 
compensating  devices  are  wrought  out  in  the 
psychoneurosis.  It  is  significant,  though,  that 
Jung  calls  attention  to  the  likeness  between 
religious  fanaticism  and  paranoia.  Now  it  is 
obvious  that  the  fanaticism  of  the  religious 
convert  differs  psychologicallj^  not  at  all  from 
that  of  any  other  convert.  We  have  already 
noted  the  fact  that  most  religious  conversions 

are  accomplished  by  the  crowd.  Moreover 

86 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


the  crowd  everywhere  tends  to  fanaticism. 
The  fanatic  is_^e  crowd-man  pure  and  simple. 
He  is  the  type  which  it  ever  strives  to  produce. 
His  excess  of  devotion,  and  willingness  to 
sacrifice  both  himself  and  everyone  else  for 
the  crowd’s  cause,  always  wins  the  admira- 
tion of  his  fellow  crowd-members.  He  has 
given  all  for  the  crowd,  is  wholly  swallowed 
by  it,  is  “determined  not  to  know  anything 
save”  his  crowd  and  its  propaganda.  He  is 
the  martyr,  the  true  believer,  “ the  red-blooded 
loyal  American”  with  “my  country  right  or 
wrong.”  He  is  the  uncompromising  radical 
whose  prison  record  puts  to  shame  the  less 
enthusiastic  members  of  his  group.  He  is  the 
militant  pacifist,  the  ever-watchful  prohibi- 
tionist, and  keeper  of  his  neighbors’  con- 
sciences, the  belligerent  moral  purist,  who 
is  scandalized  even  at  the  display  of  lingerie 
in  the  store  windows,  the  professional  re- 
former who  in  every  community  succeeds 
in  making  his  goodness  both  indispensable 
and  unendurable. 

One  need  not  be  a psychologist  to  suspect 
that  the  evil  against  which  the  fanatic  strug- 
gles is  really  in  large  measure  in  himself. 
He  has  simply  externalized,  or  “projected” 
the  conflict  in  his  own  unconscious.  Persons 
who  cry  aloud  with  horror  at  every  change  in 
the  style  of  women’s  clothing  are  in  most 
cases  persons  whose  ego  is  gnawed  by  a secret 

87 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


promiscuous  eroticism.  The  scandalmonger, 
inhibited  from  doing  the  forbidden  thing,  en- 
joys himself  by  a vicarious  indulgence  in 
rottenness.  The  prohibition  agitator,  if  not 
himself  an  alcoholic  barely  snatched  from  the 
burning,  is  likely  to  be  one  who  at  least  feels 
safer  in  a democracy  where  it  is  not  necessary 
to  resist  temptation  while  passing  a saloon 
door.  Notice  that  the  fanatic  or  crowd-man 
always  strives  to  universalize  his  owm  moral 
dilemmas.  This  is  the  de\dce  by  which  every 
crowd  seeks  dominance  in  the  earth.  A 
crowd’s  virtues  and  its  vices  are  really  made 
out  of  the  same  stuff.  Each  is  simply  the 
other  turned  upside  down,  the  compensation 
for  the  other.  They  are  alike  and  must  be 
understood  togetlier  as  the  expression  of  the 
type  of  person  who  constitutes  the  member- 
ship of  some  particular  group  or  crowd. 

I’ll  never  use  tobacco,  it  is  a filthy  weed 

I’ll  never  put  it  in  my  mouth,  said  little  Robert  Reed. 

But  obviously,  little  Robert  is  already  ob- 
sessed with  a curious  interest  in  tobacco. 
His  first  word  shows  that  he  has  already  begun 
to  think  of  this  weed  in  connection  with  him- 
self. Should  a crowd  of  persons  struggling 
with  Robert’s  temptation  succeed  in  dominat- 
ing society,  tobacco  would  become  taboo  and 

thus  would  acquire  a moral  significance  which 

88 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


it  does  not  have  at  present.  So  with  all  our 
crowd-ethics.  The  forbidden  thing  protrudes 
itself  upon  consciousness  as  a negation.  The 
negation  reveals  what  it  is  that  is  occupying 
^the  inner  psyche,  and  is  its  compensation. 

( There  are  certain  psychoneuroses  in  which 
> this  negative  form  of  compensation  is  very 
{ marked.  Now  it  is  a noteworthy  fact  that 
I with  the  crowd  the  ethical  interest  always 
V takes  this  negative  form. 

The  healthy  moral  will  is  characterized  by 
a constant  restating  of  the  problem  of  living 
in  terms  of  richer  and  higher  and  more  sig- 
nificant dilemmas  as  new  possibilities  of  per- 
sonal worth  are  revealed  by  experience.  New 
and  more  daring  valuations  are  constantly 
made.  The  whole  psychic  functioning  is  en- 
riched. Goodness  means  an  increase  of  satis- 
factions through  a more  adequate  adjustment 
to  the  real — richer  experience,  more  subtle 
power  of  appreciation  and  command,  a self- 
mastery,  sureness,  and  general  personal  ex- 
cellence— which  on  occasions  great  and  small 
mark  the  good  will  as  a reality  which  counts 
in  the  sum  total  of  things.  Something  is 
achieved  because  it  is  really  desired;  existence 
is  in  so  far  humanized,  a self  has  been  realized. 
As  Professor  Dewey  says : 

If  our  study  has  shown  anything  it  is  that  the  moral 
is  a life,  not  something  ready-made  and  complete  once 
for  all.  It  is  instinct  with  movement  and  struggle, 

7 89 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


and  it  is  precisely  the  new  and  serious  situations  which 
call  out  new  vigor  and  lift  it  to  higher  levels. 

It  is  not  so  with  the  crowd-ethic.  It  is 
/^Interesting  to  note  that  from  the  “Decalogue” 
to  Kant’s  “Categorical  Imperative,”  crowd- 
morals  always  and  everywhere  take  the  form 
I of  prohibitions,  taboos,  and  ready-made  stand- 
/ ards,  chiefly  negative.  Freud  has  made  an 
^ analytical  studjy  of  the  Taboo  as  found  in 
primitive  society  and  has  shown  that  it  has  a 
compensatory  value  similar  to  that  of  the 
taboos  and  compulsions  of  certain  neurotics. 

The  crowd  admits  of  no  personal  superiority 
other  than  that  which  consists  in  absolute 
conformity  to  its  own  negative  standards. 
Except  for  the  valuations  expressed  by  its 
own  dilemmas,  “one  man  is  as  good  as  an- 
other”— an  idea  which  it  can  be  easily  seen 
serves  the  purpose  of  compensation.  The 
goodness  which  consists  of  unique  personal 
superiority  is  very  distasteful  to  the  crowd. 
There  must  be  only  one  standard  of  behavior, 
alike  for  all.  A categorical  imperative.  The 
standard  as  set  up  is  of  the  sort  which  is  most 
congenial,  possible  of  attainment,  and  even 
necessary  for  the  survival  of  the  members  of 
some  particular  crowd.  It  is  their  good,  the 
converse  and  compensation  of  their  own  ^dces, 
temptations,  and  failures.  The  crowd  then 
demands  that  this  good  shall  be  the  good, 

90 


THE  EGOISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 


that  it  become  the  universal  standard.  By 
such  means  even  the  most  incompetent  and 
unadventurous  and  timid  spirits  may  pass 
judgment  upon  all  men.  They  may  cry  to 
the  great  of  the  earth,  “We  have  piped  unto 
you  and  you  have  not  danced.”  Judged  by 
the  measure  of  their  conformity  to  the  stand- 
ards of  the  small,  the  great  may  be  considered 
no  better,  possibly  not  so  good  as  the  little 
spirits.  The  well  are  forced  to  behave  like 
the  spiritually  sick.  The  crowd  is  a dog  in 
the  manger.  If  eating  meat  maketh  my 
brother  to  be  scandalized,  or  giveth  him  the 
cramps,  I shall  remain  a vegetarian  so  long  as 
the  world  standeth.  Nietzsche  was  correct  on 
this  point.  The  crowd — he  called  it  the  herd 
— is  a weapon  of  revenge  in  the  hands  of  the 
weaker  brother.  It  is  a Procrustean  bed  on 
which  every  spiritual  superiority  may  be 
lopped  off  to  the  common  measure,  and  every 
little  ego  consciousness  may  be  stretched  to 
the  stature  of  full  manhood. 


V 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 

PROBiVBLY  the  most  telling  point  of  like- 
ness between  the  crowd-mind  and  the 
psychoneurosis — ^paranoia  especially — is  the  . 
, y “delusion  of  persecution.’*  In  cases  of  para- 
noia the  notion  that  the  patient  is  the  victim 
of  all  sorts  of  intrigue  and  persecution  is  so 
common  as  to  be  a distinguishing  symptom  of 
this  disease.  Such  delusions  are  known  to 
be  defenses,  or  compensation  mechanisms, 
growing  out  of  the  patient’s  exaggerated  feel- 
ing of  self-importance.  The  delusion  of  gran- 
deur and  that  of  being  persecuted  commonly 
go  together.  The  reader  will  recall  the  pas- 
sage quoted  from  the  pamphlet  given  me  by  a 
typical  paranoiac.  The  author  of  the  docu- 
ment mentioned  feels  that  he  has  a great  mis- 
sion, that  of  exposing  and  reforming  the  con- 
ditions in  hospitals  for  the  insane.  He  pro- 
tests his  innocence.  In  jail  he  feels  like  Christ 
among  his  tormentors.  His  wife  has  con- 
spired against  him.  The  woman  who  owns 
the  hotel  where  he  was  employed  wishes  to 

92 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


put  him  out  of  the  way.  The  most  fiendish 
methods  are  resorted  to  in  order  to  end  his 
life.  “Some  one”  blocked  up  the  stovepipe, 
etc.,  etc. 

Another  illustration  of  a typical  case  is 
given  by  Doctor  Brill.  I quote  scattered  pas- 
sages from  the  published  notes  on  the  case 
record  of  the  patient,  “E.  R.” 

He  graduated  in  1898  and  then  took  up  schoolteach- 
ing. . . . He  did  not  seem  to  get  along  well  with  his 
principal  and  other  teachers.  . . . He  imagined  that  the 
principal  and  other  teachers  were  trying  to  work  up  a 
“badger  game”  on  him,  to  the  effect  that  he  had  some 
immoral  relations  with  his  girl  pupils.  . . . 

In  1903  he  married,  after  a brief  courtship,  and  soon 
thereafter  took  a strong  dislike  to  his  brother-in-law 
and  sister  and  accused  them  of  immorality.  . . . He  also 
accused  his  wife  of  illicit  relations  with  his  brother  and 
his  brother-in-law,  Mr.  S. 

Mr.  S.,  his  brother-in-law,  was  the  arch  conspirator 
against  him.  He  also  (while  in  the  hospital)  imagined 
that  some  women  made  signs  to  him  and  were  in  the 
hospital  for  the  purpose  of  liberating  him.  Whenever 
he  beard  anybody  talking  he  immediately  referred  it 
to  himself.  He  interpreted  every  movement  and  ex- 
pression as  having  some  special  meaning  for  himself. . . . 

Now  and  then  (after  his  first  release  by  order  of  the 
court)  he  would  send  mysterious  letters  to  different 
persons  in  New  York  City.  At  that  time  one  of  his 
delusions  was  that  he  was  a great  statesman  and  that 
the  United  States  government  had  appointed  him  am- 
bassador (to  Canada),  but  that  the  “gang”  in  New 
York  City  had  some  one  without  ability  to  impersonate 
him  so  that  he  lost  his  appointment.  (Later,  while  con- 

93 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


fined  to  the  hospital  again)  he  thought  that  the  daughter 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States  came  to  visit 
him.  . . . 

After  the  patient  was  recommitted  to  Bellevue  Hos- 
pital, he  told  me  that  I (Doctor  Brill)  was  one  of  the 
“gang.”  I was  no  longer  his  wife  in  disguise  (as  he 
has  previously  imagined)  but  his  enemy. 

Brill’s  discussion  of  this  case  contains  an 
interesting  analysis  of  the  several  stages  of 
“regression”  and  the  unconscious  mechanisms 
which  characterize  paranoia.  He  holds  that 
such  cases  show  a “fixation”  in  an  earlier 
stage  of  psychosexual  development.  The  pa- 
tient, an  unconscious  homosexual,  is  really  in 
love  with  himself.  The  resulting  inner  con- 
flict appears,  with  its  defense  formations,  as 
the  delusion  of  grandeur  and  as  conscious 
hatred  for  the  person  or  persons  who  happen 
to  be  the  object  of  the  patient’s  homosexual 
wish  fancy.”  However  this  may  be,  the 
point  of  interest  for  our  study  is  the  “pro- 
jection” of  this  hatred  to  others.  Says  Brill: 

The  sentence,  “I  rather  hate  him”  becomes  trans- 
formed through  projection  into  the  sentence,  “he  hates 
(persecutes)  me,  which  justifies  my  hating  him.” 

The  paranoiac’s  delusional  system  inevi- 
tably brings  him  in  conflict  with  his  environ- 
ment, but  his  feeling  of  being  persecuted  is 
less  the  result  of  this  conflict  with  an  external 
situation  than  of  his  own  inner  conflict.  He 

94 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


convinces  himself  that  it  is  the  other,  or  others, 
not  he,  who  is  the  author  of  this  hatred.  He  is 
the  innocent  victim  of  their  malice. 

This  phenomenon  of  “projection  and  dis- 
placement” has  received  considerable  atten- 
tion in  analytical  psychology.  Freud,  in  the 
book.  Totem  and  Taboo,  shows  the  role  which 
projection  plays  in  the  primitive  man’s  fear 
of  demons.  The  demons  are  of  course  the 
spirits  of  the  dead.  But  how  comes  it  that 
primitive  people  fear  these  spirits,  and  attrib- 
ute to  them  every  sort  of  evil  design  against 
the  living To  quote  Freud: 

When  a wife  loses  her  husband,  or  a daughter  her 
mother,  it  not  infrequently  happens  that  the  survivor 
is  afficted  with  tormenting  scruples,  called  “obsessive 
reproaches,”  which  raise  the  question  whether  she  her- 
self has  not  been  guilty,  through  carelessness  or  neglect, 
of  the  death  of  the  beloved  person.  No  recalling  of  the 
care  with  which  she  nursed  the  invalid,  or  direct  refu- 
tation of  the  asserted  guilt,  can  put  an  end  to  the  tor- 
ture, which  is  the  pathological  expression  of  mourning 
and  which  in  time  slowly  subsides.  Psychoanalytic 
investigation  of  such  cases  has  made  us  acquainted 
with  the  secret  mainspring  of  this  affliction.  We  have 
ascertained  that  these  obsessive  reproaches  are  in  a 
certain  sense  justified.  . . . Not  that  the  mourner  has 
really  been  guilty  of  the  death  or  that  she  has  really 
been  careless,  as  the  obsessive  reproach  asserts;  but 
still  there  was  something  in  her,  a wish  of  which  she 
was  unaware,  which  was  not  displeased  with  the  fact 
that  death  came,  and  which  would  have  brought  it 
about  sooner  had  it  been  strong  enough.  The  reproach 

95 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


now  reacts  against  this  unconscious  wish  after  the  death 
of  the  beloved  person.  Such  hostility,  hidden  in  the 
unconscious  behind  tender  love,  exists  in  almost  all 
cases  of  intensive  emotional  allegiance  to  a particular 
person;  indeed,  it  represents  the  classic  case,  the  pro- 
totype of  the  ambivalence  of  human  emotions.  . . . 

By  assuming  a similar  high  degree  of  ambivalence  in 
the  emotional  life  of  primitive  races  such  as  psycho- 
analysis ascribes  to  persons  suffering  from  compulsion 
neurosis,  it  becomes  comprehensible  that  the  same  kind 
of  reaction  against  the  hostility  latent  in  the  uncon- 
scious behind  the  obsessive  reproaches  of  the  neurotic 
should  also  be  necessary  here  after  the  painful  loss  has 
occurred.  But  this  hostility,  which  is  painfully  felt 
in  the  unconscious  in  the  form  of  satisfaction  wdth  the 
demise,  experiences  a different  fate  in  the  case  of 
primitive  man:  the  defense  against  it  is  accomplished 
by  a displacement  upon  the  object  of  hostility — ^namely, 
the  dead.  We  call  this  defense  process,  frequent  in 
both  normal  and  diseased  psychic  life,  a “projec- 
tion.”  . . . Thus  we  find  that  taboo  has  growTi  out''oftEe 
soiT  of  an  ambivalent  emotional  attitude.  The  taboo 
of  the  dead  also  originates  from  the  opposition  between 
conscious  grief  and  the  unconscious  satisfaction  at 
death.  If  this  is  the  origin  of  the  resentment  of  spirits, 
it  is  self-evident  that  the  nearest  and  formerly  most 
beloved  survivors  have  to  feel  it  most.  As  in  neurotic 
symptoms,  the  taboo  regulations  evince  opposite  feel- 
ings. Their  restrictive  character  expresses  mourning, 
while  they  also  betray  very  clearly  wdiat  they  are  trying 
to  conceal — namely,  the  hostility  tow'ard  the  dead  which 
is  now  motivated  as  self-defense.  . . . 

The  double  feeling — tenderness  and  hostility — 
against  the  deceased,  which  we  consider  well-founded, 
endeavors  to  assert  itself  at  the  time  of  bereavement 
as  mourning  and  satisfaction.  A conflict  must  ensue 

96 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


between  these  contrary  feelings,  and  as  one  of  them — 
namely,  the  hostility,  is  altogether,  or  for  the  greater 
part,  unconscious,  the  conflict  cannot  result  in  a con- 
scious difference  in  the  form  of  hostility  or  tenderness,  as , 
for  instance,  when  we  forgive  an  injury  inflicted  upon 
us  by  some  one  we  love.  The  process  usually  adjusts 
itself  through  a special  psychic  mechanism  which  is 
designated  in  psychoanalysis  as  “projection.”  This 
unknown  hostility,  of  which  we  are  ignorant  and  of 
which  we  do  not  wish  to  know,  is  projected  from  our 
inner  perception  into  the  outer  world  and  is  thereby 
detached  from  our  own  person  and  attributed  to 
another.  Not  we,  the  survivors,  rejoice  because  we  are 
rid  of  the  deceased,  on  the  contrary  we  mourn  for  him ; 
but  now,  curiously  enough,  he  has  become  an  evil 
demon  who  would  rejoice  in  our  misfortune  and  who 
seeks  our  death.  The  survivors  must  now  defend 
themselves  against  this  evil  enemy;  they  are  freed 
from  inner  oppression,  but  they  have  only  succeeded 
in  exchanging  it  for  an  afliiction  from  without. 

Totem,  taboo,  demon  worship,  etc.,  are 
clearly  primitive  crowd-phenomena.  Freud’s 
main  argument  in  this  book  consists  in  showing 
the  likeness  between  these  phenomena  and  the 
compulsion  neurosis.  The  projection  of  un- 
conscious hostility  upon  demons  is  by  no 
means  the  only  sort  of  which  crowds  both 
primitive  and  modern  are  capable.  Neither 
must  the  hostility  always  be  unconscious. 
Projection  is  a common  device  whereby  even 
normal  and  isolated  individuals  justify  them- 
selves in  hating.  Most  of  us  love  to  think 
evil  of  our  enemies  and  opponents.  Just  as 

97 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


two  fighting  schoolboys  will  each  declare  that 
the  other  “began  it,”  so  our  dislike  of  people 
often  first  appears  to  our  consciousness  as  a 
conviction  that  they  dislike  or  entertain  un- 
friendly designs  upon  us.  There  is  a common 
type  of  female  neurotic  whose  repressed  erotic 
wishes  appear  in  the  form  of  repeated  accusa- 
tions that  various  of  her  men  acquaintances 
are  guilty  of  making  improper  advances  to  her. 
When  the  “white  slavery”  reform  movement 
swept  over  the  country — an  awakening  of  the 
public  conscience  which  would  have  accom- 
plished a more  unmixed  good  if  it  had  not  been 
taken  up  in  the  usual  crowd-spirit — it  was 
interesting  to  watch  the  newspapers  and  sen- 
sational propagandist  speakers  as  they  de- 
liberately encouraged  these  pathological  phe- 
nomena in  young  people.  The  close  psy- 
chological relation  between  the  neurosis  and 
the  crowd-mind  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the 
two  so  frequently  appear  at  the  same  moment, 
play  so  easily  into  each  other’s  hands,  and  are 
apparently  reactions  to  the  very  same  social 
situation. 

In  Brill’s  example  of  paranoia,  it  will  be 
remembered  that  the  patient’s  delusions  of 
persecution  took  the  form  of  such  statements 
as  that  the  “gang”  had  intrigued  at  Washing- 
ton to  prevent  his  appointment  as  ambassador, 
that  certain  of  his  relatives  were  in  a “con- 
spiracy against  him.”  How  commonly  such 

98 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 

phrases  and  ideas  occur  in  crowd-oratory  and 
in  the  crowd-newspaper  is  well  known  to  all. 
We  have  already  seen  that  the  crowd  in  most 
cases  identifies  itself  with  “the  people,”  “hu- 
manity,” “society,”  etc.  Listen  to  the  crowd- 
orator  and  you  will  also  learn  that  there  are 
all  sorts  of  abominable  “conspiracies”  against 
‘ ‘ the  people. ” “The  nation  is  full  of  traitors . ’ ’ 
The  Church  is  being  “undermined  by  cunning 
heretics.”  “The  Bolshevists  are  in  secret 
league  with  the  Germans  to  destroy  civiliza- 
tion.” “ Socialists  are  planning  to  corrupt  the 
morals  of  our  youth  and  undermine  the  sacred- 
ness of  the  home.”  “The  politicians’  gang 
intends  to  loot  the  community.”  “Wall  Street 
is  conspiring  to  rob  the  people  of  their  liber- 
ties.” “England  plans  to  reduce  America  to 
a British  colony  again.”  “Japan  is  getting 
ready  to  make  war  on  us.”  “German  mer- 
chants are  conducting  a secret  propaganda 
intending  to  steal  our  trade  and  pauperize  our 
nation.”  “The  Catholics  are  about  to  seize 
power  and  deliver  us  over  to  another  Inqui- 
sition.” “The  liquor  interests  want  only  to 
make  drunkards  of  our  sons  and  prostitutes  of 
our  daughters.”  And  so  on  and  so  forth,  wher- 
ever any  crowd  can  get  a hearing  for  its  propa- 
ganda. Always  the  public  welfare  is  at  stake; 
society  is  threatened.  The  “wrongs”  in- 
flicted upon  an  innocent  humanity  are  re- 
hearsed. Bandages  are  taken  off  every  social 

99 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


wound.  Every  scar,  be  it  as  old  as  Crom- 
well’s mistreatment  of  Ireland,  is  inflamed. 
“The  people  are  being  deceived,”  “kept 
down,”  “betrayed.”  They  must  rise  and 
throw  off  their  exploiters,  or  they  must  purge 
the  nation  of  disloyalty  and  “anarchy.” 

■ It  cannot  be  denied  that  our  present  social 
order  is  characterized  by  deep  and  funda- 
mental social  injustices,  nor  that  bitter  strug- 
gles between  the  various  groups  in  society  are 
inevitable.  But  the  crowd  forever  ignores  its 
own  share  in  the  responsibility  for  human 
ills,  and  each  crowd  persists  in  making  a 
caricature  of  its  enemies,  real  and  imagined, 
nourishing  itself  in  a delusion  of  persecution 
which  is  like  nothing  so  much  as  the  charac- 
teristic obsessions  of  the  paranoiac.  This 
suspiciousness,  this  habit  of  misrepresenta- 
tion and  exaggeration  of  every  conceivable 
wrong,  is  not  only  a great  hindrance  to  the 
conflicting  groups  in  adjusting  their  differ- 
ences, it  makes  impossible,  by  misrepresenting 
the  real  issue  at  stake,  any  effective  struggle 
for  ideals.  As  the  history  of  all  crowd  move- 
ments bears  witness,  the  real  source  of  conflict 
is  forgotten,  the  issue  becomes  confused  with 
the  spectacular,  the  unimportant,  and  imag- 
nary.  Energy  is  wasted  on  side  issues,  and 
the  settlement  finally  reached,  even  by  a 
clearly  victorious  crowd,  is  seldom  that  of  the 

original  matter  in  dispute.  In  fact,  it  is  not 

100 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


at  all  the  function  of  these  crowd-ideas  of 
self-pity  and  persecution  to  deal  with  real 
external  situations.  These  ideas  are  propa- 
ganda. Their  function  is  to  keep  the  crowd 
together,  to  make  converts,  to  serve  as  a de- 
fense for  the  egoism  of  the  crowd-man,  to 
justify  the  anticipated  tyranny  which  it  is 
the  unconscious  desire  of  the  individual  to 
exercise  in  the  moment  of  victory  for  his 
crowd,  and,  as  “they  who  are  not  for  us  are 
against  us,”  to  project  the  crowd-man’s  hatred 
upon  the  intended  victims  of  his  crowd’s  will 
to  universal  dominion.  Xnpther  words,  these 
propaganda  ideas  serve  much  the  same  end 
as  do  the  similar  delusions  of  persecution  in 
paranoia. 

This  likeness  between  the  propaganda  of 
the  crowd  and  the  delusions  of  paranoia  is 
illustrated  daily  in  our  newspapers.  The 
following  items  cut  from  the  New  York 
Tribune  are  typical.  The  first  needs  no 
further  discussion,  as  it  parallels  the  cases 
given  above.  The  second  is  from  the  pub- 
lished proceedings  of  “a  committee,”  ap- 
pointed, as  I remember  it,  by  the  assembly  of 
the  state  of  New  York,  to  conduct  an  investi- 
gation into  certain  alleged  seditious  and 
anarchist  activities.  These  articles  well  il- 
lustrate the  character  of  the  propaganda  to 
wi^hich  such  a committee  almost  inevitably 

lends  itself.  Whether  the  committee  or  the 

101 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


newspapers  were  chiefly  responsible  for  such 
fabrications,  I do  not  know,  but  the  crowd 
character  of  much  of  the  attempt  to  stamp  out 
Bolshevism  is  strikingly  revealed  in  this  in- 
stance. No  doubt  the  members  of  this  com- 
mittee, as  well  as  the  detectives  and  the 
press  agents  who  are  associated  with  them, 
are  as  honestly  convinced  that  a mysterious 
gang  of  radicals  is  planning  to  murder  us  all 
as  is  the  paranoiac  W.  H.  M.  fixed  in  his  de- 
lusion that  his  enemies  are  trying  to  asphyxi- 
ate him.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Brill’s 
patient  “E.  S.”  interpreted  “every  movement 
and  expression  as  having  some  special  meaning 
for  himself.”  This  kind  of  “interpretation” 
has  a curious  logic  all  its  own.  It  is  what  I 
would  call  “compulsive  thinking,”  and  is 
characteristic  of  both  the  delusions  of  par- 
anoia and  the  rumors  of  the  crowd. 

First  clipping: 

Im^ENTOR  18  Declared  Insane  by  a Jury. 

W.  H.  M.  declares  rivals  are  attempting  to  asphyxiate 
him.  W.  H.  M.,  an  inventor,  was  declared  mentally  in- 
competent yesterday  by  a jury  in  the  Sheriff’s  court.  . . . 
Alienists  said  M.  had  hallucinations  about  enemies 
who  he  thinks  are  trying  to  asphyxiate  him.  He  also 
imagines  that  he  is  under  hypnotic  influences  and  that 
persons  are  trying  to  affect  his  body  with  “electrical 
influences.” 


Second  clipping: 


102 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


Radicals  Here  Seek  Soldiers  for  “Red  Guard.” 

Several  hundred  men,  formerly  in  United  States  Serv- 
ice, signify  willingness  to  aid  in  project.  A “Red 
Guard  ” composed  of  men  who  have  served  in  the  Amer- 
ican military  establishment  is  contemplated  in  the 
elaborate  revolutionary  plans  of  Bolshevik  leaders  here. 
This  was  learned  yesterday  when  operatives  of  the 
Lusk  committee  discovered  that  the  radicals  were 
making  every  effort  to  enlist  the  aid  of  the  Soldiers, 
Sailors,  and  Marines  Protective  Association  in  carrying 
out  a plot  to  overthrow  the  government  by  force. 
As  far  as  the  detectives  have  been  able  to  ascertain,  the 
great  mass  of  fighting  men  are  not  in  sympathy  with 
the  Reds,  but  several  hundred  have  signified  their 
willingness  to  co-operate. 

Just  how  far  the  plans  of  the  Reds  have  progressed 
was  not  revealed.  It  is  known,  however,  that  at  a 
convention  of  the  Left  Wing  Socialists  in  Buffalo  the 
movement  designed  to  enlist  the  support  of  the  Sol- 
diers, Sailors,  and  Marines  Protective  Association 
was  launched.  This  convention  was  addressed  by 
prominent  Left  Wingers  from  Boston,  New  York,  Phila- 
delphia, Pittsburgh,  and  Paterson.  They  asserted 
that  trained  military  men  must  be  obtained  for  the 
organization  if  the  plans  were  to  be  successful. 

It  was  from  this  meeting,  which  was  held  in  secret, 
that  agitators  were  sent  to  various  parts  of  the  state 
to  form  soviets  in  the  shops  and  factories.  This  phase 
of  the  radical  activity,  according  to  the  investigators, 
has  met  with  considerable  success  in  some  large  factory 
districts  where  most  of  the  workers  are  foreign-born. 
In  some  places  the  soviets  in  the  shops  have  become  so 
strong  that  the  employers  are  alarmed  and  have  noti- 
fied the  authorities  of  the  menace.  When  sufficient 
evidence  has  been  gathered,  foreign-born  agitators 

103 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


working  to  cause  unrest  in  factories  will  be  apprehended 
and  recommended  for  deportation. 

Later  report: 

Denies  Formation  of  “Red  Guard”  in  U.  S. 

Alfred  Levitt,  secretary  of  the  Soldiers,  Sailors,  and 
Marines  Protective  Association,  yesterday  emphati- 
cally denied  that  the  organization  was  to  be  used  as  a 
“Red  Guard”  by  the  radicals  when  they  started  their 
contemplated  revolution.  He  said  he  never  had 
heard  any  of  the  members  of  the  association  discuss  the 
formation  of  a “Red  Guard”  but  admitted  that  many 
of  them  were  radicals. 

In  the  two  instances  given  above,  fear, 
suspicion,  hatred,  give  rise  in  one  case  to  a de- 
lusional system  in  the  mind  of  an  isolated  in- 
dividual, and  in  the  other  to  the  circulation  of 
an  unfounded  rumor  by  men  who  in  their 
right  minds  would,  to  say  the  least,  carefully 
scrutinize  the  evidence  for  such  a story  before 
permitting  it  to  be  published.  As  several 
months  have  passed  since  the  publication  of 
this  story  and  nothing  more  has  appeared 
which  would  involve  our  returned  service 
men  in  any  such  treasonable  conspiracy,  I 
think  it  is  safe  to  say  that  this  story,  like 
many  others  circulated  by  radicals  as  well  as 
by  reactionaries  during  the  unsettled  months 
following  the  war,  has  its  origin  in  the  uncon- 
scious mechanisms  of  crowd-minded  people. 

104 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


Every  sort  of  crowd  is  prone  to  give  credence 
to  rumors  of  this  nature,  and  to  accuse  all 
those  who  can  not  at  once  give  uncritical 
acceptance  to  such  tales  of  sympathy  with  the 
enemy.  Later  we  shall  have  something  to 
say  about  the  delusional  systems  which  appear 
to  be  common  to  the  crowd-mind  and  the 
paranoiac.  In  this  connection  I am  interested 
in  pointing  out  only  the  psychological  relation 
between  what  I might  call  the  “conspiracy 
delusion”  and  unconscious  hatred.  Com- 
monly the  former  is  the  “projection”  of  the 
latter. 

One  of  the  differences  between  these  two 
forms  of  “projection”  is  the  fact  that  the 
hatred  of  the  crowd  is  commonly  less  “ration- 
alized” than  in  paranoia — ^that  is,  less  suc- 
cessfully disguised.  Like  the  paranoiac,  every 
crowd  is  potentially  if  not  actually  homicidal 
in  its  tendencies.  But  whereas  with  the  para- 
noiac the  murderous  hostility  remains  for  the 
greater  part  an  unconscious  “wish  fancy,” 
and  it  is  the  mechanisms  which  disguise  it  or 
serve  as  a defense  against  it  which  appear  to 
consciousness,  with  the  crowd  the  murder- 
wish  will  itself  appear  to  consciousness  when- 
ever the  unconscious  can  fabricate  such  de- 
fense mechanisms  as  will  provide  it  with  a 
fiction  of  moral  justification.  Consequently, 
it  is  this  fiction  of  justification  which  the 
crowd-man  must  defend. 

8 105 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


The  crowd’s  delusion  of  persecution,  con- 
spiracy, or  oppression  is  thus  a defense  mech- 
anism of  this  nature.  The  projection  of  this 
hatred  on  those  outside  the  crowd  serves  not 
so  much,  as  in  paranoia,  to  shield  the  subject 
from  the  consciousness  of  his  own  hatred,  as 
to  provide  him  with  a pretext  for  exercising  it. 
Given  such  a pretext,  most  crowds  will  display 
their  homicidal  tendencies  quite  openly. 

Ordinary  mobs  or  riots  would  seem  to  need 
very  little  justification  of  this  sort.  But 
even  these  directly  homicidal  crowds  invari- 
ably represent  themselves  as  motivated  by 
moral  idealism  and  righteous  indignation. 
Negroes  are  lynched  in  order  to  protect  the 
white  womanhood  of  the  South,  also  because, 
once  accused,  the  negro  happens  to  be  helpless. 
If  the  colored  people  were  in  the  ascendancy 
and  the  whites  helpless  we  should  doubtless 
see  the  reverse  of  this  situation.  A com- 
munity rationally  convinced  of  the  culprit’s 
guilt  could  well  afford  to  trust  the  safety  of 
womanliood  to  the  justice  meted  out  by  the 
courts,  but  it  is  obvious  that  these  “moral” 
crowds  are  less  interested  in  seeing  that  justice 
is  done  than  in  running  no  risk  of  losing  their 
victim,  once  he  is  in  their  power.  A recent 
development  of  this  spirit  is  the  lynching  in 
a Southern  town  of  a juror  who  voted  for  the 
acquittal  of  a black  man  accused  of  a crime. 

It  may  be  taken  as  a general  law  of  crowd- 
106 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 

' psychology  that  the  “morality”  of  the  crowd 
always  demands  a victim.  Is  it  likely  that 
one  of  these  mobs  would  “call  off”  an  inter- 
esting lynching  party  if  at  the  last  minute  it 
were  demonstrated  that  the  accused  was  inno- 
cent? The  practice  of  lynching  has  been  ex- 
tended, from  those  cases  where  the  offense 
with  which  the  accused  is  charged  is  so  revolt- 
ing as  justly  to  arouse  extreme  indignation, 
to  offenses  which  are  so  trivial  that  they 
merely  serve  as  a pretext  for  torture  and 
killing. 

The  homicidal  tendencies  of  the  crowd-mind 
always  reveal  themselves  the  minute  the 
crowd  becomes  sufficiently  developed  and 
powerful  to  relax  for  the  time  being  the  usual 
social  controls.  Illustrations  of  this  may  be 
seen  in  the  rioting  between  the  white  and  the 
colored  races — epidemics  of  killing — such  as 
occurred  recently  in  East  St.  Louis,  and 
in  the  cities  of  Washington,  Chicago,  and 
Omaha.  The  same  thing  is  evident  in  the 
“pogroms”  of  Russia  and  Poland,  in  the 
acts  of  revolutionary  mobs  of  Germany  and 
Russia,  in  the  promptness  with  which  the 
Turks  took  advantage  of  the  situation 
created  by  the  war  to  slaughter  the  Armenians. 
This  hatred  is  the  specter  which  forever 
haunts  the  conflict  between  labor  and  capital. 
It  is  what  speedily  transformed  the  French 
Revolution  from  the  dawn  of  an  era  of  “Fra- 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


ternity”  to  a day  of  terror  and  intimidation. 
It  is  seen  again  in  the  curious  interest  which 
the  public  always  has  in  a sensational  murder 
trial.  It  is  evident  in  the  hostility,  open  or  sup- 
pressed, with  which  any  community  regards 
the  strange,  the  foreign,  the  “outlandish” — 
an  example  of  which  is  the  frequent  bullying 
and  insulting  of  immigrants  in  this  country 
since  the  war.  Much  of  the  “Americaniza- 
tion propaganda”  which  we  have  carried  on 
since  the  war  unfortunately  gave  the  typical 
crowd-man  his  opportunity.  One  need  only 
listen  to  the  speeches  or  read  the  publications 
of  certain  “patriotic”  societies  to  learn  why 
it  was  that  the  exhortation  to  our  foreign 
neighbors  to  be  loyal  did  so  much  more  harm 
than  good. 

The  classic  example  of  the  killing  crowd  is, 
of  course,  a nation  at  war.  There  are,  to  be 
sure,  wars  of  national  self-defense  which  are 
due  to  political  necessity  rather  than  to 
crowd-thinking,  but  even  in  such  cases  the 
phenomena  of  the  crowd  are  likely  to  appear 
to  the  detriment  of  the  cause.  At  such  times 
not  only  the  army  but  the  whole  nation  be- 
comes a homicidal  crowd.  The  army,  at 
least  while  the  soldiers  are  in  service,  prob- 
ably shows  the  crowd-spirit  in  a less  degree 
than  does  the  civilian  population.  The  mental 
processes  of  an  entire  people  are  transformed. 

Every  interest  — profit-seeking  excepted  — is 

108 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  ^OF  HATE 

subordinated  to  the  one  passion  to  crush  the 
enemy.  The  moment  when  war  is  declared 
is  usually  hailed  with  tremendous  popular  en- 
thusiasm and  joy.  There  is  a general  lifting 
of  spirits.  There  is  a sense  of  release,  a na- 
tion-wide exultation,  a sigh  of  relief  as  we  feel 
the  deadening  hand  of  social  control  taken 
from  our  throats.  The  homicidal  wish-fancy, 
^ which  in  peace  times  and  in  less  sovereign 
crowds  exists  only  as  an  hypothesis,  can  now 
become  a reality.  And  though  it  is  doubtful 
if  more  than  one  person  in  a million  can  ever 
give  a rational  account  of  just  what  issue  is 
really  at  stake  in  any  war,  the  conviction  is 
practically  unanimous  that  an  occasion  has 
been  found  which  justifies,  even  demands,  the 
release  of  all  the  repressed  hostility  in  our  na- 
tures. The  fact  that  in  war  time  this  crowd 
hostility  may,  under  certain  circumstances, 
really  have  survival  value  and  be  both  bene- 
ficial and  necessary  to  the  nation,  is  to  my 
mind  not  a justification  of  crowd-making. 
It  is  rather  a revelation  of  the  need  of  a more 
competent  leadership  in  world  politics. 

Unconsciously  every  national  crowd,  I mean 
the  crowd-minded  element  in  the  nation, 
carries  a chip  on  its  shoulder,  and  swaggers 
and  challenges  its  neighbors  like  a young  town- 
bully  on  his  way  home  from  grammar  school. 
This  swaggering,  which  is  here  the  “com- 
pulsive manifestation”  of  unconscious  hos- 

109 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


tility  characteristic  of  every  crowd,  appears 
to  consciousness  as  “national  honor.”  To 
the  consciousness  of  the  nation-crowd  the 
quarrel  for  which  it  has  been  spoiling  for  a 
long  time  always  appears  to  have  been  “forced 
upon  it.”  Some  nations  are  much  more 
quarrelsome  than  others.  I cannot  believe 
that  our  conviction  that  Imperial  Germany 
was  the  aggressor  in  the  great  war  is  due 
merely  to  patriotic  conceit  on  our  part.  The 
difference  between  our  national  spirit  and  that 
of  Imperial  Prussia  is  obvious,  but  the  differ- 
ence in  this  respect,  gTeat  as  it  is,  is  one  of 
degree  rather  than  of  kind,  and  is  due  largely 
to  the  fact  that  the  political  organization  of 
Germany  permitted  the  Prussian  patriots  to 
hold  the  national  mind  in  a permanent  crowd 
state  to  a degree  which  is  even  now  hardly 
possible  in  this  republic.  My  point  is  that  a 
nation  becomes  warlike  to  precisely  the  ex- 
TenT that  its  people  may  be  made  to  think  and 
'behave  as  a crowd.  Once  a crowd,  it  is  al- 
ways ”in  the  right”  anH 

ruthless  its  behavior:  every  act,  or  proposal 
whicET  is  ^calculated  to  involve  the  nation- 
crowd  inacontroversy,  which  gams  some  ad- 
vantage over  neighboring  peoples,  or  intensi- 
~fies  hatred  once  it  is  released,  is  wildly  ap- 
plauded^  5ny  dissent  from  the  opinions  _of 
dur~ parti^ar  paffv~br'  group  is  tramj^H 

down.  He  who  fails  at  such  a time  to  be  a 
^ — no  ■ " 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


crowd-man  and  our  own  sort  of  a crowd-man 
ir~a  '"slater.”  Everyone’s  patriotism  is  put 
under  suspicion,  political  heresy-hunting  is 
the  rule,  any  personal  advantage  which  can 

l)e  gained  by  denouncing  as  “enemy  sym- 

pathizers” rival  persons  or  groups  within  the 
nation  is  sure  to  be  snatched  up  by  some  one. 
The  crowd-mind,  even  in  times  of  peace,  dis- 
tOTts  patriotism  so  that  it  is.  little_mQre  than 
a compulsive  expression  and  justification  of 
repi^^sed^ostility.  Tn  war  the  crowd  suc- 
ceeds  in  giving  rein  to  thi^TiostiTity  by  first 
projectmg~it' up^h  the^nemy. 

Freud  uThis  Tittle  book,  War  and  Deaths 
regards  war  as  a temporary  “regression”  in 
which  primitive  impulses  which  are  repressed 
by  civilization,  but  not  eradicated,  find  their 
escape.  He  argues  that  most  people  live 
psychologically  ‘ ‘ beyond  their  means . ’ ’ Hence 
war  could  be  regarded,  I suppose,  as  a sort 
of  “spiritual  liquidation.”  But  if  the  hos- 
tility which  the  war  crowd  permits  to  escape 
is  simply  a repressed  impulse  to  cruelty,  we 
should  be  obliged  to  explain  a large  part  of 
crowd-behavior  as  “sadistic.”  This  may  be 
the  case  with  crowds  of  a certain  type,  lynch- 
ing mobs,  for  instance.  But  as  the  homicidal 
tendencies  of  paranoia  are  not  commonly 
explained  as  sadism,  I can  see  no  reason  why 
those  of  the  crowd  should  be.  Sadism  is  a 

return  to  an  infantile  sex  perversion,  and  in 

111 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

its  direct  overt  forms  the  resulting  conflicts 
are  conscious  and  are  between  the  subject  and 
environment.  It  is  where  a tendency  unac- 
ceptable to  consciousness  is  repressed — and 
inadequately — that  neurotic  conflict  ensues. 
This  conflict  being  inner,  develops  certain 
mechanisms  for  the  defense  of  the  ego-feeling 
which  is  injured.  The  hatred  of  the  paranoiac 
is  really  a defense  for  his  own  injured  self- 
feeling.  As  the  crowd  always  shows  an  exag- 
gerated ego-feeling  similar  to  the  paranoiac’s 
delusion  of  grandeur,  and  as  in  cases  of  par- 
anoia this  inner  conflict  is  always  “projected” 
in  the  form  of  delusions  of  persecution,  may 
we  not  hold  that  the  characteristic  hostility 
of  the  crowd  is  also  in  some  way  a device  for 
protecting  this  inflated  self-appreciation  from 
injury?  The  forms  which  this  hatred  takes 
certainly  have  all  the  appearance  of  being 
“compulsive”  ideas  and  actions. 

We  have  been  discussing  crowds  in  which 
hostility  is  present  in  the  form  of  overt  de- 
structive and  homicidal  acts  or  other  unmis- 
takable expressions  of  hatred.  But  are  there 
not  also  peaceable  crowds,  crowds  devoted 
to  religious  and  moral  propaganda,  idealist 
crowds?  Yes,  all  crowds  moralize,  all  crowds 
are  also  idealistic.  But  the  moral  enthu- 
siasm of  the  crowd  always  demands  a victim. 
The  idealist  crowd  also  always  makes  idols  of 
its  ideals  and  worships  them  with  human 

1U2 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


sacrifice.  The  peaceable  crowd  is  only  po- 
tentially homicidal.  The  death-wish  exists  as 
a fancy  only,  or  is  expressed  in  symbols  so  as 
to  be  more  or  less  unrecognizable  to  ordinary 
consciousness.  I believe  that  every  crowd  u 

against  some  one.”  Almost  any  crowd  will 
persecute  on  occasion — if  sufficiently  power- 
ful and  directly  challenged.  The  crowd  tends 
ever  to  carry  its  ideas  to  their  deadly  logical 
conclusion. 

I have  already  referred  to  the  crowd’s  in- 
terest in  games  and  athletic  events  as  an 
innocent  symbolization  of  conflict.  How  easy 
it  is  to  change  this  friendly  rivalry  into  sudden 
riot — its  real  meaning — every  umpire  of  base- 
ball and  football  games  knows.  As  an  illus- 
tration of  my  point — namely,  that  the  en- 
thusiasm aroused  by  athletic  contests  is  the 
suppressed  hostility  of  the  crowd,  I give  the 
following.  In  this  letter  to  a New  York  news- 
paper, the  writer,  a loyal  “fan,”  reveals  the 
same  mentality  that  we  find  in  the  sectarian 
fanatic,  or  good  party  man,  whose  “prin- 
ciples” have  been  challenged.  The  challenge 
seems  in  all  such  cases  to  bring  the  hostility 
into  consciousness  as  “righteous  indignation.” 

To  the  Editor: 

Sm, — ^The  article  under  the  caption  “Giants’  Chances 
for  Flag  to  be  Settled  in  Week,”  on  the  sporting  page 
of  the  Tribune,  is  doubtless  intended  to  be  humorous. 

113 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


The  section  referring  to  the  Cincinnati  baseball  pub- 
lic is  somewhat  overdrawn,  to  say  the  least,  and  does 
not  leave  a very  favorable  impression  on  the  average 
Cincinnatian,  such  as  myself,  I have  been  a reader 
of  your  paper  for  some  time,  but  if  this  sort  of  thing 
continues  I shall  feel  very  much  like  discontinuing. 

W\  L.  D. 

The  extremes  to  which  partisan  hatred  and 
jealousy  can  lead  even  members  of  the  United 
States  Senate,  the  intolerance  and  sectarian 
spirit  which  frequently  characterize  crowds, 
the^“  bigotry  ” of  reformist  crowds,  are  matters 
known  to  us  all.  Does  anyone  doubt  that 
certain  members  of  the  Society  for  the  Pre- 
vention of  Vice,  or  of  the  Prohibitionists,  would 
persecute  if  they  had  power?  Have  not  paci- 
fist mass  meetings  been  known  to  break  up 
in  a row?  The  Christian  religion  is  funda- 
mentally a religion  of  love,  but  the  Church  has 
seldom  been  wholly  free  from  the  crowd- 
spirit,  and  the  Church  crowd  will  persecute 
as  quickly  as  any  other.  In  each  period  of  its 
history  when  Christian  believers  have  been 
organized  as  dominant  crowds  the  Church  has 
resorted  to  the  severest  forms  of  persecution. 
Popular  religion  always  demands  some  kind 
of  devil  to  stand  as  the  permanent  object  of 
the  believer’s  hostility.  Let  an  editor,  or 
lecturer,  or  clergyman  anywhere  attack  some 
one,  and  he  at  once  gains  following  and  popu- 
larity. Evangelists  and  political  orators  are 

114 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


always  able  to  “get”  their  crowd  by  resorting 
to  abuse  of  some  one.  Let  any  mass  meeting 
become  a crowd,  and  this  note  of  hostility 
inevitably  appears. 

Notice  the  inscriptions  which  commonly 
appear  on  the  banners  carried  in  political  or 
labor  parades.  On  the  day  after  the  armistice 
was  signed  with  Germany,  when  the  most 
joyous  and  spontaneous  crowds  I have  ever 
seen  filled  the  streets  of  New  York,  I was 
greatly  impressed  with  those  homemade 
banners.  Though  it  was  the  occasion  of  the 
most  significant  and  hard-won  victory  in 
human  history,  there  was  hardly  a reference 
to  the  fact.  Though  it  was  the  glad  moment 
of  peace  for  which  all  had  longed,  I did  not 
see  ten  banners  bearing  the  word  “Peace,” 
even  in  the  hands  of  the  element  in  the  city 
who  were  known  to  be  almost  unpatriotically 
pacifist.  But  within  less  than  an  hour  I 
counted  on  Fifth  Avenue  more  than  a hundred 
banners  bearing  the  inscription,  “To  Hell 
with  the  Kaiser.” 

That  the  man  chiefly  responsible  for  the 
horrors  of  the  war  should  be  the  object  of 
universal  loathing  is  only  to  be  expected,  but 
the  significant  fact  is  that  of  all  the  sentiments 
which  swept  into  people’s  minds  on  that  oc- 
casion, this  and  this  alone  should  have  been 
immediately  seized  upon  when  the  crowd  spirit 
began  to  appear.  I doubt  if  at  the  time  there 

115 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


was  a very  clear  sense  of  the  enormity  of 
Wilhelm’s  guilt  in  the  minds  of  those  laughing 
people.  The  Kaiser  was  hardly  more  than  a 
symbol.  The  antagonist,  whoever  he  be,  was 
“fallen  down  to  hell,”  our  own  sense  of  tri- 
umph was  magnified  by  the  depth  of  his  fall. 
Just  so  the  Hebrew  Prophet  cried  “Babylon 
is  fallen,”  so  the  early  Christians  pictured 
Satan  cast  into  the  bottomless  pit,  so  the 
Jacobins  cried  *‘A  bas  les  Aristocrats,”  our 
own  Revolutionary  crowds  cried  “Down  with 
George  III,”  and  the  Union  soldiers  sang, 
“Hang  Jeff  Davis  on  a Sour  Apple  Tree.”  I 
repeat  that  wherever  the  crowd-mind  appears, 
it  will  always  be  found  to  be  “against”  some 
one. 

An  interesting  fact  about  the  hostility  of  a 
crowd  is  its  ability  on  occasion  to  survive  the 
loss  of  its  object.  It  may  reveal  the  phe- 
nomenon which  psychologists  call  “displae^ 
ment.”  That  is  to  say,  another  object  jnay 
be  substituted  for  the  original  one  witfrout 
greatly  changing  the  quality  of  the  feeling.  A 
mob  in  the  street,  driven  back  from  the  object 
of  its  attack,  will  loot  a store  or  two  before  it 
disperses.  Or,  bent  on  lynching  a certain 
negro,  it  may  even  substitute  an  innocent 
man,  if  robbed  of  its  intended  victim — as,  for 
instance,  the  lynching  of  the  mayor  of  Omaha. 
Such  facts  would  seem  to  show^  that  these 
hostile  acts  are  really  demanded  by  mech- 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


anisms  within  the  psyche.  Many  symbolic 
acts  of  the  person  afflicted  with  compulsion 
neurosis  show  this  same  trait  of  substitution. 
If  inhibited  in  the  exercise  of  one  mechanism 
of  escape,  the  repressed  wish  will  substitute 
another.  Also  anyone  associated  by  the  un- 
conscious reasoning  with  the  hated  object,  or 
anyone  who  tries  to  defend  him  or  prove  him 
innocent,  may  suffer  from  this  crowd’s  hatred. 
Freud  has  analyzed  this  phenomenon  in  his 
study  of  taboo.  He  who  touches  the  tabooed 
object  himself  becomes  taboo. 

I have  said  that  the  hostility  of  the  crowd 
is  a sort  of  “defense  mechanism.”  That  this 
is  so  in  certain  cases,  I think  can  be  easily 
demonstrated.  The  following  news  item  is 
an  example  of  the  manner  in  which  such  hos- 
tility may  serve  as  a “defense  mechanism” 
compensating  the  self -feeling  for  certain  losses 
and  serving  to  enhance  the  feeling  of  self- 
importance: 


Charges  Baker  Had  57  Brands  of  Army  Objector. 


— , OF  Minnesota,  Defending  Marines  Fathers’ 
Association  Protest;  Assails  Freeing  of 
“Slackers.” 


Washington,  July  23. — A bitter  partisan  quarrel  de- 
veloped in  the  House  today  when  Representative , 

of  Minnesota,  attacked  Secretary  Baker  and  the  Presi- 
dent for  the  government’s  policy  toward  conscientious 
objectors.  The  attack  was  the  result  of  protests 

117 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


by  the  Marines  Fathers’  Association  of  Minneapolis, 
Minnesota,  representing  between  500  and  600  young 
marines  uow  in  France,  all  from  the  Minneapolis  high 
schools  and  the  University  of  Minnesota,  and  many 
in  the  famous  6th  Regiment  of  Marines  that  took  a big 
part  in  stopping  the  Germans  at  Chateau  Thierry. 

Upon  learning  of  the  treatment  accorded  conscien- 
tious objectors  in  this  country  while  their  sons  were 
dying  in  France,  the  association  asked  Representative 

to  fix  the  responsibility  for  the  government’s 

policy.  Representative  fixed  it  today  as  that  of 

Secretary  Baker  and  President  Wilson,  charging  that 
they  extended  the  defiaiition  of  those  to  be  exempted 
from  military  service  laid  down  by  Congress  in  an  act 
of  May  17,  1917. 

“One  variety  of  conscientious  objector  was  not 

enough  for  Mr.  Baker,”  declared  Representative . 

“He  had  57  kinds.  ...” 

Representative , of  Arizona,  defended  Secretary 

Baker,  asserting  that  of  20,000  men  who  were  certified 
as  conscientious  objectors,  16,000  ultimately  went  to 
war.  The  case  of  Sergt.  Alvin  C.  York,  the  Tennessee 
hero,  who  had  conscientious  objections  at  first,  but  soon 
changed  his  mind,  was  cited  in  defense  of  the  War 
Department’s  policy. 

Let  us  pass  over  the  obviously  partisan  ele- 
ment in  this  Congressional  debate — a crowd 
phenomenon  in  itself,  by  the  tvay — and  con- 
sider the  mental  state  of  this  Fathers’  Asso- 
ciation. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  treatment  of 
those  who  refused  military  service  in  this 
country  was  so  much  more  severe  than  the 

manner  with  which  the  British  government  is 

118 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


reported  to  have  dealt  with  this  class  of  per- 
sons, that  many  people,  including  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  whose  loyalty  except  to  partisan 
minds  was  above  suspicion,  sought  in  the  name 
of  humanity  to  alleviate  some  of  the  condi- 
tions in  our  military  prisons,  it  was  not  severe 
enough  to  satisfy  these  “fathers.”  It  is 
doubtful  if  anything  short  of  an  auto  da  fe 
would  have  met  their  approval.  Now  no  one 
believes  that  these  simple  farmers  from  the 
Northwest  are  such  sadists  at  heart  that  they 
enjoy  cruelty  for  its  own  sake.  I imagine  that 
the  processes  at  work  here  are  somewhat  as 
follows : 

The  telltale  phrase  here  is  that  these  farm- 
ers’ sons  “were  dying  in  France.”  Patri- 
otic motives  rightly  demanded  that  fathers 
yield  their  sons  to  the  hardship  and  danger 
of  battle,  and  while  the  sacrifice  was  made 
consciously,  with  willingness  and  even  with 
pride  in  having  done  their  painful  duty,  it  was 
not  accomplished  without  struggle — the  un- 
conscious resisted  it.  It  could  not  be  recon- 
ciled to  so  great  a demand.  In  other  words, 
these  fathers,  and  probably  many  of  their 
sons  also,  were  unconsciously  “conscientious 
objectors.”  Unconsciously  they  longed  to 
evade  this  painful  duty,  but  these  longings 
were  put  aside,  “repressed”  as  shameful  and 
cowardly — that  is,  as  unacceptable  to  con- 
scious self -feeling.  It  was  necessary  to  defend 

119 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


the  ego  against  these  longings.  Compensa- 
tion was  demanded  and  foimd  in  the  nation- 
wide recognition  of  the  value  of  this  patriotic 
sacrifice.  Expressions  of  patriotic  sentiment 
on  the  part  of  others,  therefore,  compen- 
sated the  individual  and  enhanced  his  self- 
feeling. 

Successful  refusal  anywhere  to  recognize  the 
duty  which  consciously  motivated  this  sacri- 
fice strengthened  the  unconscious  desire  to 
evade  it.  The  unconscious  reasoning  was 
something  like  this:  “If  those  men  got  out 
of  this  thing,  why  should  not  we.^  Since  we 
had  to  bear  this  loss,  they  must  also.  We 
have  suffered  for  duty’s  sake.  By  making 
them  suffer  also,  they  will  be  forced  to  recog- 
nize this  ‘duty’  with  which  we  defend  our- 
selves against  our  sense  of  loss  and  desire  to 
escape  it.”  As  a witness  to  the  values  against 
which  the  ego  of  these  fathers  has  to  struggle, 
the  existence  of  the  conscientious  objector,  in 
a less  degree  of  suffering  than  their  own,  is  as 
intolerable  as  their  own  “shameful  and  cow- 
ardly” unconscious  longings.  Hostility  to 
the  conscientious  objector  is  thus  a “projec- 
tion ” of  their  own  inner  conflict.  By  becom- 
ing a crowd,  the  members  of  this  “Fathers’ 
Association”  make  it  mutually  possible  to 
represent  their  hostility  to  conscientious  ob- 
jectors as  something  highly  patriotic.  Secre- 
tary Baker’s  alleged  leniency  to  these  hated 

120 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


persons  is  now  not  only  an  affront  to  these 
fathers,  it  is  an  affront  to  the  entire  nation. 

Another  and  somewhat  different  example  of 
the  function  of  hatred  in  the  service  of  the 
self -feeling  is  the  following  item,  which  throws 
some  light  on  the  motives  of  the  race  riots  in 
Washington.  This  is,  of  course,  a defense  of 
but  one  of  the  crowds  involved,  but  it  is 
interesting  psychologically. 

Negro  Editor  Blames  Whites  for  Race  Riots. 

Dr.  W.  F.  B.  DuBois,  of  70  Fifth  Avenue,  editor  of 
The  Crisis,  a magazine  published  in  connection  with  the 
work  of  the  National  Association  for  the  Advancement 
of  the  Colored  People,  yesterday  attributed  the  race 
riots  in  Washington  to  the  irritability  of  all  people  and 
the  unsettling  of  many  ideas  caused  by  the  war,  to  the 
influx  of  a large  number  of  Southerners  into  Washing- 
ton, and  to  the  'presence  in  that  city  of  many  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  educated,  'well-dressed  class  of  negroes 
which  white  racial  antagonists  dislike. 

Washington  policemen  are  notoriously  unfriendly  to 
the  colored  people,  he  added.  Time  and  time  again 
they  stand  by  and  witness  a dispute  between  a white 
man  and  a negro,  and  when  it  is  over  and  the  negro  has 
been  beaten  they  arrest  the  negro,  and  not  the  white 
man  who  caused  the  trouble  in  the  first  place. 

The  colored  editor  pointed  out  the  similarity  between 
the  present  riots  in  Washington  and  the  Atlanta  riots 
which  occurred  about  twelve  years  ago.  In  both  places, 
he  said,  white  hoodlums  began  rioting  and  killing  ne- 
groes. When  the  latter  became  aroused  and  began  to 
retaliate,  the  authorities  stepped  in  and  the  rioting 
stopped. 

9 


121 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Major  J.  E.  Spingarn,  acting  treasurer  of  the  Na- 
tional Association  for  the  Advancement  of  the  Colored 
People,  said  the  soldiers  and  sailors  who  have  been  tak- 
ing part  in  the  rioting  in  Washington  resent  the  new  at- 
titude of  self-respect  which  the  negro  has  assumed  be- 
cause of  the  part  he  played  in  the  war. 

“The  soldiers,”  he  said,  “instead  of  fighting  the  ne- 
groes because  the  latter  think  better  of  themselves  for 
having  fought  in  the  war,  should  respect  them  for 
having  proved  themselves  such  good  fighters.”  (The 
italics  are  mine.) 

It  is  quite  possible  that  in  most  communi- 
ties where  such  race  riots  occur  certain  mem- 
bers of  the  colored  race  are  responsible  to  the 
extent  that  they  have  made  themselves  con- 
spicuously offensive  to  their  white  neighbors. 

But  such  individual  cases,  even  where  they 
exist,  do  not  justify  attacks  upon  hundreds  of 
innocent  people.  And  it  must  be  said  that  in 
general  the  kind  of  people  whose  feelings  of 
personal  superiority  can  find  no  other  social 
support  than  the  mere  fact  that  they  happen 
to  belong  to  the  white  race — and  I think  it 
will  be  found  that  the  mobs  who  attack  ne- 
groes are  uniformly  made  of  people  who  belong 
to  this  element — naturally  find  their  self- 
feeling injured  “if  a nigger  puts  on  airs.” 
Their  fiction  is  challenged;  to  accept  the 
challenge  would  force  upon  the  consciousness 
of  such  people  a correct  estimate  of  their  own 
worth.  Such  an  idea  is  unacceptable  to 
consciousness.  The  presumptuous  negroes 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


who  serve  as  such  unpleasant  reminders 
“must  be  put  in  their  proper  place” — that 
is,  so  completely  under  the  feet  of  the  white 
element  in  the  community  that  the  mere  fact 
of  being  a white  man  may  serve  as  a defense 
mechanism  for  just  those  members  of  our 
noble  race  who  approach  more  closely  to  the 
social  position  of  the  colored  element  in  our 
midst. 

As  the  moral  standards  of  the  community 
will  not  permit  even  this  element  of  the  white 
race  to  play  the  hoodlum  with  self-approval, 
some  disguise  or  “displacement”  for  this  mo- 
tive must  be  found  whereby  the  acts  to  which 
it  prompts  may  appear  to  the  consciousness 
of  their  perpetrators  as  justifiable.  A mis- 
deed is  committed  by  a black  man;  instantly 
this  element  of  the  white  race  becomes  a 
crowd.  The  deed  provides  the  whites  with 
just  the  pretext  they  want.  They  may  now 
justify  themselves  and  one  another  in  an 
assault  on  the  whole  colored  community. 
Here  I believe  we  have  the  explanation  of 
much  that  is  called  “race  prejudice.”  The 
hatred  between  the  races,  like  all  crowd- 
hatred,  is  a “ defense  mechanism”  designed  to 
protect  the  ego  in  its  conflict  with  ideas 
unacceptable  to  consciousness. 

The  intensest  hatred  of  the  crowd  is  that 
directed  toward  the  heretic,  the  nonconform- 
ist, the  “traitor.”  I have  sometimes  thought 

123 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


that  to  the  crowd-mind  there  is  only  one  sin, 
heresy.  Every  sort  of  crowd,  political,  re- 
ligious, moral,  has  an  ax  ready  for  the  person 
who  in  renouncing  its  ideas  and  leaving  it 
threatens  to  break  it  up.  The  bitter  partisan 
hatred  of  crowds  is  nothing  compared  to  their 
hatred  for  the  renegade.  To  the  crowd  of 
true  believers,  the  heretic  or  schismatic  is 
“worse  than  the  infidel.”  The  moral  crowd 
will  “bear  with”  the  worst  roue  if  only  he 
strives  to  keep  up  appearances,  has  a guilty 
conscience,  asks  forgiveness,  and  professes 
firm  belief  in  the  conventions  against  which  he 
offends;  one  may  be  forgiven  his  inability  to 
“live  up  to  his  principles”  if  only  his  pro- 
fessed principles  are  the  same  as  the  crowd’s. 
But  let  a Nietzsche,  though  his  life  be  that  of 
an  ascetic,  openly  challenge  and  repudiate 
the  values  of  popular  morality,  and  his  name 
is  anathema. 

As  an  example  of  the  hatred  of  the  political 
crowd  for  one  who,  having  once  put  his  hand 
to  the  plow  and  turned  back,  henceforth  is  no 
longer  fit  for  the  “kingdom,”  I quote  the 
following  from  an  ultraradical  paper.  It  is 
hard  to  believe  that  this  passage  was  written 
by  a man  who,  in  his  right  mind,  is  really 
intelligent  and  kind-hearted,  but  such  is  the 
case: 

An  Explanation. — Owing  to  a failure  of  editorial 
supervision  we  published  an  advertisement  of  John 

124 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


Spargo’s  book  on  Bolshevism.  We  have  returned 
the  money  we  received  for  it,  and  canceled  the  contract 
for  its  future  appearances.  We  do  not  pretend  to  pro- 
tect our  readers  against  patent-medicine  swindlers, 
real-estate  sharpers,  canned  goods  prevaricators,  pto- 
maine poisoners,  fairy  bond-sellers,  picaroon  nickel- 
pickers,  subway  ticket  speculators,  postage-stamp 
forgers,  pie  and  pancake  counterfeiters,  plagiary  bur- 
glars, lecherous  pornographers,  and  pictorial  back-porch 
climbers,  plundering  buccaneer  blackmailers  and  de- 
faulting matrimonial  agents,  journalistic  poachers, 
foragers,  pickpockets,  thimbleriggers,  lick-sauce  pub- 
licity men,  notoriety  hunters,  typographical  body- 
snatchers,  blackletter  assassins,  and  promulgators  of 
licentious  meters  in  free  verse.  Against  these  natural 
phenomena  we  offer  no  guarantee  to  our  readers,  but 
we  never  intended  to  advertise  John  Spargo’s  book  on 
Bolshevism. 

Here  again,  it  seems,  the  reason  for  hatred 
is  “seh-defense.”  One  important  difference 
between  the  crowd-mind  and  the  psychosis 
is  the  fact  that  while  the  psychic  mechanisms 
of  the  latter  serve  to  disguise  the  inadequately 
repressed  wish,  those  of  the  crowd-mind  per- 
mit the  escape  of  the  repressed  impulse  by 
relaxing  the  force  which  demands  the  repres- 
sion— namely,  the  immediate  social  environ- 
ment. This  relaxation  is  accomplished  by  a 
general  fixation  of  attention  which  changes 
for  those  who  share  it  the  moral  significance 
of  the  social  demand.  The  repressed  wish 
then  appears  to  consciousness  in  a form  which 

meets  with  the  mutual  approval  of  the  in- 

125 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


dividuals  so  affected.  Or,  as  I have  said,  the 
social  environment,  instead  of  acting  as  a 
check  upon  the  realization  of  the  wish-fancy, 
slips  along  in  the  same  direction  with  it. 
Hence  the  will  to  believe  the  same,  so  charac- 
teristic of  every  crowd.  As  soon  as  this 
mutuality  is  broken  the  habitual  criteria  of 
the  real  again  become  operative.  Every  in- 
dividual who  “comes  to”  weakens  the  hold 
of  the  crowd-ideas  upon  all  the  others  to  just 
the  extent  that  his  word  must  be  taken  into 
account.  The  crowd  resorts  to  all  sorts  of 
devices  to  bind  its  members  together  per- 
manently in  a common  faith.  It  resists  dis- 
integration as  the  worst  conceivable  evil. 
Disintegration  means  that  crowd-men  must 
lose  their  pet  fiction — which  is  to  say,  their 
“faith.”  The  whole  system  elaborated  by 
the  unconscious  fails  to  function;  its  value  for 
compensation,  defense,  or  justification  van- 
ishes as  in  waking  out  of  a dream. 

Strong  spirits  can  stand  this  disillusion- 
ment. They  have  the  power  to  create  new, 
more  workable  ideals.  They  become  capable 
of  self-analysis.  They  learn  to  be  legislators 
of  value  and  to  revise  their  beliefs  for  them- 
selves. Their  faiths  become  not  refuges,  but 
instruments  for  meeting  and  mastering  the 
facts  of  experience  and  giving  them  meaning. 
The  strong  are  capable  of  making  their  lives 

spiritual  adventures  in  a real  world.  The 

126 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


“truths”  of  such  persons  are  not  compulsive 
ideas,  they  are  working  hypotheses  which  they 
are  ready,  as  occasion  may  demand,  to  verify 
at  great  personal  risk,  or  to  discard  when 
proved  false.  Such  persons  sustain  them- 
selves in  their  sense  of  personal  worth  less  by 
defense  mechanisms  than  by  the  effort  of  will 
which  they  can  make. 

As  William  James  said: 

If  the  searching  of  our  heart  and  reins  be  the  purpose 
of  this  human  drama,  then  what  is  sought  seems  to  be 
what  effort  we  can  make.  He  who  can  make  none  is 
but  a shadow;  he  who  can  make  much  is  a hero.  The 
huge  world  that  girdles  us  about  puts  all  sorts  of  ques- 
tions to  us,  and  tests  us  in  all  sorts  of  ways.  Some  of 
the  tests  we  meet  by  actions  that  are  easy,  and  some  of 
the  questions  we  answer  in  articulately  formulated 
words.  But  the  deepest  question  that  is  ever  asked 
admits  of  no  reply  but  the  dumb  turning  of  the  will 
and  tightening  of  our  heartstrings  as  we  say,  “Yes,  I 
will  even  have  it  so!”  When  a dreadful  object  is  pre- 
sented, or  when  life  as  a whole  turns  up  its  dark  abysses 
to  our  view,  then  the  worthless  ones  among  us  lose 
their  hold  on  the  situation  altogether,  and  either  escape 
from  its  difficulties  by  averting  their  attention,  or,  if 
they  cannot  do  that,  collapse  into  yielding  masses  of 
plaintiveness  and  fear.  The  effort  required  for  facing 
and  consenting  to  such  objects  is  beyond  their  power 
to  make.  But  the  heroic  mind  does  differently.  To  it, 
too,  the  objects  are  sinister  and  dreadful,  unwelcome, 
incompatible  with  wished-for  things.  But  it  can  face 
them  if  necessary  without  losing  its  hold  upon  the 
rest  of  life.  The  world  thus  finds  in  the  heroic  man  its 
worthy  match  and  mate. . . . He  can  stand  this  Universe. 

127 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Indeed  the  path  for  all  who  would  make  of 
living  a reality  rather  than  an  imitation  leads 
along  what  James  used  to  call  “the  perilous 
edge.”  Every  personal  history  that  is  a his- 
tory, and  not  a mere  fiction,  contains  in  it 
something  unique,  a fraction  for  which  there 
is  no  common  denominator.  It  requires  just 
that  effort  of  attention  to  concrete  reality  and 
the  fact  of  self  which  in  the  crowd  we  always 
seek  to  escape  by  diverting  attention  to  con- 
genial abstractions  and  ready-made  univer- 
sals.  We  “find  ourselves”  only  as  we  “get 
over”  one  after  another  of  our  crowd-com- 
pulsions, until  finally  we  are  strong  enough, 
as  Ibsen  would  say,  “to  stand  alone.” 

Timid  spirits  seldom  voluntarily  succeed  in 
getting  closer  to  reality  than  the  “philosophy 
of  ‘as  if’”  which  characterizes  the  thinking 
both  of  the  crowd  and  the  psychoneurosis. 
What  indeed  is  the  crowd  but  a fiction  of  up- 
holding ourselves  by  all  leaning  on  one 
another,  an  “escape  from  difficulties  by 
averting  attention,”  a spiritual  safety -first  or 
“fool-proof”  mechanism  by  which  we  bear 
up  one  another’s  collapsing  ego-consciousness 
lest  it  dash  its  foot  against  a stone? 

The  crowd-man  can,  when  his  fiction  is 
challenged,  save  himself  from  spiritual  bank- 
ruptcy, preserve  his  defenses,  keep  his  crowd 
from  going  to  pieces,  only  by  a demur.  Any- 
one who  challenges  the  crowd’s  fictions  must 

128 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


be  ruled  out  of  court.  He  must  not  be  per- 
mitted to  speak.  As  a witness  to  contrary 
values  his  testimony  must  be  discounted. 
The  worth  of  his  evidence  must  be  discredited 
by  belittling  the  disturbing  witness.  “He 
is  a bad  man;  the  crowd  must  not  listen  to 
him.”  His  motives  must  be  evil;  he  “is 
bought  up”;  he  is  an  immoral  character;  he 
tells  lies;  he  is  insincere  or  he  “has  not  the 
courage  to  take  a stand”  or  “there  is  nothing 
new  in  what  he  says.”  Ibsen’s  “Enemy  of 
the  People,”  illustrates  this  point  very  well. 
The  crowd  votes  that  Doctor  Stockman  may 
not  speak  about  the  baths,  the  real  point  at 
issue.  Indeed,  the  mayor  takes  the  floor  and 
officially  announces  that  the  doctor’s  state- 
ment that  the  water  is  bad  is  “unreliable  and 
exaggerated.”  Then  the  president  of  the 
Householder’s  Association  makes  an  address 
accusing  the  doctor  of  secretly  aiming  at 
revolution''  When  finally  Doctor  Stockman 
speaks  and  tells  his  fellow  citizens  the  real 
meaning  of  their  conduct,  and  utters  a few 
plain  truths  about  “the  compact  majority,” 
the  crowd  saves  its  face,  not  by  proving  the 
doctor  false,  but  by  howling  him  down, 
voting  him  an  “enemy  of  the  people,”  and 
throwing  stones  through  his  windows. 

A crowd  is  like  an  unsound  banking  institu- 
tion. People  are  induced  to  carry  their  de- 
posits of  faith  in  it,  and  so  long  as  there  is  no 

129 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


unusual  withdrawing  of  accounts  the  insolvent 
condition  may  be  covered  up.  Many  uneasy 
depositors  would  like  to  get  their  money  out 
if  they  could  do  so  secretly,  or  without  in- 
curring the  displeasure  of  the  others.  Mean- 
while all  insist  that  the  bank  is  perfectly  safe 
and  each  does  all  he  can  to  compel  the  others 
to  stay  in.  The  thing  they  all  most  fear  is 
that  some  one  Avill  “start  a run  on  the  bank,” 
force  it  to  liquidate,  and  everyone  will  lose. 
So  the  crowd  functions  in  its  way  just  so  long 
as  its  members  may  be  cajoled  into  an  ap- 
pearance of  continued  confidence  in  its  ideals 
and  values.  The  spiritual  capital  of  each 
depends  on  the  confidence  of  the  others.  As 
a consecpience  they  all  spend  most  of  their 
time  exhorting  one  another  to  be  good  crowd- 
men,  fearing  and  hating  no  one  so  much  as  the 
person  who  dares  raise  the  question  whether 
the  crow’d  could  really  meet  its  obligations. 

The  classic  illustration  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  crowd  is  led  to  discredit  the  witness 
to  values  contrary  to  its  own,  is  the  oration  of 
Mark  Antony  in  Shakespeare’s  “Julius  Cae- 
sar.” It  is  by  this  means  alone  that  Antony 
is  able  to  turn  the  minds  of  the  Roman  citizens 
into  the  crowd  state.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  the  address  of  Brutus,  just  before  this, 
while  not  at  all  a bit  of  crowd-oratory,  left  a 
favorable  impression.  The  citizens  are  con- 
vinced that  “This  Caesar  was  a tyrant.” 

130 


THE  CROWD  A CREATURE  OF  HATE 


When  Antony  goes  up  to  speak,  he  thanks 
them  “for  Brutus’  sake.”  They  say,  “’Twere 
best  he  speak  no  harm  of  Brutus  here.”  He 
can  never  make  them  his  crowd  unless  he  can 
destroy  Brutus’  influence.  This  is  precisely 
what  he  proceeds  gradually  to  do. 

At  first  with  great  courtesy — “The  noble 
Brutus  hath  told  you  Csesar  was  ambitious; 
if  it  were  so  it  was  a grievous  fault  . . . for 
Brutus  is  an  honorable  man,  so  are  they  all, 
all  honorable  men.”  This  sentence  is  re- 
peated four  times  in  the  first  section;  Csesar 
was  a good  faithful  friend  to  Antony,  “But  . . . 
and  Brutus  is  an  honorable  man.”  Again 
Csesar  refused  the  crown,  but  “Brutus  is  an 
honorable  man.”  Csesar  wept  when  the  poor 
cried,  “sure,  Brutus  is  an  honorable  man,  I 
speak  not  to  disprove  what  he  says”  but  “men 
have  lost  their  reason”  and  “my  heart  is  in 
the  coffin  there  with  C^sar.”  The  citizens 
are  sorry  for  the  weeping  Antony ; they  listen 
more  intently  now.  Again — “If  I were  dis- 
posed to  stir  your  hearts  and  minds  to  mutiny 
and  rage” — but  that  would  be  to  wrong 
Brutus  and  Cassius,  “Who  you  all  know  are 
honorable  men” — this  time  said  with  more 
marked  irony.  Rather  than  wrong  such  hon- 
orable men,  Antony  prefers  to  “wrong  the 
dead,  to  wrong  myself — and  you.”  That 
sentence  sets  Brutus  squarely  in  opposition 
to  the  speaker  and  his  audience.  Caesar’s 

131 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


will  is  mentioned — if  only  the  commons  knew 
what  was  in  it,  but  Antony  will  not  read  it, 
“you  are  not  wood,  you  are  not  stones,  but 
men.”  The  speaker  now  resists  their  demand 
to  hear  the  will,  he  ought  not  have  mentioned 
it.  He  fears  he  has,  after  all,  wronged  “the 
honorable  men  whose  daggers  have  stabbed 
Csesar.”  The  citizens  have  caught  the  note 
of  irony  now;  the  honorable  men  are  “trai- 
tors,” “villains,”  “murderers.” 

From  this  point  on  the  speaker’s  task  is 
easy;  they  have  become  a crowd.  They 
think  only  of  revenge,  of  killing  everyone  of 
the  conspirators,  and  burning  the  house  of 
Brutus.  Antony  has  even  to  remind  them  of 
the  existence  of  the  will.  The  mischief  is  set 
afloat  the  moment  Brutus  is  successfully 
discredited. 

The  development  of  the  thought  in  this 
oration  is  typical.  Analysis  of  almost  any 
propagandist  speech  will  reveal  some,  if  not 
all,  the  steps  by  which  Brutus  is  made  an  object 
of  hatred.  The  crowd  hates  in  order  that  it 
may  believe  in  itself. 


VI 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD-MIND 

WHEREVER  conscious  thinking  is  de- 
termined by  unconscious  mechanisms, 
and  all  thinking  is  more  or  less  so,  it  is  dog- 
matic in  character.  Beliefs  which  serve  an 
unconscious  purpose  do  not  require  the  sup- 
port of  evidence.  They  persist  because  they 
are  demanded.  This  is  a common  symptom 
of  various  forms  of  psychoneurosis.  Ideas 
“haunt  the  mind”  of  the  patient;  he  cannot 
rid  himself  of  them.  He  may  know  they  are 
foolish,  but  he  is  compelled  to  think  them. 
In  severe  cases,  he  may  hear  voices  or  experi- 
ence other  hallucinations  which  are  symbolic 
of  the  obsessive  ideas.  Or  his  psychic  life 
may  be  so  absorbed  by  his  one  fixed  idea  that 
it  degenerates  into  the  ceaseless  repetition  of 
a gesture  or  a phrase  expressive  of  this  idea. 

In  paranoia  the  fixed  ideas  are  organized 
into  a system.  Brill  says: 

I know  a number  of  paranoiacs  who  went  through  a 
stormy  period  lasting  for  years,  but  who  now  live  con- 
tentedly as  if  in  another  world.  Such  transformations 
of  the  world  are  common  in  paranoia.  They  do  not 

133 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


care  for  anything,  as  nothing  is  real  to  them.  They 
have  withdravra  their  sum  of  libido  from  the  persons 
of  their  environment  and  the  outer  world.  The  end 
of  the  world  is  the  projection  of  this  internal  catas- 
trophe. Their  subjective  world  came  to  an  end  since 
they  withdrew  their  love  from  it.  By  a secondary 
rationalization,  the  patients  then  explain  whatever 
obtrudes  itself  upon  them  as  something  intangible  and 
fit  it  in  with  their  own  system.  Thus  one  of  my 
patients  who  considers  himself  a sort  of  Messiah  denies 
the  reality  of  his  own  parents  by  saying  that  they  are 
only  shadows  made  by  his  enemy,  the  devil,  whom  he 
has  not  yet  wholly  subdued.  Another  paranoiac  in 
the  Central  Islip  State  Hospital,  who  represented  him- 
self as  a second  Christ,  spends  most  of  his  time  sewing 
out  on  cloth  crude  scenes  containing  many  buildings, 
interspersed  with  pictures  of  the  doctors.  He  ex- 
plained all  this  very  minutely  as  the  new  world  sys- 
tem. . . . Thus  the  paranoiac  builds  up  again  with  bis 
delusions  a new  world  in  which  he  can  live.  . . . (Italics 
mine.) 

However,  a withdrawal  of  libido  is  not  an  exclusive 
occurrence  in  paranoia,  nor  is  its  occurrence  any- 
where necessarily  followed  by  disastrous  consequences. 
Indeed,  in  normal  life  there  is  a constant  wathdrawal  of 
libido  from  persons  and  objects  without  resulting  in 
paranoia  or  other  neuroses.  It  merely  causes  a special 
psychic  mood.  The  withdrawal  of  the  libido  as  such 
cannot  therefore  be  considered  as  pathogenic  of  para- 
noia. It  requires  a special  character  to  distinguish 
the  paranoiac  withdrawal  of  libido  from  other  kinds  of 
the  same  process.  This  is  readily  foimd  when  we  follow 
the  further  utilization  of  the  libido  thus  withdrawn. 
Normally,  we  immediately  seek  a substitute  for  the 
suspended  attachment,  and  until  one  is  foimd  the  libido 
floats  freely  in  the  psyche  and  causes  tensions  which 

134 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


influence  our  moods.  In  hysteria  the  freed  sum  of 
libido  becomes  transformed  into  bodily  innervations 
of  fear.  Clinical  indications  teach  us  that  in  paranoia 
a special  use  is  made  of  the  libido  which  is  withdrawn 
from  its  object . . . the  freed  libido  in  paranoia  is  thrown 
back  on  the  ego  and  serves  to  magnify  it. 

Note  the  fact  that  there  is  a necessary  re- 
lation between  the  fixed  ideal  system  of  the 
paranoiac  and  his  withdrawal  of  interest  in 
the  outside  world.  The  system  gains  the 
function  of  reality  for  him  in  the  same  measure 
that,  loving  not  the  world  nor  the  things  that 
are  in  the  world,  he  has  rendered  our  common 
human  world  unreal.  His  love  thrown  back 
upon  himself  causes  him  to  create  another 
world,  a world  of  “pure  reason,”  so  to  speak, 
which  is  more  congenial  to  him  than  the  world 
of  empirical  fact.  In  this  system  he  takes 
refuge  and  finds  peace  at  last.  Now  we  see 
the  function,  at  least  so  far  as  paranoia  is 
concerned,  of  the  ideal  system.  As  Brill  says, 
it  is  a curative  process  of  a mind  which  has 
suffered  “regression”  or  turning  back  of  its 
interest  from  the  affairs  of  ordinary  men  and 
women,  to  the  attachments  of  an  earlier  stage 
in  its  history.  To  use  a philosophical  term, 
the  paranoiac  is  the  Simon-pure  “solipsist.” 
And  as  a 'priori  thinking  tends,  as  Schiller  has 
shown,  ever  to  solipsism,  we  see  here  the  grain 
of  truth  in  G.  K.  Chesterton’s  witty  com- 
parison of  rationalism  and  lunacy. 

135 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


“Regression,”  or  withdrawal  of  the  libido,  is 
present  to  some  degree  I believe  in  all  forms 
of  the  neurosis.  But  we  are  informed  that  a 
withdrawal  of  the  libido  may,  and  frequently 
does,  occur  also  in  normal  people.  Knowledge 
of  the  neurosis  here,  as  elsewhere,  serves  to 
throw  light  on  certain  thought  processes  of 
people  who  are  considered  normal.  Brill  says 
\ that  “normally  we  seek  a substitute  for  the 
l/suspended  attachment.”  New  interests  and 
new  affections  in  time  take  the  places  of 
the  objects  from  which  the  feelings  have 
been  torn.  In  analytical  psychology  the 
process  by  which  this  is  achieved  is  called  a 
“transference.” 

Now  the  crowd  is  in  a sense  a “trans- 
ference phenomenon.”  In  the  temporary  crowd 
or  mob  this  transference  is  too  transitory  to 
be  very  evident,  though  even  here  I believe 
there  will  generally  be  found  a certain  es'prit 
de  corps.  In  permanent  crowds  there  is  often 
a marked  transference  to  the  other  members 
of  the  group.  This  is  evident  in  the  joy  of 
the  new  convert  or  the  newly  initiated,  also 
in  such  terms  of  affection  as  “comrade”  and 
“brother.”  I doubt,  however,  if  this  affec- 
tion, so  far  as  it  is  genuine  among  indi\’iduals 
of  a certain  crowd,  is  very  different  from  the 
good  will  and  affection  which  may  spring  up 
anywhere  among  individuals  who  are  more 
or  less  closely  associated,  or  that  it  ever 

136 


THE  xVBSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


really  extends  beyond  the  small  circle  of  per- 
sonal friends  that  everyone  normally  gains 
through  his  daily  relations  with  others. 

But  to  the  crowd-mind  this  transference  is 
supposed  to  extend  to  all  the  members  of  the 
group;  they  are  comrades  and  brothers  not 
because  we  like  them  and  know  them  in- 
timately, but  because  they  are  fellow  mem- 
bers. In  other  words,  this  transference,  so 
far  as  it  is  a crowd  phenomenon  as  such,  is 
not  to  other  individuals,  but  to  the  idea  of 
the  crowd  itself.  It  is  not  enough  for  the 
good  citizen  to  love  his  neighbors  in  so  far  as 
he  finds  them  lovable;  he  must  love  his  coun- 
try. To  the  churchman  the  Church  herself 
is  an  object  of  faith  and  adoration.  One 
does  not  become  a humanitarian  by  being  a 
good  fellow;  he  must  love  “humanity” — 
which  is  to  say,  the  bare  abstract  idea  of  every- 
body. I remember  once  asking  a missionary 
who  was  on  his  way  to  China  what  it  was  that 
impelled  him  to  go  so  far  in  order  to  minister 
to  suffering  humanity.  He  answered,  “It 
is  love.”  I asked  again,  “Do  you  really 
mean  to  say  that  you  care  so  much  as  that 
for  Chinese,  not  one  of  whom  you  have  ever 
seen?”  He  answered,  “Well,  I — you  see,  I 
love  them  through  Jesus  Christ.”  So  in  a 
sense  it  is  with  the  crowd-man  always;  he 
loves  through  the  crowd. 

The  crowd  idealized  as  something  sacred, 

10  137 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


as  end  in  itself,  as  something  which  it  is  an 
honor  to  belong  to,  is  to  some  extent  a dis- 
guised object  of  our  self-love.  But  the  idea 
of  the  crowd  disguises  more  than  self-love. 
Like  most  of  the  symbols  through  which  the 
unconscious  functions,  it  can  serve  more 
than  one  purpose  at  a time.  The  idea  of  the 
crowd  also  serves  to  disguise  the  parental 
image,  and  our  own  imaginary  identification 
or  reunion  with  it.  The  nation  is  to  the 
crowd-man  the  “Fatherland,”  the  “mother 
country,”  “Uncle  Sam” — a figure  which  serves 
to  do  more  than  personalize  for  cartoonists 
the  initials  U.  S.  Uncle  Sam  is  also  the 
father-image  thinly  disguised.  The  Church 
is  “the  Mother,”  again  the  “Bride.”  Such 
religious  symbols  as  “the  Heavenly  Father” 
and  the  “Holy  Mother”  also  have  the  value 
of  standing  for  the  parent  image.  For  a 
detailed  discussion  of  these  symbols,  the 
reader  is  referred  to  Jung’s  Psychology  of  the 
Unconscious. 

In  another  connection  I have  referred  to  the 
fact  that  the  crowd  stands  to  the  member  in 
loco  'parentis.  Here  I wish  to  point  out  the 
fact  that  such  a return  to  the  parent  image  is 
commonly  found  in  the  psychoneurosis  and  is 
what  is  meant  by  “regression.”  I have  also 
dwelt  at  some  length  on  the  fact  that  it  is  by 
securing  a modification  in  the  immediate 
social  environment,  ideally  or  actually,  that 

138 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


the  crowd  permits  the  escape  of  the  repressed 
wish.  Such  a modification  in  the  social  at 
once  sets  the  members  of  the  crowd  off  as  a 
“peculiar  people.”  Interest  tends  to  with- 
draw from  the  social  as  a whole  and  center  in 
the  group  who  have  become  a crowd.  The 
Church  is  “in  the  world  but  not  of  it.”  The 
nation  is  an  end  in  itself,  so  is  every  crowd. 
Transference  to  the  idea  of  the  crowd  differs 
then  from  the  normal  substitutes  which  we 
find  for  the  object  from  which  affection  is 
withdrawn.  It  is  itself  a kind  of  regression. 
In  the  psychoneurosis — in  paranoia  most 
clearly — the  patient’s  attempt  to  rationalize 
this  shifting  of  interest  gives  rise  to  the  closed 
systems  and  ideal  reconstructions  of  the  world 
mentioned  in  the  passage  quoted  from  Brill. 

Does  the  crowd’s  thinking  commonly  show 
a like  tendency  to  construct  an  imaginary 
world  of  thought-forms  and  then  take  refuge 
in  its  ideal  system.^  As  we  saw  at  the  begin- 
ning of  our  discussion,  it  does.  The  focusing 
of  general  attention  upon  the  abstract  and 
universal  is  a necessary  step  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  crowd-mind. 

The  crowd  does  not  think  in  order  to  solve 
problems.  To  the  crowd-mind,  as  such,  there 
are  no  problems.  It  has  closed  its  case  be- 
forehand. This  accounts  for  what  Le  Bon 
termed  the  “credulity”  of  the  crowd.  But 
the  crowd  believes  only  what  it  wants  to  be- 

139 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


lieve  and  nothing  else.  Anj^one  who  has  been 
in  the  position  of  a public  teacher  knows  how 
almost  universal  is  the  habit  of  thinking  in  the 
manner  of  the  crowd  and  how  difficult  it  is  to 
get  people  to  think  for  themselves.  One 
frequently  hears  it  said  that  the  people  do  not 
think,  that  they  do  not  want  to  know  the 
iruth. 

Ibsen  makes  his  Doctor  Stockman  say : 

What  sort  of  truths  are  they  that  the  majority  usu- 
ally supports?  They  are  truths  that  are  of  such  ad- 
vanced age  that  they  are  beginning  to  break  up.  . . . 
These  “majority  truths”  are  like  last  year’s  cured 
meat — like  rancid  tainted  ham;  and  they  are  the 
origin  of  the  moral  scurvy  that  is  rampant  in  our  com- 
munities. . . . The  most  dangerous  enemy  of  truth  and 
freedom  among  us  is  the  compact  majority,  yes,  the 
damned  compact  liberal  majority  . . . the  majority  has 
might  on  its  side  unfortunately,  but  right  it  has  never. 

It  is  not  really  because  so  many  are  ignorant, 
but  because  so  few  are  able  to  resist  the  appeal 
which  the  peculiar  logic  of  crowd-thinking 
makes  to  the  unconscious,  that  the  cheap,  the 
tawdry,  the  half-true  almost  exclusively  gain 
popular  acceptance.  The  average  man  is  a 
dognmtist.  He  thinks  what  he  ttimks  others 
think  heTs  thinking.  He  is  so  used  to  propa- 
ganda that  he  can  hardly  think  of  any  matter 
in  other  terms.  It  is  almost  impossible  to 
keep  the  consideration  of  any  subject  of  gen- 
eral interest  above  the  dilemmas  of  partisan 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


crowds.  People  will  wherever  possible  change 
the  discussion  of  a mooted  question  into  an 
antiphonal  chorus  of  howling  mobs,  each 
chanting  its  ritual  as  ultimate  truth,  and 
hurling  its  shibboleths  in  the  faces  of  the 
others.  Pursuit  of  truth  with  most  people 
consists  in  repeating  their  creed.  Nearly 
ever}^  movement  is  immediately  made  into  a 
cult.  Theology  supplants  religion  in  the 
churches.  In  popular  ethics  a dead  formalism 
puts  an  end  to  moral  advance.  Straight 
thinking  on  political  subjects  is  subordinated 
to  partisan  ends.  Catch-phrases  and  magic 
formulas  become  substituted  for  scientific  in- 
formation. Even  the  Socialists,  who  feel  that 
they  are  the  intellectually  elect — and  I cite 
them  here  as  an  example  in  no  unfair  spirit, 
but  just  because  so  many  of  them  are  really 
well-informed  and  “advanced”  in  their  think- 
ing— have  been  unable  to  save  themselves 
from  a doctrinaire  economic  orthodoxy  of 
spirit  which  is  often  more  dogmatic  and  in- 
tolerant than  that  of  the  “religious  folks” 
to  whose  alleged  “narrow-mindedness”  every 
Socialist,  even  while  repeating  his  daily  chap- 
ter from  the  Marxian  Koran,  feels  himself 
superior. 

The  crowd-mind  is  everywhere  idealistic, 
and  absolutist.  Its  truths  are  “given,”  made- 
in-advance.  Though  unconsciously  its  sys- 
tems of  logic  are  created  to  enhance  the  self- 

111 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


feeling,  they  appear  to  consciousness  as  highly 
impersonal  and  abstract.  As  in  the  intel- 
lectualist  philosophies,  forms  of  thought  are 
regarded  as  themselves  objects  of  thought, 
Systems  of  general  ideas  are  imposed  upon 
the  minds  of  men  apparently  from  without. 
Universal  acceptance  is  demanded.  Thought 
becomes  stereotyped.  What  ought  to  be  is 
confused  with  what  is,  the  ideal  becomes  more 
real  than  fact. 

In  the  essays  on  “Pragmatism”  William 
James  showed  that  the  rationalist  system,  even 
that  of  the  great  philosopher,  is  in  large 
measure  determined  by  the  thinker’s  peculiar 
“temperament.”  Elsewhere  he  speaks  of  the 
“Sentiment  of  Rationality.”  For  a discus- 
sion of  the  various  types  of  philosophical 
rationalism,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
criticisms  by  William  James,  F.  C.  S.  Schiller, 
Dewey,  and  other  Pragmatists.  It  is  suffi- 
cient for  our  purpose  to  note  the  fact  that  the 
rationalist  tj^e  of  mind  everywhere  shows  a 
tendency  to  assert  the  unreality  of  the  world 
of  everyday  experience,  and  to  seek  comfort 
and  security  in  the  contemplation  of  a log- 
ically ordered  system  or  world  of  “pure  rea- 
son.” Ideals,  not  concrete  things,  are  the 
true  realities.  The  world  with  which  we  are 
always  wrestling  is  but  a distorted  manifesta- 
tion, a jumbled,  stereotyped  copy  of  what 
James  ironically  referred  to  as  “the  de  luxe 

142 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


edition  which  exists  in  the  Absolute.”  The 
parable  of  the  cave  which  Plato  gives  in  the 
Republic  represents  ordinary  knowledge  as  a 
delusion,  and  the  empirically  known  world  as 
but  dancing  shadows  on  the  wall  of  our 
subterranean  prison. 

R.  W.  Livingstone,  who  sees  in  Platonism, 
from  the  very  beginning,  a certain  world- 
weariness and  turning  away  of  the  Greek 
spirit  from  the  healthy  realism  which  had 
formerly  characterized  it,  says: 

For  if  Greece  showed  men  how  to  trust  their  own 
nature  and  lead  a simply  human  life,  how  to  look 
straight  in  the  face  of  the  world  and  read  the  beauty 
that  met  them  on  the  surface,  certain  Greek  writers 
preached  a different  lesson  from  this.  In  opposition 
to  directness  they  taught  us  to  look  past  the  “unimag- 
inary and  actual”  qualities  of  things  to  secondary 
meanings  and  inner  symbolism.  In  opposition  to 
liberty  and  humanism  they  taught  us  to  mistrust  our 
nature,  to  see  in  it  weakness,  helplessness,  and  incur- 
able taint,  to  pass  beyond  humanity  to  communion 
with  God,  to  live  less  for  this  world  than  for  one  to 

come. Perhaps  to  some  people  it  may  seem  surprising 

that  this  writer  is  Plato. 

According  to  this  view  reality  may  be  found 
only  by  means  of  “pure  knowledge,”  and,  to 
give  a familiar  quotation  from  the  Phsedo: 

If  we  would  have  pure  knowledge  of  anything  we 
must  be  quit  of  the  body;  the  soul  in  herself  must 

143 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


behold  things  in  themselves;  and  then  we  shall  at- 
tain the  wisdom  which  we  desire  and  of  which  we  say 
that  we  are  lovers;  not  whUe  we  live,  but  after  death; 
for  if,  while  in  company  with  the  body,  the  soul  cannot 
have  pure  knowledge,  one  of  two  things  follows — 
either  knowledge  is  not  to  be  obtained  at  all,  or  if  at 
all  after  death. 

Intellectualism  may  not  always  be  so  clearly 
other-worldly  as  Plato  shows  himseK  to  be  in 
this  passage.  But  it  commonly  argues  that 
behind  the  visible  world  of  “illusory  sense 
experience”  lies  the  true  ground  and  cause — 
an  unseen  order  in  which  the  contradictions  of 
experience  are  either  unknown  or  harmonized, 
an  external  and  unchangeable  “Substance,” 
a self-contained  Absolute  to  which  our  ephem- 
eral personalities  with  their  imperfections 
and  problems  are  unknown.  A “thing  in  it- 
self,” or  principle  of  Being  which  transcends 
our  experience. 

This  tj^e  of  thinking,  whether  it  be  known 
as  Idealism,  Rationalism,  Intellectualism,  or 
Absolutism,  finds  little  sympathy  from  those 
who  approach  the  study  of  philosophy  from 
the  standpoint  of  psychology".  The  following 
passages  taken  from  Studies  in  Humanism  by 
Schiller,  show  that  even  without  the  technique 
of  the  analytical  method,  it  was  not  hard  to 
detect  some  of  the  motives  which  prompted 
the  construction  of  systems  of  this  sort.  The 
partisanism  of  one  of  these  motives  is  rather 

144 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


suggestive  for  our  study  of  the  mind  of  the 
crowd.  Says  our  author : 

Logical  defects  rarely  kill  beliefs  to  which  men,  for 
psychological  reasons,  remain  attached.  . . . This  may 
suggest  to  us  that  we  may  have  perhaps  unwittingly 
misunderstood  Absolutism,  and  done  it  a grave  injus- 
tice. . . . What  if  its  real  appeal  was  not  logical  but 
psychological?  . . , 

The  history  of  English  Absolutism  distinctly  bears 
out  these  anticipations.  It  was  originally  a deliberate 
importation  from  Germany,  with  a purpose.  And  this 
purpose  was  a religious  one — that  of  counteracting  the 
antireligious  developments  of  Science.  The  indig- 
enous philosophy,  the  old  British  empiricism,  was 
useless  for  this  purpose.  For  though  a form  of  intel- 
lectualism,  its  sensationalism  was  in  no  wise  hostile  to 
Science.  On  the  contrary,  it  showed  every  desire  to 
ally  itseh  with,  and  to  promote,  the  great  scientific 
movement  of  the  nineteenth  century,  which  penetrated 
into  and  almost  overwhelmed  Oxford  between  1859 
and  1870. 

But  this  movement  excited  natural  and  not  unwar- 
ranted alarm  in  that  great  center  of  theology.  For 
Science,  flushed  with  its  hard-won  liberty,  ignorant  of 
philosophy,  and  as  yet  unconscious  of  its  proper  limita- 
tions, was  decidedly  aggressive  and  overconfident. 
It  seemed  naturalistic,  nay,  materialistic,  by  the  law 
of  its  being.  The  logic  of  Mill,  the  philosophy  of 
Evolution,  the  faith  in  democracy,  in  freedom,  in 
progress  (on  material  lines),  threatened  to  carry  all 
before  them. 

What  was  to  be  done?  Nothing  directly;  for  on  its 
own  ground  Science  seemed  invulnerable,  and  had  the 
knack  of  crushing  the  subtlest  dialectics  by  the  knock- 
down force  of  sheer  scientific  fact.  But  might  it  not 

145 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


be  possible  to  change  the  venue,  to  shift  the  battle- 
ground to  a region  ubi  instahilis  terra  unda  (where  the 
land  afforded  no  firm  footing),  where  the  frozen  sea 
could  not  be  navigated,  where  the  very  air  was  thick 
with  mists  so  that  phantoms  might  well  pass  for  reali- 
ties— the  realm,  in  short,  of  metaphysics?  . . . 

So  it  was  rarely  necessary  to  do  more  than  recite  the 
august  table  of  a 'priori  categories  in  order  to  make  the 
most  audacious  scientist  feel  that  he  had  got  out  of  his 
depth;  while  at  the  merest  mention  of  the  Hegelian 
dialectic  all  the  “ advanced  thinkers  ” of  the  time  would 
flee  affrighted. 

Schiller’s  sense  of  humor  doubtless  leads  him 
to  exaggerate  somewhat  the  deliberateness  of 
this  importation  of  German  metaphysics. 
That  these  borrowed  transcendental  and  dia- 
lectical systems  served  their  purpose  in  the 
warfare  of  traditional  theologies  against  Sci- 
ence is  but  half  the  truth.  The  other  half  is 
that  these  logical  formulas  pro%dded  certain 
intelligent  believers  with  a defense,  or  safe 
refuge,  in  their  owti  inner  conflicts. 

That  this  is  the  case,  Schiller  evidently  has 
little  doubt.  After  discussing  Absolutism  it- 
self as  a sort  of  religion,  and  showing  that  its 
“catch-words”  taken  at  their  face  value  are 
not  only  emotionally  barren,  but  also  logically 
meaningless  because  “inapplicable  to  our 
actual  experience,”  he  then  proceeds  to  an 
examination  of  the  unconscious  motives  which 
determine  this  sort  of  thinking.  His  descrip- 
tion of  these  motives,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is  an 

146 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


excellent  little  bit  of  analytical  psychology. 
He  says: 

How  then  can  Absolutism  possibly  be  a religion? 
It  must  appeal  to  psychological  motives  of  a different 
sort,  rare  enough  to  account  for  its  total  divergence 
from  the  ordinary  religious  feelings  and  compelling 
enough  to  account  for  the  fanaticism  with  which  it  is 
held  and  the  persistence  with  which  the  same  old 
round  of  negations  has  been  reiterated  through  the 
ages.  Of  such  psychological  motives  we  shall  indicate 
the  more  important  and  reputable. 

(1)  It  is  decidedly  flattering  to  one’s  spiritual  pride 
to  feel  oneself  a “part”  or  “manifestation”  or  “ve- 
hicle” or  “reproduction”  of  the  Absolute  Mind,  and 
to  some  this  feeling  affords  so  much  strength  and  com- 
fort and  such  exquisite  delight  that  they  refrain  from 
inquiring  what  these  phrases  mean.  ...  It  is,  moreover, 
the  strength  of  this  feeling  which  explains  the  blindness^ 
of  ^^oliffists  toward  the  lo^cal  jdefe.cts  of  their^QWS 
theory.  . . . 

(2)  There  is  a strange  delight  in  wide  generalization 
merely  as  such,  which,  when  pursued  without  reference 
to  the  ends  which  it  subserves,  and  without  regard  to 
its  actual  functioning,  often  results  in  a sort  of  logical 
vertigo.  This  probably  has  much  to  do  with  the 
peculiar  “craving  for  unity”  which  is  held  to  be  the 
distinctive  affliction  of  philosophers.  At  any  rate,  the 
thought  of  an  all-embracing  One  or  Whole  seems  to  be 
regarded  as  valuable  and  elevating  quite  apart  from 
any  definite  function  it  performs  in  laiowing,  or  light 
it  throws  on  any  actual  problem. 

(3)  The  thought  of  an  Absolute  Unity  is  cherished 
as  a guarantee  of  cosmic  stability.  In  face  of  the  rest- 
less vicissitudes  of  phenomena  it  seems  to  secure  us 
against  falling  out  of  the  Universe.  It  assures  us  a 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


priori — and  that  is  its  supreme  value — that  the  cosmic 
order  cannot  fall  to  pieces  and  leave  us  dazed  and  con- 
founded among  the  debris.  . . . We  want  to  have  an 
absolute  assurance  a prion-Goncernmg  the  future^  and 
^ the  thought  of  the  absolute  seems  designed  to  give  it. 
It  is  probably  this  last  notion  that,  consciously  or  un- 
consciously, weighs  most  in  the  psychology  of  the 
Absolutists’  creed. 

In  this  connection  the  reader  will  recall  the 
passage  quoted  from  Adler’s  The  Neurotic  Con- 
stitution, in  which  it  was  shown  that  the  ficti- 
tious “guiding-lines”  or  rational  systems  of 
both  the  neurotic  and  normal  are  motivated  by 
this  craving  for  security.  But  it  makes  all  the 
difference  in  the  world  whether  the  system  of 
ideas  is  used,  as  in  science  and  common  sense, 
to  solve  real  problems  in  an  objective  world, 
or  is  created  to  be  an  artifieial  and  imaginary 
defense  of  the  ego  against  a subjective  feeling 
of  insecurity;  whether,  in  a word,  the  craving 
for  security  moves  one  to  do  something  cal- 
culated to  render  the  forces  with  which  he 
must  deal  concretely  more  congenial  and  hos- 
pitable to  his  will,  or  makes  him  content  to 
withdraw  and  file  a demur  to  the  challenge  of 
the  environment  in  the  form  of  theoretical 
denial  of  the  reality  of  the  situation. 

There  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  Absolute 
Idealism,  if  not  taken  too  seriously,  may 
have  the  function  for  some  people  of  steadying 
their  nerves  in  the  battle  of  life.  And  though, 

148 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


as  I believe,  logically  untenable,  it  not  infre- 
quently serves  as  a rationalization  of  faith- 
values  which  work  out  beneficially,  and,  quite 
apart  from  their  metaphysical  trappings,  may 
be  even  indispensable.  Yet  when  carried  to 
its  logical  conclusions  such  thinking  inevi- 
tably distorts  the  meaning  of  personal  living, 
robs  our  world  and  our  acts  of  their  feeling  of 
reality,  serves  as  an  instrument  for  “regres- 
sion” or  withdrawal  of  interest  from  the  real 
tasks  and  objects  of  living  men  and  women, 
and  in  fact  functions  for  much  the  same  pur- 
pose, if  not  precisely  in  the  same  way,  as  do 
the  ideal  systems  of  the  psychopath. 

In  justice  to  idealism  it  should  be  added 
that  this  is  by  no  means  the  only  species  of 
Rationalism  which  may  lead  to  such  psychic 
results.  There  are  various  paths  by  which 
the  craving  for  artificial  security  may  lead  to 
such  attempts  to  reduce  the  whole  of  possible 
experience  to  logical  unity  that  the  realities  of 
time  and  change  and  of  individual  experience 
are  denied.  How  many  deterministic  the- 
ories, with  all  their  scientific  jargon,  are  really 
motivated  by  an  inability  to  accept  a world 
with  an  element  of  chance  in  it.  There  is  a 
sense  in  which  all  science  by  subsuming  like 
individuals  in  a common  class,  and  thus 
ignoring  their  individuality,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  alike  in  certain  respects,  gains  added 
power  over  all  of  them.  There  is  a sense,  too, 

149 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


in  which  science,  by  discovering  that  when- 
ever a given  combination  of  elements  occurs, 
a definitely  foreseen  result  will  follow,  is  justi- 
fied in  ignoring  time  and  treating  certain 
futures  as  if  they  were  already  tucked  up  the 
sleeves  of  the  present.  It  should  be  remem- 
bered that  this  sort  of  determinism  is  purely 
methodological,  and  is,  like  all  thinking,  done 
for  a purpose — that  of  effecting  desirable  ends 
in  a world  made  up  of  concrete  situations. 

When  this  purpose  becomes  supplanted  by 
a passion  to  discount  all  future  change  in 
general — when  one  imagines  that  he  has  a 
formula  which  enables  him  to  write  the 
equation  of  the  curve  of  the  universe,  science 
has  degenerated  into  scientificism,  or  head-in- 
the-sand  philosophy.  The  magic  formula  has 
precisely  the  same  psychic  value  as  the  “ab- 
solute.” I know  a number  of  economic  de- 
terminists,  for  instance,  who  just  cannot  get 
out  of  their  heads  the  notion  that  social  evolu- 
tion is  a process  absolutely  underwritten, 
guaranteed,  and  predictable,  without  the 
least  possible  doubt.  In  such  a philosophy  of 
history  as  this  the  individual  is  of  course  a 
mere  “product  of  his  environment,”  and  his 
role  as  a creator  of  value  is  nil.  On  this 
“materialistic”  theory,  the  individual  is  as 
truly  a mere  manifestation  of  impersonal 
evolutionary  forces  as  he  is,  according  to 
orthodox  Platonism,  a mere  manifestation  of 

150 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


the  abstract  idea  of  his  species.  Notwith- 
standing the  professed  impersonalism  of  this 
view,  its  value  for  consolation  in  minimizing 
the  causes  of  the  spiritual  difference  in  men 
— that  is,  its  function  for  enhancing  the  self- 
feeling of  some  people,  is  obvious.  That 
such  an  idea  should  become  a crowd-idea  is 
not  to  be  wondered  at.  And  this  leads  me  to 
my  point.  It  is  no  mere  accident  that  the 
crowd  takes  to  rationalistic  'philosophies  like  a 
duck  to  water. 

The  crowd-man,  however  unsophisticated 
|he  may  be,  is  a Platonist  at  heart.  He  may 
never  have  heard  the  word  epistemology,  but 
his  theory  of  knowledge  is  essentially  the  same 
as  Plato’s.  Religious  crowds  are,  to  one 
familiar  with  the  Dialogues,  astonishingly 
Platonic.  There  is  the  same  habit  of  giving 
ontological  rather  than  functional  value  to 
general  ideas,  the  same  other-worldliness,  the 
same  moral  dilemmas,  the  same  contempt  for 
the  material,  for  the  human  body,  for  self- 
hood; the  same  assertion  of  finality,  and  the 
conformist  spirit. 

Reformist  crowds  differ  only  superficially 
from  religious  crowds.  Patriotic  crowds  make 
use  of  a different  termmology,  but  their  men- 
tal habits  are  the  same.  It  has  become  a cult 
among  crowds  with  tendencies  toward  social 
revolution  to  paint  their  faces  with  the  colors 
of  a borrowed  nineteenth-century  materialism. 

151 


K 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


But  all  this  is  mere  swagger  and  “frightful- 
ness,” an  attempt  to  make  themselves  look 
terrible  and  frighten  the  bourgeois.  I am 
sure  that  no  one  who  has  seen  all  this  radieal 
rigmarole,  as  I have  had  occasion  to  see  it, 
can  be  deceived  by  it.  These  dreadful  ma- 
terialist doctrines  of  the  radical  crowd  are 
wooden  guns,  no  thicker  than  the  soap-box. 
As  a matter  of  fact,  the  radical  crowds  are 
extremely  idealistic.  With  all  their  talk  of 
proletarian  opposition  to  intellectualism.  So- 
cialists never  become  a crowd  without  becom- 
ing as  intellectualist  as  Fichte  or  Hegel. 
There  is  a sense  in  which  Marx  himself  never 
succeeded  in  escaping  Hegel’s  dilemmas,  he 
only  followed  the  fashion  in  those  days  of 
turning  them  upside  down. 

With  radical  crowds  as  with  conservative, 
there  is  the  same  substitution  of  a closed 
system  of  ideas  for  the  shifting  phenomena 
of  our  empirical  world;  the  same  worship  of 
abstract  forms  of  thought,  the  same  uncom- 
promising spirit  and  insistence  upon  general 
uniformity  of  opinions;  the  same  orthodoxj". 
All  orthodoxy  is  nothing  other  than  the  will 
of  the  crowd  to  keep  itself  together.  With  all 
kinds  of  crowds,  also,  there  is  the  same  di- 
verting of  attention  from  the  personal  and  the 
concrete  to  the  impersonal  and  the  general; 
the  same  flight  from  reality  to  the  tran- 
scendental for  escape,  for  consolation,  for 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


defense,  for  vindication;  the  same  fiction  that 
existence  is  at  bottom  a sort  of  logical  propo- 
sition, a magic  formula  or  principle  of  Being 
to  be  correctly  copied  and  learned  by  rote; 
the  same  attempt  to  create  the  world  or  find 
reality  by  thinking  rather  than  by  acting. 

The  intellectualist  bias  of  the  average  man 
is  doubtless  due  in  great  part  to  the  fact  that 
theology,  and  therefore  the  religious  education 
of  the  young,  both  Christian  and  Jewish,  has 
throughout  the  history  of  these  religions  been 
saturated  with  Platonism,  But  then,  the 
universal  sway  of  this  philosopher  may  be  ex- 
plained by  the  fact  that  there  is  something  in 
his  abstractionism  which  is  congenial  to  the 
creed -making  propensities  of  the  crowd -mind. 
The  great  a 'priori  thinkers,  Plato,  St.  Augus- 
tine, Thomas  Aquinas,  Anselm,  Rousseau, 
Kant,  Hegel,  Green,  etc.,  have  often  been 
called  solitary  men,  but  it  is  significant  that 
their  doctrines  survive  in  popularized  form  in 
the  creeds  and  shibboleths  of  permanent 
crowds  of  all  descriptions.  WTiile  humanists, 
nominalists,  empiricists,  realists,  pragmatists, 
men  like  Protagoras,  Epicurus,  Abelard, 
Bacon,  Locke,  Hume,  Schopenhauer,  Nie- 
tzsche, Bergson,  James,  have  always  had  a hard 
time  of  it.  They  are  considered  destructive, 
for  the  reason  that  the  tendency  of  their 
teaching  is  to  disintegrate  the  crowd-mind  and 
call  one  back  to  himself.  Their  names  are  1 

11  153 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


seldom  mentioned  in  popular  assemblies  ex- 
cept to  discredit  them.  Yet  it  is  on  the  whole 
these  latter  thinkers  who  orient  us  in  our  real 
world,  make  us  courageously  face  the  facts 
with  which  we  have  to  deal,  stimulate  our 
wills,  force  us  to  use  our  ideas  for  what  they 
are — instruments  for  better  living, — inspire  us 
to  finer  and  more  correct  valuations  of  things, 
and  point  out  the  way  to  freedom  for  those 
who  dare  walk  in  it. 

All  this,  however,  is  the  very  thing  that  the 
crowd-mind  is  running  headlong  away  from. 
A.S  a crowd  we  do  not  wish  to  think  em- 
pirically.  Why  should  we  seek  piecemeal 
goods  by  tedious  and  dangerous  effort,  when 
we  have  only  to  do  a little  trick  of  attention, 
and  behold  The  Good,  abstract,  perfect,  uni- 
versal, waiting  just  around  the  corner  in  the 
realm  of  pure  reason,  ready  to  swallow  up 
and  demolish  all  evil?  Are  we  not  even  now 
in  possession  of  Love,  Justice,  Beauty,  and 
Truth  by  the  sheer  magic  of  thinking  of  them 
in  the  abstract,  calling  them  “principles” 
and  writing  the  words  with  the  initial  letters 
in  capitals?  The  very  mental  processes  by 
which  a group  of  people  becomes  a crowd 
change  such  abstract  nouns  from  mere  class 
names  into  copies  of  supermundane  realities. 

In  wholesome  thinking  principles  are  of 
course  necessary.  They  are  what  I might  call 
“leading  ideas.”  Their  function  is  to  lead  to 

154 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


more  satisfactory  thinking — that  is,  to  other 
ideas  which  are  desired.  Or  they  are  useful  in 
leading  us  to  actions  the  results  of  which  are 
intended  and  wished  for.  They  may  also  be 
principles  of  valuation  guiding  us  in  the  choice 
of  ends.  If  there  were  no  substantial  agree- 
ment among  us  concerning  certain  principles 
we  could  not  relate  our  conduct  to  one  another 
at  all;  social  hfe  would  be  impossible.  But 
necessary  as  such  leading  ideas  are,  they  are 
means  rather  than  ends.  Circumstances  may 
demand  that  we  alter  them  or  make  excep- 
tions to  their  application. 

To  the  crowd-mind_a_principle  appears  as 


It  must  be  vindicated  at  all 


costs.  To  offend  against  it  in  one  point  is  to 
be  guilty  of  breaking  the  whole  law.  Crowds 
are  always  uncompromising  about  their  prin- 
ciples. They  must  apply  to  all  alike.  Crowds 
are  no  respecters  of  persons. 

As  crowd-men  we  never  appear  without 
some  set  of  principles  or  some  cause  over  our 
heads.  Crowds  crawl  under  their  principles 
like  worms  under  stones.  They  cover  up  the 
wrigglings  of  the  unconscious,  and  protect  it 
from  attack.  Every  crowd  uses  its  principles 
as  universal  demands.  In  this  way  it  gets 
unction  upon  other  crowds,  puts  them  in  the 
wrong,  makes  them  give  assent  to  the  crowd’s 
real  purpose  by  challenging  them  to  deny  the 
righteousness  of  the  professed  justifications  of 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

that  purpose.  It  is  said  that  the  Sioux  In- 
dians, some  years  ago,  used  to  put  their 
women  and  children  in  front  of  their  firing 
line.  The  braves  could  then  crouch  behind 
these  innocent  ones  and  shoot  at  white  men, 
knowing  that  it  would  be  a violation  of  the 
principles  of  humanity  for  the  white  soldiers 
to  shoot  back  and  risk  killing  women  and 
children.  Crowds  frequently  make  just  such 
use  of  their  principles.  About  each  crowd, 
like  the  circle  of  fire  which  the  gods  placed 
about  the  sleeping  Brmihilde,  there  is  a 
flaming  hedge  of  logical  abstractions,  sanc- 
tions, taboos,  which  none  but  the  intellectu- 
ally courageous  few  dare  cross.  In  this  way 
the  slumbering  critical  faculties  of  the  crowd- 
mind  are  protected  against  the  intrusion  of 
realities  from  outside  the  cult.  The  intel- 
lectual curiosity  of  the  members  of  the  group 
is  kept  within  proper  bounds.  Hostile  per- 
sons or  groups  dare  not  resist  us,  for  in  so 
doing  they  make  themselves  enemies  of  Truth, 
of  Morality,  of  Liberty,  etc.  Both  political 
parties,  by  a common  impulse,  “drape  them- 
selves in  the  Flag.”  It  is  an  interesting  fact 
that  the  most  antagonistic  crowds  profess 
much  the  same  set  of  principles.  The  “sec- 
ondarj’^  rationalization”  of  crowds,  both 
Northern  and  Southern,  at  the  time  of  the 
Civil  War,  made  use  of  our  traditional  prin- 
ciples of  American  Liberty,  and  Christian 

156 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


Morality.  We  have  seen  both  pacifist  and  mil- 
itarist crowds  setting  forth  their  manifestoes 
in  terms  of  New  Testament  teaching.  Each 
religious  sect  exists  only  to  teach  “the  one 
system  of  doctrine  logically  deduced  from 
Scripture.” 

As  an  illustration  of  this  sort  of  reasoning,  I 
give  here  a few  passages  from  a propagandist 
publication  in  which  the  crowd-will  to  domi- 
nate takes  the  typical  American  method  of 
striving  to  force  its  cult  ideas  upon  the  com- 
munity as  a whole  by  means  of  restrictive 
moralist  legislation — in  this  case  attempt  is 
made  to  prohibit  the  exhibition  of  motion 
pictures  on  Sunday.  That  the  demand  for 
such  legislation  is  for  the  most  part  a pure 
class-crowd  phenomenon,  designed  to  enhance 
the  self-feeling  and  economic  interests  of  the 
“reformers,”  by  keeping  the  poor  from  having 
a good  time,  is  I think,  rather  obvious.  The 
reasoning  here  is  interesting,  as  the  real  mo- 
tive is  so  thinly  disguised  by  pietistic  plati- 
tudes that  the  two  follow  each  other  in 
alternate  succession: 

(1)  Sunday  Movies  are  not  needed.  The  people 
have  six  days  and  six  nights  each  week  on  which  to 
attend  the  movies.  Is  not  that  plenty  of  time  for  all.^ 

(2)  Sunday  Movie  Theaters  commercialize  the 
Christian  Sabbath.  While  “the  Sabbath  was  made  for 
man,”  yet  it  is  God’s  day.  We  have  no  right  to  sell  it 
for  business  purposes.  It  is  a day  for  rest  and  worship, 

157 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

not  a day  for  greed  and  gain.  Sunday  would,  of  course, 
be  tbe  best  day  in  the  week  financially  for  the  movies. 
It  would  also  be  the  best  day  in  the  week  for  the  open 
saloons  and  horse-racing,  but  that  is  no  reason  why 
these  should  be  allowed  on  Sunday.  The  Sabbath  must 
not  be  commercialized. 

(3)  Sunday  Movie  Theaters  destroy  the  rest  and  quiet 
of  many  people,  especially  those  who  live  in  the  residential 
district  of  cities  and  in  the  neighborhood  where  such 
motion-picture  theaters  are  located.  Great  crowds 
pour  along  the  streets  near  such  theaters,  often  breaking 
tbe  Sunday  quiet  of  that  part  of  the  city  by  loud  and 
boisterous  talk. 

Thousands  of  people  every  year  are  moving  away 
from  the  downtown  noisy  districts  of  the  cities  out  into 
the  quiet  residential  districts  in  order  to  have  quiet 
Sundays.  But  when  a motion-picture  theater  comes 
and  locates  next  to  their  homes,  or  in  their  block,  as 
has  been  done  in  many  cases,  and  great  noisy,  boisterous 
crowds  surge  back  and  forth  before  their  homes  all 
Sunday  afternoon  and  evening,  going  to  the  movies, 
they  are  being  robbed  of  that  for  which  they  paid  their 
money  when  they  bought  a home  in  that  quiet  part  of  the 
city.  . . . 

(4)  . . . Anything  that  injures  the  Christian  Sabbath 
injures  the  Christian  churches,  and  certainly  Sunday 
motion-picture  theaters,  wherever  allowed,  do  injure 
the  Christian  Sabbath.  . . . 

Dr.  Wilbur  F.  Crafts  of  Washington,  D.  C.,  probably 
the  greatest  authority  on  the  Sabbath  question  in  this 
country,  says,  “The  Sabbath -keeping  nations  are  the 
strongest  physically,  mentally,  moTa\[y,  financially,  and 
politically.”  Joseph  Cook  said,  “It  is  no  accident  that 
the  nations  that  keep  the  Sabbath  most  carefully  are 
those  where  there  is  the  most  pohtical  freedom.”  Sab- 
bath-breaking nations  gradually  lose  their  political  freedom. 

158 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


(5)  Sunday  Movie  Theaters  injure  the  Christian 
Sabbath  and  thus  injure  the  morals  of  the  people. 
Anything  that  injures  the  morals  of  the  people,  injures 
the  nation  itself.  From  a patriotic  standpoint,  we  ought 
to  stand  for  strict  observance  of  the  Christian  Sabbath, 
as  past  experience  has  shown  and  the  testimony  of 
many  witnesses  proves  that  a disregard  of  the  Christian 
Sabbath  produces  crime  and  immorality  and  tends  to 
destroy  the  free  institutions  which  have  helped  to  make 
our  nation  great.  . . . 

Fundamentally,  all  such  vicious  laws  are  unconstitu- 
tional. 

Sunday  Movie  Theaters  disregard  the  rights  of  labor 
....  Canon  William  Sheafe  Chase  has  aptly  said,  “No 
man  has  the  Christ  spirit  who  wants  a better  time  on 
Sunday  than  he  is  willing  to  give  everyone  else.”  . . . 

Col.  Fairbanks,  the  famous  scale  manufacturer,  said: 
“I  can  tell  by  watching  the  men  at  work  Monday  which 
spent  Sunday  in  sport  and  which  at  home,  church,  or 
Sabbath-school.  The  latter  do  more  and  better  work.’' 

Superintendents  of  large  factories  in  Milwaukee  and 
elsewhere  have  said,  “When  our  men  go  on  a Sunday 
excursion,  some  cannot  work  Monday,  and  many  who 
work  cannot  earn  their  wages,  while  those  who  had  no 
sport  Sunday  do  their  best  day’s  work  Monday.”  (Italics 
mine.) 


We  need  not  be  surprised  to  find  that  the 
closed  ideational  system  which  in  the  first 
instance  is  a refuge  from  the  real,  becomes  in 
turn  a device  for  imposing  one’s  will  upon  his 
fellows.  The  behever’s  ego  is  served  in  both 
instances.  It  is  interesting  to  note  also  that 
this  self-feeling  appears  in  crowd-thinking  as 
its  very  opposite.  The  greatest  enemy  of  per- 

159 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


the.,  crowd.  The  crowd  does  not 
want  valuable  men;  it  wants  only  useful  men. 
Everyone  must  justify  his  existence  by  ap- 
pealing to  the  not-self.  One  may  do  nothing 
for  his  own  sake.  He  may  not  even  strive 
for  spiritual  excellence  for  such  a reason. 
He  must  live  for  “principle,”  for  “the  great 
cause,”  for  impersonal  abstractions — w^hich 
is  to  say,  he  must  live  for  his  crowd,  and  so 
make  it  easier  for  the  other  members  to  do 
the  same  with  a good  face. 

The  complex  of  ideas  in  which  the  crow’d- 
mind  as  we  have  seen  takes  refuge,  being  neces- 
sarily made  up  of  abstract  generalizations, 
serves  the  crowd-will  to  social  dominance 
through  the  very  claim  to  universality  which 
such  ideas  exert.  Grant  that  an  idea  is  an 
absolute  truth,  and  it  follow^s,  of  course,  that 
it  must  be  true  on  all  occasions  and  for  everv- 
one.  The  crowd  is  justified,  therefore,  in 
sacrificing  people  to  its  ideal — itself.  The 
idea  is  no  longer  an  instrument  of  living;  it 
is  an  imperative.  It  is  not  yours  to  use  the 
idea;  the  idea  is  there  to  use  you.  You  have 
ceased  to  be  an  end.  Anything  about  you 
that  does  not  partake  of  the  reality  of  this  idea 
has  no  right  to  be,  any  experience  of  yours 
which  happens  to  be  incommensurable  with 
this  idea  loses  its  right  to  be;  for  experience 
as  such  has  now  only  a “phenomenal  exist- 
ence.” The  crowd,  by  identifying  its  will  to 

160 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


power  with  this  idea,  becomes  itself  absolute. 
Your  personal  self,  as  an  end,  is  quite  as 
unwelcome  to  the  Absolute  as  to  the  crowd. 
There  must  be  no  private  property  in  thought 
or  motive.  By  making  everybody’s  business 
my  business,  I have  made  my  business  every- 
body’s business.  There  may  be  only  one 
standard — that  of  our  crowd,  which,  because 
of  its  very  universal  and  impersonal  character 
is  really  nobody’s. 

The  absolutism  of  the  crowd-mind  with  its 
consequent  hostility  to  conscious  personality 
finds  a perfect  rationalization  in  the  ethical 
philosophy  of  Kant.  The  absolutism  of  the 
idea  of  Duty  is  less  skillfully  elaborated  in  its 
popular  crowd-manifestations,  but  in  its  essen- 
tials it  is  always  present,  as  propaganda  every- 
where when  carefully  annalyzed  will  show. 
We  must  not  be  deceived  by  Kant’s  assertion 
that  the  individual  is  an  end.  This  indi- 
vidual is  not  you  or  I,  or  anyone;  it  is  a mere 
logical  abstraction.  By  declaring  that  every- 
one is  equally  an  end,  Kant  ignores  all  personal 
differences,  and  therefore  the  fact  of  individu- 
ality as  such.  We  are  each  an  end  in  respect 
to  those  qualities  only  in  which  we  are  iden- 
tical— ^namely,  in  that  we  are  “rational  be- 
ings.” But  this  rational  being  is  not  a per- 
sonal intelligence;  it  is  a fiction,  a bundle  of 
mental  faculties  assumed  a priori  to  exist,  and 

then  treated  as  if  it  were  universally  and 

161 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


equally  applicable  to  all  actually  existing 
intelligences. 

In  arguing  that  “I  am  never  to  act  other- 
wise than  so  that  I could  also  will  that  my 
maxim  should  become  a universal  law,”  Kant 
may  be  easily  imderstood  as  justifying  any 
crowd  in  seeking  to  make  its  peculiar  maxims 
universal  laws.  Who  but  a Rationalist  or  a 
crowd-man  presumes  to  have  found  the  “uni- 
versal law,”  who  else  would  have  the  effron- 
tery to  try  to  legislate  for  every  conscience  in 
existence?  But  this  presumption  has  its 
price.  In  thus  universalizing  my  moral  will, 
I wholly  depersonalize  it.  He  says: 

It  is  of  extreme  importance  to  remember  that  we 
must  not  allow  ourselves  to  think  of  deducing  the 
reality  of  this  principle  from  the  particular  attributes 
of  human  nature.  For  duty  is  to  be  a practical  uncon- 
ditional necessity  of  action;  it  must  therefore  hold 
for  all  rational  beings  (to  whom  an  imperative  can 
apply  at  all),  and  for  this  reason  only  be  also  a law  for 
all  human  wills.  On  the  contrary,  whatever  it  deduces 
from  the  particular  natural  characteristics  of  humanity, 
from  certain  feelings  and  propensions,  nay,  even  if 
possible  from  any  particular  tendency  proper  to  human 
reason,  and  which  need  not  necessarily  bold  for  the 
will  of  every  rational  being,  this  may  indeed  supply  us 
with  a maxim  but  not  with  a law;  with  a subjective 
principle  on  which  we  may  have  a propension  or  in- 
clination to  act,  but  not  with  an  objective  principle  on 
which  we  should  be  enjoined  to  act,  even  though  all  our 
propensions,  inclinations,  and  natural  dispositions  were 
opposed  to  it.  In  fact,  the  sublimity  and  intrinsic  dig- 

162 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


nity  of  the  command  in  duty  are  so  much  the  more  evi- 
dent the  less  subjective  impulses  favor  it,  and  the  more 
they  oppose  it  [italics  here  are  mine],  without  being 
able  in  the  slightest  degree  to  weaken  the  obligation  of 
the  law  or  to  diminish  its  validity. 

. . . An  action  done  from  duty  derives  its  moral 
worth  not  from  the  purpose  which  is  to  be  attained  by 
it,  but  from  the  maxim  by  which  it  is  determined. 
It  (this  moral  worth)  cannot  lie  anywhere  but  in  the 
principle  of  The  Will,  without  regard  to  the  ends  which 
can  be  attained  by  such  action. 

] This  loss  of  the  conscious  self  in  the  univer- 
sal, this  turning  from  the  empirically 

knownTthis  demand  tha,t  an  a priori j)rindple 
b^ollowed  to  its  deadly  practical  conclusion 
regardless  of  the  ends  to  which  it  leads,  is^f 
ufmdsT  importance  for  our  study.  It  is  pre- 
cisely what  the  paranoiac  does  after  his  own 
fashion.  In  ^owd-thinking  it  is  often  made 
the'mstrument  of  wholesale  destruction  and 
human  ^^ghter.  The  mob  is  ever  moti- 
vated  by  this  logic  of  negation,  and  of  auto- 
matic behavior.  It  is  thus  that  compulsive 
thinking  sways  vast  hordes  of  men  and 
women,  impelling  them,  in  the  very  name  of 
truth  or  righteousness,  to  actions  of  the  most 
atrocious  character.  It  is  this  which  robs 
most  popular  movements  of  their  intelligent 
purposiveness,  unleashes  the  fanatic  and  the 
bigot,  and  leads  men  to  die  and  to  kill  for  a 
phrase.  This  way  of  thinking  points  straight 
to  Salem,  Massachusetts,  to  the  torture- 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


chamber,  the  pile  of  fagots  and  the  mill  pond 
at  Rosmersholm. 

The  habit  of  thinking  as  a crowd  is  so  wide- 
spread that  it  is  impossible  to  trace  the  influ- 
ence of  its  rationalistic  negations  in  the  daily 
mental  habits  of  most  of  us.  We  play  out 
our  lives  as  if  we  were  but  acting  a part  which 
some  one  had  assigned  to  us.  The  fact  that 
we  are  ourselves  realities,  as  inevitable  as 
falling  rain,  and  with  the  same  right  to  be  as 
the  rocks  and  hills,  positively  startles  us.  We 
feel  that  we  must  plead  extenuation,  apologize 
for  our  existence,  as  if  the  end  and  aim  of 
living  were  to  serve  or  vindicate  a Good  which, 
being  sufficient  in  itself  and  independent  of 
us,  can  never  be  realized  as  actually  good  for 
anybody.  We  behave  as  if  we  were  un- 
profitable servants,  cringing  before  wrathful 
ideas  which,  though  our  own  creations,  we 
permit  to  lord  it  over  us.  Our  virtues  we 
regard  not  as  expressions  of  ourselves  or  as 
habitual  ways  of  reaching  desirable  goods,  but 
as  if  they  w*ere  demanded  of  us  unwillingly  by 
something  not  self.  We  should  remind  our- 
selves that  these  big  words  we  idolize  have  no 
eyes  to  see  us  and  no  hearts  to  care  what  we 
do,  that  they  are  but  symbols  of  ideas  which 
we  might  find  very  useful  if  we  dared  to  be- 
come masters  of  them.  The  most  common  use 
we  make  of  such  ideas  is  to  beat  one  another 
and  ourselves  into  line  with  them,  or  enforce 

164 


THE  ABSOLUTISM  OF  THE  CROWD 


upon  ourselves  and  others  the  collection  of  a 
debt  which  was  contracted  only  by  our  uncon- 
scious desire  to  cheat  at  cards  in  the  game  of 
civilization. 

A conscious  recognition  of  this  desire  and  its 
more  deliberate  and  voluntary  resistance  in 
ourselves  rather  than  in  our  neighbors,  a 
candid  facing  of  the  fact  of  what  we  really 
are  and  really  want,  and  a mutual  readjust- 
ment of  our  relations  on  this  recognized  basis 
would  doubtless  deliver  us  from  the  compul- 
sion of  crowd-thinking  in  somewhat  the  same 
way  that  psychoanalysis  is  said  to  cure  the 
neurotic  by  revealing  to  him  his  unconscious 
wish. 

That  some  such  cure  is  an  imperative  social 
need  is  evident.  To-day  the  mob  lurks  just 
under  the  skin  of  most  of  us,  both  ignorant 
and  educated.  The  ever-increasing  frequency 
of  outbreaks  of  mob  violence  has  its  source  iu 
the  crowd -thinking  which  is  everywhere  en- 
couraged. The  mob  which  may  at  any  time 
engulf  us  is,  after  all,  but  the  logical  conclu- 
sion and  sudden  ripening  of  thought  processes 
which  are  commonly  regarded  as  highly  re- 
spectable, idealistic,  and  moral. 


VII 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


The  crowd-mind  is  seen  at  its  best  and  at 
its  worst  in  revolution.  To  many  minds, 
revolution  is  so  essentially  a crowd  phe- 
nomenon that  the  terms  revolution  and  crowd- 
rule  are  almost  synonymous.  “Hurrah,  the 
mob  rules  Russia,”  cried  certain  radicals  in 
the  spring  of  1917 — “Let  the  people  rule 
everywhere.”  Others,  more  conservative,  saw 
in  every  extravagant  deed  and  atrocity  al- 
leged to  have  happened  in  Russia  only  the 
thing  logically  to  be  expected  where  the  mob 
rules.  The  idea  of  revolution  is  itself  so  com- 

monly  a crowd-idea  lhaf"  the  thinking — if 

thinking  it  may  be  calT^ — of  most  people  on 
this  subject  depends  principally  upon  which 
crowd  we  happen  to  belong  to,  the  crowd 
which  sustains  the  ego-feeling  of  its  members 
by  the  hope  of  revolution,  or  the  crowd  which, 
for  similar  reason,  brands  everything  which 
opposes  its  interests,  real  or  imaginary,  as 
“anarchy”  and  “Bolshevism.” 

If  the  word  “revolution”  be  taken  to 
166 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


mean  fundamental  change  in  men’s  habits  of 
thought,  and  life,  and  the  forms  of  their  rela- 
tions to  one  another,  then  it  may  be  said  that 
great  “revolutions  may  be  and  have  been 
achieved  with  a relatively  small  degree  of 
crowd-thinking  and  mob  violence.”  Much  of 
the  normal  development  of  civilization,  for 
instance,  the  great  scientific  advance  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  spread  of  culture,  the 
creation  of  artistic  values,  the  rise  in  the 
standard  of  living,  is  change  of  this  sort. 
Such  change  is,  however,  gradual.  It  is 
brought  about  by  countless  concrete  adapta- 
tions, by  thinking  always  toward  realizable 
ends.  New  and  often  unforeseeable  results 
are  thus  reached;  but  they  are  reached,  as  in 
all  organic  growth  and  in  all  sound  thinking, 
by  a series  of  successful  adjustments  within 
the  real.  True  progress  is  doubtless  made  up 
of  (Ranges  of  this  sort.  But  for  the  course  of 
progress  to  run  on  uninterrupted  and  un- 
defeated we  should  have  to  be,  both  in  our 
individual  and  social  behavior,  the  reasonable 
beings  which  certain  nineteenth-century  util- 
itarians mistook  us  for. 

It  is  the  fool  thing,  the  insincere  thing,  that 
more  commonly  happens  in  matters  social 
and  political.  The  adjustment  reached  is 
not  often  a solution  of  a social  problem  worked 
out  deliberately  on  the  “greatest-happiness” 
principle.  It  is  commonly  a status  quo,  or 

167 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


balance  of  power  among  contending  crowds, 
each,  inspired  by  the  fiction  of  its  own  im- 
portance, by  self -idealization,  and  desire  to 
rule.  It  is  an  unstable  equilibrium  usually 
held  in  place  for  the  time  by  a dominant 
crowd.  This  dominant  crowd  may  itself  be 
composed  of  quarreling  factions,  but  these 
parties,  so  long  as  they  share  enough  of  the 
supremacy  to  keep  up  their  self-feeling,  so 
long,  in  fact,  as  their  members  may  even  be 
able  to  make  themselves  believe  that  they,  too, 
are  in  the  upper  set,  or  so  long  as  they  con- 
tinue to  hope  for  success  in  the  social  game  as 
now  played,  unite  in  repeating  the  catch- 
words which  justify  their  crowd  in  its  su- 
premacy. The  dommant  group  identifies  its 
own  interests  with  the  general  welfare.  And 
in  the  sense  that  some  sort  of  order,  or  any  at 
all,  is  to  be  preferred  to  social  chaos,  there  is 
an  element  of  truth  in  this  identification. 

The  fact  remains,  however,  that  the  domi- 
nant crowd  possesses  always  much  of  the 
crowd-spirit  which  originally  secured  for  it  its 
enviable  position.  Its  ideas,  like  those  of  all 
crowds,  are  devices  for  sustaming  the  self- 
feeling of  its  members,  for  protecting  itself,  for 
keeping  the  group  together,  for  justification. 
They  are  only  secondarily,  if  at  all,  instru- 
ments for  dealing  with  new  and  perplexing 
social  situations.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 

a certain  set  of  opinions,  prejudices,  man- 
ias 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


nerisms,  ceremonies  “go  with”  the  social 
position  which  corresponds  to  them.  They 
are  the  ready-made  habits  of  the  “set”  or 
class.  They  are  badges  by  which  the  “gentle- 
man” is  distinguished,  the  evening  clothes  of 
the  psyche,  as  it  were.  Many  of  these  crowd- 
forms  represent  true  values  of  living,  some  of 
them  are  useful  in  our  dealings  with  reality; 
if  this  were  not  so,  if  such  spiritual  tattooings 
or  ceremonial  forms  were  wholly  harmful,  the 
crowd  which  performed  them  would  be  at  such 
a disadvantage  that  it  could  not  hold  its  own. 
But  that  considerations  of  utility — other  than 
the  function  which  such  ceremonialism  is 
known  to  have  for  the  unconscious  always — 
do  not  directly  govern  these  forms  of  thought 
and  behavior  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  so  many 
of  them,  as  Sumner  says  of  “folkways,”  are 
either  harmful  or  useless  in  dealing  with 
matters  of  fact. 

The  dominant  crowd,  therefore,  in  just  so 
far  as  it  must  remain  a crowd  in  order  to  secure 
its  own  position  of  supremacy,  must  strive  to 
force  all  social  realities  into  the  forms  of  its 
own  conflicts  and  dilemmas.  Inevitably  the 
self-feeling  of  a great  many  people,  who  are 
forced  by  the  dominant  crowd  to  conform  and 
labor  with  no  compensation,  is  hurt.  They 
cannot  but  contrast  their  own  lot  with  that 
of  their  more  fortunate  neighbors.  Of  all 
things,  people  probably  resist  most  the  feeling 

12  169 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROTOS 


of  inferiority.  Any  suggestion  that  the  differ- 
ence in  social  position  is  due  to  a similar  differ- 
ence in  personal  worth  or  in  ability  is  hotly 
resented.  The  resentment  is  in  no  wise 
abated  by  the  fact  that  in  some  cases  this  sug- 
gestion may  be  true.  Compensations  are  at 
once  created  by  the  unconscious.  In  mediseval 
times  “all  men  were  brothers  and  were  equal 
before  the  altars  of  the  Church  and  in  heaven.” 
Thus  distinctions  of  merit,  other  than  those 
which  prevailed  in  the  social  order,  were  set 
up  in  the  interest  of  the  common  man. 

As  the  influence  of  the  Renaissance  directed 
V~general  attention  from  the  realm  of  the 
I spiritual  to  practical  affairs  of  earth,  these 
I compensations  changed  from  thoughts  of  the 
I future  world  to  dreams  of  the  future  of  this 
/ world.  The  injured  self-feeling  dwells  upon 
I the  economic  or  political  inequalities  which 
< flow  from  the  dominance  of  the  ruling  crowd, 
j The  injustices  and  acts  of  exploitation,  which 
are  certainly  neither  new  nor  rare  occurrences 
’ in  human  relations,  are  seized  upon  as  if  it 
' were  these  things,  not  the  assumption  to 
i ^superiority,  which  were  the  issue  at  stake. 

At  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution 
the  Third  Estate,  or  Bourgeois,  which  showed 
itself  quite  as  capable  of  exploiting  the  poor 
as  ever  were  the  older  aristocrats,  saw  itself 
only  as  part  of  the  wronged  and  exploited 
“people.”  The  sufferings  of  the  poor,  which 

170 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


it  was  frequently  even  then  profiting  in  quite 
as  heartily,  to  say  the  least,  as  the  titled 
nobility,  were  represented  as  the  grievance  of 
all  mankind  against  the  hated  nobility.  That 
the  ideas  of  “liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity” 
which  these  good  tradesmen  preached  may 
easily  become  the  sort  of  compensatory  ideas 
we  have  been  discussing  is  shown  by  the  fact 
of  the  genuine  astonishment  and  indignation 
of  the  burghers  when  later  their  employees 
made  use  of  this  same  phrase  in  the  struggles 
between  labor  and  capital.  Sans-culottism 
had  quite  as  many  psychological  motives  as 
economic  behind  it. 

How  pompous,  hateful,  and  snobbish  were 
those  titled  folk  with  their  powdered  wigs,  | 
carriages,  fine  clothes,  and  their  exclusive 
social  gatherings  to  which  honest  citizens,  i 
often  quite  as  wealthy  as  themselves,  were  not 
invited.  If  the  “people” — that  is,  the  burgh- 
ers themselves — only  had  a chance  they  would 
be  just  as  fine  ladies  and  gentlemen  as  those 
who  merely  inherited  their  superiority.  Down 
with  the  aristocrats ! All  men  were  equal  and 
always  had  been.  There  must  be  fraternity 
and  the  carier  ouvert  les  talents,  in  other  words, 
brotherhood  and  free  competition. 

I am  sure,  from  all  I have  ever  seen  or  read 
of  social  revolt  and  unrest,  that  this  injured 
self-feeling,  or  defense  against  the  sense  of 
personal  inferiority,  while  not  the  only  motive, 

171  y 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


is  the  most  powerful  one  at  work.  It  crops 
out  everywhere,  in  the  layman’s  hatred  of  the 
clergy  during  the  Reformation,  in  that  curious 
complex  of  ideas  whereby  the  uneducated 
often  look  upon  a college  diploma  as  some- 
thing little  short  of  magical,  and  defend  their 
ego  against  this  ridiculously  exaggerated  mark 
of  distinction  and  accompanying  feeling  of 
self-reproach  by  a slur  at  “high-brows.”  Few 
people  realize  how  general  this  feeling  is;  the 
trick  of  making  fun  of  the  educated  is  one  of 
the  commonest  forms  of  crowd-humor  in 
America,  both  in  vaudeville  and  in  popular 
oratory.  I have  previously  pointed  out  the 
fact  that  the  religious  revival  in  our  day  is  to 
a great  extent  characterized  by  a popular 
resistance  to  scholars.  No  one  can  read  Mr. 
Sunday’s  sermons  and  deny  this  fact.  The 
City  of  New  York  gave  the  largest  majority 
in  its  history  to  the  candidate  for  the  oflBce  of 
mayor  who  made  opposition  to  “experts” 
the  main  issue  in  his  campaign.  Scores  of 
times  I have  heard  popular  speakers  resort  to 
this  trick  to  gain  favor  with  their  audiences, 
and  I cannot  remember  ever  having  known 
such  sentiments  to  fail  to  gain  applause — I 
am  not  speaking  now  of  strictly  academic 
groups,  but  of  general  gatherings. 

The  point  of  interest  here  is  that  these  same 
people  have  a most  extravagant  notion  of  the 
value  of  the  academic  training  which  they 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


encourage  the  crowd  speaker  in  ridiculing.  I 
have  made  it  a practice  of  talking  with  a 
great  many  people  personally  and  drawing 
them  out  on  this  point,  and  I have  found  that 
this  is  almost  uniformly  the  case.  F.  B.,  a 
cigar  maker  by  trade,  says,  ‘‘‘Oh,  if  I had  only 
had  sense  enough  to  go  on  to  school  when  I 
had  the  opportunity!”  E.  L.,  a mechanic, 
says,  “I  might  have  been  somebody,  if  I had 
been  given  any  chance  to  get  an  education.” 
R.,  a sort  of  jack-of-all-trades,  says,  “If  I 
only  had  N.’s  education,  I’d  be  a millionaire.” 
B.,  a farmer  with  limited  intellectual  interests, 
says,  “I  tell  you,  my  boys  are  not  going  to  be 
like  me;  they  have  got  to  go  to  college.” 
G.,  a waiter,  says,  “I  don’t  know  much,”  and 
then  proceeds  to  impress  me  with  the  latest 
bit  of  academic  information  which  he  has 
picked  up.  C.,  a printer,  who  has  been 
moderately  successful,  says:  “I’d  give  ten 
thousand  dollars  right  this  minute  if  I knew 

Greek;  now  there  is and  there  is  — — , 

neighbors  of  mine,  they’re  highly  educated. 
When  I’m  with  them  I’m  ashamed  and  feel 
like  a dub.” 

When,  on  such  occasions,  I repeatedly  say 
that  the  average  academic  student  really 
learns  hardly  anything  at  all  of  the  classic 
languages,  and  cite  the  small  fruits  of  my  own 
years  of  tedious  study  as  an  example,  the 
efiPect  produced  is  invariably  comforting — 

173 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

until  I add  that  one  need  not  attend  a uni- 
versity seven  years  or  even  four  to  become 
educated,  but  that  nearly  everyone  with 
ability  to  learn  and  with  genuine  intellectual 
interests  may  achieve  a remarkable  degree  of 
learning.  The  answer  of  the  perplexed  person 
is  then  often  an  extenuation.  “Well,  you  see, 
a busy  person  or  a working  man  is  so  tired 
after  the  day’s  work  that  he  has  no  energy 
left  for  study,”  or  it  is,  “Wait  till  the  working 
class  have  more  leisure,  then  they,  too,  can 
be  cultivated.”  Passing  over  this  extenua- 
tion, which  ignores  the  fact  that  some  of  the 
best  informed  and  clearest  thinking  people 
one  meets  are  working  people,  while  the  aver- 
age university  graduate  leads  anything  but 
r an  intellectual  life,  it  can  hardly  be  klenied, 
j I think,  that  our  crowd  cult  of  anti- 
“ highbrowism  ” is  really  a defense  mechanism 
against  an  inner  feeling  of  inferiority.  Now 
the  interesting  thing  about  this  feeling  of 
inferiority  is  the  exaggerated  notion  of  the 
superiority  of  the  college-trained,  which  is 
entertained  chiefly  by  the  uneducated  them- 
selves, \Miat  appears  here  is  in  fact  nothing 
other  than  a cheapening  of  the  idea  of  superi- 
ority. Personal  excellence  is  something  which 
anyone  may  attain;  it  is  not  something  con- 
genital, but  something  to  be  added  on;  one 
“gets  an  education,”  possesses  something  of 
advantage,  merely  by  a few  years  of  conven- 

174 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


tional  study  of  books.  Anyone  might  do 
that,  therefore.  “I,  too,  if  I only  cared  to,  or 
had  been  given  opportunity,  might  now  be 
famous.”  “The  difference  between  myself  and 
the  world’s  greatest  genius  is  not  a spiritual 
chasm  which  I could  not  myself,  at  least 
hypothetically,  cross.”  “It  is  rather  an  ‘ac- 
quired character,’  a mere  fruit  of  special  oppor- 
tunity— which  in  a few  cases  it  doubtless  may 
be — but  it  is  something  external;  at  bottom 
we  are  all  equal.” 

Many  facts  may  be  advanced  to  corroborate 
the  results  of  our  analysis  here.  The  crowd 
always  resents  the  Carlyle,  William  James, 
Nietzsche,  Goethe  theory  of  genius.  Genius 
is  not  congenital  superiority.  It  is  the  result 
of  hard  work.  The  genius  is  not  a unique 
personal  fact,  he  is  a “representative  man.” 
He  says  just  what  his  age  is  thinking.  The 
inarticulate  message  of  his  contemporaries 
simply  becomes  articulate  in  some  one,  and 
behold  a genius.  In  other  words,  I suppose, 
all  Vienna,  messenger  boys  and  bootblacks 
especially,  were  suddenly  fascinated  by  Schil- 
ler’s “Ode  to  Joy”  and  went  about  whistling 
improvised  musical  renderings  of  the  theme 
of  this  poem,  till  the  deaf  Beethoven  heard 
and  wrote  these  whistlings  down  in  the  form 
of  the  Ninth  Symphony. 

According  to  the  crowd,  Luther  did  not 

create  the  Reformation,  or  Petrarch  the  Ren- 

175 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


aissance;  these  movements  themselves  created 
their  leaders  and  founders ; all  that  the  genius 
did  was  to  interpret  and  faithfully  obey  the 
People’s  will.  Ergo,  to  be  a genius  one  need 
only  study  hard  enough  to  be  able  to  tell  the 
people  what  they  already^  think.  The  su- 
periority of  genius  is  therefore~ho  different 
from  that  of  any  educated  person;  except  in 
degree  of  application.  Anyone  of  us  might 
possess  this  superiority.  In  other  words,  the 
“intellectual  snobbishness”  which  the  crowd 
resents  IS  nothing  else  than  the  crowd-man’s 
own  fiction  of  self-importance,  projected  upon 
thos^j'^Lbse~imagined~  supefidf ity he  envies . 
It  is  recognized,  even  exaggerated  by  the  un- 
learned, because  it  is  precisely  the  sort  of 
superiority  which  the  ignorant  man  himself, 
in  his  ignorance,  imagines  that  he  himself 
would  display  if  he  “only  had  the  chance,” 
and  even  now  possesses  unrecognized. 

We  have  made  the  foregoing  detour  because 
I think  it  serves  to  illustrate,  in  a way,  the 
psychic  processes  behind  much  revolutionary 
propaganda  and  activity.  I would  not  at- 
tempt to  minimize  the  extent  of  the  social 
injustice  and  economic  slavery  which  a domi- 
nant crowd,  whether  ecclesiastical,  feudal,  or 
capitalistic,  is  guilty  of  in  its  dealings  with 
its  subjects.  But  every  dominant  crowd, 
certain  sections  of  the  “proletariat”  as  quickly 
as  any  other,  will  resort  to  such  practices,  and 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


will  alike  justify  them  by  moral  catchwords 
the  minute  its  supremacy  over  other  crowds 
gives  it  opportunity.  Therefore  there  is  a 
certain  amount  of  tautology  in  denouncing 
the  “master  class”  for  its  monstrous  abuses. 
That  the  real  point  at  issue  between  the 
dominant  crowd  and  the  imder  crowd  is  the 
assumed  personal  superiority  of  the  members 
of  the  former,  rather  than  the  economic 
“exploitation”  which  it  practices,  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  the  French  Revolution  was 
led  by  wealthy  bourgeois,  and  that  the 
leading  revolutionary  element  in  the  working 
class  to-day  consists,  not  of  the  “down  and 
out”  victims  of  capitalist  exploitation,  but 
of  the  members  of  the  more  highly  skilled  and 
better  paid  trades,  also  of  certain  intellectuals 
who  are  not  “proletarians”  at  all. 

And  now  we  come  to  our  point:  the  fiction 
of  superiority  of  the  dominant  crowd,  just  as 
in  the  case  of  the  assumed  personal  superiority 
of  the  intellectuals,  is  resented  by  the  under 
crowd  because  it  is  secretly  recognized  by  the 
under  crowd.  Of  course  the  dominant  crowd, 
like  all  crowds,  is  obsessed  by  its  feelings  of 
self-importance,  and  this  feeling  is  apparently 
vindicated  by  its  very  social  position.  But 
the  fiction  is  recognized  at  its  full  face  value, 
and  therefore  resented  by  the  under  crowds, 
because  that  is  precisely  the  sort  of  personal 
supremacy  to  which  they  also  aspire. 

177 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


One  commonly  hears  it  said  to-day,  by 
those  who  have  made  the  catchwords  of 
democracy  their  crowd  cult,  that  the  issue  in 
modern  society  is  between  democracy  and 
capitalism.  In  a sense  this  may  be  true,  but 
only  in  a superficial  sense;  the  real  issue  is 
between  the  personal  self  as  a social  entity 
and  the  crowd.  Capitalism  is,  to  my  mind, 
the  logical  first  fruit  of  so-called  democracy. 
Capitalism  is  simply  the  social  supremacy  of 
the  trader-man  crowd.  For  a hundred  years 
and  more  commercial  ability — that  of  or- 
ganizing industry  and  selling  goods — has  been 
rewarded  out  of  all  proportion  to  any  other 
kind  of  ability,  because,  in  the  first  place,  it 
leads  to  the  kind  of  success  which  the  ordinary 
man  most  readily  recognizes  and  envies — 
large  houses,  fine  clothes,  automobiles,  ex- 
clusive clubs,  etc.  A WTiittier  may  be  ever 
so  great  a poet,  and  yet  sit  beside  the  stove  in 
the  general  store  of  his  little  country"  village, 
and  no  one  thinks  he  is  so  very  wonderful. 
Some  may  envy  him  his  fame,  but  few  will 
envy  and  therefore  be  fascinated  by  that  in 
him  which  they  do  not  understand.  But  a 
multimillionaire  in  their  community  is  under- 
stood; everyone  can  see  and  envj’^  his  success; 
he  is  at  once  both  envied  and  admired. 

Moreover,  the  commercial  ability  is  the  sort 
which  the  average  man  most  commonly 
thinks  he  possesses  in  some  degree.  TMiile, 

178 


REVOLUTIONAEY  CROWDS 


therefore,  he  grumbles  at  the  unjust  inequali- 
ties in  wealth  which  exist  in  modern  society, 
and  denounces  the  successful  business  man  as 
an  exploiter  and  fears  his  power,  the  average 
man  will  nevertheless  endure  all  this,  much  in 
the  same  spirit  that  a student  being  initiated 
into  a fraternity  will  take  the  drubbing, 
knowing  well  that  his  own  turn  at  the  fun  will 
come  later.  It  is  not  until  the  members  of 
the  under  crowd  begin  to  suspect  that  their 
own  dreams  of  “aping  the  rich”  may  never 
come  true  that  they  begin  to  entertain  revolu- 
tionary ideas.  In  other  words,  forced  to 
abandon  the  hope  of  joining  the  present 
dominating  crowd,  they  begin  to  dream  of 
supplanting  and  so  dispossessing  this  crowd 
by  their  own  crowd. 

That  the  dominant  crowd  is  just  as  much  to 
blame  for  this  state  of  affairs  as  the  under 
crowd,  perhaps  more  so,  is  shown  by  the  his- 
tory of  every  period  preceding  a revolutionary 
outbreak.  I will  dwell  at  some  length  on  this 
fact  later.  My  point  here  is  that,  first,  a revo- 
lution, in  _the  sense  that  the  word  means  a 
violent  uprising  against  the  existing  order,  is 
a psychological  crowd-phenomenon — and  sec- 
ond; Tliat  it  t^es  two  crowds  to  make  a 
revolution. 

Writers,  like  Le  Bon,  have  ignored  the  part 
which  the  dominant  crowd  plays  in  such 
events.  They  have  thought  of  revolution 

179 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


only  as  the  behavior  of  the  under  crowd. 
They  have  assumed  that  the  crowd  and 
the  people  were  the  same.  Their  writings 
are  hardly  more  than  conservative  warnings 
against  the  excess  and  wickedness  of  the 
popular  mind  once  it  is  aroused.  Sumner 
says: 

Moral  traditions  are  the  guides  which  no  one  can 
afford  to  neglect.  They  are  in  the  mores,  and  they  are 
lost  in  every  great  revolution  of  the  mores.  Then  the 
men  are  morally  lost. 

Le  Bon  says,  writing  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution : 

The  people  may  kiU,  burn,  ravage,  commit  the  most 
frightful  cruelties,  glorify  its  hero  to-day  and  throw  him 
into  the  gutter  to-morrow;  it  is  all  one;  the  politicians 
will  not  cease  to  vaunt  its  virtues,  its  high  wisdom,  and 
to  bow  to  its  every  decision. 

Now  in  what  does  this  entity  really  consist,  this 
mysterious  fetich  which  revolutionists  have  revered 
for  more  than  a century? 

It  may  be  decomposed  into  two  distinct  categories. 
The  first  includes  the  peasants,  traders,  and  workers  of 
all  sorts  who  need  tranquillity  and  order  that  they  may 
exercise  their  calling.  This  people  forms  the  majority, 
but  a majority  which  never  caused  a revolution.  Liv- 
ing in  laborious  silence,  it  is  ignored  by  historians. 

The  second  category,  which  plays  a capital  part  in 
all  national  disturbances,  consists  of  a subversive  social 
residue  dominated  by  a criminal  mentality.  Degener- 
ates of  alcoholism  and  poverty,  thieves,  beggars,  desti- 
tute “casuals,”  indifferent  workers  without  employ- 

180 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


ment — these  constitute  the  dangerous  bulk  of  the 
armies  of  insurrection.  ...  To  this  sinister  substratum 
are  due  the  massacres  which  stain  all  revolutions.  . . . 
To  elements  recruited  from  the  lowest  dregs  of  the  pop- 
ulace are  added  by  contagion  a host  of  idle  and  in- 
different persons  who  are  simply  drawn  into  the  move- 
ment. They  shout  because  there  are  men  shouting, 
and  revolt  because  there  is  a revolt,  without  having  the 
vaguest  idea  of  the  cause  of  the  shouting  or  revolution. 
The  suggestive  power  of  the  environment  absolutely 
hypnotized  them. 

This  idea,  which  is  held  with  some  variation 
by  Sumner,  Gobineau,  Faguet,  and  Conway, 
is,  I believe,  both  unhistorical  and  unpsycho- 
logical,  because  it  is  but  a half-truth.  This 
substratum  of  the  population  does  at  the 
moment  of  revolution  become  a dangerous 
mob.  Such  people  are  unadjusted  to  any 
[Social  order,  and  the  least  deviation  from  the 
routine  of  daily  life  throws  them  off  their 
balance.  The  relaxation  of  authority  at  the 
moment  when  one  group  is  supplanting  an- 
other in  position  of  social  control,  is  to  these 
people  like  the  two  or  three  days  of  inter- 
regnum between  the  pontificates  of  Julius  and 
Leo,  described  by  Cellini.  Those  who  need 
some  one  to  govern  them,  and  they  are  many, 
find  their  opportunity  in  the  general  disturb- 
ance. They  suddenly  react  to  the  revolu- 
tionary propaganda  which  up  to  this  minute 
they  have  not  heeded,  they  are  controlled  by 

revolutionary  crowd-ideas  in  a somnambulistic 

181 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


manner,  and  like  automatons  carry  these  ideas 
precipitately  to  their  deadly  conclusion.  But 
this  mob  is  not  the  really  revolutionary  crowd 
and  in  the  end  it  is  always  put  back  in  its 
place  by  the  newly  dominant  crowd.  The 
really  revolutionary  crowd  consists  of  the 
group  who  are  near  enough  the  dominant 
crowd  to  be  able  to  envy  its  “airs”  with  some 
show  of  justification,  and  are  strong  enough 
to  dare  try  issue  with  it  for  supreme  position. 
Madame  Rolland,  it  will  be  remembered, 
justified  her  opposition  to  aristocrats  on  the 
principle  of  equality  and  fraternity,  but  she 
could  never  forget  her  resentment  at  being 
made,  in  the  home  of  a member  of  this  aris- 
tocracy, to  eat  with  the  servants. 

What  Le  Bon  and  others  seem  to  ignore  is 
that  the  ruling  class  may  be  just  as  truly  a 
crowd  as  the  insurrectionary  mob,  and  that 
the  violent  behavior  of  revolutionary  crowds 
is  simply  the  logic  of  crow’d-thinking  carried 
to  its  swift  practical  conclusion. 

It  is  generally  assumed  that  a revolution  is 
a sudden  and  violent  change  in  the  form  of 
government.  From  what  has  been  said  it 
will  be  seen  that  this  definition  is  too  narrow. 
History  will  bear  me  out  in  this.  The 
Protestant  Reformation  was  certainly  a revo- 
lution, as  Le  Bon  has  shown,  but  it  affected 
more  than  the  government  or  even  the  organ- 
ization of  the  Church.  The  French  Revolu- 

182 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


tion  changed  the  form  of  the  government  in 
France  several  times  before  it  was  done,  pass- 
ing through  a period  of  imperial  rule  and  even 
a restoration  of  the  monarchy.  But  the 
revolution  as  such  survived.  Even  though 
later  a Bourbon  or  a prince  of  the  House  of 
Orleans  sat  on  the  throne  of  France,  the  re- 
stored king  or  his  successor  was  hardly  more 
than  a figurehead.  A new  class,  the  Third 
Estate,  remained  in  fact  master  of  France. 
There  had  been  a change  in  the  ownership  of 
the  land;  power  through  the  control  of  vested 
property  rested  with  the  group  which  in  1789 
began  its  revolt  under  the  leadership  of  Mira- 
beau.  A new  dictatorship  had  succeeded  the 
old.  And  this  is  what  a revolution  ^ — the 
dictatorship  .jiem  crowd.  The  Russian 
( revolutionists  now  candidly  admit  this  fact  in 
their  use  of  the  phrase  “the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat.”  Of  course  it  is  claimed  that 
this  dictatorship  is  really  the  dictatorship  of 
“all  the  people.”  But  this  is  simply  the  old 
fiction  with  which  every  dominant  crowd  dis- 
guises seizure  of  power.  Capitalist  republic- 
anism is  also  the  rule  of  all  the  people,  and 
the  pope  and  the  king,  deriving  their  au- 
thority from  God,  are  really  but  “the  servants 
of  all.” 

As  we  have  seen,  the  crowd  mind  as  such 
wills  to  dominate.  Society  is  made  up  of 
struggle  groups,  or  organized  crowds,  each 

183 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

seeking  the  opportunity  to  make  its  catch- 
words realities  and  to  establish  itself  in  the 
position  of  social  control.  The  social  order  is 
always  held  intact  by  some  particular  crowd 
which  happens  to  be  dominant.  A revolu- 
tion occurs  when  a new  crowd  pushes  the  old 
one  out  and  itself  climbs  into  the  saddle. 
When  the  new  crowd  is  only  another  faction 
within  the  existing  dominant  crowd,  like  one 
of  our  established  political  parties,  the  suc- 
cession will  be  accomplished  vdthout  resort  to 
violence,  since  both  elements  of  the  ruling 
crowd  recognize  the  rules  of  the  game.  It  will 
also  not  result  in  far-reaching  social  changes 
for  the  same  reason.  A true  revolution  oc- 
curs when  the  difference  between  the  dominant 
crowd  and  the  one  which  supplants  it  is  so 
great  as  to  produce  a general  social  upheaval. 
The  Reformation,  the  French  Revolution,  and 
the  “Bolshevist”  coup  d’etat  in  Russia,  all 
were  of  this  nature.  A new  social  leadership 
was  established  and  secured  by  a change  in 
each  case  in  the  personnel  of  the  ownership 
of  such  property  as  would  give  the  owners  the 
desired  control.  In  the  first  case  there  was  a 
transfer  of  property  in  the  church  estates, 
either  to  the  local  congregations,  or  the  state, 
or  the  denomination.  In  the  second  case  the 
property  transferred  was  property  in  land,  and 
with  the  Russian  revolutionists  landed  prop- 
erty was  given  to  the  peasants  and  vested 

184 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 

capital  turned  over  to  the  control  of  industrial 
workers. 

Those  who  lay  all  emphasis  on  this  transfer 
of  property  naturally  see  only  economic 
causes  in  revolutionary  movements.  Eco- 
nomics, however,  is  not  a science  of  impersonal 
things.  It  treats  rather  of  men’s  relations 
to  things,  and  hence  to  one  another.  It  has 
to  do  with  valuations  and  principles  of  ex- 
change and  ownership,  all  of  which  need 
psychological  restatement.  The  transfer  of 
the  ownership  of  property  in  times  of  revolu- 
tion to  a new  class  is  not  an  end,  it  is  a means 
to  a new  crowd’s  social  dominance.  The  doc- 
trines, ideals,  and  principles  believed  by  the 
revolutionary  crowd  also  serve  this  end  of 
securing  its  dominance,  as  do  the  social 
changes  which  it  effects,  once  in  power. 

Revolutions  do  not  occur  directly  from 
abuses  of  power,  for  in  that  case  there  would 
be  nothing  but  revolution  all  the  time,  since 
every  dominant  crowd  has  abused  its  power. 
It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  revolution  gener- 
ally occurs  after  the  abuses  of  which  the  revo- 
lutionists complain  have  been  in  great  measure 
stopped — that  is,  after  the  ruling  crowd  has 
begun  to  make  efforts  at  reform.  The  Refor- 
mation occurred  in  the  pontificate  of  Leo  X. 
If  it  had  been  the  result  of  intolerable  abuse 
alone,  it  would  have  happened  in  the  time  of 
Alexander  VI,  Borgia.  The  French  Revolu- 

13  185 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


tion  fell  upon  the  mild  head  of  Louis  XVI, 
though  the  wrongs  which  it  tried  to  right 
mostly  happened  in  the  reign  of  his  predeces- 
sor. In  most  cases  the  abuses,  the  existence 
of  which  a revolutionary  crowd  uses  for  propa- 
ganda purposes,  are  in  turn  repeated  in  new 
form  by  itself  after  it  becomes  dominant. 
The  Reformers  in  the  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries  resorted  to  much  the  same 
kind  of  persecution  from  which  they  had  them- 
selves earlier  sufiPered.  The  Constituent  As- 
sembly, though  it  had  demanded  liberty,  soon 
set  up  a more  outrageous  tyranny  through  its 
own  committees  than  any  that  the  Louies 
had  dreamed  of.  Bolshevists  in  capitalist 
coimtries  are  the  greatest  advocates  of  free 
speech;  in  Russia  they  are  the  authors  of  a 
very  effective  press-censorship. 

No,  it  is  hardly  the  abuses  which  men 
suffer  from  their  ruling  crowds  which  cause 
insurrection.  People  have  borne  the  most  ter- 
rible outrages  and  suffered  in  silence  for  cen- 
turies. Russia  itself  is  a good  example  of  this, 
r jtjrjevolutiorL  occurs,  when  the  dominant  crowd 
begins  to  weaken.  I think  we  find  proof  of 
this  in  the  psychology'  of  revolutionary  propa- 
ganda. A general  revolution  is  not  made  in  a 
day,  each  such  cataclysm  is  preceded  by  a 
long  period  of  unrest  and  propaganda  of  oppo- 
sition to  the  existing  order  and  its  beneficiaries. 

The  Roman  Republic  began  going  to  pieces 

186 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


about  a hundred  years  before  the  battle  of 
Actium.  The  social  unrest  which  followed 
the  Punic  Wars  and  led  to  the  revolt  of  the 
brothers  Gracchi  was  never  wholly  checked 
during  the  century  which  followed.  The 
dominant  party  had  scarcely  rid  itself  of  these 
troublesome  “demagogues”  than  revolt  broke 
out  among  the  slave  population  of  Sicily. 
This  was  followed  by  the  revolt  of  the  Italian 
peasants,  then  again  by  the  insurrection  of 
Spartacus,  and  this  in  turn  by  the  civil  war 
between  Marius  and  Sulla,  the  conspiracy  of 
Catiline,  the  brief  triumph  of  Julius  Csesar 
over  the  Senate,  the  revenge  of  the  latter  in 
the  assassination  of  Csesar,  and  the  years  of 
turmoil  during  the  Second  Triumvirate. 

It  is  doubtful  if  there  was  at  any  time  a 
very  clear  or  widespread  consciousness  of  the 
issues  which  successively  arose  during  that 
unhappy  century.  It  would  seem  that  first 
one  counter-crowd  and  then  another,  repre- 
senting various  elements  of  the  populace,  tried 
issue  with  the  ruling  crowd.  The  one  factor 
which  remained  constant  through  all  this  was 
the  progressive  disintegration  of  the  dominant 
party.  The  supremacy  of  the  Patres  Con- 
scripti  et  Equites  became  in  fact  a social 
anachronism  the  day  that  Tiberius  Gracchus 
demanded  the  ejjpropriation  of  the  landed 
aristocracy.  The  ideas  whereby  the  dominant 
crowd  sought  to  justify  its  pre-emptions  began 

187 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


to  lose  their  functional  value.  Only  the  un- 
disguised use  of  brute  force  was  left.  Such 
ideas  ceased  to  convince.  Men  of  unusual 
independence  of  mind,  or  men  with  ambitious 
motives,  who  had  grown  up  within  the  domi- 
nant crowd,  began  to  throw  off  the  spell  of  its 
control-ideas,  and,  by  leaving  it,  to  weaken  it 
further  from  within.  No  sooner  was  this 
weakness  detected  by  other  groups  than  every 
sort  of  grievance  and  partisan  interest  be- 
came a moral  justification  for  efforts  to  sup- 
plant the  rulers.  The  attempt  of  the  domi- 
nant crowd  to  retain  its  hold  by  repeating 
its  traditional  justification-platitudes,  un- 
changed, but  with  greater  emphasis,  may 
be  seen  in  the  orations  of  Cicero.  It  would  be 
well  if  some  one  besides  high-school  students 
and  their  Latin  teachers  were  to  take  up  the 
study  of  Cicero;  the  social  and  psycho- 
logical situation  which  this  orator  and  writer 
of  moral  essays  reveals  has  some  suggestive 
similarities  to  things  which  are  happening 
to-day. 

The  century  and  more  of  unrest  which  pre- 
ceded both  the  Reformation  and  the  French 
Revolution  is  in  each  instance  a long  storj". 
But  in  both  there  is  the  same  gradual  loss  of 
prestige  on  the  part  of  the  dominant  crowd; 
the  same  inability  of  this  crowd  to  change 
with  the  changes  of  time;  to  find  new  sanc- 
tions for  itself  when  the  old  ones  were  no 

188 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


longer  believed;  the  same  unadaptability,  the 
same  intellectual  and  moral  bankruptcy,  there- 
fore, the  same  gradual  disintegration  from 
within;  the  same  resort  to  sentimentalism 
and  ineffective  use  of  force,  the  same  circle 
of  hungry  counter-crowds  waiting  around 
with  their  tongues  hanging  out,  ready  to 
pounce  upon  that  before  which  they  had  pre- 
viously groveled,  and  to  justify  their  raven- 
ousness as  devotion  to  principle;  the  same 
growing  fearlessness,  beginning  as  perfectly 
loyal  desire  to  reform  certain  abuses  incidental 
to  the  existing  order,  and  advancing,  with 
every  sign  of  disillusionment  or  weakness,  to 
moral  indignation,  open  attack  upon  funda- 
mental control  ideas,  bitter  hostility,  aug- 
mented by  the  repressive  measures  taken  by 
the  dominant  crowd  to  conserve  a status  quo 
which  no  longer  gained  assent  in  the  minds  of 
a growing  counter-crowd;  finally  force,  and  a 
new  dominant  crowd  more  successful  now  in 
justifying  old  tyrannies  by  principles  not  yet 
successfully  challenged. 

In  the  light  of  these  historical  analogies  the 
record  of  events  during  the  last  seventy-five 
years  in  western  Europe  and  America  is 
rather  discomforting  reading,  and  I fear  the 
student  of  social  psychology  will  find  little  to 
reassure  him  in  the  pitiable  lack  of  intellectual 
leadership,  the  tendency  to  muddle  through, 
the  unteachableness  and  general  want  of 

189 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


statesmanlike  vision  displayed  by  our  present 
dominant  crowds.  If  a considerable  number 
of  people  of  all  classes,  those  who  desire  change 
as  well  as  those  who  oppose  it,  could  free  their 
thinking  from  the  mechanisms  of  the  crowd- 
mind,  it  might  be  possible  to  find  the  working 
solution  of  some  of  our  pressing  social  prob- 
lems and  save  our  communities  from  the 
dreadful  experience  of  another  revolution. 
Our  hope  lies  in  the  socially  minded  person 
who  is  sufficiently  in  touch  with  reality  to  be 
also  a non-crowd  man. 

Anyone  who  is  acquainted  with  the  state  of 
the  public  mind  at  present,  knows  that  a 
'priori  arguments  against  revolution  as  such 
are  not  convincing,  except  to  those  who  are 
already  convinced  on  other  ground.  The 
dominant  crowd  in  each  historical  epoch 
gained  its  original  supremacy  by  means  of 
revolution.  One  can  hardly  make  effective 
use  of  the  commonplace  antirevolutionarj’^ 
propaganda  of  defense  of  a certain  order 
which  has  among  its  most  ardent  supporters 
people  who  are  proud  to  call  themselves  sons 
and  daughters  of  the  Revolution.  Skeptics  at 
once  raise  the  question  whether,  according  to 
such  abstract  social  ethics,  revolutionists  be- 
come respectable  only  after  they  are  successful 
or  have  been  a long  time  dead.  In  fact,  the 
tendency  to  resort  to  such  reasoning  is  one 
among  many  symptoms  that  the  conservative 

190 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


mind  lias  permitted  itself  to  become  quite  as 
mucb  a crowd-phenomenon  as  has  the  radical 
mind. 

The  correct  approach  here  is  psychological 
and  pragmatic.  There  is  an  increasingly 
critical  social  situation,  demanding  far-reach- 
ing reconstructive  change;  only  the  most 
hopeless  crowd-man  would  presume  to  deny 
this  fact.  The  future  all  depends  upon  the 
mental  processes  with  which  we  attempt  to 
meet  this  situation.  Nothing  but  useless 
misery  can  result  from  dividing  crowd  against 
crowd.  Crowd-thinking,  as  I have  said,  does 
not  solve  problems.  It  only  creates  ideal 
compensations  and  defense  devices  for  our 
inner  conflicts.  Conservative  crowd-behavior 
has  always  done  quite  as  much  as  anything 
else  to  precipitate  a revolutionary  outbreak. 
Radical  crowd-behavior  does  not  resolve  the 
situation,  it  only  inverts  it.  Any  real  solu- 
tion lies  wholly  outside  present  crowd-dilem- ) 
mas.  What  the  social  situation  demands 
most  is  a different  kind  of  thinking,  a new 
education,  an  increasing  number  of  people  who  \ 
understand  themselves  and  are  intellectually 
and  morally  independent  of  the  tyranny  of 
crowd-ideas. 

From  what  has  been  said  above,  it  follows 
that  revolutionary  propaganda  is  not  directly 
the  cause  of  insurrection.  Such  propaganda 
is  itself  an  effect  of  the  unconscious  reaction 

191 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


between  a waning  and  a crescent  crowd.  It 
is  a symptom  of  the  fact  that  a large  number 
of  people  have  ceased  to  believe  in  or  assent 
to  the  continued  dominance  of  the  present 
controlling  crowd  and  are  looking  to  another. 

There  is  always  a tendency  among  con- 
servative crowds  to  hasten  their  own  downfall 
by  the  manner  in  which  they  deal  with  revo- 
lutionary propaganda.  The  seriousness  of 
the  new  issue  is  denied;  the  crowd  seeks  to 
draw  attention  back  to  the  old  issue  which  it 
fought  and  won  years  ago  in  the  hour  of  its 
ascendancy.  The  fact  that  the  old  charms 
and  shibboleths  no  longer  work,  that  they  do 
not  now  apply,  that  the  growing  counter- 
crowd is  able  to  psychoanalyze  them,  discover 
the  hidden  motives  which  they  disguise,  and 
laugh  at  them,  is  stoutly  denied.  The  fiction 
is  maintained  to  the  effect  that  present  unrest 
is  wholly  uncalled-for,  that  everything  is  all 
right,  that  the  agitators  who  “make  people 
discontented”  are  alien  and  foreign  and  need 
only  be  silenced  with  a time-worn  phrase,  or, 
that  failing,  shut  up  by  force  or  deported,  and 
all  will  be  well. 

I do  not  doubt  that  before  the  Reformation 
and  the  French  Revolution  there  were  eccle- 
siastics and  nobles  aplenty  who  were  quite 
sure  that  the  masses  would  never  have  known 
they  were  miserable  if  meddling  disturbers 
had  not  taken  the  trouble  to  tell  them  so. 

192 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


Even  an  honest  critical  understanding  of  the 
demands  of  the  opposing  crowd  is  discouraged, 
possibly  because  it  is  rightly  felt  that  the 
critical  habit  of  mind  is  as  destructive  of  one 
' crowd-complex  as  the  other  and  the  old  crowd 
prefers  to  remain  intact  and  die  in  the  last 
ditch  rather  than  risk  dissolution,  even  with 
the  promise  of  averting  a revolution.  Hence 
the  Romans  were  willing  to  believe  that  the 
Christians  worshiped  the  head  of  an  ass.  The 
mediaeval  Catholics,  even  at  Leo’s  court, 
failed  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  the  outbreak 
in  north  Germany.  Thousands  saw  in  the 
Reformation  only  the  alleged  fact  that  the 
monk  Luther  wanted  to  marry  a wife.  To-day 
one  looks  almost  in  vain  among  business  men, 
editors,  and  politicians  for  a more  intelligent 
understanding  of  socialism.  A crowd  goes 
, down  to  its  death  fighting  bogies,  and  actually 
running  upon  the  sword  of  its  real  enemy,  be- 
cause a crowd,  once  its  constellation  of  ideas 
is  formed,  never  learns  anything. 

The  crowd-group  contains  in  itself,  in  the 
very  nature  of  crowd-thinking,  the  germs 
which  sooner  or  later  lay  it  low.  When  a 
crowd  first  becomes  dominant,  it  carries  into 
a place  of  power  a number  of  heterogeneous 
elements  which  have,  up  to  this  time,  been 
united  in  a great  counter-crowd  because  of 
their  common  dissatisfaction  with  the  old 
order.  Gradually  the  special  interests  of 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


these  several  groups  become  separated.  The 
struggle  for  place  is  continued  as  a factional 
fight  within  the  newly  ruling  crowd.  This 
factional  struggle  greatly  complicates  every 
revolutionary  movement.  We  witness  this 
in  the  murderously  hostile  partisan  conflicts 
which  broke  out  in  the  revolutionary  Assem- 
blies in  France.  It  is  seen  again  in  the 
Reformation,  which  had  hardly  established 
itself  when  the  movement  was  rent  by  intense 
sectarian  rivalries  of  all  sorts.  The  same  is 
true  of  Russia  since  the  fall  of  the  Tsar,  and 
of  Mexico  ever  since  the  overthrow  of  the 
Diaz  regime.  If  these  factional  struggles  go 
so  far  as  to  result  in  schism — that  is,  in  a con- 
scious repudiation  by  one  or  more  factions  of 
the  revolutionary  creed  which  had  formerly 
united  them  all,  there  is  disintegration  and 
in  all  probability  a return  to  the  old  ruling 
crowd. 

This  reaction  may  also  be  made  possible  by 
a refusal  of  one  faction  to  recognize  the  others 
as  integral  parts  of  the  newdy  triumphant 
crowd.  If  the  new  crowd  after  its  victory  can 
hold  itself  together,  the  revolution  is  estab- 
lished. It  then  becomes  the  task  of  the 
leading  faction  in  the  newly  dominant  crowd 
to  grab  the  lion’s  share  of  the  spoils  for  itself, 
give  the  other  factions  only  so  much  prestige 
as  will  keep  alive  in  their  minds  the  belief 
that  they,  too,  share  in  the  new  victory  for 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


“humanity”  and  hold  the  new  social  order 
together,  while  at  the  same  time  justifying  its 
own  leadership  by  the  compulsive  power  of 
the  idea  which  they  all  alike  believe.  This 
belief,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  sine  qua  non 
of  the  continued  existence  of  any  crowd.  A 
, dominant  crowd  survives  so  long  as  its  belief 
i is  held  uncritically  and  repeated  and  acted 
, upon  automatically  both  by  the  members  of 
i the  crowd  and  its  victims.  When  the  fac- 
j tions  which  have  been  put  at  a disadvantage 
by  the  leading  faction  renounce  the  belief,  or 
awake  to  the  fact  that  they  “have  been 
cheated,”  disintegration  begins. 

Between  the  crowd’s  professed  belief  and 
the  things  which  it  puts  into  practice  there  is 
a great  chasm.  Yet  the  fiction  is  uniformly 
maintained  that  the  things  done  are  the  cor- 
rect and  faithful  application  of  the  great  prin- 
ciples to  which  the  crowd  is  devoted.  We 
saw  in  our  study  of  crowd-ideas  in  general 
that  such  ideas  are  not  working  programs, 
but  are  screens  which  disguise  and  apparently 
justify  the  real  unconscious  motive  of  crowd- 
behavior.  The  crowd  secures  its  control,  first, 
by  proclaiming  in  the  most  abstract  form 
certain  generally  accepted  principles,  such  as 
freedom,  righteousness,  brotherly  love  — as 
though  these  universal  “truths”  were  its  own 
invention  and  exclusive  monopK^ly.  Next, 
certain  logical  deductions  are  made  from  these 

195 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

principles  which,  when  carried  to  their  logical 
conclusions  regardless  of  fact  or  the  effect  pro- 
duced, make  the  thing  which  the  crowd  really 
wants  and  does  appear  to  be  a vindication  of 
the  first  principles.  It  is  these  inferences 
which  go  to  make  up  the  conscious  thinking  or 
belief  of  the  crowd.  Thus  in  the  revolutionary 
convention  in  France  all  agree  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity. 
Fidelity  to  these  principles  would  to  a non- 
crowd mean  that  the  believer  should  not  try 
to  dictate  to  his  fellows  what  they  must 
believe  and  choose,  that  he  would  exercise 
good  will  in  his  dealings  with  them  and  show 
them  the  same  respect  which  he  wished  them 
to  have  for  himself.  But  the  crowd  does  not 
understand  principles  in  this  manner.  Do  all 
agree  to  the  great  slogan  of  the  revolution.'' 
Well,  then,  fidelity  to  Liberty,  Equality,  and 
Fraternity  demands  that  the  enemies  of  these 
principles  and  the  crowd’s  definition  of  them 
be  overthrovm.  The  Mountain  is  the  truly 
faithful  party,  hence  to  the  guillotine  with  the 
Gironde.  This  chasm  between  crowd  faith 
and  crowd  practice  is  well  illustrated  in  the 
case  of  those  Southern  patriots  in  America 
who  were  ready  to  fight  and  die  for  the  rights 
of  man  as  expressed  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  but  refused  to  apply  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  inalienable  rights  of  all  men  to 
their  own  black  slaves.  Or,  again  in  the 

196 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


case  of  nineteenth-century  capitalism,  liberty 
must  be  given  to  all  alike.  Liberty  means 
equal  opportunity.  Equal  opportunity  means 
free  competition  in  business.  Free  competi- 
tion exists  only  where  there  is  an  “incentive”; 
hence  the  investor  must  be  encouraged  and 
his  gains  protected  by  law.  Therefore  anti- 
capitalistic  doctrines  must  be  suppressed  as 
subversive  of  our  free  institutions.  Immi- 
grants to  whom  for  a generation  we  have  ex- 
tended the  hospitality  of  our  slums  and  labor 
camps,  and  the  opportunity  of  freely  com- 
peting with  our  well-intrenched  corporations, 
must  be  made  to  feel  their  ingratitude  if 
they  are  so  misguided  as  to  conclude,  from  the 
fact  that  hundreds  of  leading  radicals  have 
been  made  to  serve  jail  sentences,  while  after 
thirty  years  of  enforcing  the  antitrust  law 
not  a single  person  has  ever  been  sent  to 
prison,  that  possibly  this  is  not  a free  land. 

Or  again — one  convicts  himself  of  being 
a crowd-man  who  shows  partiality  among 
crowds — the  principle  of  democracy  is  gen- 
erally accepted.  Then  there  should  be  indus- 
trial democracy  as  well  as  political’  ’—hence  the 
“Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat — ^for  the 
workers  are  “the  people.”  Parliamentary 
assemblies  elected  by  all  the  people  do  not 
necessarily  represent  labor.  Organized  labor, 
therefore,  though  a minority  of  the  whole, 
should  establish  “industrial  democracy”  by 

197 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


force.  So,  according  to  Bolshevist  crowd- 
logic,  democracy  means  the  rule  of  a minority 
by  means  of  force. 

Now  it  is  this  fictitious,  paranoiac,  crowd- 
logic  which  one  must  be  able  to  dispel  before 
he  can  extricate  himself  from  the  clutches  of 
his  crowd.  If  he  subjects  the  whole  fabric 
of  abstractions  to  critical  analysis,  revalues 
it,  puts  himself  above  it,  assumes  a prag- 
matic attitude  toward  whatever  truths  it 
contains,  dares  to  test  these  truths  by  their 
results  in  experience  and  to  use  them  for  de- 
sired ends;  if,  in  short,  he  scrutinizes  his  own 
disguised  impulses,  brings  them  to  conscious- 
ness as  what  they  are,  and  refuses  to  be  de- 
ceived as  to  their  real  import,  even  when  they 
appear  dressed  in  such  sheep’s  clothing  as  ab- 
solutes and  first  principles,  he  becomes  a non- 
crowd man,  a social  being  in  the  best  sense. 

Those,  however,  who  continue  to  give  assent 
to  the  crowd’s  first  principles,  who  still  accept 
its  habit  of  a 'priori  reasonmg,  merely  substi- 
tuting for  its  accepted  deductions  others  of 
their  own  which  in  turn  serve  to  conceal  and 
justify  their  own  miconscious  desires,  will 
turn  from  the  old  crowd  only  to  be  gobbled 
up  by  a new  and  counter-crowd.  Such  people 
have  not  really  changed.  They  denounce  the 
old  crowd  on  the  ground  that  “it  has  not 
lived  up  to  its  principles.”  It  is  a significant 
fact  that  a crowd’s  rule  is  generally  challenged 

198 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


in  the  name  of  the  very  abstract  ideas  of  which 
it  has  long  posed  as  the  champion. 

For  instance,  there  is  liberty.  Every  crowd 
demands  it  when  it  is  seeking  power;  no 
crowd  permits  it  when  it  is  in  power.  A crowd 
which  is  struggling  for  supremacy  is  really 
trying  to  free  itself  and  as  many  people  as 
possible  from  the  control  of  another  crowd. 
Naturally,  the  struggle  for  power  appears  to 
consciousness  as  a struggle  for  liberty  as  such. 
The  controlling  crowd  is  correctly  seen  to  be 
a tyrant  and  oppressor.  What  the  opposition 
crowd  does  not  recognize  is  its  own  wish  to 
oppress,  hidden  under  its  struggle  for  power. 
We  have  had  occasion  to  note  the  intolerance 
of  the  crowd-mind  as  such.  A revolutionary 
crowd,  with  all  its  lofty  idealism  about 
liberty,  is  commonly  just  as  intolerant  as  a 
reactionary  crowd.  It  must  be  so  in  order  to 
remain  a crowd.  Once  it  is  triumphant  it 
may  exert  its  pressure  in  a different  direction, 
but  the  pinch  is  there  just  the  same.  Like  its 
predecessor,  it  must  resort  to  measures  of 
restraint,  possibly  even  a “reign  of  terror,” 
in  order  that  the  new-won  “liberty” — which 
is  to  say,  its  own  place  at  the  head  of  the 
procession — may  be  preserved.  The  denial  of 
freedom  appears  therefore  as  its  triumph,  and 
for  a time  people  are  deceived.  They  think 
they  are  free  because  everyone  is  talking  about 
liberty. 


199 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Eventually  some  one  makes  the  discovery 
that  people  do  not  become  free  just  by  re- 
peating the  magic  word  “liberty.”  A disap- 
pointed faction  of  the  newly  emancipated  hu- 
manity begins  to  demand  its  “rights.”  The 
crowd  hears  its  own  catchwords  quoted 
against  itself.  It  proceeds  to  prove  that 
freedom  exists  by  denouncing  the  disturbers 
and  silencing  them,  if  necessary,  by  force. 
The  once  radical  crowd  has  now  become  reac- 
tionary. Its  dream  of  world  emancipation  is 
seen  to  be  a hoax.  Lovers  of  freedom  now 
yoke  themselves  in  a new  rebel  crowd  so  that 
oppressed  humanity  may  be  liberated  from 
the  liberators.  Again,  the  will  to  power  is 
clothed  in  the  dream  symbols  of  an  emanci- 
cipated  society,  and  so  on  around  and  around 
the  circle,  until  people  learn  that  w^h  crowds 
freedom  is  impossible.  For  men  to  attain  to 
mast^y  of  themselves  is  as  abhorrent  to  one 
crowd  as  to  another.  The  crowd  merely 
wants  freedom  to  be  a crowd — that  is,  to  set 
up  its  own  tyranny  in  the  place  of  that  which 
offends  the  self-feeling  of  its  members. 

The  social  idealism  of  revolutionary  crowds 
is  very  significant  for  our  view  of  the  crowd- 
mind.  There  are  certain  forms  of  revolution- 
ary belief  which  are  repeated  again  and  again 
with  such  uniformity  that  it  would  seem  the 
unconscious  of  the  race  changes  very  little 

from  age  to  age.  The  wish-fancy  which 

200 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


motivates  revolutionary  activity  always  ap- 
pears to  consciousness  as  the  dream  of  an 
ideal  society,  a world  set  free;  the  reign  of 
brotherly  love,  peace,  and  justice.  The  folly 
and  wickedness  of  man  is  to  cease.  There  will 
be  no  more  incentive  for  men  to  do  evil.  The 
lion  and  the  lamb  shall  lie  down  together. 
Old  extortions  and  tyrannies  are  to  be  left 
behind.  There  is  to  be  a new  beginning, 
poverty  is  to  be  abolished,  God’s  will  is  to  be 
done  in  earth,  or  men  are  at  last  to  live  accord- 
ing to  reason,  and  the  inalienable  rights  of  all 
are  to  be  secured;  or  the  co-operative  common- 
wealth is  to  be  established,  with  no  more 
profit-seeking  and  each  working  gladly  for 
the  good  of  all.  In  other  words,  the  mind  of 
revolutionary  crowds  is  essentially  eschato- 
logical, or  Messianic.  The  crowd  always  imag- 
ines its  own  social  dominance  is  a millennium. 
And  this  trait  is  common  to  revolutionary 
crowds  in  all  historical  periods. 

We  have  here  the  psychological  explanation 
of  the  Messianic  faith  which  is  set  forth  with 
tremendous  vividness  in  Biblical  literature. 
The  revolutionary  import  of  the  social  teach- 
ing of  both  the  Hebrew  and  Christian  religions 
is  so  plain  that  I do  not  see  how  any  honest 
and  well-informed  person  can  even  attempt  to 
deny  it.  The  telling  effectiveness  with  which 
this  element  in  religious  teaching  may  be 

used  by  clever  radicals  to  convict  the  apolo- 
14  201 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


gists  of  the  present  social  order  by  the  words 
out  of  their  own  mouths  is  evident  in  much  of 
the  socialist  propaganda  to-day.  The  ten- 
dency of  the  will  to  revolt,  to  express  itself  in 
accepted  religious  symbols,  is  a thing  to  be 
expected  if  the  unconscious  plays  the  im- 
portant part  in  crowd-behavior  that  we  have 
contended  that  it  does. 

The  eighth-century  Hebrew  prophet  mingles 
his  denunciations  of  those  who  join  house  to 
house  and  field  to  field,  who  turn  aside  the 
way  of  the  meek,  and  sit  in  Samaria  in  the 
comer  of  a couch  and  on  the  silken  cushions 
of  a bed,  who  have  turned  justice  to  worm- 
wood and  cast  down  righteousness  to  the 
earth,  etc.,  etc., — reserving  his  choicest  woes 
of  course  for  the  foreign  oppressors  of  “my 
people” — with  promises  of  “the  day  of  the 
Lord”  with  all  that  such  a day  implies,  not 
only  of  triumph  of  the  oppressed  over  their 
enemies,  but  of  universal  happiness. 

Similarly  the  same  complex  of  ideas  appears 
in  the  writings  which  deal  with  the  Hebrew 
“Captivity”  in  the  sixth  century  b.c.,  with 
the  revolt  of  the  Maccabeans,  and  again  in 
the  impotent  hatred  against  the  Romans 
about  the  time  of  the  origin  of  Christianity. 

The  New  Testament  dwells  upon  some 
phase  of  this  theme  on  nearly  every  page. 
Blessed  are  ye  poor,  and  woe  unto  you  who 
are  rich,  you  who  laugh  now.  The  Messiah 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


has  come  and  with  him  the  Kingdom  of  the 
Heavens,  but  at  present  the  kingdom  is  re- 
vealed only  to  the  believing  few,  who  are  in 
the  world,  but  not  of  it.  However,  the  Lord 
is  soon  to  return ; in  fact,  this  generation  shall 
not  pass  away  until  all  these  things  be  accom- 
plished. After  a period  of  great  trial  and 
suffering  there  is  to  be  a new  world,  and  a 
new  and  holy  Jerusalem,  coming  down  from 
the  skies  and  establishing  itself  in  place  of  the 
old.  All  the  wicked,  chiefly  those  who  oppress 
the  poor,  shall  be  cast  into  a lake  of  fire. 
There  shall  be  great  rejoicing,  and  weeping 
and  darkness  and  death  shall  be  no  more. 

The  above  sketch  of  the  Messianic  hope  is 
so  brief  as  to  be  hardly  more  than  a carica- 
ture, but  it  will  serve  to  make  my  point  clear, 
that  Messianism  is  a revolutionary  crowd 
'phenomenon.  This  subject  has  been  pre- 
sented in  great  detail  by  religious  writers  in 
recent  years,  so  that  there  is  hardly  a member 
of  the  reading  public  who  is  not  more  or  less 
familiar  with  the  “social  gospel.”  My t point  | 
is  that  all  revolutionary  propaganda  is  “social  i 
gospel.”  Even  when  revolutionists  profess 
an  antireligious  creed,  as  did  the  Deists  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  and  as  do  many 
modern  socialists  with  their  “materialist  in- 
terpretation of  history,”  nevertheless  the  ele- 
ment of  irreligion  extends  unly  to  the  super- 
ficial trappings  of  the  revolutionary  crowd- 

203 


u/ 


i 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


faith,  and  even  here  is  not  consistent.  At 
bottom  the  revolutionists’  dream  of  a new 
world  is  religious. 

I am  using  the  word  “religious”  in  this 
connection  in  its  popular  sense,  meaning  no 
more  than  that  the  revolutionary  crowd  ra- 
tionalizes its  rB’pam  of  a new  world-order  in 
imager"’  i repeats  over  and  over  again 

the  ess^iicii^ls  of  the  Biblical  “day  of  the 
Lord,”  or  “kingdom  of  heaven”  to  be 
established  in  earth.  This  notion  of  cosmic 
regeneration,  is  very  evident  in  the  various 
“utopian”  socialist  theories.  The  Fourier- 
ists  and  St.  Simonists  of  the  early  part  of  the 
nineteenth  century  were  extremely  Messianic. 
So-called  “scientific  socialists”  are  now  in- 
clined to  ridicule  such  idealistic  speculation, 
but  one  has  only  to  scratch  beneath  the  sur- 
face of  present-day  socialist  propaganda  to 
find  under  its  materialist  jargon  the  same  old 
dream  of  the  ages.  A great  world-change  is 
to  come  suddenly.  With  the  triumph  of  the 
workers  there  will  be  no  more  poverty  or 
ignorance,  no  longer  any  incentive  to  men  to 
do  evil  to  one  another.  The  famous  “Man- 
ifesto” is  filled  with  such  ideas.  Bourgeois 
society  is  doomed  and  about  to  fall.  Forces 
of  social  evolution  inevitably  pomt  to  the 
world-wide  supremacy  of  the  working  class, 
under  whose  mild  sway  the  laborer  is  to  be 
given  the  full  product  of  his  toil,  the  exploita- 

204 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


tion  of  children  is  to  cease,  true  liberty  will 
be  aehieved,  prostitution,  which  is  somehow 
a bourgeois  institution,  is  to  be  abolished, 
everyone  will  be  educated,  production  in- 
creased till  there  is  enough  for  all,  the  cities 
shall  no  more  lord  it  over  the  rural  communi- 
ties, all  alike  will  perform  useful  labor,  waste 
places  of  the  earth  will  b,.  "cultivated 

lands  and  the  fertility  of  the  sox,.^4.^^/be  in- 
creased in  accordance  with  a common  plan, 
the  state,  an  instrument  of  bourgeois  exploita- 
tion, will  cease  to  exist;  in  fact,  the  whole 
wicked  past  is  to  be  left  behind,  for  as 

The  Communist  revolution  is  the  most  rad  cal  rup- 
ture with  traditional  property  relations,  no  wonder 
that  its  development  involves  the  most  radical  rupture 
with  traditional  ideas. 

In  fine. 

In  place  of  the  old  bourgeois  society  with  its  classes 
and  class  antagonisms  we  shall  have  an  association  in 
which  the  free  development  of  each  is  the  condition  for 
tlie  free  development  of  all. 

Le  Bon  says  of  the  French  Revolution: 

The  principles  of  the  Revolution  speedily  inspired 
a wave  of  mystic  enthusiasm  analogous  to  those  pro- 
voked by  the  various  religious  beliefs  which  had  pre- 
ceded it.  All  they  did  was  to  change  the  orientation 
of  a mental  ancestry  which  the  centuries  had  solidified. 

205 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


So  there  is  nothing  astonishing  in  the  savage  zeal  of 
the  men  of  the  Convention.  Their  mystic  mentality 
was  the  same  as  that  of  the  Protestants  at  the  time  of 
the  Reformation.  The  principlal  heroes  of  the  Terror — 
Couthon,  Saint  Just,  Robespierre,  etc. — ^were  apostles. 
Like  Polyeuctes  destroying  the  altars  of  the  false  gods 
to  propagate  his  faith,  they  dreamed  of  converting  the 
globe.  . . . The  mystic  spirit  of  the  leaders  of  the  Revo- 
lution was  betrayed  in  the  least  details  of  their  public 
life.  Robespierre,  convinced  that  he  was  supported 
by  the  Almighty,  assured  his  hearers  in  a speech  that 
the  Supreme  Being  had  “decreed  the  Republic  since 
the  beginning  of  time.” 

A recent  writer,  after  showing  that  the 
Russian  revolution  has  failed  to  put  the 
Marxian  principles  into  actual  operation,  says 
of  Lenin  and  his  associates: 

They  have  caught  a formula  of  glittering  words; 
they  have  learned  the  verbal  cadences  which  move  the 
masses  to  ecstasy;  they  have  learned  to  paint  a vision 
of  heaven  that  shall  outflare  in  the  minds  of  their 
followers  the  shabby  realities  of  a Bolshevik  earth. 
They  are  master  phraseocrats,  and  in  Russia  they  have 
reared  an  empire  on  phraseocracy. 

The  alarmists  who  shriek  of  Russia  would  do  well 
to  turn  their  thoughts  from  Russia’s  socialistic  men- 
ace. The  peril  of  Russia  is  not  to  our  industries,  but 
to  our  states.  The  menace  of  the  Bolsheviki  is  not  an 
economic  one,  it  is  a political  menace.  It  is  the  menace 
of  fanatic  armies,  drunken  with  phrases  and  sweeping 
forward  under  Lenin  like  a Musco\dte  scourge.  It 
is  the  menace  of  intoxicated  proletarians,  goaded  by 
invented  visions  to  seek  to  conquer  the  world. 

In  Nicolai  Lenin  the  Socialist,  we  have  naught  to 
206 


REVOLUTIONARY  ^CROWDS 

fear.  In  Nicolai  Lenin  the  political  chief  of  Russia’s 
millions,  we  may  well  find  a menace,  for  his  figure  looms 
over  the  world.  His  Bolshevik  abracadabra  has  se- 
duced the  workers  of  every  race.  His  stealthy  propa- 
ganda has  shattered  the  morale  of  every  army  in  the 
world.  His  dreams  are  winging  to  Napoleonic  flights, 
and  well  he  may  dream  of  destiny;  for  in  an  age  when 
we  bow  to  phrases,  it  is  Lenin  who  is  the  master 
phraseocrat  of  the  world. 


Passing  over  the  question  of  Lenin’s  per- 
sonal ambitions,  and  whether  our  own  crowd- 
stupidity,  panic,  and  wrong-headed  Allied 
diplomacy  may  not  have  been  contributing 
causes  of  the  menace  of  Bolshevism,  it 
can  hardly  be  denied  that  Bolshevism,  like 
all  other  revolutionary  crowd-movements,  is 
swayed  by  a painted  vision  of  heaven  which 
outflares  the  miseries  of  earth.  Every  revolu- 
tionary crowd  of  every  description  is  a pilgrim- 
age set  out  to  regain  our  lost  Paradise. 

Now  it  is  this  dream  of  paradise,  or  ideal 
society,  which  deserves  analytical  study. 
Why  does  it  always  appear  the  minute  a 
crowd  is  sufficiently  powerful  to  dream  of 
world-power  It  will  readily  be  conceded 
that  this  dream  has  some  function  in  creating 
certain  really  desirable  social  values.  But 
such  values  cannot  be  the  psychogenesis  of 
the  dream.  If  the  dream  were  ever  realized, 
I think  William  James  was  correct  in  saying 
that  we  should  find  it  to  be  but  a “sheep’s 

207 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROTOS 


heaven  and  lubberland  of  joy,”  and  that  life 
in  it  would  be  so  “mawkish  and  dishwatery” 
that  we  should  gladly  return  to  this  world  of 
struggle  and  challenge,  or  anywhere  else,  if 
only  to  escape  the  deadly  inanity. 

We  have  already  noted  the  fact  that  this 
dream  has  the  function  of  justifying  the  crowd 
in  its  revolt  and  will  to  rule.  But  this  is  by 
no  means  all.  The  social  idealism  has  well 
been  called  a dream,  for  that  is  just  what  it  is, 
the  daydream  of  the  ages.  It  is  like  belief 
in  fairies,  or  the  Cinderella  myth.  It  is  the 
Jack  - and  - the  - beanstalk  philosophy.  The 
dream  has  exactly  the  same  function  as  the 
Absolute,  and  the  ideal  world-systems  of  the 
paranoiac;  it  is  an  imaginary  refuge  from  the 
real.  Like  all  other  dreams,  it  is  the  realiza- 
tion of  a wish.  I have  long  been  impressed 
with  the  static  character  of  this  dream;  not 
only  is  it  much  the  same  in  all  ages,  but  it  is 
always  regarded  as  the  great  culmination  be- 
yond which  the  imagination  cannot  stretch. 
Even  those  who  hold  the  evolutionary  view  of 
reality  and  know  well  that  life  is  continuous 
change,  and  that  progress  cannot  be  fixed  in 
any  passing  moment,  however  sweet,  are 
generally  unable  to  imagine  progress  going  on 
after  the  establishment  of  the  ideal  society  and 
leaving  it  behind. 

Revolutionary  propaganda  habitually  stops, 

like  the  nineteenth-century  love  story,  with 

208 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


a general  statement,  “and  so  they  lived 
happily  ever  after.”  It  is  really  the  end,  not 
the  beginning  or  middle  of  the  story.  It  is 
the  divine  event  toward  which  the  whole 
creation  moves,  and  having  reached  it,  stops. 
Evolution  having  been  wound  up  to  run  to 
just  this  end,  time  and  change  and  effort  may 
now  be  discontinued.  There  is  nothing  fur- 
ther to  do.  In  other  words,  the  ideal  is  lifted 
clear  out  of  time  and  all  historical  connec- 
tions. As  in  other  dreams,  the  empirically 
known  sequence  of  events  is  ignored.  Whole 
centuries  of  progress  and  struggle  and  piece- 
meal experience  are  telescoped  into  one  imag- 
inary symbolic  moment.  The  moment  now 
stands  for  the  whole  process,  or  rather  it  is 
substituted  for  the  process.  We  have  taken 
refuge  from  the  real  into  the  ideal.  The 
“Kingdom  of  Heaven,”  “Paradise,”  “The 
Return  to  Man  in  the  State  of  Nature,” 
“Back  to  Primitive  New  Testament  Christi- 
anity,” “The  Age  of  Reason,”  “Utopia,”  the 
“Revolution,”  the  “Co-operative  Common- 
wealth,” all  mean  psychologically  the  same 
thing.  And  that  thing  is  not  at  all  a scientific 
social  program,  but  a symbol  of  an  easier  and 
better  world  where  desires  are  realized  by 
magic,  and  everyone’s  check  drawn  upon  the 
bank  of  existence  is  cashed.  Social  idealism 
of  revolutionary  crowds  is  a mechanism  of 
compensation  and  escape  for  suppressed  desires. 

209 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Is  there  any  easier  way  of  denying  the  true 
nature  and  significance  of  our  objective  world 
than  by  persuading  ourselves  that  that  world 
is  even  now  doomed,  and  is  bound  suddenly 
to  be  transformed  into  the  land  of  our  heart’s 
desire?  Is  it  not  to  be  expected  that  people 
would  soon  learn  how  to  give  those  desires 
greater  unction,  and  to  encourage  one  another 
in  holding  to  the  fictions  by  which  those  de- 
sires could  find  their  compensation  and  es- 
cape, by  resorting  to  precisely  the  crowd- 
devices  which  we  have  been  discussing? 

The  Messianists  of  Bible  times  expected 
the  great  transformation  and  world  cataclysm 
to  come  by  means  of  a divine  miracle.  Those 
who  are  affected  by  the  wave  of  premillen- 
nialism  which  is  now  running  through  certain 
evangelical  Christian  communions  are  experi- 
encing a revival  of  this  faith  with  much  of  its 
primitive  terminology. 

Evolutionary  social  revolutionists  expect 
the  great  day  to  come  as  the  culmination  of 
a process  of  economic  evolution.  This  is 
what  is  meant  by  “evolutionary  and  revolu- 
tionary socialism.”  The  wish-fancy  is  here 
rationalized  as  a doctrine  of  evolution  by 
revolution.  Thus  the  difference  between  the 
social  revolutionist  and  the  Second  Ad- 
ventist is  much  smaller  than  either  of  them 
suspects.  As  Freud  would  doubtless  say,  the 

difference  extends  only  to  the  “secondary 

210 


REVOLUTIONAEY  CROWDS 


elaboration  of  the  manifest  dream  formation” 
— the  latent  dream  thought  is  the  same  in 
both  cases.  The  Adventist  expresses  the 
wish  in  the  terminology  of  a prescientific  age, 
while  the  social  revolutionist  makes  use  of 
modern  scientific  jargon.  Each  alike  finds 
escape  from  reality  in  the  contemplation  of  a 
new-world  system.  The  faith  of  each  is  a 
scheme  of  redemption — that  is,  of  “com- 
pensation.” Each  contemplates  the  sudden, 
cataclysmic  destruction  of  the  “present  evil 
world,”  and  its  replacement  by  a new  order 
in  which  the  meek  shall  inherit  the  earth. 
To  both  alike  the  great  event  is  destined,  in 
the  fullness  of  time,  to  come  as  a thief  in  the 
night.  In  the  one  case  it  is  to  come  as  the 
fulfillment  of  prophecy;  in  the  other  the 
promise  is  underwritten  and  guaranteed  by 
impersonal  forces  of  “economic  evolution.” 

This  determinism  is  in  the  one  case  what 
Bergson  calls  “radical  finalism,”  and  in  the 
other  “radical  mechanism.”  But  whether 
the  universe  exists  but  to  reel  off  a divine 
plan  conceived  before  all  worlds,  or  be  but 
the  mechanical  swinging  of  the  shuttle  of 
cause  and  effect,  what  difference  is  there  if 
the  point  arrived  at  is  the  same?  In  both 
cases  this  point  was  fixed  before  the  beginning 
of  time,  and  the  meaning  of  the  universe  is 
just  that  and  nothing  else,  since  that  is  what 

it  all  comes  to  in  the  end, 

211 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Whether  the  hand  which  turns  the  crank 
of  the  world-machine  be  called  that  of  God  or 
merely  “Evolution,”  it  is  only  a verbal  differ- 
ence; it  is  in  both  cases  “a  power  not  our- 
selves which  makes  for  righteousness.”  And 
the  righteousness?  Why,  it  is  just  the  right- 
eousness of  our  own  crowd — in  other  words, 
the  crowd’s  bill  of  rights  painted  in  the  sky 
by  our  own  wish-fancy,  and  dancing  over  our 
heads  like  an  aurora  borealis.  It  is  the  his- 
tory of  all  crowds  that  this  dazzling  pillar  of 
fire  in  the  Arctic  night  is  hailed  as  the  “rosy- 
fingered  dawn”  of  the  Day  of  the  Lord. 

Or,  to  change  the  figure  somewhat,  the 
faithful  crowd  has  but  to  follow  its  fiery  cloud 
to  the  promised  land  which  flows  with  milk 
and  honey;  then  march  for  an  appointed 
time  about  the  walls  of  the  wicked  bourgeois 
Jericho,  playing  its  propaganda  tune  until  the 
walls  fall  down  by  magic  and  the  world  is 
ours.  No  revolution  is  possible  without  a 
miracle  and  a brass  band. 

I have  no  desire  to  discourage  those  who  have 
gone  to  work  at  the  real  tasks  of  social  recon- 
struction— certainly  no  wish  to  make  this  study 
an  apology  for  the  existing  social  order.  In  the 
face  of  the  ugly  facts  which  on  every  hand 
stand  as  indictments  of  what  is  called  “cap- 
italism,” it  is  doubtful  if  anyone  could  defend 
the  present  system  without  recourse  to  a 

certain  amount  of  cynicism  or  cant.  The 

212 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


widespread  social  unrest  which  has  enlisted 
in  its  service  so  much  of  the  intellectual 
spirit  of  this  generation  surely  could  never 
have  come  about  without  provocation  more 
real  than  the  work  of  a mere  handful  of 
“ mischief -making  agitators.”  The  challenge 
to  modern  society  is  not  wholly  of  crowd 
origin. 

But  it  is  one  thing  to  face  seriously  the 
manifold  problems  of  reconstruction  of  our 
social  relations,  and  it  is  quite  another  thing 
to  persuade  oneself  that  all  these  entangled 
problems  have  but  one  imaginary  neck  which 
is  waiting  to  be  cut  with  a single  stroke  of 
the  sword  of  revolution  in  the  hands  of  “the 
people.”  Hundreds  of  times  I have  heard 
radicals,  while  discussing  certain  evils  of 
present  society,  say,  “All  these  things  are  but 
symptoms,  effects;  to  get  rid  of  them  you 
must  remove  the  cause.”  That  cause  is 
always,  in  substance,  the  present  economic 
system. 

If  this  argument  means  that,  instead  of 
thinking  of  the  various  phases  of  social  be- 
havior as  isolated  from  one  another,  we  should 
conceive  of  them  as  so  interrelated  as  to  form 
something  like  a more  or  less  causally  con- 
nected organic  whole,  I agree.  But  if  it  means 
something  else  — and  it  frequently  does  — 
the  argument  is  based  upon  a logical  fallacy. 
The  word  “system”  is  not  a causal  term;  it 

213 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


is  purely  descriptive.  The  facts  referred  to, 
whatever  connections  we  may  discover  among 
them,  are  not  the  effects  of  a mysterious^ 
“system”  behind  the  facts  of  human  be- 
havior; the  facts  themselves,  taken  together, 
are  the  system. 

The  confusion  of  causal  and  descriptive 
ideas  is  a habit  common  to  both  the  intel- 
lectualist  philosopher  and  the  crowd-minded. 
It  enables  people  to  turn  their  gaze  from  the 
empirical  Many  to  the  fictitious  One,  from  the 
real  to  the  imaginary.  The  idea  of  a system 
behind,  over,  outside,  and  something  different 
from  the  related  facts  which  the  term  “sys- 
tem” is  properly  used  to  describe,  whether 
that  system  be  a world-system,  a logical 
system,  or  a social  system,  whether  it  be 
capitalism  or  socialism,  “system”  so  con- 
ceived is  a favorite  crowd-spook.  It  is  the 
same  logical  fallacy  as  if  one  spoke  of  the  tem- 
perature of  this  May  day  as  the  effect  of  the 
climate,  when  all  know  that  the  term  climate 
is  simply  (to  paraphrase  James)  the  term  by 
which  we  characterize  the  temperature, 
weather,  etc.,  which  we  experience  on  this  and 
other  days.  We  have  already  seen  to  what 
use  the  crowd-mind  puts  all  such  general- 
izations. 

A popular  revolutionary  philosophy  of  his- 
tory pictures  the  procession  of  the  ages  as 
made  up  of  a pageant  of  spook-social  systems. 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


each  distinct  from  the  others  and  coming  in 
its  appointed  time.  But  social  systems  do 
not  follow  in  a row,  like  elephants  in  a circus 
parade — each  huge  beast  with  its  trunk  coiled 
about  the  end  of  his  predecessor’s  tail.  The 
greater  part  of  this  “evolutionary  and  revolu- 
tionary” pageantry  is  simply  dream-stuff.; 
Those  who  try  to  march  into  Utopia  in  such 
an  imaginary  parade  are  not  even  trying  to 
reconstruct  society;  they  are  sociological 
somnambulists. 

The  crowd-mind  clings  to  such  pageantry 
because,  as  we  saw  in  another  connection,  the 
crowd  desires  to  believe  that  evolution  guaran- 
tees its  own  future  supremacy.  It  then 
becomes  unnecessary  to  solve  concrete  prob- 
lems. One  need  only  possess  an  official  pro- 
gram of  the  order  of  the  parade.  In  other 
words,  the  crowd  must  persuade  itself  that 
only  one  solution  of  the  social  problem  is 
possible,  and  that  one  inevitable — its  own. 

Such  thinking  wholly  misconceives  the  na- 
ture of  the  social  problem.  Like  all  the  prac- 
tical dilemmas  of  life,  this  problem,  assuming 
it  to  be  in  any  sense  a single  problem,  is  real 
just  because  more  than  one  solution  is  pos- 
sible. The  task  here  is  like  that  of  choosing 
a career.  Whole  series  of  partially  foreseen 
possibilities  are  contingent  upon  certain  defi- 
nite choices.  Aside  from  our  choosing,  many 
sorts  of  futures  may  be  equally  possible. 

215 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Our  intervention  at  this  or  that  definite  point 
is  an  act  by  which  we  will  one  series  of  pos- 
sibilities rather  than  another  into  reality. 
But  the  act  of  intervention  is  never  performed 
once  for  all.  Each  intervention  leads  only  to 
new  dilemmas,  among  which  we  must  again 
choose  and  intervene.  It  is  mainly  in  order 
to  escape  from  the  necessity  of  facing  this 
terrifying  series  of  unforeseeable  dilemmas  that 
the  crowd-man  walketh  in  a vain  show. 

In  pointing  out  the  futility  of  present-day 
revolutionary  crowd-thinking,  I am  only  striv- 
ing to  direct,  in  however  small  a degree,  our 
thought  and  energies  into  channels  which 
lead  toward  desired  results.  It  is  not  by 
trombones  that  we  are  to  redeem  society,  nor 
is  the  old  order  going  to  tumble  down  like  the 
walls  of  Jericho,  and  a complete  new  start  be 
i given.  Civilization  cannot  be  wiped  out  and 
begun  all  over  again.  It  constitutes  the 
environment  within  which  our  reconstructive 
thinking  must,  by  tedious  effort,  make  certain 
definite  modifications.  Each  such  modifica- 
; tion  is  a problem  in  itself,  to  be  dealt  with, 
not  by  belief  in  miracle,  but  by  what  Dewey 
calls  “ creative  intelligence.”  Each  such  mod- 
fication  must  be  achieved  by  taking  all  the 
known  facts,  which  are  relevant,  into  ac- 
count. As  such  it  is  a new  adaptation,  and 
the  result  of  a series  of  such  adaptations  may 

be  as  great  and  radical  a social  transformation 

216 


REVOLUTIONARY  CROWDS 


as  one  may  have  the  courage  to  set  as  the  goal 
of  a definite  policy  of  social  effort.  But  there 
is  a world  of  difference  between  social  thinking 
of  this  kind,  where  faith  is  a working  hypothe- 
sis, and  that  which  ignores  the  concrete 
problems  that  must  be  solved  to  reach  the 
desired  goal,  and,  after  the  manner  of  crowds, 
dreams  of  entering  fairyland,  or  of  pulling 
a new  world  en  bloc  down  out  of  the  blue, 
by  the  magic  of  substituting  new  tyrannies 
for  old. 

Revolutionary  crowd-thinking  is  not  “cre- 
ative intelligence.”  It  is  hocus-pocus,  a sort 
of  social  magic  formula  like  the  “mutabor” 
in  the  Arabian  Nights ; it  is  an  AladdirC s-lamp 
philosophy.  And  here  we  may  sum  up  this  ^ 
part  of  our  argument.  The  idea  of  the  revo- 
lution is  to  the  crowd  a symbol,  the  function 
of  which  is  compensation  for  the  burdens  of 
the  struggle  for  existence,  for  the  feeling  of 
social  inferiority,  and  for  desires  suppressed 
by  civilization.  It  is  an  imaginary  escape 
from  hard  reality,  a new-world  system  in 
which  the  ego  seeks  refuge,  a defense  mechan- 
ism under  the  compulsive  influence  of  which 
crowds  behave  like  somnambulistic  individ- 
uals. It  is  the  apotheosis  of  the  under  crowd 
itself  and  the  transcendental  expression  and 
justification  of  its  will  to  rule.  It  is  made  up 
of  just  those  broad  generalizations  which  are 
of  use  in  keeping  that  crowd  together.  It 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


gives  the  new  crowd  unction  in  its  fight  with 
the  old,  since  it  was  precisely  these  same 
dream-thoughts  which  the  old  crowd  wrote  on 
its  banners  in  the  day  when  it,  too,  was  blowing 
trumpets  outside  the  walls  of  Jericho. 


VIII 


THE  FRUITS  OP  REVOLUTION — NEW  CROWD- 
TYRANNIES  FOR  OLD 

SO  much  for  the  psychology  of  the  revolu- 
tionary propaganda.  Now  let  us  look  at 
what  happens  in  the  moment  of  revolutionary 
outbreak.  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on 
the  fact  that  a revolution  occurs  when  a new 
crowd  succeeds  in  displacing  an  old  one  in 
position  of  social  control.  At  first  there  is  a 
-general  feeling  of  release  and  of  freedom. 
There  is  a brief  priod  of  ecstasy,  of  good 
will,  a strange,  almost  mystical  magnanimity. 
A flood  of  oratory  is  released  in  praise  of  the 
“new  day  of  the  people.”  Everyone  is  a 
“comrade.”  Everyone  is  important.  There 
is  an  inclination  to  trust  everyone.  This 
Easter-morning  state  of  mind  generally  lasts 
for  some  days — until  people  are  driven  by  the 
pinch  of  hunger  to  stop  talking  and  take  up 
again  the  routine  tasks  of  daily  living.  We 
have  all  read  how  the  “citizens”  of  the 
French  Revolution  danced  in  the  streets  for 
sheer  joy  in  their  new-won  liberty.  Those 

219 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


who  were  in  Petrograd  during  the  days  which 
immediately  followed  the  downfall  of  the  Tsar 
bear  witness  to  a like  almost  mystical  sense 
of  the  general  goodness  of  human  kind  and  of 
joy  in  human  fellowship. 

With  the  return  to  the  commonplace  tasks 
of  daily  life,  some  effort,  and  indeed  further 
rationalization,  is  needed  to  keep  up  the 
feeling  that  the  new  and  wonderful  age  has 
really  come  to  stay.  Conflicts  of  interest 
and  special  grievances  are  viewed  as  involving 
the  vital  principles  of  the  Revolution.  People 
become  impatient  and  censorious.  There  is 
a searching  of  hearts.  People  watch  their 
neighbors,  especially  their  rivals,  to  make 
sure  that  nothing  in  their  behavior  shall  con- 
firm the  misgivings  which  are  vaguely  felt  in 
their  own  minds.  The  rejoicing  and  com- 
radeship which  before  were  spontaneous  are 
now  demanded.  Intolerance  toward  the  van- 
quished crowd  reappears  with  increased  in- 
tensity, not  a little  augmented  by  the  knowl- 
edge that  the  old  enemies  are  now  at  “the 
people’s”  mercy. 

There  is  a demand  for  revenge  for  old  abuses. 
The  displaced  crowd  likely  as  not,  foreseeing 
the  doom  which  awaits  its  members,  seeks 
escape  by  attempting  a counter-revolution. 
A propaganda  of  sympathy  is  carried  on 
among  members  of  this  same  class  who  re- 
main in  the  dominant  crowd  in  communities 

220 


NEW  TYRANNIES  FOR  OLD 

not  affected  by.  the  revolution.  There  is 
secret  plotting  and  suspicion  of  treason  on 
every  hand.  People  resort  to  extravagant 
expressions  of  their  revolutionary  principles, 
not  only  to  keep  up  their  own  faith  in  them, 
but  to  show  their  loyalty  to  the  great  cause. 
The  most  fanatical  and  uncompromising  mem- 
bers of  the  group  gain  prominence  because  of 
their  excessive  devotion.  By  the  very  logic 
of  crowd-thinking,  leadership  passes  to  men 
who  are  less  and  less  competent  to  deal  with 
facts  and  more  and  more  extreme  in  their 
zeal.  Hence  the  usual  decline  from  the  Mira- 
beaus  to  the  Dantons  and  Cariers,  and  from 
these  to  the  Marats  and  Robespierres,  from 
the  Milukoffs  to  the  Kerenskys  and  from  the 
Kerenskys  to  the  Trotzkys.  With  each  ex- 
cess the  crowd  must  erect  some  still  new 
defense  against  the  inevitable  disclosure  of 
the  fact  that  the  people  are  not  behaving  at 
aU  as  if  they  were  living  in  the  kingdom  of 
heaven.  With  each  farther  deviation  from 
the  plain  meaning  of  facts,  the  revolution 
must  resort  to  more  severe  measures  to  sus- 
tain itself,  until  finally  an  unsurmountable 
barrier  is  reached,  such  as  the  arrival  on  the 
scene  of  a Napoleon.  Then  the  majority  are 
forced  to  abandon  the  vain  hope  of  really 
attaining  Utopia,  and  content  themselves 
with  fictions  to  the  effect  that  what  they  have 

really  is  Utopia — or  with  such  other  mechan- 

221 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


isms  as  will  serve  to  excuse  and  minimize  the 
significance  of  existing  facts  and  put  off  the 
complete  realization  of  the  ideal  until  some 
future  stage  of  progress.  It  is  needless  to 
add  that  those  who  have  most  profited  by  the 
revolutionary  change  are  also  most  ready  to 
take  the  lead  in  persuading  their  neighbors 
to  be  content  with  these  rational  compromises. 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  revolutionary 
leaders  have  set  up  a dictatorship  of  their 
own,  which,  while  necessary  to  “save  the  revo- 
lution,” is  itself  a practical  negation  of  the 
revolutionary  dream  of  a free  world.  This 
dictatorship,  finally  passing  into  the  hands  of 
the  more  competent  element  of  the  revolu- 
tionary crowd,  justifies  itself  to  the  many; 
professing  and  requiring  of  all  a verbal 
assent  to  the  revolutionary  creed  of  which  its 
very  existence  is  a fundamental  repudiation. 
This  group  becomes  in  time  the  nucleus  about 
which  society  finally  settles  down  again  in 
comparative  peace  and  equilibrium. 

In  general,  then,  it  may  be  said  that  a revo- 
lution does  not  and  cannot  realize  the  age-long 
dream  of  a world  set  free.  Its  results  may  be 
summed  up  as  follows:  a newly  dominant 
crowd,  a new  statement  of  old  beliefs,  new 
owners  of  property  in  the  places  of  the  old, 
new  names  for  old  tyrannies.  Looking  back 
over  the  history  of  the  several  great  tidal 

waves  of  revolution  which  have  swept  over 

222 


NEW  TYRANNIES  FOR  OLD 


the  civilization  which  is  to-day  ours,  it  would 
appear  that  one  effect  of  them  has  been  to 
intensify  the  hold  which  crowd-thinking  has 
upon  all  of  us,  also  to  widen  the  range  of  the 
things  which  we  submit  to  the  crowd-mind  for 
final  judgment.  In  confirmation  of  this  it  is 
to  be  noted  that  it  is  on  the  whole  those  nations 
which  have  been  burnt  over  by  both  the 
Reformation  and  the  eightenth-century  revo- 
lution which  exhibit  the  most  chauvian  brand 
of  nationalism  and  crowd-patriotism.  It  is 
these  same  nations  also  which  have  most 
highly  depersonalized  their  social  relation- 
ships, political  structures,  and  ideals.  It  is 
these  nations  also  whose  councils  are  most  de- 
termined by  spasms  of  crowd-propaganda. 

The  modern  man  doubtless  has  a sense  of 
self  in  a degree  unknown — except  by  the  few 
— in  earlier  ages,  but  along  with  this  there 
exists  in  “modern  ideas,”  a complete  system 
of  crowd-ideas  with  which  the  conscious  self 
comes  into  conflict  at  every  turn.  Just  how 
far  the  revolutionary  crowds  of  the  past  have 
operated  to  provide  the  stereotyped  forms  in 
which  present  crowd-thinking  is  carried  on,  it 
is  almost  impossible  to  learn.  But  that  their 
influence  has  been  great  may  be  seen  by  any- 
one who  attempts  a psychological  study  of 
“public  opinion.” 

Aside  from  the  results  mentioned,  I think 
the  deposit  of  revolutionary  movements  in 

223 


THE  BEHAVIOE  OF  CROWDS 


history  has  been  very  small.  It  may  be  that, 
in  the  general  shake-up  of  such  a period,  a few 
vigorous  spirits  are  tossed  into  a place  where 
their  genius  has  an  opportunity  which  it 
would  otherwise  have  failed  to  get.  But  it 
would  seem  that  on  the  whole  the  idea  that 
revolutions  help  the  progress  of  the  race  is  a 
hoax.  Where  advancement  has  been  achieved 
in  freedom,  in  intelligence,  in  ethical  values,  i 
in  art  or  science,  in  consideration  for  hu- 
manity, in  legislation,  it  has  in  each  instance 
been  achieved  by  unique  individuals,  and  has 
spread  chiefly  by  personal  influence,  never 
gaining  assent  except  among  those  who  have 
power  to  recreate  the  new  values  won  in  their 
own  experience. 

Whenever  we  take  up  a new  idea  as  a 
crowd,  we  at  once  turn  it  into  a catchword 
and  a fad.  Faddism,  instead  of  being  merely 
a hunger  for  the  new  is  rather  an  expression 
of  the  crowd-will  to  uniformity.  To  be  “ old- 
fashioned”  and  out  of  date  is  as  truly  to  be  a 
nonconformist  as  to  be  a freak  or  an  origina- 
tor. Faddism  is  neither  radicalism  nor  a 
symptom  of  progress.  It  is  a mark  of  the 
passion  for  uniformity  or  the  conservatism  of 
the  crowd-mind.  It  is  change;  but  its  change 
is  insignificant. 

It  is  often  said  that  religious  liberty  is  the 
fruit  of  the  Reformation.  If  so  it  is  an  in- 
direct result  and  one  which  the  reformers 

224 


NEW  TYRANNIES  FOR  OLD 


certainly  did  not  desire.  They  sought  liberty 
only  for  their  own  particular  propaganda,  a 
fact  which  is  abundantly  proved  by  Calvin’s 
treatment  of  Servetus  and  of  the  Anabap- 
tists, by  Luther’s  attitude  toward  the  Saxon 
peasants,  by  the  treatment  of  Catholics  in 
England,  by  the  whole  history  of  Cromwell’s 
rule,  by  the  persecution  of  Quakers  and  all 
other  “heretics”  in  our  American  colonies — 
Pennsylvania,  I believe,  excepted — down  to 
the  date  of  the  American  Revolution. 

It  just  happened  that  Protestantism  as  tJie 
religion  of  the  bourgeois  fell  into  the  hands 
of  a group,  who,  outside  their  religious-crowd 
interests  were  destined  to  be  the  greatest 
practical  beneficiaries  of  the  advancement  of 
applied  science.  Between  applied  science  and 
science  as  a cultural  discipline — that  is,  science 
as  a humanistic  study — the  line  is  hard  to 
draw.  The  Humanist  spirit  of  the  sciences 
attained  a certain  freedom,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  the  whole  Reformation  was 
really  a reactionary  movement  against  the 
Renaissance;  in  spite,  moreover,  of  the  patent 
fact  that  the  Protestant  churches  still,  offi- 
cially at  least,  resist  the  free  spirit  of  scientific 
culture. 

It  is  to  the  free  spirits  of  the  Italian  Renais- 
sance, also  to  the  Jeffersons  and  Franklins  and 
Paines,  the  Lincolns  and  Ingersolls,  the  Hux- 
leys and  Darwins  and  Spencers,  the  men  who 

225 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


dared  alone  to  resist  the  religious  crowd-mind 
and  to  undermine  the  abstract  ideas  in  which 
it  had  intrenched  itself,  to  whom  the  modern 
world  owes  its  religious  and  intellectual  liberty. 
The  same  is  true  of  political  liberty.  Eng- 
land, which  is  the  most  free  country  in  the 
world  to-day,  never  really  experienced  the 
revolutionary  crowd-movement  of  the  eight- 
eenth century.  Instead,  the  changes  came 
by  a process  of  gradual  reconstruction.  And 
it  is  with  just  such  an  opportunist  recon- 
structive process  that  England  promises  now 
to  meet  and  solve  the  problems  of  the 
threatened  social  revolution.  In  contrast  with 
Russia,  Socialism  in  England  has  much  ground 
for  hope  of  success.  The  radical  movement  in 
England  is  on  the  whole  wisely  led  by  men 
who  with  few  exceptions  can  think  realistically 
and  pragmatically,  and  refuse  to  be  swept  off 
their  feet  by  crowd-abstractions.  The  British 
Labor  party  is  the  least  crowd-minded  of  any 
of  the  socialistic  organizations  of  our  day. 
The  Rochdale  group  has  demonstrated  that 
if  it  is  co-operation  that  people  desire  as  a 
solution  of  the  economic  problem,  the  way  to 
solve  it  is  to  co-operate  along  definite  and 
I practicable  lines;  the  co-operators  have  given 
I up  belief  in  the  miracle  of  Jericho.  The 
British  trade-union  movement  has  demon- 
strated the  fact  that  organization  of  this  kind 
succeeds  in  just  the  degree  that  it  can  rise 


NEW  TYEANNIES  FOR  OLD 


above  crowd-thinking  and  deal  with  a sug- 
gestion of  concrete  problems  according  to  a 
statesmanlike  policy  of  concerted  action. 

To  be  sure  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
social  reconstruction  in  England  is  seriously 
menaced  by  the  tendency  to  crowd-behavior. 
At  best  it  reveals  hardly  more  than  the  su- 
perior advantage  to  the  whole  community 
of  a slightly  less  degree  of  crowd-behavior; 
but  when  compared  with  the  Socialist  move- 
ment in  Russia,  Germany,  and  the  United 
States,  it  would  seem  that  radicalism  in  Eng- 
land has  at  least  a remote  promise  of  reaching 
a working  solution  of  the  social  problem;  and 
that  is  more  than  can  at  present  be  said  for 
the  others. 

In  the  light  of  what  has  been  said  about  the 
psychology  of  revolution,  I think  we  may 
hazard  an  opinion  about  the  vaunted  “Dic- 
tatorship of  the  Proletariat” — an  idea  that 
has  provided  some  new  catchwords  for  the 
crowd  which  is  fascinated  by  the  soviet  revo- 
lution in  Russia.  Granting  for  the  sake  of 
argument  that  such  a dictatorship  would  be 
desirable  from  any  point  of  view — I do  not 
see  how  the  mere  fact  that  people  work 
proves  their  capacity  to  rule,  horses  also  work 
— would  it  be  possible.?  I think  not.  Even 
the  temporary  rule  of  Lenin  in  Russia  can 
hardly  be  called  a rule  of  the  working  class. 
Bolshevist  propaganda  will  have  it  that  such 

227 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROTO3 


a dictatorship  of  the  working  class  is  posi- 
tively necessary  if  we  are  ever  to  get  away 
from  the  abuses  of  present  “capitalistic  so- 
ciety.” Moreover,  it  is  argued  that  this  dic- 
tatorship of  the  organized  workers  could  not 
be  undemocratic,  for  since  vested  property  is 
to  be  abolished  and  everyone  forced  to  work 
for  his  living,  all  will  belong  to  the  working 
class,  and  therefore  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  is  but  the  dictatorship  of  all. 

In  the  first  place,  assuming  that  it  is  the 
dictatorship  of  all  who  survive  the  revolu- 
tion, this  dictatorship  of  all  over  each  is  not 
liberty  for  anyone;  it  may  leave  not  the 
tiniest  corner  where  one  may  be  permitted  to 
be  master  of  himself.  The  tyranny  of  all 
over  each  is  as  different  from  freedom  as  is 
Pharisaism  from  spiritual  living. 

Again,  what  is  there  to  show  that  this  imag- 
ined dictatorship  of  all  is  to  be  shared  equally 
by  all,  and  if  not  have  we  not  merely  set  up 
a new  privileged  class — the  very  thing  which 
the  Socialist  Talmud  has  always  declared  it  is 
the  mission  of  the  workers  to  destroy  forever? 
While  the  workers  are  still  a counter-crowd, 
struggling  for  power  against  the  present 
ruling  class,  they  are  of  course  held  together 
by  a common  cause — namely,  their  opposition 
to  capital.  But  with  labor’s  triumph,  everj'- 
body  becomes  a worker,  and  there  is  no  one 

longer  to  oppose.  That  which  held  the  vari- 

228 


NEW  TYRANNIES  FOR  OLD 

ous  elements  of  labor  together  in  a common 
crowd  of  revolt  has  now  ceased  to  exist,  “class 
consciousness”  has  therefore  no  longer  any 
meaning.  Labor  itself  has  ceased  to  exist  as 
a class  by  reason  of  its  very  triumph.  What 
then  remains  to  hold  its  various  elements  to- 
gether in  a common  cause?  Nothing  at  all. 
The  solidarity  of  the  workers  vanishes,  when 
the  struggle  which  gave  rise  to  that  solidarity 
ceases.  There  remains  now  nothing  but  the 
humanitarian  principle  of  the  solidarity  of  the 
human  race.  Solidarity  has  ceased  to  be  an 
economic  fact,  and  has  become  purely  “ideo- 
logical.” 

Since  by  hypothesis  everyone  is  a worker, 
the  dictatorship  of  the  workers  is  a dictator- 
ship based  not  on  labor  as  such,  but  upon  a 
universal  human  quality.  It  would  be  quite 
as  truly  a dictatorship  of  everyone  if  based 
upon  any  other  common  human  quality — 
say,  the  fact  that  we  are  all  bipeds,  that  we 
all  have  noses,  or  the  fact  of  the  circulation  of 
the  blood.  As  the  purely  proletarian  charac- 
ter of  this  dictatorship  becomes  meaningless, 
the  crowd-struggle  switches  from  that  of 
labor  as  a whole  against  capital,  to  a series  of 
struggles  within  the  dominant  labor  group 
itself. 

The  experience  of  Russia  has  even  now 
shown  that  if  the  soviets  are  to  save  them- 
selves from  nation-wide  bankruptcy,  specially 

229 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


trained  men  must  be  found  to  take  charge  of 
their  industrial  and  political  activities.  Long 
training  is  necessary  for  the  successful  man- 
agement of  large  affairs,  and  becomes  all  the 
more  indispensable  as  industry,  education, 
and  political  affairs  are  organized  on  a large 
scale.  Are  specially  promising  youths  to  be 
set  apart  from  early  childhood  to  prepare 
themselves  for  these  positions  of  authority.? 
Or  shall  such  places  be  filled  by  those  vigorous 
few  who  have  the  ambition  and  the  strength 
to  acquire  the  necessary  training  while  at  the 
same  time  working  at  their  daily  tasks?  In 
either  case  an  intellectual  class  must  be  de- 
veloped. Does  anyone  imagine  that  this  new 
class  of  rulers  will  hesitate  to  make  use  of 
every  opportunity  to  make  itself  a privileged 
class? 

“But  what  opportunity  can  there  be,”  is 
the  reply,  “since  private  capital  is  to  be 
abolished?”  Very  well,  there  have  been 
ruling  classes  before  in  history  who  did  not 
enjoy  the  privilege  of  owning  private  property. 
The  clergy  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  such  a 
class,  and  their  dominance  was  quite  as 
effective  and  as  enduring  as  is  that  of  our  com- 
mercial classes  today.  But  let  us  not  de- 
ceive ourselves;  in  a soviet  republic  there 
would  be  opportunity  aplenty  for  exploita- 
tion. As  the  solidarity  of  labor  vanished, 
eaeh  important  trade-group  would  enter  into 

230 


NEW  TYRANNIES  FOR  OLD 


rivalry  with  the  others  for  leadership  in  the 
co-operative  commonwealth.  Every  economic 
advantage  which  any  group  possessed  would 
be  used  in  order  to  lord  it  over  the  rest. 

For  instance,  let  us  suppose  that  the 
workers  in  a strategic  industry,  such  as  the 
railways,  or  coal  mines,  should  make  the  dis- 
covery that  by  going  on  a strike  they  could 
starve  the  community  as  a whole  into  sub- 
mission and  gain  practically  anything  they 
might  demand.  Loyalty  to  the  rest  of  labor 
would  act  no  more  as  a check  to  such  ambitions 
than  does  loyalty  to  humanity  in  general  now. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  crowd  is  always  formed 
for  the  unconscious  purpose  of  relaxing  the 
social  control  by  mechanisms  which  mu- 
tually justify  such  antisocial  conduct  on  the 
part  of  members  of  the  crowd.  There  is 
every  reason,  both  economic  and  psycho- 
logical, why  the  workers  in  each  industry 
would  become  organized  crowds  seeking  to 
gain  for  their  particular  groups  the  lion’s 
share  of  the  spoils  of  the  social  revolution. 
What  would  there  be,  then,  to  prevent  the 
workers  of  the  railroads  or  some  other  essen- 
tial industry  from  exploiting  the  community 
quite  as  mercilessly  as  the  capitalists  are  al- 
leged to  do  at  present?  Nothing  but  the 
rivalry  of  other  crowds  who  were  seeking  the 
same  dominance.  In  time  a modus  vivendi 
would  doubtless  be  reached  whereby  social 

231 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


control  would  be  shared  by  a few  of  the 
stronger  unions — and  their  leaders. 

The  strike  has  already  demonstrated  the 
fact  that  in  the  hands  of  a well-organized 
body  of  laborers,  especially  in  those  trades 
where  the  number  of  apprentices  may  be 
controlled,  industrial  power  becomes  a much 
more  effective  weapon  than  it  is  in  the  hands 
of  the  present  capitalistic  owners. 

A new  dictatorship,  therefore,  must  in- 
evitably follow  the  social  revolution,  in  sup- 
port of  which  a favored  minority  will  make  use 
of  the  industrial  power  of  the  community, 
just  as  earlier  privileged  classes  used  military 
power  and  the  power  of  private  property. 
And  this  new  dominance  would  be  just  as 
predatory,  and  would  justify  itself,  as  did  the 
others,  by  the  platitudes  of  crowd-thinking. 
The  so-called  dictatorship  turns  out,  on 
examination,  to  be  the  dictatorship  of  one 
section  of  the  proletariat  over  the  rest  of  it. 
The  dream  of  social  redemption  by  such 
means  is  a pure  crowd-idea. 


IX 

FREEDOM  AND  GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 

The  whole  philosophy  of  politics  comes 
down  at  last  to  a question  of  four  words^ 
Who  is  to  govern?  Compared  with  this  ques-i'" 
tidiT^e  problem  of  the  form  of  government 
is  relatively  unimportant.  Crowd-men,  what- 
ever political  faith  they  profess,  behave  much 
the  same  when  they  are  in  power.  The  par- 
ticular forms  of  political  organization  through 
which  their  power  is  exerted  are  mere  inci- 
dentals. There  is  the  same  self -laudation, 
the  same  tawdry  array  of  abstract  principles, 
the  same  exploitation  of  under  crowds,  the 
same  cunning  in  keeping  up  appearances,  the 
same  preference  of  the  charlatan  for  positions 
of  leadership  and  authority.  Machiavelli’s 
Prince,  or  Dostoievsky’s  Grand  Inquisitor, 
would  serve  just  as  well  as  the  model  for  the 
guidance  of  a Csesar  Borgia,  a leader  of 
Tammany  Hall,  a chairman  of  the  National 
Committee  of  a political  party,  or  a Nicolai 
Lenin. 

Ever  since  the  days  of  Rousseau  certain 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

crowds  have  persisted  in  the  conviction  that 
all  tyrannies  were  foisted  upon  an  innocent 
humanity  by  a designing  few.  There  may 
have  been  a few  instances  in  history  where 
such  was  the  case,  but  tyrannies  of  that  kind 
have  never  lasted  long.  For  the  most  part 
the  tyrant  is  merely  the  instrument  and  official 
symbol  of  a dominant  crowd.  His  acts  are 
his  crowd’s  acts,  and  without  his  crowd  to 
support  him  he  very  soon  goes  the  way  of  the 
late  Sultan  of  Turkey.  The  Caesars  w’ere 
hardly  more  than  “walking  delegates,”  repre- 
senting the  ancient  Roman  Soldiers’  soviet. 
They  w^ere  made  and  unmade  by  the  army 
which,  though  Caesars  might  come  and  Caesars 
might  go,  continued  to  lord  it  over  the  Roman 
world.  TVTiile  the  army  was  pagan,  even  the 
mild  Marcus  Aurelius  followed  Nero’s  example 
of  killing  Christians.  WTien  finally  the  army 
itself  became  largely  Christian,  and  the  fiction 
that  the  Christians  drank  human  blood, 
worshiped  the  head  of  an  ass,  and  were 
sexually  promiscuous  was  no  longer  good 
patriotic  propaganda,  the  Emperor  Con- 
stantine began  to  see  visions  of  the  Cross  in 
the  sky.  The  Pope,  who  is  doubtless  the 
most  absolute  monarch  in  the  Occident,  is, 
however,  “infallible”  only  when  he  speaks 
ex-cathedra — that  is,  as  the  “Church  Herself.” 
His  infallibility  is  that  of  the  Church.  All 
crowds  in  one  way  or  another  claim  infal- 

2S4 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 

libility.  The  tyrant  Robespierre  survived 
only  so  long  as  did  his  particular  revolutionary 
crowd  in  France. 

The  fate  of  Savonarola  was  similar.  From 
his  pulpit  he  could  rule  Florence  with  absolute 
power  just  so  long  as  he  told  his  crowd  what 
it  wished  to  hear,  and  so  long  as  his  crowd  was 
able  to  keep  itself  together  and  remain  domi- 
nant. The  Stuarts,  Hohenzollerns,  Haps- 
burgs,  and  Romanoffs,  with  all  their  claims  to 
divine  rights,  were  little  more  than  the  living 
symbols  of  their  respective  nation-crowds. 
They  vanished  when  they  ceased  to  represent 
successfully  the  crowd-will. 

In  general,  then,  it  may  be  said  that  where 
Jjw  crowd  is,  there  is  tyranny.  Tyranny  may 
b^  exercised  through  one  agenkhortl^ugh 
mahyj^RuFdt  nearly  always  cornes  from  the 
same  source — the  crowd.  Crowd-rule  may 
exist  in  a monarchical  form  of  government,  or 
in  a republic.  The  personnel  of  the  dominant 
crowd  will  vary  with  a change  in  the  form  of 
the  state,  but  the  spirit  will  be  much  the  same. 
Conservative  writers  are  in  the  habit  of  as- 
suming that  democracy  is  the  rule  of  crowds 
pure  and  simple.  Whether  crowd-govern- 
ment is  more  absolute  in  a democracy  than 
in  differently  constituted  states  is  a question. 
The  aim  of  democratic  constitutions  like  our 
own  is  to  prevent  any  special  crowd  from  in- 
trenching itself  in  a position  of  social  control 

235 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


and  thus  becoming  a ruling  class.  As  the 
experiment  has  worked  out  thus  far  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  it  has  freed  us  from  the 
rule  of  crowds.  It  has,  however,  multiplied 
the  number  of  mutually  suspicious  crowds,  so 
that  no  one  of  them  has  for  long  enjoyed  a 
sufficiently  great  majority  to  make  itself 
clearly  supreme,  though  it  must  be  admitted 
that  up  to  the  present  the  business-man  crowd 
has  had  the  best  of  the  deal.  The  story  of 
the  recent  Eighteenth  Amendment  shows  how 
easy  it  is  for  a determined  crowd,  even  though 
in  a minority,  to  force  its  favorite  dogmas 
upon  the  whole  community.  We  shall  doubt- 
less see  a great  deal  more  of  this  sort  of  thing 
in  the  future  than  we  have  in  the  past.  And 
if  the  various  labor  groups  should  become 
sufficiently  united  in  a “proletarian”  crowd 
there  is  nothing  to  prevent  their  going  to  any 
extreme. 

We  are  passing  through  a period  of  so- 
cialization. All  signs  point  to  the  establish- 
ment of  some  sort  of  social  state  or  industrial 
commonwealth.  No  one  can  foresee  the  ex- 
tent" to  which  capital  now  privately  owned  is 
to  be  transferred  to  the  public.  It  is  doubt- 
ful if  anything  can  be  done  to  check  this 
process.  The  tendency  is  no  sooner  blocked 
along  one  channel  than  it  begins  to  seep 
through  another.  In  itself  there  need  be 
nothing  alarming  about  this  transition.  If 

236 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


industry  could  be  better  co-ordinated  and 
more  wisely  administered  by  non-crowd  men 
for  the  common  good,  the  change  might  work 
out  to  our  national  advantage. 

It  is  possible  to  conceive  of  a society  in 
which  a high  degree  of  social  democracy,  even 
communism,  might  exist  along  with  a maxi- 
mum of  freedom  and  practical  achievement. 
But  we  should  first  have  to  get  over  our 
crowd-ways  of  thinking  and  acting.  Peo- 
ple would  have  to  regard  the  state  as  a 
purely  administrative  affair.  They  would 
have  to  organize  for  definite  practical  ends, 
and  select  their  leaders  and  administrators 
very  much  as  certain  corporations  now  do, 
strictly  on  the  basis  of  their  competency. 
Political  institutions  would  have  to  be  made 
such  that  they  could  not  be  seized  by  special 
groups  to  enhance  themselves  at  the  expense 
of  the  rest.  Partisanship  would  have  to 
cease.  Every  effort  would  have  to  be  made 
to  loosen  the  social  control  over  the  individ- 
ual’s personal  habits.  The  kind  of  people 
who  have  an  inner  gnawing  to  regulate  their 
neighbors,  the  kind  who  cannot  accept  the 
fact  of  their  psychic  inferiority  and  must 
consequently  make  crowds  by  way  of  com- 
pensation, would  have  to  be  content  to  mind 
their  own  business.  Police  power  would  have 
to  be  reduced  to  the  minimum  necessary  to 
protect  life  and  keep  the  industries  running 

237 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


People  would  have  to  become  much  more 
capable  of  self-direction  as  well  as  of  voluntary 
co-operation  than  they  are  now.  They  would 
have  to  be  more  resentful  of  petty  oflBcial 
tyranny,  more  independent  in  their  judgments 
and  at  the  same  time  more  willing  to  accept 
the  advice  and  authority  of  experts.  They 
would  have  to  place  the  control  of  affairs  in 
the  hands  of  the  type  of  man  against  whose 
dominance  the  weaker  brethren  have  in  all 
ages  waged  war — that  is,  the  free  spirits  and 
natural  masters  of  men.  All  pet  dogmas  and 
cult  ideas  that  clashed  with  practical  consid- 
erations would  have  to  be  swept  away. 

Such  a conception  of  society  is,  of  course, 
wholly  utopian.  It  could  not  possibly  be 
realized  by  people  behaving  and  thinking  as 
crowds.  With  our  present  crowd-making  hab- 
its, the  process  of  greater  socialization  of 
industry  means  only  increased  opportunities 
for  crowd-tyranny.  In  the  hands  of  a dom- 
inant crowd  an  industrial  state  would  be 
indeed  what  Herbert  Spencer  called  the 
“coming  slavery.” 

As  it  is,  the  state  has  become  overgrown  and 
bureaucratic.  Commissions  of  all  sorts  are 
being  multiplied  year  by  year.  Public  debts 
are  piled  up  till  they  approach  the  point  of 
bankruptcy.  Taxes  are  increasing  in  the 
same  degree.  Statutes  are  increased  in  num- 
ber until  one  can  hardly  breathe  without 

238 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 

violating  some  decree,  ordinance,  or  bit  of 
sumptuary  legislation.  Every  legislative  as- 
sembly is  constantly  besieged  by  the  pro- 
fessional lobbyists  of  a swarm  of  reformist 
crowds.  Busybodies  of  every  description 
twist  the  making  and  the  enforcement  of  law 
into  conformity  with  their  peculiar  preju- 
dices. Censorships  of  various  kinds  are  grow- 
ing in  number  and  effrontery.  Prohibition  is 
insincerely  put  forth  as  a war  measure. 
Ignorant  societies  for  the  “suppression  of 
vice”  maul  over  our  literature  and  our  art. 
Parents  of  already  more  children  than  they 
can  support  may  not  be  permitted  lawfully 
to  possess  scientific  knowledge  of  the  means  of 
the  prevention  of  conception.  The  govern- 
ment, both  state  and  national,  takes  advan- 
tage of  the  war  for  freedom  to  pass  again 
the  hated  sort  of  “alien  and  sedition”  laws 
from  which  the  country  thought  it  had  freed 
itself  a century  ago.  A host  of  secret  agents 
and  volunteer  “guardians  of  public  safety” 
are  ready  to  place  every  citizen  under  sus- 
picion of  disloyalty  to  the  government.  Any 
advocacy  of  significant  change  in  established 
political  practices  is  regarded  as  sedition. 
An  inquisition  is  set  up  for  the  purpose  of 
inquiring  into  people’s  private  political  opin- 
ions. Reputable  citizens  are,  on  the  flimsiest 
hearsay  evidence  or  rumor  that  they  entertain 
nonconformist  views,  subjected  to  public  cen- 

239 


THE  BEHAWOR  OF  CROTOS 

sure  by  notoriety-seeking  “investigation  com- 
missions”— and  by  an  irresponsible  press. 
Only  members  of  an  established  political 
party  in  good  standing  are  permitted  to  criti- 
cize the  acts  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  Newspapers  and  magazines  are  sup- 
pressed and  denied  the  privilege  of  the  mails 
at  the  whim  of  opinionated  post-office  officers 
or  of  ignorant  employees  of  the  Department 
of  Justice.  An  intensely  patriotic  weekly  paper 
in  New  York,  which  happened  to  hold  uncon- 
ventional views  on  the  subject  of  religion,  has 
had  certain  issues  of  its  paper  suppressed  for 
the  offense  of  publishing  accounts  of  the  alleged 
misconduct  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A. 

The  stupidity  and  irresponsibility  of  the 
Russian  spy-system  which  has  grown  up  in 
this  country  along  with  our  overweening 
state  is  illustrated  by  an  amusing  little  ex- 
perience which  happened  to  myself  several 
months  after  the  signing  of  the  armistice  with 
Germany.  All  through  the  trying  months 
of  the  war  the  great  audience  at  Cooper 
Union  had  followed  me  with  a loyalty  and 
tolerance  which  was  truly  wonderful.  Though 
I knew  that  many  had  not  always  been  in 
hearty  accord  with  my  rather  spontaneous  and 
outspoken  Americanism,  the  Cooper  Union 
Forum  was  one  of  the  few  places  in  America 
where  foreign  and  labor  elements  were  present 
in  large  numbers  in  which  there  was  no  out- 

240 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


break  or  demonstration  of  any  kind  which 
could  possibly  be  interpreted  as  un-American, 
We  all  felt  that  perhaps  the  People’s  Institute 
with  its  record  of  twenty  years’  work  behind 
it  had  been  of  some  real  service  to  the  nation 
in  adhering  strictly  to  its  educational  method 
and  keeping  its  discussions  wholly  above  the 
level  of  any  sort  of  crowd-propaganda. 

However,  in  the  course  of  our  educational 
work,  it  became  my  task  to  give  to  a selected 
group  of  advanced  students  a course  of  lec- 
tures upon  the  Theory  of  Knowledge.  The 
course  was  announced  with  the  title,  “How 
Free  Men  Think,”  and  the  little  folder  con- 
tained the  statement  that  it  was  to  be  a 
study  of  the  Humanist  logic,  with  Professor 
F.  C.  S.  Schiller’s  philosophical  writings  to  be 
used  as  textbooks.  The  publication  of  this 
folder  announcing  the  course  was  held  up  by 
the  printer,  and  we  learned  that  he  had  been 
told  not  to  print  it  by  some  official  personage 
whose  identity  was  not  revealed.  Notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  Schiller  is  professor  of 
philosophy  in  Corpus  Christi  College,  Oxford, 
and  is  one  of  the  best-known  philosophical 
writers  in  the  English-speaking  world,  and 
holds  views  practically  identical  with  what  is 
called  the  “American  School,”  led  by  the  late 
William  James,  it  developed  that  the  govern- 
ment agents — or  whoever  they  were — ob- 
jected to  the  publication  of  the  announcement 

241 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


on  the  ground  that  they  thought  Schiller  was 
a German.  Such  is  our  intellectual  freedom 
regarding  matters  which  have  no  political 
significance  whatever,  in  a world  made  “safe 
for  democracy.”  But  we  must  not  permit 
ourselves  to  despair  or  grow  weary  of  life  in 
this  “safety  first”  world — waves  of  pseudo- 
patriotic  panic  often  follow  on  the  heels  of 
easily  won  victory.  Crowd-phenomena  of 
such  intensity  are  usually  of  short  duration, 
as  these  very  excesses  soon  produce  the 
inevitable  reaction. 

The  question,  however,  arises,  is  democracy 
more  conducive  to  freedom  than  other  forms 
of  political  organization?  To  most  minds 
the  terms  “liberty”  and  “democracy”  are 
almost  synonymous.  Those  who  consider 
that  liberty  consists  in  having  a vote,  m giving 
everyone  a voice  regardless  of  whether  he  has 
anything  to  say,  will  have  no  doubts  in  the 
matter.  But  to  those  whose  thinking  means 
more  than  the  mere  repetition  of  eighteenth- 
century  crowd-ideas,  the  question  will  reduce 
itself  to  this:  Is  democracy  more  conducive 
to  crowd-behavior  than  other  forms  of  govern- 
ment? Le  Bon  and  those  who  identify  the 
crowd  with  the  masses  would  answer  with  an 
a 'priori  affirmative.  I do  not  believe  the 
question  may  be  answered  in  any  such  off- 
hand manner.  It  is  a question  of  fact  rather 

than  of  theory.  Theoretically,  since  we  have 

212 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


demonstrated  I think  that  the  crowd  is  not 
the  common  people  as  such,  but  is  a peculiar 
form  of  psychic  behavior,  it  would  seem  that 
there  is  no  logical  necessity  for  holding  that 
democracy  must  always  and  everywhere  be 
the  rule  of  the  mob.  And  we  have  seen  that 
other  forms  of  society  may  also  suffer  from 
crowd-rule.  I suspect  that  the  repugnance 
which  certain  aristocratic,  and  bourgeois 
writers  also,  show  for  democracy  is  less  the 
horror  of  crowd-rule  as  such,  than  dislike  of 
seeing  control  pass  over  to  a crowd  other  than 
their  own.  Theoretically  at  least,  democracy 
calls  for  a maximum  of  self-government  and 
personal  freedom.  The  fact  that  democracy 
is  rapidly  degenerating  into  tyranny  of  all 
over  each  may  be  due,  not  to  the  democratic 
ideal  itself,  but  the  growing  tendency  to  crowd- 
behavior  in  modern  times.  It  may  be  that 
certain  democratic  ideals  are  not  so  much 
causes  as  effects  of  crowd-thinking  and  action. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  such  ideals  come  in 
very  handy  these  days  in  the  way  of  furnishing 
crowds  with  effective  catchwords  for  their 
propaganda  and  of  providing  them  with 
ready-made  justifications  for  their  will  to 
power.  I should  say  that  democracy  has  in- 
directly 'permitted,  rather  than  directly  caused, 
an  extension  in  the  range  of  thought  and  be- 
havior over  which  the  crowd  assumes  dictator- 
ship. 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

In  comparing  democracy  with  more  auto- 
cratic forms  of  government,  this  extent  or 
range  of  crowd-control  over  the  individual  is 
important.  Of  course,  human  beings  will 
never  permit  to  one  another  a very  large 
degree  of  personal  freedom.  It  is  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  everyone  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence to  reduce  his  neighbors  as  much  as 
possible  to  automatons.  In  this  way  one’s 
own  adjustment  to  the  behavior  of  others  is 
made  easier.  If  we  can  induce  or  compel  all 
about  us  to  confine  their  actions  to  perfect 
routine,  then  we  may  predict  with  a fair  de- 
gree of  accuracy  their  future  behavior,  and 
be  prepared  in  advance  to  meet  it.  We  all 
dread  the  element  of  the  unexpected,  and  no- 
where so  much  as  in  the  conduct  of  our 
neighbors.  If  we  could  only  get  rid  of  the 
humanly  unexpected,  society  would  be  almost 
fool  - proof.  Hence  the  resistance  to  new 
truths,  social  change,  progress,  nonconformity 
of  any  sort;  hence  our  orthodoxies  and  con- 
ventions; hence  our  incessant  preaching  to 
our  neighbors  to  “be  good”;  hence  the 
fanaticism  with  which  every  crowd  strives  to 
keep  its  believers  in  line.  Much  of  this  in- 
sistence on  regularity  is  positively  necessary. 
Without  it  there  could  be  no  social  or  moral 
order  at  all.  It  is  in  fact  the  source  and 
security  of  the  accepted  values  of  civilization, 
as  Schiller  has  shown. 

244 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


But  process  of  keeping  on^  another  in 
line  is  carried  much  farther  than  is  necessary 
to  preserve  the  social  order.  It  is  insisted 
upon  to  the  extent  that  will  guarantee*  the 
survival,  even  the  dominance,  of  the  spirit- 
ually sick,  the  morally  timid,  the  trained- 
animal  men,  those  who  would  revert  to 
savagery,  or  stand  utterly  helpless  the  moment 
a new  situation  demanded  that  they  do  some 
original  thinking  in  the  place  of  performing 
the  few  stereotyped  tricks  which  they  have 
acquired;  the  dog-in-the-manger  people,  who 
because  they  can  eat  no  meat  insist  that  all 
play  the  dyspeptic  lest  the  well-fed  out- 
distance them  in  the  race  of  life  or  set  them 
an  example  in  following  which  they  get  the 
stomach  ache;  the  people  who,  because  they 
cannot  pass  a saloon  door  without  going  in 
and  getting  drunk,  cannot  see  a moving- 
picture,  or  read  a modern  book,  or  visit  a 
bathing  beach  without  being  tormented  with 
their  gnawing  promiscuous  eroticism,  insist 
upon  setting  up  their  own  perverted  dilemmas 
as  the  moral  standard  for  everybody. 

Such  people  exist  in  great  numbers  in  every 
society.  They  are  always  strong  for  “broth- 
erly love,”  for  keeping  up  appearances,  for 
removing  temptation  from  the  path  of  life, 
for  uniform  standards  of  belief  and  conduct. 
Each  crowd,  in  its  desire  to  become  the  ma- 
jority, to  hold  the  weaker  brethren  within  its 

245 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


fold,  and  especially  as  everyone  of  us  has  a 
certain  amount  of  this  “little  brother”  weak- 
ness in  his  own  nature,  which  longs  to  be 
pampered  if  only  the  pampering  can  be  done 
without  hurting  our  pride — the  crowd  invari- 
ably plays  to  this  sort  of  thing  and  bids  for 
its  support.  As  the  little  brother  always  ex- 
presses his  survival-values  in  terms  of  ac- 
cepted crowd-ideas,  no  crowd  can  really  turn 
him  down  without  repudiating  its  abstract 
principles.  In  fact,  it  is  just  this  weakness  in 
our  nature  which,  as  we  have  seen,  leads  us  to 
become  crowd-men  in  the  first  place.  Fur- 
thermore, we  have  seen  that  any  assertion  of 
personal  independence  is  resented  by  the 
crowd  because  it  weakens  the  crowd-faith  of 
all. 

The  measure  of  freedom  gTanted  to  men 
will  depend,  therefore,  upon  how  many  things 
the  crowd  attempts  to  consider  its  business. 
There  is  a law  of  inertia  at  work  here.  In 
monarchical  forms  of  government,  where  the 
crowd-will  is  exercised  through  a single  human 
agent,  the  monarch  may  be  absolute  in  re- 
gard to  certain  things  which  are  necessary  to 
his  own  and  his  crowd’s  survival.  In  such 
matters  “he  can  do  no  wrong”;  there  is  little 
or  no  appeal  from  his  decisions.  But  the  very 
thoroughness  with  which  he  hunts  down  non- 
conformity in  matters  which  directly  concern 
his  authority,  leaves  him  little  energy’  for  other 

246 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


things.  Arbitrary  power  is  therefore  usually 
limited  to  relatively  few  things,  since  the 
autocrat  cannot  busy  himself  with  everything 
that  is  going  on.  Within  the  radius  of  the 
things  which  the  monarch  attempts  to  regulate 
he  may  be  an  intolerable  tyrant,  but  so  long 
as  he  is  obeyed  in  these  matters,  so  long  as 
things  run  on  smoothly  on  the  surface,  there 
are  all  sorts  of  things  which  he  would  prefer 
not  to  have  brought  to  his  attention,  as  wit- 
ness, for  instance,  the  letter  of  Trajan  to  the 
younger  Pliny. 

With  a democracy  it  is  different.  While 
the  exercise  of  authority  is  never  so  inexo- 
rable— indeed  democratic  states  frequently 
pass  laws  for  the  purpose  of  placing  the  com- 
munity on  record  “for  righteousness,”  rather 
than  with  the  intention  of  enforcing  such 
laws — the  number  of  things  which  a democracy 
will  presume  to  regulate  is  vastly  greater  than 
in  monarchical  states.  As  sovereignty  is  uni- 
versal, everybody  becomes  lawmaker  and 
regulator  of  his  neighbors.  As  the  lawmaking 
power  is  present  everywhere,  nothing  can 
escape  its  multieyed  scrutiny.  All  sorts  of 
foibles,  sectional  interests,  group  demands, 
class  prejudices  become  part  of  the  law  of  the 
land.  A democracy  is  no  respecter  of  per- 
sons and  can,  under  its  dogma  of  equality 
before  the  law,  admit  of  no  exceptions.  The 
whole  body  politic  is  weighed  down  with  all 

247 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROTOS 


the  several  bits  of  legislation  which  may  be 
demanded  by  any  of  the  various  groups  within 
it.  An  unusual  inducement  and  opportunity 
are  thus  provided  for  every  crowd  to  force  its 
own  crowd-dilemmas  upon  all. 

The  majority  not  only  usurps  the  place  of 
the  king,  but  it  tends  to  subject  the  whole 
range  of  human  thought  and  behavior  to  its 
authority — everything,  in  fact,  that  anyone, 
disliking  in  his  neighbors  or  finding  himself 
tempted  to  do,  may  wish  to  “pass  a law 
against.”  Every  personal  habit  and  private 
opinion  becomes  a matter  for  public  concern. 
Custom  no  longer  regulates ; all  is  rationalized 
according  to  the  logic  of  the  crowd-mind. 
Public  policy  sits  on  the  doorstep  of  every 
man’s  personal  conscience.  The  citizen  in  us 
eats  up  the  man.  Not  the  tiniest  personal 
comfort  may  yet  be  left  us  in  private  enjoy- 
ment. All  that  cannot  be  translated  into 
propaganda  or  hold  its  own  in  a legislative 
lobby  succumbs.  If  we  are  to  preserve  any- 
thing of  our  personal  independence,  we  must 
organize  ourselves  into  a crowd  like  the  rest 
and  get  out  in  the  streets  and  set  up  a public 
howl.  Unless  some  one  pretty  soon  starts  a pro- 
tobacco crusade  and  proves  to  the  newspaper- 
reading public  that  the  use  of  nicotine  by 
everybody  in  equal  amount  is  absolutely  nec- 
essary for  the  preservation  of  the  American 
home,  for  economic  efficiency  and  future  mili- 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


tary  supremacy,  we  shall  doubtless  all  soon  be 
obliged  to  sneak  down  into  the  cellar  and 
smoke  our  pipes  in  the  dark. 

Here  we  see  the  true  argument  for  a written 
constitution,  and  also,  I think,  a psychological 
principle  which  helps  us  to  decide  what  should 
be  in  a constitution  and  what  should  not.  The 
aim  of  a constitution  is  to  put  a limit  to  the 
number  of  things  concerning  which  a majority- 
crowd  may  lord  it  over  the  individual.  I am 
aware  that  the  appeal  to  the  Constitution  is 
often  abused  by  predatory  interests  which 
skulk  behind  its  phraseology  in  their  defense 
of  special  economic  privilege.  But,  neverthe- 
less, people  in  a democracy  may  be  free  only 
so  long  as  they  submit  to  the  dictation  of  the 
majority  in  justmid^onlu  those  few  interests  con- 
cerning which  a monarch,  were  he  in  existence;, 
would  take  advantage  of  them  for  his  personal 
ends.  There  are  certain  political  and  economic 
relations  which  cannot  be  left  to  the  chance 
exploitation  of  any  individual  or  group  that 
happens  to  come  along.  Some  one  is  sure  to 
come  along,  for  you  may  be  sure  that  if  there 
is  a possible  opportunity  to  take  advantage, 
some  one  will  do  it  sooner  or  later. 

Now  because  people  have  discovered  that 
there  is  no  possible  individual  freedom  in  re- 
spect to  certain  definite  phases  of  their  com- 
mon life  which  are  always  exposed  to  seizure 
by  exploiters,  democrats  have  substituted  a 

17  249 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


tyranny  of  the  majority  for  the  tyranny  of 
the  one  or  the  favored  few  which  would  other- 
wise be  erected  at  these  points.  Since  it  is 
necessary  to  give  up  freedom  in  these  regions 
anyway,  there  is  some  compensation  in  spread- 
ing the  tyrannizing  around  so  that  each  gets  a 
little  share  of  it.  But  every  effort  should  be 
mside^Xo^limit  the  tyranny . of  the  majority  to 
j fust  these  points.  And  the  line  limiting  the 
I number  of  things  that  the  majority  may  med- 
. die  with  must  be  drawn  as  hard  and  fast  as 
possible,  since  every  dominant  crowd,  as  we 
have  seen,  will  squeeze  the  life  out  of  every- 
thing human  it  can  get  its  hands  on.  The 
minute  a majority  finds  that  it  can  extend  its 
tyranny  beyond  this  strictly  constitutionally 
limited  sphere,  nothing  remains  to  stop  it;  it 
becomes  worse  than  an  autocracy.  Tyranny 
is  no  less  abhorrent  just  because  the  number 
of  tyrants  is  increased.  A nation  composed  of 
a hundred  million  little  tyrants  snooping  and 
prying  into  every  corner  may  be  democratic, 
but,  personally,  if  that  ever  comes  to  be  the 
choice  I think  I should  prefer  one  tyrant.  He 
might  occasionally  look  the  other  way  and 
leave  me  a free  man,  long  enough  at  least  for 
me  to  light  my  pipe. 

True  democrats  will  be  very  jealous  of  gov- 
ernment. Necessary  as  it  is,  there  is  no  magic 
about  government,  no  saving  grace.  Govern- 
ment cannot  redeem  us  from  our  sins;  it  will 

230 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


always  require  all  the  decency  we  possess  to 
redeem  the  government.  Government  always 
represents  the  moral  dilemmas  of  the  worst 
people^  not  the  best.  It  cannot  give  us  free- 
dom ; it  can  give  or  grant  us  nothing  but  what 
it  first  takes  from  us.  It  is  we  who  grant  to 
the  government  certain  powers  and  privileges 
necessary  for  its  proper  functioning.  We  do 
not  exist  for  the  government;  it  exists  for  us. 
We  are  not  its  servants;  it  is  our  servant. 
Government  at  best  is  a useful  and  necessary 
machine,  a mechanism  by  which  we  protect 
ourselves  from  one  another.  It  has  no  more 
rights  and  dignities  of  its  own  than  are  pos- 
sessed by  any  other  machine.  Its  laws  should 
be  obeyed,  for  the  same  reason  that  the  laws 
of  mechanics  should  be  obeyed — otherwise  the 
machine  will  not  run. 

As  a matter  of  fact  it  is  not  so  much  gov- 
ernment itself  against  which  the  democrat 
must  be  on  guard,  but  the  various  crowds 
which  are  always  seeking  to  make  use  of 
the  machinery  of  government  in  order  to 
impose  their  peculiar  tyranny  upon  all  and 
invade  the  privacy  of  everyone.  By  wid- 
ening the  radius  of  governmental  control, 
the  crowd  thus  pinches  down  the  individ- 
uality of  everyone  with  the  same  restrictions 
as  are  imposed  by  the  crowd  upon  its  own 
members. 

Conway  says: 


251 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Present-day  Democracy  rests  on  a few  organized 
parties.  What  would  a democracy  be  like  if  based  on 
millions  of  independent  Joneses  each  of  whom  decided 
to  vote  this  or  that  way  as  he  pleased?  The  dominion 
of  the  crowd  would  be  at  an  end,  both  for  better  and  for 
worse.  We  shall  not  behold  any  such  revolution  in  the 
world  as  we  know  it.  . . . 

Thus  we  must  conclude  that  the  crowd  by  its  very 
nature  tends,  and  always  must  tend,  to  diminish  (if 
possible,  to  the  vanishing  point)  the  freedom  of  its 
members,  and  not  in  one  or  two  respects  alone,  but  in 
all.  The  crowd’s  desire  is  to  swallow  up  the  individu- 
ality of  its  members  and  reduce  them  one  and  aU  to 
the  condition  of  crowd  units  whose  whole  life  is  lived 
according  to  the  crowd-pattern  and  is  sacrificed  and 
devoted  to  crowd-interests.  . . . 

An  excellent  illustration  of  this  crowd -dominance 
crops  up  in  my  afternoon  paper.  ...  It  appears  that  in 
certain  parts  of  the  country  artisans,  by  drinking  too 
much  alcohol,  are  reducing  their  capacity  of  doing 
their  proper  work,  which  happens  at  the  moment  to  be 
of  great  importance  to  the  country  at  war.  Many 
interferences  with  liberty  are  permitted  in  war  time 
by  general  consent.  It  is  accordingly  proposed  to 
put  difficulties  in  the  way  of  these  drinkers  by  execu- 
tive orders.  One  would  suppose  that  the  just  way  to 
do  this  would  be  to  make  a list  of  the  drinkers  and  pro- 
hibit their  indulgence.  But  this  is  not  the  way  the 
crowd  works.  To  it  everyone  of  its  constituent 
members  is  like  another,  and  all  must  be  drilled  and 
controlled  alike.  . . . Whatever  measure  is  adopted  must 
fall  evenly  on  all  classes,  upon  club,  restaurant  and 
hotel  as  upon  public  house.  Could  anjdhing  be  more 
absurd?  Lest  a gimmaker  or  a shipbuilder  in  Glasgow 
should  drink  too  much,  jMr.  Asquith  must  not  take  a 
glass  of  sherry  with  his  lunch  at  the  Athenaeum!  . . . 

252 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


We  live  in  days  when  crowd  dominion  over  individ- 
uals has  been  advancing  at  a headlong  pace.  ...  If  he 
is  not  to  drink  in  London  lest  a Glasgow  engineer 
should  get  drunk,  why  should  not  his  eating  be  alike 
limited.^  Why  not  the  style  and  cut  of  his  clothes.? 
Why  not  the  size  and  character  of  his  house?  He  must 
cause  his  children  to  be  taught  at  least  the  minimum 
of  muddled  information  which  the  government  calls 
education.  He  must  insure  for  his  dependents  the 
attention  of  an  all-educated  physician,  and  the  ad- 
ministration of  drugs  known  to  be  useless.  If  the 
crowd  had  its  way  every  mother  and  infant  would  be 
under  the  orders  of  inspectors,  regardless  of  the  capac- 
ity of  the  parent.  We  should  all  be  ordered  about  in 
every  relation  of  life  from  infancy  to  manhood.  . . . 
Freedom  would  utterly  vanish,  and  this,  not  because 
the  crowd  can  arrange  things  better  than  the  individual. 
It  cannot.  It  lacks  the  individual’s  brains.  The  ulti- 
mate reason  for  all  this  interference  is  the  crowd’s  desire 
to  swallow  up  and  control  the  unit.  The  instinct  of  all 
crowds  is  to  dominate,  to  capture  and^verwhelm  the 
individual,  to  make  him  their  slave,  to  absorb  all  his 
life  for  their  service. 


The  criticism  has  often  been  made  of 
democracy  that  it  permits  too  much  freedom ; 
the  reverse  of  this  is  nearer  the  truth.  It  was 
de  Tocqueville,  I think,  who  first  called  atten- 
tion to  the  “tyranny  of  the  majority”  in 
democratic  America.  Probably  one  of  the 
most  comprehensive  and  discriminating 
studies  that  have  ever  been  made  of  the  habits 
and  institutions  of  any  nation  may  be  found 
in  the  work  of  this  observing  young  French- 

233 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


man  who  visited  our  country  at  the  close  of 
its  first  half  century  of  political  independence. 
De  Tocqueville’s  account  of  Democracy  in 
America  is  still  good  reading,  much  of  it  being 
applicable  to  the  present.  This  writer  was  in 
no  sense  an  unfriendly  critic.  He  praised 
much  that  he  saw,  but  even  in  those  days 
(the  period  of  1830)  he  was  not  taken  in  by 
the  fiction  that,  because  the  American  people 
live  under  laws  of  their  own  making,  they  are 
therefore  free.  Much  of  the  following  pas- 
sages taken  here  and  there  from  Chapters 
XIV  and  XV  is  as  true  today  as  it  was  when 
it  was  written: 

America  is  therefore  a free  coimtry  in  which,  lest 
anybody  be  hurt  by  your  remarks,  you  are  not  allowed 
to  speak  freely  of  private  individuals,  of  the  State,  or 
the  citizens,  or  the  authorities,  of  public  or  private 
undertakings,  in  short  of  anything  at  all,  except  per- 
haps the  climate  and  the  soil,  and  even  then  Americans 
will  be  found  ready  to  defend  both  as  if  they  had  con- 
curred in  producing  them. 

The  American  submits  without  a murmur  to  the 
authority  of  the  pettiest  magistrate.  This  truth  pre- 
vails even  in  the  trivial  details  of  national  hfe.  An 
American  cannot  converse — he  speaks  to  you  as  if  he 
were  addressing  a meeting.  If  an  American  were 
condemned  to  confine  himself  to  his  own  affairs,  he 
would  be  robbed  of  one-half  of  his  existence;  his 
wretchedness  would  be  unbearable.  . . . 

The  moral  authority  of  the  majority  in  America  is 
based  on  the  notion  that  there  is  more  intelligence  and 
wisdom  in  a number  of  men  united  than  in  a single 

254 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


individual.  . . . The  theory  of  equality  is  thus  applied 
to  the  intellects  of  men. 

The  French,  under  the  old  regime,  held  it  for  a maxim 
that  the  King  could  do  no  wrong.  The  Americans 
entertain  the  same  opinion  with  regard  to  the  majority. 

In  the  United  States,  all  parties  are  willing  to  recog- 
nize the  rights  of  the  majority,  because  they  all  hope 
at  some  time  to  be  able  to  exercise  them  to  their  own 
advantage.  The  majority  therefore  in  that  country 
exercises  a prodigious  actual  authority  and  a power  of 
opinion  which  is  nearly  as  great  (as  that  of  the  absolute 
autocrat).  No  obstacles  exist  which  can  impair  or 
even  retard  its  progress  so  as  to  make  it  heed  the  com- 
plaints of  those  whom  it  crushes  upon  its  path.  This 
state  of  things  is  harmful  in  itself  and  dangerous  for 
the  future. 

As  the  majority  is  the  only  power  which  it  is  impor- 
tant to  court,  all  its  projects  are  taken  up  with  the 
greatest  ardor;  but  no  sooner  is  its  attention  distracted 
than  all  this  ardor  ceases. 

There  is  no  power  on  earth  so  worthy  of  honor  in 
itself,  or  clothed  with  rights  so  sacred,  that  I would 
admit  its  uncontrolled  and  aU-predominant  authority. 

In  my  opinion  the  main  evil  of  the  present  democratic 
institutions  of  the  United  States  does  not  arise,  as  is 
so  often  asserted  in  Europe,  from  their  weakness,  but 
from  their  irresistible  strength.  ...  I am  not  so  much 
alarmed  by  the  excessive  liberty  which  reigns  in  that 
country,  as  by  the  inadequate  securities  which  one  finds 
against  tyranny.  When  an  individual  or  party  is 
wronged  in  the  United  States,  to  whom  can  he  apply  for 
redress? 

It  is  in  the  examination  of  the  exercise  of  thought 
in  the  United  States  that  we  clearly  perceive  how  far 
the  power  of  the  majority  surpasses  all  the  powers  with 
which  we  are  acquainted  in  Europe.  At  the  present 

255 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


time  the  most  absolute  monarchs  in  Europe  cannot 
prevent  certain  opinions  hostile  to  their  authority  from 
circulating  in  secret  through  their  dominions  and  even 
in  their  courts. 

It  is  not  so  in  America.  So  long  as  the  majority  is 
undecided,  discussion  is  carried  on,  but  as  soon  as  its 
decision  is  announced  everyone  is  silent.  . . . 

I know  of  no  country  in  which  there  is  so  little  inde- 
pendence of  mind  and  real  freedom  of  discussion  as  in 
America.  In  America  the  majority  raises  formidable 
barriers  around  the  liberty  of  opinion.  W'^ithin  these 
barriers  an  author  may  write  what  be  pleases,  but  woe 
to  him  if  he  goes  beyond  them.  Not  that  he  is  in  danger 
of  an  auto-da-fe,  but  he  is  exposed  to  continued  obloquy 
and  persecution.  His  political  career  is  closed  for  ever. 
Every  sort  of  compensation,  even  that  of  celebrity,  is 
refused  him.  Those  who  think  like  him  have  not  the 
courage  to  speak  out,  and  abandon  him  to  silence. 
He  yields  at  length,  overcome  by  the  daily  effort  which 
he  has  to  make,  and  subsides  into  silence  as  if  he  felt 
remorse  for  having  spoken  the  truth. 

Fetters  and  headsmen  were  coarse  instruments  . . . 
but  civilization  has  perfected  despotism  itself.  Under 
absolute  despotism  of  one  man,  the  body  was  attacked 
to  subdue  the  soul,  but  the  soul  escaped  the  blows 
and  rose  superior.  Such  is  not  the  course  adopted  in 
democratic  republics;  there  the  body  is  left  free,  but 
the  soul  is  enslaved.  . . . 

The  ruling  power  in  the  United  States  is  not  to  be 
made  game  of.  The  smallest  reproach  irritates  its 
sensibilities.  The  slightest  joke  which  has  any  founda- 
tion in  truth  renders  it  indignant.  Everything  must 
be  the  subject  of  encomium.  No  writer,  whatever  his 
eminence,  can  escape  paying  his  tribute  of  adoration 
to  his  fellow  citizens. 

The  majority  lives  in  the  perpetual  utterance  of 
256 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


self-applause,  and  there  are  certain  truths  which  Amer- 
icans can  only  learn  from  strangers,  or  from  experience. 
If  America  has  not  yet  had  any  great  writers,  the  reason 
is  given  in  these  facts — there  can  be  no  literary  genius 
without  freedom  of  opinion,  and  freedom  of  opinion 
does  not  exist  in  America. 

Such  passages  as  the  above,  quoted  from  the 
words  of  a friendly  student  of  American  de- 
mocracy, show  the  impression  which,  not- 
withstanding our  popular  prattle  about  free- 
dom, thoughtful  foreigners  have  since  the  be- 
ginning received.  And  de  Tocqueville  wrote 
long  before  crowd-thinking  had  reached  any- 
thing like  the  development  we  see  at  present. 
To-day  the  tyrannizing  is  not  confined  to  the 
majority -crowd.  All  sorts  of  minority -crowds, 
impatient  of  waiting  until  they  can  by  fair 
means  persuade  the  majority  to  agree  with 
them,  begin  to  practice  coercion  upon  every- 
one within  reach  the  minute  they  fall  into 
possession  of  some  slight  advantage  which  may 
be  used  as  a weapon.  From  the  industrial 
side  we  were  first  menaced  by  the  “invisible 
government”  of  organized  vested  interests; 
now,  by  a growing  tendency  to  government  by 
strikes.  Organized  gangs  of  all  sorts  have  at 
last  learned  the  amusing  trick  of  pointing  a 
pistol  at  the  public’s  head  and  threatening  it 
with  starvation,  and  up  go  its  hands,  and  the 
gang  gains  whatever  it  wants  for  itself,  regard- 
less of  anyone  else.  But  this  “hold-up  game” 

257 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


is  by  no  means  confined  to  labor.  Capitalistic 
soviets  have  since  the  beginning  of  the  war 
taken  advantage  of  situations  to  enhance  their 
special  crowd-interests.  The  following,  quoted 
from  a letter  written  during  the  war  to  the 
Atlantic  Monthly,  by  a thoroughly  American 
writer,  Charles  D.  Stewart,  describes  a type  of 
mob  rule  which  existed  in  almost  every  part 
of  the  nation  while  we  were  fighting  for  free- 
dom abroad: 

Carlyle  said  that  “Of  aU  forms  of  government,  a 
government  of  busybodies  is  the  worst.”  This  is 
true.  It  is  worse  than  Prussianism,  because  that  is 
one  form  of  government,  at  least;  and  worse  than  So- 
cialism, because  Socialism  would  be  run  by  law,  any- 
way. But  government  by  busybodies  has  neither 
head  nor  tail;  working  outside  the  law,  it  becomes 
lawless;  and  having  no  law  to  support  it,  it  finally 
depends  for  its  enforcement  upon  hoodlums  and  mob 
rule.  WTaen  the  respectable  and  wealthy  elements  are 
resorting  to  this  sort  of  government,  abetted  by  the 
newspapers  and  by  all  sorts  of  busybody  societies  intent 
upon  “government  by  public  sentiment,”  we  finally 
have  a new  thing  in  the  world  and  a most  obnoxious 
one — mob  rule  by  the  rich;  with  the  able  assistance  of 
the  hoodlums — always  looking  for  a chance. 

It  starts  as  follows: 

The  government  wishes  a certain  amount  of  money. 
It  therefore  appeals  to  local  pride;  it  sets  a “quota,” 
which  has  been  apportioned  to  each  locality,  and 
promises  of  a fine  “over-the-top”  flag  to  be  hoisted 
over  the  courthouse.  AU  weU  and  good;  local  pride 
is  a very  fine  thing,  competition  is  wholesome. 

258 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


But  the  struggle  that  ensues  is  not  so  much  local 
})ride  as  it  looks  to  be. 

Milwaukee,  for  instance,  a big  manufacturing  center, 
is  noted  for  its  German  population.  This,  the  local 
proprietors  fear,  may  affect  its  trade.  It  may  be  boy- 
cotted to  some  extent.  A traveling  man  comes  back 
and  says  that  a certain  dealer  in  stoves  refuses  to  buy 
stoves  made  in  Milwaukee! 

Ha! — Milwaukee  must  redeem  its  reputation;  it 
must  always  go  over  the  top:  it  must  be  able  to  afiBx 
this  stamp  to  all  its  letters. 

Now,  as  the  state  has  a quota,  and  the  county  and 
city  has  each  its  quota,  so  each  individual  must  have 
his  quota.  Each  individual  must  be  “assessed”  to  buy 
a certain  quota  [government  war  loan]  of  bonds.  Suc- 
cess must  be  made  sure:  the  manufacturers  must  see 
the  honor  of  Milwaukee,  and  Wisconsin,  maintained. 

It  is  not  compulsory  to  give  a certain  “assessed” 
amount  to  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.;  and  the  government  does 
not  make  a certain  quota  of  bonds  compulsory  on 
citizens — oh,  no!  it  is  not  compulsory,  only  you  must 
abide  by  your  assessment.  And  we  will  see  that  you 
do.  No  excuse  accepted.  . . . 

Picture  to  yourself  the  following  “collection  com- 
mittee ” traveling  out  of  the  highly  civilized,  “ kultured  ” 
city  of  Milwaukee. 

Twenty-five  automobiles  containing  sixty  to  seventy 
respectable  citizens  of  Milwaukee. 

One  color  guard  (a  flag  at  the  head)  with  two  home 
guardsmen  in  citizens’  clothes. 

Two  deputy  sheriffs. 

One  “oflacial”  photographer. 

One  “official”  stenographer. 

One  banker  (this  personage  to  make  arrangements 
to  lend  a farmer  the  money  in  case  he  protests  that  he 
has  subscribed  too  much  already). 

2S9 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


This  phalanx,  entirely  lawless,  moves  down  upon  a 
farmer  who  is  urging  two  horses  along  a cloddy  furrow, 
doing  his  fall  plowing. 

They  form  a semicircle  about  him;  the  speechmaker 
says,  “Let  us  salute  the  flag”  (watching  him  to  see 
that  he  does  it  promptly);  and  while  his  horses  stand 
there  the  speechmaker  delivers  a speech.  He  must  sub- 
scribe his  “assessed”  amount — no  excuses  accepted. 
If  he  owes  for  the  farm,  and  has  just  paid  his  interest, 
and  has  only  fifteen  dollars  to  go  on  with,  it  makes  no 
difference.  He  must  subscribe  the  amoimt  of  his 
“assessment,”  and  “sign  here.” 

If  not,  what  happens?  The  farmer  all  the  time,  of 
course,  is  probably  scared  out  of  his  wits,  or  does  not 
know  what  to  make  of  this  delegation  of  notables 
bearing  down  upon  his  sohtary  task  in  the  fields.  But 
if  he  argues  too  much,  he  finds  this.  They  have  a 
large  package  of  yellow  placards  reading : 

THE  OCCUPANT  OF  THESE  PREMISES  HAS 
REFUSED  TO  TAKE  HIS  JUST  SHARE  OF 
LIBERTY  BONDS. 

And  they  put  them  all  over  his  place.  He  probably 
signs. 

Now  bear  in  mind  that  this  method  is  not  practiced 
merely  against  farmers  who  have  made  unpatriotic 
remarks,  or  have  refused  to  support  the  war.  It  is 
practiced  against  a farmer  who  has  taken  only  one  hun- 
dred dollars  when  he  was  assessed  a hundred  and  fifty — 
and  this  is  to  make  him  “come  across”  with  the 
remainder. 

You  might  ask.  Is  this  comic  opera  or  is  it 
government? 

And  now  we  come  to  the  conclusion.  Imagine  your- 
self either  a workman  in  Milwaukee,  or  a farmer  out 

260 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


in  the  country.  You  are  dealt  with  in  this  entirely 
Prussian  manner — possibly  the  committee,  which 
knows  little  of  your  financial  difficulties  in  your  home, 
has  just  assessed  you  arbitrarily. 

Your  constitutional  rights  do  not  count.  There  is 
no  remedy.  If  you  are  painted  yellow,  the  District 
Attorney  will  pass  the  buck — he  knows  what  the  manu- 
facturer expects  of  him,  and  the  financier.  The  state 
officers  of  these  drives.  Federal  representatives,  are 
always  Milwaukee  bankers. 

But  for  you  there  is  no  remedy  if  you  are  “assessed” 
too  high. 

With  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  and  other  religious  society 
drives,  the  same  assessment  scheme  is  worked.  You 
cannot  give  to  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  You  are  told  right  off 
how  much  you  are  to  pay. 

It  would  seem  that  in  our  democracy  free- 
dom consists  first  of  freedom  to  vote;  second, 
of  f reborn  to  make  commercial  profit;  third, 
of  freedom  to  make  propaganda;  fourth,  of 
freedom  from  intellectual  and  moral  responsi- 
bility. Each  of  these  “liberties”  is  little  more 
than  a characteristic  form  of  crowd-behavior. 
The  vote,  our  most  highly  prized  modern 
right,  is  nearly  always  so  determined  by  crowd - 
thinking  that  as  an  exercise  of  individual 
choice  it  is  a joke.  Men  are  herded  in  droves 
and  delivered  by  counties  in  almost  solid 
blocks  by  professional  traders  of  political  in- 
fluence. Before  each  election  a campaign  of 
crowd-making  is  conducted  in  which  every 
sort  of  vulgarity  and  insincerity  has  survival 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


value,  in  which  real  issues  are  so  lost  in  parti- 
san propaganda  as  to  become  unrecognizable. 
When  the  vote  is  cast  it  is  commonly  a choice 
between  professional  crowd  - leaders  whose 
competency  consists  in  their  ability  to  Billy 
Sundayize  the  mob  rather  than  in  any  marked 
fitness  for  the  oflSce  to  which  they  aspire — 
also  between  the  horns  of  a dilemma  which 
wholly  misstates  the  issue  involved  and  is 
trumped  up  chiefly  for  purposes  of  political 
advertising.  Time  and  again  the  franchise 
thus  becomes  an  agency  by  which  rival  crowds 
may  fasten  their  own  tyrannies  upon  one 
another. 

Freedom  to  make  commercial  profit,  to  get 
ahead  of  others  in  the  race  for  dollars,  is  what 
democracy  generally  means  bj’^  “opportunity.” 
Nothing  is  such  a give-away  of  the  modern 
man  as  the  popular  use  of  the  word  “indi- 
vidualism.” It  is  no  longer  a philosophy  of 
becoming  something  genuine  and  unique,  but 
of  getting  something  and  using  it  according  to 
your  own  whims  and  for  personal  ends  regard- 
less of  the  effect  upon  others.  This  pseudo- 
individualism encourages  the  rankest  selfish- 
ness and  exploitation  to  go  hand  in  hand  with 
the  most  deadly  spiritual  conformity  and  in- 
anity. Such  “individualism”  is,  as  I have 
pointed  out,  a crowd-idea,  for  it  is  motivated 
by  a cheaply  disguised  ideal  of  personal  su- 
periority through  the  mere  fact  of  possessing 

262 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


things.  Paradoxical  as  it  may  appear  at  first 
sight,  this  is  really  the  old  crowd  notion  of 
“equality,”  for,  great  as  are  the  differences  of 
wealth  which  result,  every  man  may  cherish 
the  fiction  that  he  possesses  the  sort  of  ability 
necessary  for  this  kind  of  social  distinction. 
Such  superiority  thus  has  little  to  do  with 
personal  excellence;  it  is  the  result  of  the 
external  accident  of  success.  One  man  may 
still  be  “as  good  as  another.” 

Against  this  competitive  struggle  now  there 
has  grown  up  a counter-crowd  ideal  of  col- 
lectivism. But  here  also  the  fiction  of  uni- 
versal spiritual  equality  is  maintained;  the 
competitive  struggle  is  changed  from  an  indi- 
vidual to  a gang  struggle,  while  the  notion 
that  personal  worth  is  the  result  of  the  en- 
vironment and  may  be  achieved  by  anyone 
whose  belly  is  filled  still  persists.  Proletarians 
for  the  most  part  wish,  chinch-bug  fashion,  to 
crawl  into  the  Elysian  fields  now  occupied  by 
the  hated  capitalists.  The  growing  tendency 
to  industrial  democracy  will  probably  in  the 
near  future  cut  off  this  freedom  to  make 
money,  which  has  been  the  chief  “liberty”  of 
political  democracy  until  now,  but  whether 
liberty  in  general  will  be  the  gainer  thereby 
remains  to  be  seen.  One  rather  prominent 
Socialist  in  New  York  declares  that  liberty  is 
a “myth.”  He  is  correct,  in  so  far  as  the 
democratic  movement,  either  political  or  so- 

263 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CRO^T)S 


cial,  is  a crowd-phenomenon.  Socialist  agi- 
tators are  always  demanding  “liberty”  never- 
theless, but  the  liberty  which  they  demand  is 
little  more  than  freedom  to  make  their  own 
propaganda.  And  this  leads  us  to  the  third 
liberty  permitted  by  modern  democracy. 

The  “freedom  of  speech”  which  is  every- 
where demanded  in  the  name  of  democracj'^  is 
not  at  all  freedom  in  the  expression  of  indi- 
vidual opinion.  It  is  only  the  demand  for 
advertising  space  on  the  part  of  various 
crowds  for  the  publication  of  their  shibboleths 
and  propaganda.  Each  crowd,  while  demand- 
ing this  freedom  for  itself,  seeks  to  deny  it  to 
other  crowds,  and  all  unite  in  denjdng  it  to 
the  non-crowd  man  wherever  possible.  The 
Puritan’s  “right  to  worship  according  to  the 
dictates  of  a man’s  own  conscience”  did  not 
apply  to  Quakers,  Deists,  or  Catholics.  \Mien 
Republicans  were  “black  abolitionists”  they 
would  have  regarded  any  attempt  to  suppress 
The  Liberator,  as  edited  by  William  Lloyd 
Garrison,  as  an  assault  upon  the  constitutional 
liberties  of  the  whole  nation.  But  they  are 
not  now  particular!}’'  interested  in  preserving 
the  constitutional  liberties  of  the  nation  as 
represented  in  the  right  of  circulation  of  The 
Liberator,  edited  by  Max  Eastman.  In  Jef- 
ferson’s time,  when  Democrats  were  accused 
of  “Jacobinism,”  they  invoked  the  “spirit  of 
1776”  in  opposition  to  the  alien  and  sedition 

£64 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


laws  under  which  their  partisan  propaganda 
suffered  limitation.  To-day,  when  they  are 
striving  to  outdo  the  Republicans  in  “Amer- 
icanization propaganda,”  they  actually  stand 
sponsor  for  an  espionage  law  which  would 
have  made  Jefferson  or  Andrew  Jackson  froth 
at  the  mouth.  Socialists  are  convinced  that 
liberty  is  dead  because  Berger  and  Debs  are 
convicted  of  uttering  opinions  out  of  harmony 
with  temporarily  dominant  crowd-ideas  of 
patriotism.  But  when  Theodore  Dreiser  was 
put  under  the  ban  for  the  crime  of  writing  one 
of  the  few  good  novels  produced  in  America,  I 
do  not  recall  that  Socialists  held  any  meetings 
of  protest  in  Madison  Square  Garden.  I have 
myself  struggled  in  vain  for  three  hours  or 
more  on  a street  corner  in  Green  Point  trying 
to  tell  liberty-loving  Socialists  the  truth  about 
the  Gary  schools.  When  the  politicians  in 
our  legislative  assemblies  were  tricked  into 
passing  the  obviously  unliberal  Eighteenth 
Amendment,  I was  much  interested  in  learn- 
ing how  the  bulk  of  the  Socialists  in  the  Cooper 
Union  audiences  felt  about  it.  As  I had  ex- 
pected, they  regarded  it  as  an  unpardonable 
infringement  of  personal  freedom,  as  a typical 
piece  of  American  Puritan  hypocrisy  and 
Pharisaism.  But  they  were,  on  the  whole,  in 
favor  of  it  because  they  thought  it  would  be 
an  aid  to  Bolshevist  propaganda,  since  it 
would  make  the  working  class  still  more  dis- 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


\ 


contented!  Such  is  liberty  in  a crowd-gov- 
erned democracy.  ...  It  is  nothing  but  the 
liberty  of  crowds  to  he  crowds. 

The  fourth  liberty  in  democratic  society  to- 
day is  freedom  from  moral  and  intellectual  re- 
sponsibility. This  is  accomplished  by  the 
magic  of  substituting  the  machinery  of  the 
law  for  self-government,  bureaucratic  meddle- 
someness for  conscience,  crowd-tyranny  for 
personal  decency.  Professor  Faguet  has  called 
democracy  the  “cult  of  incompetence”  and 
the  “dread  of  responsibility.”  He  is  not  far 
wrong,  but  these  epithets  apply  not  so  much 
to  democracy  as  such  as  to  democracy  under 
the  heel  of  the  crowd.  The  original  aim  of 
democracy,  so  far  as  its  philosophical  thinkers 
conceived  of  it,  was  to  set  genius  free  from  the 
trammels  of  tradition,  realize  a maximum  of 
self-government,  and  make  living  something 
of  an  adventure.  But  crowds  do  not  so  under- 
stand democracy.  Every  crowd  looks  upon 
democracy  simply  as  a scheme  whereby  it 
may  have  its  own  way.  We  have  seen  that 
the  crowd-mind  as  such  is  a device  for  “kid- 
ding” ourselves,  for  representing  the  easiest 
path  to  the  enhancement  of  our  self -feeling  as 
something  highly  moral,  for  making  our  per- 
sonal right  appear  like  universal  righteousness, 
for  dressing  up  our  will  to  lord  it  over  others, 
as  if  it  were  devotion  to  impersonal  principle. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  crowd  therefore  insists 

266 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 

upon  universal  conformity;  goodness  means 
only  making  everyone' alike.  By  taking  refuge 
in  the  abstract  and  ready-made  system  of 
crowd-ideas,  the  unconscious  will  to  power  is 
made  to  appear  what  it  is  not;  the  burden  of 
responsibility  is  transferred  to  the  group  with 
its  fiction  of  absolute  truth.  Le  Bon  noted  the 
fact  of  the  irresponsibility  of  crowds,  but 
thought  that  such  irresponsibility  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  crowd,  being  an  anonymous 
gathering,  the  individual  could  lose  his  iden- 
tity in  the  multitude.  The  psychology  of  the 
unconscious  has  provided  us  with  what  I think 
is  a better  explanation,  but  the  fact  of  irre- 
sponsibility remains  and  is  evident  in  all  the 
influence  of  crowd-thinking  upon  democratic 
institutions.  The  crowd-ideal  of  society  is  one 
in  which  every  individual  is  protected  not  only 
against  exploitation,  but  against  temptation — 
protected  therefore  against  himself.  The  whole 
tendency  of  democracy  in  our  times  is  toward 
just  such  inanity.  Without  the  least  critical 
analysis  of  accepted  moral  dilemmas,  we  are 
all  to  be  made  moral  in  spite  of  ourselves,  re- 
gardless of  our  worth,  without  effort  on  our 
part,  moral  in  the  same  way  that  machines 
are  moral,  by  reducing  the  will  to  mere  auto- 
matic action,  leaving  no  place  for  choice  and 
uncertainty,  having  everyone  wound  up  and 
oiled  and  regulated  to  run  at  the  same  speed. 
Each  crowd  therefore  strives  to  make  its  own 

267 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


moral  ideas  the  law  of  the  land.  Law  becomes 
thus  a sort  of  anthologj^  of  various  existing 
crowd-hobbies.  In  the  end  moral  responsibil- 
ity is  passed  over  to  legislatures,  commissions, 
detectives,  inspectors,  and  bureaucrats.  Any- 
thing that  “gets  by”  the  public  censor,  how- 
ever rotten,  we  may  wallow  in  with  a perfect 
feeling  of  respectability.  The  right  and  neces- 
sity of  choosing  our  way  is  superseded  by  a 
system  of  statutory  taboos,  which  as  often  as 
not  represent  the  survival  values  of  the  mean- 
est little  people  in  the  community — the  kind 
who  cannot  look  upon  a nude  picture  without 
a struggle  with  their  perverted  eroticism,  or 
entertain  a significant  idea  without  losing 
their  faith. 

The  effect  of  all  this  upon  the  intellectual 
progress  and  the  freedom  of  art  in  democratic 
society  is  obvious,  and  is  just  what,  to  one 
who  understands  the  mechanisms  of  the  crowd- 
mind,  might  be  expected.  No  wonder  de 
Tocqueville  said  he  found  less  freedom  of 
opinion  in  America  than  elsewhere.  Explain 
it  as  you  will,  the  fact  is  here  staring  us  in  the 
face.  Genius  in  our  democracy  is  not  free.  It 
must  beg  the  permission  of  little  crowd-men 
for  its  right  to  exist.  It  must  stand,  hat  in 
hand,  at  the  window  of  the  commissioner  of 
licenses  and  may  gain  a permit  for  only  so 
much  of  its  inspiration  as  happens  to  be  of 

use-value  to  the  uninspired.  It  must  play  the 

268 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


conformist,  pretend  to  be  hydra-headed  rather 
than  unique,  useful  rather  than  genuine,  a 
servant  of  the  “least  of  these”  rather  than 
their  natural  master.  It  must  advertise,  but 
it  may  not  prophesy.  It  may  flatter  and  pat 
ronize  the  stupid,  but  it  may  not  stand  up 
taller  than  they.  In  short,  democracy  every- 
where puts  out  the  eyes  of  its  Samson,  cuts  off 
his  golden-rayed  locks,  and  makes  him  grind 
corn  to  fill  the  bellies  of  the  Philistines. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury until  now  it  has  been  chiefly  the  business 
man,  the  political  charlatan,  the  organizer  of 
trade,  the  rediscoverer  of  popular  prejudices 
who  have  been  preferred  in  our  free  modern  so- 
cieties. Keats  died  of  a broken  heart;  Shelley 
and  Wagner  were  exiled;  Beethoven  and  Schu- 
bert were  left  to  starve;  Darwin  was  con- 
demned to  hell  fire;  Huxley  was  denied  his 
professorship ; Schopenhauer  was  ostracized  by 
the  elite;  Nietzsche  ate  his  heart  out  in  soli- 
tude; Walt  Whitman  had  to  be  fed  by  a few 
English  admirers,  while  his  poems  were  pro- 
hibited as  obscene  in  free  America;  Emerson 
was  for  the  greater  part  of  his  life  persona  non 
grata  at  his  own  college;  Ingersoll  was  denied 
the  political  career  which  his  genius  merited; 
Poe  lived  and  died  in  poverty;  Theodore 
Parker  was  consigned  to  perdition;  Percival 
Lowell  and  Simon  Newcomb  lived  and  died 
almost  unrecognized  by  the  American  public. 

269 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Nearly  every  artist  and  writer  and  public 
teacher  is  made  to  understand  from  the  begin- 
ning that  he  will  be  popular  in  just  the  degree 
that  he  strangles  his  genius  and  becomes  a 
vulgar,  commonplace,  insincere  clown. 

On  the  other  hand  steel  manufacturers  and 
railroad  kings,  whose  business  record  will 
often  scarcely  stand  the  light,  are  rewarded 
with  fabulous  millions  and  everyone  grovels 
before  them.  When  one  turns  from  the 
“ commercialism,”  which  everywhere  seems  to 
be  the  dominant  and  most  sincere  interest  in 
democratic  society,  when  one  seeks  for  spir- 
itual values  to  counterbalance  this  weight 
of  materialism,  one  finds  in  the  prevailing 
spirit  little  more  than  a cult  of  naive  senti- 
mentality. 

It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  if  Shakespeare, 
Boccaccio,  Rabelais,  Montaigne,  Cassanova, 
Goethe,  Dostoievsky,  Ibsen,  Tolstoi,  Rous- 
seau, St.  Augustine,  Milton,  Nietzsche,  Swin- 
burne, Rossetti,  or  even  Flaubert,  were  alive 
and  writing  his  masterpiece  in  America  to- 
day, he  would  be  instantly  silenced  bj'^  some 
sort  of  society  for  the  prevention  of  vice,  and 
held  up  to  the  public  scorn  and  ridicule  as  a 
destroyer  of  our  innocence  and  a corrupter  of 
public  morals.  The  guardians  of  our  char- 
acters are  ceaselessly  expurgating  the  classics 
lest  we  come  to  harm  reading  them.  I often 
think  that  the  only  reason  why  the  Bible  is 

270 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


permitted  to  pass  through  our  mails  is  because 
hardly  anyone  ever  reads  it. 

It  is  this  same  habit  of  crowd-thinking 
which  accounts  to  a great  extent  for  the  dearth 
of  intellectual  curiosity  in  this  country.  From 
what  we  have  seen  to  be  the  nature  of  the 
crowd-mind,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  in  a 
democracy  in  which  crowds  play  an  important 
part  the  condition  described  by  de  Tocque- 
ville  will  generally  prevail.  There  is  much 
truth  in  his  statement  that  it  seems  at  first  as 
if  the  minds  of  all  the  Americans  “ were  formed 
upon  the  same  model.”  Spiritual  variation 
will  be  encouraged  only  in  respect  to  matters 
in  which  one  crowd  differs  from  another.  The 
conformist  spirit  will  prevail  in  all.  Intel- 
lectual leadership  will  inevitably  pass  to  the 
“tight-minded.”  There  will  be  violent  con- 
flicts of  ideas,  but  they  will  be  crowd  ideas. 

The  opinions  about  which  people  differ  are 
for  the  most  part  ready-made.  They  are 
concerned  with  the  choice  of  social  mechan- 
isms, but  hardly  with  valuations.  With  nearly 
all  alike,  there  is  a notion  that  mankind  may 
be  redeemed  by  the  magic  of  externally 
manipulating  the  social  environment.  There 
is  a wearisome  monotony  of  professions  of 
optimism,  idealism,  humanitarianism,  with 
little  knowledge  of  what  these  terms  mean. 

I am  thinking  of  all  those  young  people 
who,  in  the  decade  and  a half  which  preceded 

271 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


the  war,  represented  the  finished  product  of 
our  colleges  and  universities.  What  a stretch 
of  imagination  is  needed  before  one  may  call 
these  young  people  educated!  How  little  of 
intellectual  interest  they  have  brought  back 
from  school  to  their  respective  communities! 
How  little  cerebral  activity  they  have  stirred 
up ! Habits  of  study,  of  independent  thinking, 
have  seldom  been  acquired.  The  “educated” 
have  possibly  gained  a little  in  social  grace; 
they  have  in  some  cases  learned  things  which 
are  of  advantage  to  them  in  the  struggle  for 
position.  Out  of  the  confused  mass  of  un- 
assimilated information  which  they  dimly  re- 
member as  the  education  which  they  “got,” 
a sum  of  knowledge  doubtless  remains  which 
is  greater  in  extent  than  that  possessed  by  the 
average  man,  but,  though  greater  in  extent, 
this  knowledge  is  seldom  different  in  kind. 
There  is  the  same  superficiality,  the  same 
susceptibility  to  crowd-thinking  on  every  sub- 
ject. The  mental  habits  of  American  de- 
mocracy are  probably  best  reflected  to-day  by 
the  “best-seller”  novel,  the  Saturday  Evening 
Post,  the  Chautauqua,  the  Victrola,  the  mo\dng 
picture. 

Nearly  everyone  in  America  can  read,  for 
the  “schoolhouse  is  the  bulwark  of  democratic 
freedom.”  However,  with  the  decrease  in 
illiteracy  there  has  gone  a corresponding  low- 
ering of  literary  and  intellectual  standards,  a 

27^ 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


growing  timidity  in  telling  the  truth,  and  a 
passion  for  the  sensationally  commonplace. 
If  it  be  true  that  before  people  may  be  polit- 
ically free  they  must  be  free  to  function  men- 
tally, one  wonders  how  much  of  an  aid  to 
liberty  the  public  schools  in  this  country  have 
been,  or  if,  with  their  colossal  impersonal  sys- 
tems and  stereotyped  methods  of  instruction, 
they  have  not  rather  on  the  whole  succeeded 
chiefly  in  making  learning  uninteresting,  dull- 
ing curiosity  and  killing  habits  of  independent 
thinking.  There  is  probably  no  public  insti- 
tution where  the  spirit  of  the  crowd  reigns  to 
the  extent  that  it  does  in  the  public  school. 
The  aim  seems  to  be  to  mold  the  child  to 
type,  make  him  the  good,  plodding  citizen, 
teaching  him  only  so  much  as  some  one  thinks 
it  is  to  the  public’s  interest  that  he  should 
know.  I am  sure  that  everyone  who  is  familiar 
with  the  actions  of  the  school  authorities  in 
New  York  City  during  the  two  years,  1918 
and  1919,  will  be  impelled  to  look  elsewhere 
for  much  of  that  liberty  which  is  supposed  to 
go  with  democracy. 

Some  years  ago  I conducted  a little  investi- 
gation into  the  mental  habits  of  the  average 
high-school  graduate.  An  examination  was 
made  of  twenty  or  more  young  people  who 
had  been  out  of  school  one  year.  This  is 
doubtless  too  limited  a number  to  give  the 
findings  great  general  significance,  but  I give 

273 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

the  results  in  brief  for  what  they  are  worth. 
These  students  had  been  in  school  for  eleven 
years.  I thought  that  they  ought  at  least 
to  have  a minimum  of  general  cultural  infor- 
mation and  to  be  able  to  express  some  sort  of 
opinion  about  the  commonplaces  of  our  spir- 
itual heritage.  The  questions  asked  were  such 
as  follow:  What  is  the  difference  between  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States.^  What  is  a 
dicotyledon?  Does  the  name  Darwin  mean 
anything  to  you?  Have  you  ever  heard  of 
William  James?  WTiat  is  the  significance  of 
the  battle  of  Tours?  Who  was  Thomas  Jef- 
ferson? There  were  twenty  questions  in  all. 
The  average  grade,  even  with  the  most  liberal 
marking,  was  44.6.  The  general  average  was 
raised  by  one  pupil  who  made  a grade  of  69. 
But  then  we  should  not  be  too  severe  upon  the 
public -school  graduate.  One  of  the  brightest 
college  graduates  I know  left  a large  Eastern 
institution  believing  that  Karl  Marx  was  a 
philologist.  Another,  a graduate  from  a West- 
ern college,  thought  that  Venus  de  Milo  was 
an  Italian  count  who  had  been  born  without 
any  arms.  I know  a prominent  physician, 
whose  scientific  training  is  such  that  he  has 
been  a lecturer  in  a medical  college,  who  be- 
lieves that  Heaven  is  located  just  a few  miles 
up  in  the  sky,  beyond  the  Milky  Way.  These 
are  doubtless  exceptional  cases,  but  how  many 

274 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


persons  with  university  degrees  are  there  who 
have  really  caught  the  spirit  of  the  human- 
istic culture,  or  have  ever  stopped  to  think 
why  the  humanities  are  taught  in  our  col- 
leges? How  many  are  capable  of  discriminat- 
ing criticism  of  works  of  music,  or  painting, 
literature,  or  philosophy?  My  own  experi- 
ence convinces  me,  and  I am  sure  that  other 
public  teachers  who  have  had  a like  experience 
will  bear  witness  to  the  same  lamentable  fact, 
that  such  little  genuine  intellectual  interest  as 
there  is  in  this  country  is  chiefly  confined  to 
immigrant  Jews,  our  American  youth  being, 
on  the  whole,  innocent  of  it.  The  significance 
of  this  fact  is  obvious,  as  is  its  cause.  Due  to 
the  conformist  spirit  of  the  dominant  crowd, 
native-born  Americans  are  losing  their  intel- 
lectual leadership. 

We  must  not  ignore  the  fact  that  there  is 
among  the  educated  here  a small  and,  let  us 
hope,  growing  group  of  youthful  “intellectu- 
als.” But  in  the  first  place  the*^ proportion  of 
these  to  the  whole  mass  is  tragically  small. 
In  the  second  place  intellectual  liberalism  has 
been  content  for  the  most  part  to  tag  along 
behind  the  labor  movement,  as  if  the  chief 
meaning  of  the  intellectual  awakening  were 
economic.  It  is  no  disparagement  of  labor  to 
say  that  the  intellect  in  this  country  of  crowds 
has  also  other  work  to  do,  and  that,  until  it 

strikes-out  for  itself,  neither  the  labor  move- 

275 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


ment  nor  anything  else  will  rise  above  com- 
monplace crowd  dilemmas.  Too  much  of  our 
so-called  intellectualism  is  merely  the  substi- 
tution of  ready-made  proletarian  crowd-ideas 
for  the  traditional  crowd-ideas  which  pass  for 
thinking  among  the  middle  classes. 

All  the  facts  which  have  been  pointed  out 
above  are  the  inevitable  consequences  of  gov- 
ernment by  crowds.  There  can  be  no  real 
liberty  with  crowds  because  there  can  be  no 
personal  independence.  The  psychic  mechan- 
isms of  the  crowd  are  hostile  to  conscious  per- 
sonality. The  independent  thinker  cannot  be 
controlled  by  catchwords.  In  our  day  intel- 
lectual freedom  is  not  smothered  in  actual 
martyr  fires,  but  it  is  too  often  strangled  in 
the  cradle.  The  existence  of  new  values,  a 
thing  which  will  inevitably  happen  where  the 
human  spirit  is  left  free  in  its  creative  im- 
pulses, is  disturbing  to  the  crowd-mind.  Edu- 
cation must  therefore  be  made  “safe  for  de- 
mocracy”; it  must  be  guarded  carefully  lest 
the  youth  become  an  original  personal  fact,  a 
new  spiritual  creation.  I realize  the  element 
of  truth  in  the  statement  often  made,  that 
there  is  already  too  much  spiritual  originality 
in  the  youths  of  this  generation.  I am  not 
contending  that  certain  phases  of  egoism 
should  not  be  checked  by  education.  A solid 
intellectual  basis  must  be  created  which  will 
make  social  living  possible.  The  trouble  is. 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 

however,  that  this  task  is  done  too  well.  It  is 
the  merely  useful  man,  not  the  unusual  man, 
whom  the  crowd  loves.  Skill  is  encouraged, 
for,  whether  it  be  skill  in  serving  or  in  de- 
manding service,  skill  in  itself  does  not  upset 
existing  crowd-values.  Reflection  is  “wicked  ” 
for  it  leads  to  doubt,  and  doubt  is  non- 
gregarious  behavior.  Education  ceases  to  be 
the  path  of  spiritual  freedom;  it  becomes  a de- 
vice for  harnessing  the  spirit  of  youth  in  the 
treadmill  of  the  survival-values  of  the  crowd. 
It  is  also  the  revenge  of  the  old  against  the 
young,  a way  of  making  them  less  trouble- 
some. It  teaches  the  rules  for  success  in  a 
crowd-governed  world  while  taking  advantage 
of  the  natural  credulity  of  childhood  to  draw 
the  curtain  with  such  terrifying  mummery 
about  the  figure  of  wisdom  that  the  average 
mind,  never  having  the  daring  or  curiosity  to 
lift  it,  will  remain  to  its  dying  day  a dullard 
and  a mental  slave  without  suspecting  the 
fact.  Every  “dangerous”  thought  is  de- 
natured and  expurgated.  The  student  is  skill- 
fully insulated  from  any  mental  shock  that 
might  galvanize  him  into  original  intellectual 
life.  The  classic  languages  are  taught  for 
purposes  of  “discipline.”  After  six  or  seven 
years’  study  of  Greek  literature  in  the  accepted 
manner  one  may  be  able  to  repeat  most  of  the 
rules  of  Goodwin’s  Greek  Grammar,  and  pride 

himself  upon  being  a cultivated  person,  know- 

277 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


ing  in  the  end  less  of  the  language  than  a 
bootblack  from  modern  Athens  knows  of  it, 
or  than  a waiter  from  Bologna  knows  of  Eng- 
lish after  one  year’s  residence  in  Greenwich 
Village.  And  the  all-important  thing  is  that 
never  once  has  the  student  been  given  a 
glimpse  of  the  beautiful  free  pagan  life  which 
all  this  literature  is  about. 

Science  is  taught  that  the  student,  if  he  has 
ability,  may  learn  how  to  make  a geological 
survey  of  oil  lands,  construct  and  operate  a 
cement  factory,  make  poison  gas,  remove  in- 
fected tonsils,  or  grow  a culture  of  bacteria; 
but  should  he  cease  to  hold  popular  beliefs 
about  the  origin  of  life  or  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  it  is  well  for  him  to  keep  the  tragic 
fact  to  himself.  Those  who  teach  history, 
economics,  and  political  science  in  such  a way 
as  to  stimulate  independence  of  thinking  on  the 
part  of  the  students  are  likely  to  be  dismissed 
from  their  faculties  by  the  practical  busmess 
men  who  constitute  the  boards  of  trustees  of 
our  institutions  of  higher  learning;  the  pur- 
pose of  these  sciences  is  to  make  our  youth 
more  patriotic.  Finally,  the  average  instructor 
receives  less  pay  than  a policeman,  or  a head- 
waiter,  and  the  unconscious  reason  for  this  is 
all  of  a piece  with  the  psychology  of  the 
crowd-mind.  The  ignorant  man’s  resentment 
toward  superiority,  or  “highbrowism,”  is 
thereby  vindicated.  Moreover,  the  integrity 

278 


GOVERNMENT  BY  CROWDS 


of  the  complex  of  ruling  crowd-ideas  is  less 
endangered.  There  is  less  likelihood  of  its 
being  undermined  in  the  process  of  education 
when  vigorous,  independent  spirits  are  di- 
verted from  intellectual  pursuits  by  richer 
prizes  offered  in  other  fields,  and  the  task  of 
instruction  therefore  left  largely  to  the  un- 
derfed and  timid  who  are  destined  by  tem- 
perament to  trot  between  the  shafts. 

In  this  discussion  of  the  government  of 
crowds  I have  ignored  consideration  of  the 
mechanisms  of  political  and  social  organiza- 
tions which  usually  characterize  the  treatment 
of  this  subject.  It  is  not  that  I wish  to  divert 
attention  from  the  necessity  of  more  practical 
and  just  social  arrangements  and  political 
forms  of  organizations.  These  we  must 
achieve.  But  the  facts  which  ultimately  make 
for  our  freedom  or  slavery  are  of  the  mind. 
The  statement  that  we  cannot  be  politically 
or  economically  a free  peopde  until  we  attain 
mental  freedom  is  a platitude,  but  it  is  one 
which  needs  special  emphasis  in  this  day  when 
all  attention  is  directed  to  the  external  form 
of  organization. 

No  tyranny  was  ever  for  long  maintained 
by  force.  All  tyrannies  begin  and  end  in  the 
tyranny  of  ideas  uncritically  accepted.  It  is 
of  just  such  ideas  that  the  conscious  thinking 
of  the  crowd  consists,  and  it  is  ultimately 
from  the  crowd  as  a psychological  mechanism 

279 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


that  tyranny  as  such  proceeds.  Democracy  in 
America  fails  of  freedom,  not  because  of  our 
political  constitution,  though  that  would 
doubtless  be  modified  by  a people  who  were 
more  free  at  heart;  it  fails  because  freedom 
of  opinion,  intellectual  alertness,  critical  think- 
ing about  fundamentals,  is  not  encouraged. 
There  is,  moreover,  little  promise  of  greater 
freedom  in  the  various  revolutionary  crowds 
who  to-day  want  freedom  only  to  add  to  the 
number  of  crowds  which  pester  us.  And  for 
this  w^e  have,  whether  we  are  radicals  or  re- 
actionaries or  simply  indifferent,  no  one  to 
blame  but  ourselves  and  our  own  crowd- 
thinking. 


X 


EDUCATION  AS  A POSSIBLE  CURE  FOR  CROVk  D- 
THINKING 

WE  have  seen  that  Democracy  in  and  of 
itself  is  no  more,  sure  a guarantee  of 
liberty  than  other  forms  of  government.  This 
does  not  necessarily  mean  that  we  have  been 
forced  by  our  psychological  study  into  an  ar- 
gument against  the  idea  of  democracy  as 
such.  In  fact,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  this 
form  of  human  association  may  have  decided 
advantages,  both  practical  and  spiritual,  if 
we  set  about  in  the  right  way  to  realize 
them.  It  does  not  follow  that,  because  the 
franchise  is  exercised  by  all,  democracy  must 
necessarily  be  an  orgy  of  mob  rule.  If,  under 
our  modern  political  arrangements,  it  has  been 
shown  that  the  crowd  presumes  to  regulate 
acts  and  thought  processes  hitherto  considered 
purely  personal  matters,  it  is  also  true  that 
the  dominance  of  any  particular  crowd  has, 
in  the  long  run,  been  rendered  less  absolute 
and  secure  by  the  more  openly  expressed 
hostility  of  rival  crowds.  But  crowd-behavior 
has  been  known  in  all  historic  periods.  De- 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

mocracy  cannot  be  said  to  have  caused  it. 
It  may  be  a mere  accident  of  history  that  the 
present  development  of  crowd-mindedness  has 
come  along  with  that  of  democratic  institu- 
tions. Democracy  has  indeed  given  new  kinds 
of  crowds  their  hope  of  dominance.  It  has 
therefore  been  made  into  a cult  for  the  self- 
justification  of  various  modern  crowds. 

The  formula  for  realizing  a more  free  and 
humane  common  life  will  not  be  found  in  any 
of  the  proffered  cure-alls  and  propagandas 
which  to-day  deafen  our  ears  with  their  din. 
Neither  are  we  now  in  such  possession  of  the 
best  obtainable  social  order  that  one  would 
wish  to  preserve  the  status  quo  against  all 
change,  which  would  mean,  in  other  words, 
the  survival  of  the  present  ruling  crowds. 
Many  existing  facts  belie  the  platitudes  which 
these  crowds  speak  in  their  defense,  just  as 
they  lay  bare  the  hidden  meaning  of  the  magic 
remedies  which  are  proposed  by  counter- 
crowds. Thereuis  no  single  formula  for  social 
redemption,  and  the  man  who  has  come  to 
himself  will  refuse  to  invest  his  faith  in  any 
such  thing — which  does  not  mean,  however, 
that  he  wiU  refuse  to  consider  favorably  the 
practical  possibilities  of  any  proposed  plan 
for  improving  social  conditions. 

The  first  and  greatest  effort  must  be  to  free 
democracy  from  crowd-mindedness,  hy  llherat- 

ing  our  own  thinking.  The  way  out  of  this 

282 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


complex  of  crowd  compulsions  is  the  solitary 
part  of  self-analysis  and  intellectual  courage. 
It  is  the  way  of  Socrates,  and  Protagoras,  of 
Peter  Abelard,  and  Erasmus,  and  Montaigne, 
of  Cervantes  and  Samuel  Butler,  of  Goethe, 
and  Emerson,  of  Whitman  and  William  James. 

Just  here  I know  that  certain  conservatives 
will  heartily  agree  with  me.  “That  is  it,” 
they  wiU  say;  “begin  with  the  individual.” 
Yes,  but  which  individuaTshall  we  Fegln  with? 
Most  of  those  who  speak  thus  mean,  begin 
with  some  other  individual.  Evangelize  the 
heathen,  uplift  the  poor,  Americanize  the 
Bolshevists,  do  something  to  some  one  which 
will  make  him  like  ourselves;  in  other  words, 
bring  him  into  our  crowd.  The, individual 
with  whom  I wouldJbegin  is  myself.  Some- 
liow~or  other  if  I am  to  have  individuality  at 
aIPiUwiir'be”by  virtue  of  being  ah  individual, 
a single^”^ separate  person.”  And  that  is  a 
dangerous  and  at  present  a more  or  less  lonely 
thing  to  do.  But  the  problem  is  really  one 
of  practical  psychology.  We  must  come  out 
of  the  crowd-self,  just  as,  before  the  neurotic 
may  be  normal,  he  must  get  over  his  neurosis. 
To  do  that  he  must  trace  his  malady  back  to 
its  source  in  the  unconscious,  and  learn  the 
meaning  of  his  conscious  behavior  as  it  is  re- 
lated to  his  unconscious  desires.  Then  he 
must  do  a difficult  thing — ^he  must  accent  the 
fact  of  himself  at  its  real  worth. 

283 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


It  is  much  the  same  with  our  crowd-mind- 
edness.  If  psychoanalysis  has  therapeutic 
value  by  the  mere  fact  of  revealing  to  the 
neurotic  the  hidden  meaning  of  his  neurosis, 
then  it  would  seem  that  an  analysis  of  crowd- 
behavior  such  as  we  have  tried  to  make  should 
be  of  some  help  in  breaking  the  hold  of  the 
crowd  upon  our  spirits,  and  thus  freeing  de- 
mocracy to  some  extent  from  quackery. 

To  see  behind  the  shibboleths  and  dogmas 
of  crowd-thinking  the  “cussedness” — that  is, 
the  primitive  side — of  human  nature”  at  work 
is  a great  moral  gain.  At  least  the  “cussed- 
ness” cannot  deceive  us  any  more.  We  have 
won  our  greatest  victory  over  it  when  we  drag 
it  out  into  the  light.  We  can  at  least  wrestle 
with  it  consciously,  and  maybe,  by  directing 
it  to  desirable  ends,  it  will  cease  to  be  so 
“cussed,”  and  become  a useful  servant.  Xo 
such  good  can  come  to  us  so  long  as  this  side 
of  our  nature  is  allowed  its  way  only  on  con- 
dition that  it  paint  its  face  and  we  encourage 
it  to  talk  piously  of  things  which  it  really  does 
not  mean.  Disillusionment  may  be  painful 
both  to  the  neurotic  and  to  the  crowd-man,  but 
the  gain  is  worth  the  shock  to  our  pride.  The 
ego,  when  better  understood,  becomes  at  once 
more  higiily  personalized  because  more  con- 
scious of  itself,  and  more  truly  social  be- 
cause better  adjusted  to  the  demands  of 
others.  It  is  this  socialized  and  conscious 

284 


EDUCATION  AS  A CUBE 


selfhood  which  is  both  the  aim  and  the  hope  of 
true  democracy. 

Such  analysis  may  possibly  give  us  the  gift 
to  see  ourselves  as  others  do  not  see  us,  as  we 
have  not  wished  them  to  see  us,  and  finally 
enable  us  to  see  ourselves  and  others  and  to 
be  seen  by  them  as  we  really  are. 

We  shall  be  free  when  we  cease  pampering 
oiu’selves,  stop  lying  to  ourselves  and  to  one 
another,  and  give  up  the  crowd-mummery  in 
which  we  indulge  because  it  happens  to  flatter 
our  hidden  weaknesses!  In  the  end  we  shall 
only  begin  to  solve  the  social  problem  when 
we  can  cease  together  taking  refuge  from 
reality  in  systems  made  up  of  general  ideas 
that  we  should  be  using  as  tools  in  meeting 
the  tasks  from  which  as  crowd-men  and  neu- 
rotics people  run  away;  when  we  discontinue 
making  use  of  commonly  accepted  principles 
and  ideals  as  defense  formations  for  shame- 
ful things  in  which  we  can  indulge  ourselves 
with  a clear  conscience  only  by  all  doing  them 
together. 

There  must  be  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
unambitious  men,  men  who  can  rise  above 
vulgar  dilemmas  and  are  deaf  to  crowd  propa- 
ganda, men  capable  of  philosophical  toler- 
ance, critical  doubt  and  inquiry,  genuine 
companionship,  and  voluntary  co-operation 
in  the  achievement  of  common  ends,  free 
spirits  who  can  smile  in  the  face  of  the  mob, 

285 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 

who  know  the  mob  and  are  not  to  be  taken 
in  by  it. 

All  this  sounds  much  like  the  old  gospel  of 
conviction  of  sin  and  repentance;  perhaps  it 
is  just  that.  We  must  think  differently, 
change  our  minds.  Again  and  again  peo- 
ple have  tried  the  wide  way  and  the  broad 
gate,  the  crowd-road  to  human  happiness, 
only  to  find  that  it  led  to  destruction  in  a 
cul-de-sac.  Now  let  us  try  the  other  road, 
“the  strait  and  narrow  path.”  The  crowd- 
path  leads  neither  to  self-mastery  nor  social 
blessedness.  People  in  crowds  are  not  think- 
ing together;  they  are  not  thmEmg  at'all, 
save  as  a paranoiac  thinks.  They  are  not 
working  together;  they  are  only  sticking  to- 
gether. We  have  leaned  on  one  another  till  we 
have  all  run  and  fused  into  a common  mass. 
The  democratic  crowd  to-day,  with  its  sweet 
optimism,  its  warm  “brotherly  love,”  is  a 
sticky,  gooey  mass  which  one  can  hardly 
touch  and  come  back  to  himself  clean.  By 
dissolving  everything  in  “one  great  union” 
people  who  cannot  climb  alone  expect  to  ooze 
into  the  co-operative  commonwealth  or  king- 
dom of  heaven.  I am  sick  of  this  oozing 
democracy.  There  must  be  something  crystal- 
line and  insoluble  left  in  democratic  America. 
Somewhere  there  must  be  people  with  sharp 
edges  that  cut  when  they  are  pressed  too 

hard,  people  who  are  still  solid,  who  have  im- 

286 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


penetrable  depths  in  them  and  hard  facets 
which  reflect  the  sunlight.  They  are  the  hope 
of  democracy,  these  infusible  ones. 

To  change  the  figure,  may  their  tribe  in- 
crease. And  this  is  the  business  of  every  edu- 
cator who  is  not  content  to  be  a faker.  What 
we  need-is-not-only  more  educj-tion,.  but  _a, 
different  kind  of  education.  There  is  more 
liope  in  an  illiterate  community  where  people 
hate  lying  than  in  a high-school  educated 
nation  which  reads  nothing  but  trash  and  is 
fed  up  on  advertising,  newspapers,  popular 
fiction,  and  propaganda. 

In  the  foregoing  chapter,  reference  was 
made  to  our  traditional  educational  systems. 
The  subject  is  so  closely  related  to  the  mental 
habits  of  democracy  that  it  would  be  difficult 
to  overemphasize  its  importance  for  our  study. 
Traditional  educational  methods  have  more 
often  given  encouragement  to  crowd-thinking 
than  to  independence  of  judgment.  Thinking  | 
has  been  divorced  from  doing.  Knowledge, 
instead  of  being  regarded  as  the  foresight  of 
ends  to  be  reached  and  the  conscious  direction 
of  activity  toward  such  ends,  has  been  more 
commonly  regarded  as  the  copying  of  isolated 
things  to  be  learned.  The  act  of  learning  has 
been  treated  as  if  it  were  the  passive  reception 
of  information  imposed  from  without.  The 
subject  to  be  learned  has  been  sequestered 
and  set  apart  from  experience  as  a whole,  with 


THE  BEHAMOR  OF  CROWDS 

the  result  that  ideas  easily  come  to  be  re- 
garded as  things  in  themselves.  Systems  of 
thought  are  built  up  with  little  or  no  sense  of 
their  connection  with  everyday  problems. 
Thus  our  present-day  education  prepares  in 
advance  both  the  ready-made  logical  .systems 
in  which  the  crowd-mind  takes  refuge  from 
the  concretely  real  and  the  disposition  to  ac- 
cept truth  second-hand,  upon  the  authority  of 
another,  which  in  the  crowd-man  becomes  the 
spirit  of  conformity. 

Even  science,  taught  in  this  spirit  may  be 
destructive  of  intellectual  freedom.  Professor 
Dewey  says  that  while  science  has  done  much 
to  modify  men’s  thoughts,  still 

It  must  be  admitted  that  to  a considerable  extent 
the  progress  thus  procured  has  been  only  technical; 
it  has  provided  more  efficient  means  for  satisfying  pre- 
existent desires  rather  than  modified  the  quality  of 
human  purposes.  There  is,  for  example,  no  modern 
civilization  which  is  the  ecjual  of  Greek  culture  in  all 
respects.  Science  is  still  too  recent  to  have  been  ab- 
sorbed into  imaginative  and  emotional  disposition. 
IMen  move  more  swiftly  and  surely  to  the  realization 
of  their  ends,  but  their  ends  too  largely  remain  what 
they  were  prior  to  scientific  enlightenment.  This  fact 
places  upon  education  the  responsibility  of  using  science 
in  a way  to  modify  the  habitual  attitude  of  imagination 
and  feeling,  not  leave  it  just  an  extension  of  our  physical 
arms  and  legs.  . . . 

The  problem  of  an  educational  use  of  science  is  then 
to  create  an  intelligence  pregnant  with  belief  in  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  direction  of  human  affairs  by  itself.  The 

288 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


method  of  science  ingrained  through  education  in  habit 
means  emancipation  from  rule  of  thumb  and  from  the 
routine  generated  by  rule  of  thumb  procedure.  . . . 

That  science  may  be  taught  as  a set  of  formal  and 
technical  exercises  is  only  too  true.  This  happens 
whenever  information  about  the  world  is  made  an  end 
in  itself.  The  failure  of  such  instruction  to  procure 
culture  is  not,  however,  evidence  of  the  antithesis 
of  natural  knowledge  to  humanistic  concern,  but  evi- 
dence of  a wrong  educational  attitude. 

The  new  kind  of  education,  the  education 
which  is  to  liberate  the  mind,  will  make  much 
of  scientific  methods.  But  let  us  notice  what 
it  is  to  set  a mind  free.  Mind  does  not  exist 
in  a vacuum,  nor  in  a world  of  “pure  ideas.” 
The  free  mind  is  the  functioning  mind,  the 
mind  which  is  not  inhibited  in  its  work  by 
any  conflict  within  itself.  Thought  is  not 
made  free  by  the  mere  substitution  of  natu- 
ralistic for  theological  dogma.  It  is  possible 
to  make  a cult  of  science  itself.  Crowd- 
propaganda  is  often  full  of  pseudoscientific 
jargon  of  this  sort.  Specialization  in  technical 
training  may  produce  merely  a high-class 
trained-animal  man,  of  the  purely  reflex  type, 
who  simply  performs  a prescribed  trick  which 
he  has  learned,  whenever  an  expected  motor- 
cue  appears.  In  the  presence  of  the  unex- 
pected such  a person  may  be  as  helpless  as 
any  other  animal.  It  is  possible  to  train 
circus  dogs,  horses,  and  even  horned  toads,  to 
behave  in  this  same  way.  Much  so-called 

2S9 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


scientific  training  in  our  scliools  to-day  is  of 
this  sort.  It  results  not  in  freedom,  but  in 
what  Bergson  would  call  the  triumph  of 
mechanism  over  freedom. 

Science,  to  be  a means  of  freedom — that  is, 
science  as  culture — may  not  be  pursued  as  pure 
theorizing  apart  from  practical  application. 
Neither  may  a calculating  utilitarianism  gain 
freedom  to  us  by  ignoring,  in  the  application 
of  scientific  knowledge  to  given  ends,  a con- 
sideration of  the  ends  themselves  and  their 
value  for  enriching  human  experience.  I^s 
human  interest  which  gives  scientific  knowl- 
edge any  meaning.  Science  must  be  taught 
iiTthe  Humanist  s^rit.  It  may  not  ignore  this 
quality  of  human  interest  which  exists  in  all 
knowledge.  To  do  so  is  to  cut  off  our  relations 
with  reality.  And  the  result  may  become  a 
negation  of  personality  similar  to  that  with 
which  the  crowd  compensates  itself  for  its 
unconscious  ego-mania. 

The  reference  just  made  to  Humanism 
leads  us  next  to  a consideration  of  the  humani- 
ties. It  has  long  been  the  habit  of  traditional 
education  to  oppose  to  the  teaching  of  science 
the  teaching  of  the  classic  languages  and  the 
arts,  as  if  there  were  two  irreconcilable  prin- 
ciples involved  here.  Dewey  says  that 

Humanistic  studies  when  set  in  opposition  to  study 
of  nature  are  hampered.  They  tend  to  reduce  them- 
selves to  exclusively  literary  and  linguistic  studies, 

290 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


which  in  turn  tend  to  shrink  to  “the  classics,”  to 
languages  no  longer  spoken.  ...  It  would  be  hard  to 
find  anything  in  history  more  ironical  than  the  edu- 
cational practices  which  have  identified  the  “human- 
ities ” exclusively  with  a knowledge  of  Greek  and  Latin. 
Greek  and  Roman  art  and  institutions  made  such  im- 
portant contributions  to  our  civilization  that  there 
should  always  be  the  amplest  opportunities  for  making 
their  acquaintance.  But  to  regard  them  as  par  excel- 
lence the  humane  studies  involves  a deliberate  neglect 
of  the  possibilities  of  the  subject-matter  which  is  ac- 
cessible in  education  to  the  masses,  and  tends  to  cul- 
tivate a narrow  snobbery — that  of  a learned  class  whose 
insignia  are  the  accidents  of  exclusive  opportunity. 
Knowledge  is  humanistic  in  quality  not  because  it  is 
about  human  products  in  the  past,  but  because  of  what 
it  does  in  liberating  human  intelligence  and  human 
sympathy.  Any  subject-matter  which  accomplishes 
this  result  is  humane  and  any  subject-matter  which 
does  not  accomplish  it  is  not  even  educational. 

The  point  is  that  it  is  precisely  what  a cor- 
rect knowledge  of  ancient  civilization  through 
a study  of  the  classics  does  that  our  traditional 
educators  most  dread.  William  James  once 
said  that  the  good  which  came  from  such  study 
was  the  ability  to  “know  a good  man  when 
we  see  him.”  The  student  would  thus  become 
more  capable  of  discriminating  appreciation. 
He  would  grow  to  be  a judge  of  values.  He 
would  acquire  sharp  likes  and  dislikes  and 
thus  set  up  his  own  standards  of  judgment. 
He  would  become  an  independent  thinker  and 
therefore  an  enemy  of  crowds.  Scholars  of  the 

291 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Renaissance  knew  this  well,  and  that  is  why 
in  their  revolt  against  the  crowd-mindedness 
of  their  day  they  made  use  of  the  litteroe  hu- 
manores  to  smash  to  pieces  the  whole  dogmatic 
system  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

With  the  picture  of  ancient  life  before  him 
Jie  student  could  not  help  becoming  more 
cosmopolitan  in  spirit.  Here  he  got  a glimpse 
of  a manner  of  living  in  which  the  controlling 
ideas  and  fixations  of  his  contemporary  crowds 
were  frankly  challenged.  Here  were  witnesses 
to  values  contrary  to  those  in  which  his  crowd 
had  sought  to  bring  him  up  in  a docile  spirit. 
Inevitably  his  thinking  would  wander  into 
what  his  crowd  considered  forbidden  paths. 
One  cannot  begin  to  know  the  ancients  as  they 
reallj^  were  without  receiving  a tremendous 
intellectual  stimulus.  After  becoming  ac- 
quainted with  the  intellectual  freedom  and 
courage  and  love  of  life  which  are  almost 
everywhere  manifest  in  the  literature  of  the 
ancients,  something  happens  to  a man.  He 
becomes  acquainted  with  himself  as  a valuing 
animal.  Few  things  are  better  calculated  to 
make  free  spirits  than  these  very  classics,  once 
the  student  “catches  on.” 

But  that  is  just  the  trouble;  from  the 
Renaissance  till  now,  the  crowd-mind,  whether 
interested  politically,  morally,  or  religiously; 
whether  Catholic,  or  Protestant,  or  merely 
Rationalist,  has  done  its  level  best  to  keep  the 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


student  from  “catching  on.”  Educational  tra- 
dition, which  is  for  the  most  part  only  sys- 
tematized crowd-thinking,  has  perverted  the 
classics  into  instruments  for  producing  spir- 
itual results  of  the  very  opposite  nature  from 
the  message  which  these  literatures  contain. 
Latin  and  Greek  are  taught  for  'purposes  of 
discipline.  The  task  of  learning  them  has  been 
made  as  difficult  and  as  uninteresting  as  pos- 
sible, with  the  idea  of  forcing  the  student  to 
do  something  he  dislikes,  of  whipping  his  spirit 
into  line  and  rendering  him  subservient  to  in- 
tellectual authority.  Thus,  while  keeping  up 
the  external  appearance  of  culture,  the  effect 
is  to  make  the  whole  thing  so  meaningless  and 
unpleasant  that  the  student  will  never  have 
the  interest  to  try  to  find  out  what  it  is  all 
about. 

I have  said  that  the  sciences  and  classics 
should  be  approached  in  the  “humanistic” 
spirit.  The  humanist  method  must  be  ex- 
tended to  the  whole  subject-matter  of  educa- 
tion, even  to  a revaluation  of  knowing  itself. 
I should  not  say  even,  but  primarily.  It  is 
impossible  here  to  enter  into  an  extended  dis- 
cussion of  the  humanist  theories  of  knowledge 
as  contrasted  with  the  traditional  or  “intel- 
lectualist”  theories.  But  since  we  have  seen 
that  the  conscious  thinking  of  the  crowd- 
mind  consists  in  the  main  of  abstract  and 
dogmatic  logical  systems,  similar  to  the 

293 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


“rationalizations”  of  the  paranoiac,  it  is  im- 
portant to  note  the  bearing  of  humanism  upon 
these  logical  systems  wherever  they  are  found. 

A number  of  years  ago,  while  discussing 
certain  phases  of  this  subject  with  one  of  the 
physicians  in  charge  of  a large  hospital  for 
the  insane,  the  significance  of  education  for 
healthy  mental  life  was  brought  out  with  great 
emphasis.  It  was  at  the  time  when  psychi- 
atrists were  just  beginning  to  make  use  of 
analytical  psychologj^  in  the  treatment  of 
mental  and  nervous  disorders. 

“The  trouble  with  a great  many  of  our 
patients,”  said  my  friend,  “is  the  fact  that 
they  have  been  wrongly  educated.” 

“Do  you  mean,”  I said,  “that  they  have  not 
received  proper  moral  instruction.^” 

“Yes,  but  by  the  proper  moral  instruction 
I do  not  mean  quite  the  same  thing  that  most 
people  mean  by  that.  It  all  depends  on  the 
way  in  which  the  instruction  is  given.  Many 
of  these  patients  are  the  mental  slaves  of  con- 
vention. They  have  been  terrified  by  it;  its 
weight  crushes  them;  when  they  discover 
that  their  own  impulses  or  behavior  are  in 
conflict  with  what  they  regard  as  absolute 
standards,  they  cannot  bear  the  shock.  They 
do  not  know  how  to  use  morality;  they  simply 
condemn  themselves;  they  seek  reconciliation 
by  all  sorts  of  crazy  ideas  which  develop  into 
the  psychoneurosis.  And  the  only  hope  there 

294 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


is  of  cure  for  them  is  re-education.  The 
physician,  when  it  is  not  too  iate,  often  to  do 
any  good  has  to  become  an  educator.” 

The  practice  of  psychoanalysis  as  a thera- 
peutic method  is  really  hardly  anything  more 
than  re-education.  The  patient  must  first  be 
led  to  face  the  fact  of  himself  as  he  really  is; 
then  he  must  be  taught  to  revalue  conventional 
ideas  in  such  a way  that  he  can  use  these 
ideas  as  instruments  with  which  he  may  adjust 
himself  in  the  various  relations  of  life.  This 
process  of  education,  in  a word,  is  humanistic. 
It  is  pragmatic;  the  patient  is  taught  that  his 
thinking  is  a way  of  functioning;  that  ideas 
are  instruments,  ways  of  acting.  He  learns 
to  value  these  tendencies  to  act  and  to  find 
himself  through  the  mastery  of  his  own 
thinking. 

Now  we  have  seen  that  the  neurosis  is  but 
one  path  of  escape  from  this  conflict  of  self 
with  the  imperatives  and  abstract  ideas 
through  which  social  control  is  exercised.  The 
second  way  is  to  deny,  unconsciously,  the  true 
meaning  of  these  ideas,  and  this,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  crowd-thinking.  Here,  as  in  the  other 
case,  the  education  which  is  needed  is  that 
which  acquaints  the  subject  with  the  func- 
tional nature  of  his  own  thinking,  which  directs 
his  attention  to  results,  which  dissolves  the 
fictions  into  which  the  unconscious  takes 
refuge,  by  showing  that  systems  of  ideas  have 

295 


'i'HE  BEHAMOR  OF  CROWDS 


no  other  reality  than  what  they  do  and  no 
other  meaning  than  the  difference  which  their 
being  true  makes  in  actual  experience  some- 
where. 

We  have  previously  noted  the  connection 
between  the  intellectualist  philosophies  with 
their  closed  systems  of  ideas,  their  absolutists, 
and  the  conscious  thinking  of  crowds.  The 
crowd  finds  these  systems  readj^-made  and 
merely  backs  into  them  and  hides  itself  like  a 
hermit  crab  in  a deserted  seashell.  It  follows 
that  the  humanist,  however  social  he  may  be, 
cannot  be  a crowd-man.  He,  too,  will  have 
his  ideals,  but  they  are  not  made-in-advance 
goods  which  all  must  accept;  they  are  good 
only  as  they  may  be  made  good  in  real  experi- 
ence, true  only  when  verified  in  fact.  To  such 
a mind  there  is  no  unctuousness,  by  which 
ideas  may  be  fastened  upon  others  without 
their  assent.  Nothing  is  regarded  as  so  final 
and  settled  that  the  spirit  of  inquiry  should  be 
discouraged  from  efforts  to  modify  and  im- 
prove it. 

Generalizations,  such  as  justice,  truth,  lib- 
erty, and  all  other  mtellectualist-  and  crowd- 
abstractions,  become  to  the  hmnanist  not 
transcendental  things  in  themselves,  but  de- 
scriptions of  certain  qualities  of  behavior, 
actual  or  possible,  existing  only  where  they 
are  experienced  and  in  definite  situations.  He 
will  not  be  swept  into  a howling  mob  by  these 


EDUCxVnON  AS  A CURE 


big  words;  be  will  stop  to  see  what  partieular 
things  are  they  which  in  a given  instance  are 
to  be  called  just,  what  particular  hypothesis 
is  it  which  it  is  sought  to  verify  and  thus  add 
to  the  established  body  of  truth,  whose  liberty 
is  demanded  and  what,  to  be  definite,  is  it 
proposed  that  he  ^hall  do  with  the  greater 
opportunity  for  action?  Let  the  crowd  yell 
itself  hoarse,  chanting  its  abstract  nouns 
made  out  of  adjectives,  the  humanist  will 
know  that  these  are  but  words  and  that  the 
realities  which  they  point  to,  if  they  have  any 
meaning  at  all,  are  what  “they  are  known  as.” 

This  humanist  doctrine  of  the  concreteness 
of  the  real  is  important.  It  is  a rfeaflSrmation 
of  the  reality  of  human  experience.  William 
James,  who  called  himself  a “radical  empiri- 
cist,” made  much  of  this  point.  Experience 
may  not  be  ruled  out  for  the  sake  of  an  a 'priori 
notion  of  what  this  world  ought  to  be.  As 
James  used  to  say,  we  shall  never  know  what 
this  world  really  is  or  is  to  become  until  the 
last  man’s  vote  is  in  and  counted.  Here,  of 
course,  is  an  emphasis  upon  the  significance  of 
unique  personality  which  no  crowd  will  grant. 
Crowds  will  admit  personality  as  an  abstract 
principle,  but  not  as  an  active  will  having 
something  of  its  own  to  say  about  the  ultimate 
outcome  of  things. 

Another  important  point  in  which  human- 
ism corrects  crowd-thinking  is  the  fact  that  it 

20  297 


K 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


regards  intellect  as  an  instrument  of  acting, 
and  not  as  a mere  copyist  of  realities  earthly 
or  supermundane.  Dewey  says: 

If  it  be  true  that  the  self  or  subject  of  experience  is 
part  and  parcel  of  the  course  of  events,  it  foUows  that 
the  self  becomes  a knower.  It  becomes  a mind  in  virtue 
of  a distinctive  way  of  partaking  in  the  course  of  events. 
The  significant  distinction  is  no  longer  between  a knower 
and  the  world,  it  is  between  different  ways  of  being  in 
and  of  the  movement  of  things;  between  a physical 
way  and  a purposive  way.  . . . 

As  a matter  of  fact  the  pragmatic  theory  of  intelli- 
gence means  that  the  function  of  mind  is  to  project 
new  and  more  complex  ends  to  free  experience  from 
routine  and  caprice.  Not  the  use  of  thought  to  accom- 
plish purposes  already  given  either  in  the  mechanism  of 
the  body  or  in  that  of  the  existent  state  of  society,  but 
the  use  of  intelligence  to  liberate  and  liberalize  action, 
is  the  pragmatic  lesson. . . . Intelligence  as  intelligence  is 
inherently  forward  looking;  only  by  ignoring  its  pri- 
maryfimction  does  it  become  a means  for  an  end  already 
given.  The  latter  is  servile,  even  when  the  end  is 
labeled  moral,  religious,  esthetic.  But  action  directed 
to  ends  to  which  the  agent  has  not  previously  been 
attached  inevitably  carries  with  it  a quickened  and 
enlarged  spirit.  A pragmatic  intelligence  is  a creative 
intelligence,  not  a routine  mechanic. 

Hence  humanism  breaks  down  the  conform- 
ist spirit  of  crowds.  From  the  simplest  to  the 
most  complex,  ideas  are  regarded  as  primarily 
motor,  or,  rather,  as  guides  to  our  bodily 
movements  among  other  things  in  our  en- 
vironment. James  says  that  the  stream  of  life 

298 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


which  runs  in  at  our  eyes  and  ears  is  meant  to 
run  out  at  our  lips,  our  feet,  and  our  finger- 
tips. Bergson  says  that  ideas  are  like  snap- 
shots of  a man  running.  However  closely  they 
are  taken  together,  the  movement  always  oc- 
curs between  them.  They  cannot,  therefore, 
give  us  reality,  or  the  movement  of  life  as 
such,  but  only  cross-sections  of  it,  which  serve 
as  guides  in  directing  the  conscious  activity  of 
life  upon  matter.  According  to  James  again, 
there  are  no  permanently  existing  ideas,  or 
impersonal  ones;  each  idea  is  an  individual 
activity,  ^own  only  in  the  thinking,  and  is 
al_ways  thought /or  a 'purpose.  As  all  thinking 
is  pu^dsive,  and  therefore  partial,  emphasiz- 
ing just  those  aspects  of  things  which  are  use- 
ful for^our  present  problem,  it  follows  that  the 
sum  total  of  partial  views  cannot  give  us  the 
whole  of  reality  or  anything  like  a true  copy 
of  it.  Existence  as  a whole  cannot  be  reduced 
to  any  logical  system.  The  One  and  the  Abso- 
lute are  therefore  meaningless  and  are  only 
logical  fictions,  useful,  says  James,  by  way  of 
allowing  us  a sort  of  temporary  irresponsi- 
bility, or  “moral  holiday.” 

From  all  this  follows  the  humanist  view  of 
Truth.  Truth  is  nothing  complete  and  exist- 
ing in  itself  independent  of  human  purpose. 
The  word  is  a noun  made  out  of  an  adjective, 
as  I have  said.  An  idea  becomes  true,  says 
James,  when  it  fits  into  the  totality  of  our 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROV'DS 

experience;  truth  is  what  we  say  about  an 
idea  when  it  works.  It  must  be  made  true, 
by  ourselves — that  is,  verified.  Truth  is  there- 
fore of  human  origin,  frankly,  man-made.  To 
Schiller  it  is  the  same  as  the  good;  it  is  the 
attainment  of  satisfactory  relations  within  ex- 
perience. Or,  to  quote  the  famous  humanist 
creed  of  Protagoras,  as  Schiller  is  so  fond  of 
doing,  “Man  is  the  measure  of  all  things.” 
The  meaning  of  the  world  is  precisely,  for  all 
purposes,  its  meaning  for  us.  Its  worth,  both 
logical  and  moral,  is  not  something  given,  but 
just  what  we  through  our  activity  are  able  to 
assign  to  it. 

The  humanist  is  thus  thrown  upon  his  own 
responsibility  in  the  midst  of  concrete  realities 
of  which  he  as  a knowing,  willing  being  is  one. 
His  task  is  to  make  such  modifications  within 
his  environnienf,  j^yiTcal  and  social,  as  will 
make  hTs  own  activity  and  that  of  others  with 
him  richer  and  more  satisfactory  in  the^^ future. 

The  question  arises — it  is  a question  com- 
monly put  by  crowd-minded  people  and  by 
intellectual  philosophers;  Plato  asks  it  of  the 
Protagoreans — how,  if  the  individual  man  is 
the  measure  of  all  things,  is  there  to  be  any 
common  measure.'^  How  any  agreement? 
May  not  a thing  be  good  and  true  for  one  and 
not  for  another?  How',  then,  shall  there  be 
any  getting  together  without  an  outside  au- 
thority and  an  absolute  standard?  The  an- 

300 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


swer,  as  Schiller  and  James  showed,  is  obvi- 
ous; life  is  a matter  of  adjustment.  We  each 
constitute  a part  of  the  other’s  environment. 
At  certain  points  our  desires  conflict,  our  valu- 
ations are  different,  and  yet  our  experience 
at  these  points  overlaps,  as  it  were.  It  is  to 
our  common  advantage  to  have  agreement  at 
these  points.  Out  of  our  habitual  adjustments 
to  one  another,  a body  of  mutual  understand- 
ing and  agreement  grows  up  which  constitutes 
the  intellectual  and  moral  order  of  life.  But 
this  order,  necessary  as  it  is,  is  still  in  the 
making.  It  is  not  something  given;  it  is  not 
a copy  of  something  transcendent,  impersonal, 
and  final  which  crowds  may  write  upon  their 
banners  and  use  to  gain  uniform  submission 
for  anything  which  they  may  be  able  to  ex- 
press in  terms  which  are  general  and  abstract. 
This  order  of  life  is  purely  practical;  it  exists 
for  us,  not  we  for  it,  and  because  we  have 
agreed  that  certain  things  shall  be  right  and 
true,  it  does  not  follow  that  righteousness  and 
truth  are  fixed  and  final  and  must  be  wor- 
shiped as  pure  ideas  in  such  a way  that  the 
mere  repetition  of  these  words  paralyzes  our 
cerebral  hemispheres. 

Doubtless  one  of  the  greatest  aids  of  the 
humanist  way  of  thinking  in  bringing  the  indi- 
vidual to  self-consciousness  is  the  way  in 
which  it  orients  us  in  the  world  of  present- 

day  events.  It  inspires  one  to  achieve  a work- 

301 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROTOS 


ing  harmony,  not  a fictitious  haven  of  rest  for 
the  mind  interested  only  in  its  relations  to  its 
own  ideas.  The  unity  which  hfe  demands  of 
us  is  not  that  of  a perfect  rational  system.  It 
is  rather  the  unity  of  a healthy  organism  all 
the  parts  of  which  can  work  together. 

Cut  up  as  we  are  into  what  Emerson  called 
“fragments  of  men,”  I think  w’e  are  particu- 
larly susceptible  to  crowd-thinking  because  we 
are  so  disintegrated.  Thought  and  behavior 
must  always  be  more  or  less  automatic  and 
compulsory  where  there  is  no  conscious  co- 
ordination of  the  several  parts  of  it.  It  is 
partly  because  we  are  the  heirs  of  such  a 
patchwork  of  civilization  that  few  people  to- 
day are  able  to  think  their  lives  through. 
There  can  be  little  organic  unity  in  the  hetero- 
geneous and  unrelated  aggregation  of  half- 
baked  information,  warring  interests,  and  ir- 
reconcilable systems  of  valuation  which  are 
piled  together  in  the  modern  man’s  thinking. 

Life  may  not  be  reduced  to  a logical  unity, 
but  it  is  an  organic  whole  for  each  of  us,  and 
we  do  not  reach  that  organic  unity  by  adding 
mutually  exclusive  partial  views  of  it  together. 

Something  happens  to  one  who  grasps  the 
meaning  of  humanism;  he  becomes  self-con- 
scious in  a new  way.  His  psychic  life  becomes 
a fascinating  adventure  in  a real  world.  He 
finds  that  his  choices  are  real  events.  He  is 
“set  intellectually  on  fire,”  as  one  of  our  edu- 

302 


EDUCATION  AS  A CURE 


cators  has  correctly  defined  education.  As 
Jung  would  doubtless  say,  he  has  “extro- 
verted” himself;  his  libido,  which  in  the 
crowd  seeks  to  enhance  the  ego  feeling  by 
means  of  the  mechanism  which  we  have  de- 
scribed, now  is  drawn  out  and  attached  to  the 
outer  world  through  the  intellectual  channel. 
Selfhood  is  realized  in  the  satisfactoriness  of 
the  results  which  one  is  able  to  achieve,  in  the 
very  fullness  of  his  activity  and  the  richness 
of  his  interests. 

Such  a free  spirit  needs  no  crowds  to  keep 
up  his  faith,  and  he  is  truly  social,  for  he  ap- 
proaches his  social  relationships  with  intelli- 
gent discrimination  and  judgments  of  worth 
which  are  his  own.  He  contributes  to  the 
social,  not  a copy  or  an  imitation,  not  a child- 
ish wish-fancy  furtively  disguised,  but  a 
psychic  reality  and  a new  creative  energy.  It 
is  only  in  the  fellowship  of  such  spirits,  what- 
ever political  or  economic  forms  their  associa- 
tion may  take,  that  we  may  expect  to  see  the 
Republic  of  the  Free. 


INDEX 


Abelard.  153.  283. 

Absolute,  the,  143. 

Absolutism,  133,  144. 

Abstract  ideas,  2,  49,  160. 

function  of,  154,  155. 

Adler,  Dr.  Alfred,  59. 

The  tleurotie  Constitution,  20,  61, 

63. 

(Translated  by  Bernard  Glueck 
and  John  A.  Lind;  Moffat,  Yard 
& Co.,  New  York,  1917.) 
Adventist,  211. 

(See  also  Messianism.) 

Age  of  Reason,  209. 

Agitators.  192. 

Alcoholic  neurosis,  86. 

Alice  in  Wonderland,  2. 

Ambition,  66. 

America,  conformist  spirit  in,  275. 

crowd  movements  in,  53. 

democracy  in,  253,  280. 

education  in,  273,  280. 

freedom  of  opinion  in,  268. 

leadership  in,  275. 

present  condition,  189. 

American  colonists,  52. 

Declaration  of  Independence,  196. 

democracy,  mental  habits  in,  272. 

revolution,  225. 

Americanism,  87. 

Americanization  propaganda,  108. 
Anabaptists,  225. 

Analytical  psychology,  12,  294. 

(See  also  Psychoanalysis,  Freud, 
Jung,  Adler,  Brill,  The  Uncon- 
scious.) 

Anselm,  153. 

a priori  ideas  in  paranoia,  67. 

Arbitrary  power,  limits  of,  246. 
Aristocrats,  182. 

Armenians,  persecution  of,  107. 
Armistice,  the,  115. 

Athletic  contests,  82. 

events,  symbols  of  conflict,  113. 

Atlantic  Monthly,  258. 

Attention,  36. 

direction  of,  29. 

function  of,  58. 

Augustine,  Saint,  153,  270. 

Bacon,  Francis,  153. 

Baker,  Secretary  Newton  D.,  117,  119. 
Beethoven,  175,  269. 

Behavior,  social,  5. 

Belief,  crowd  a creature  of,  31. 


Beliefs,  as  ends  in  themselves,  33. 

crowd  professions  of,  195. 

Berger,  Victor,  265. 

Bergson,  Henri,  153. 

on  sleep,  57. 

Creative  Evolution,  211,  299. 

(Translated  by  Arthur  Mitchell; 
Henry  Holt  & Co.,  New  York, 

1911. ) 

Time  and  Free  Will,  290. 

(Translated  by  F.  L.  Pogson; 
George  Allen  & Co.,  London, 

1912. ) 

Bible,  270. 

Birth  control,  239. 

Boccaccio,  270. 

Bolshevism,  166,  186,  207. 

(See  also  Soviets,  Revolution,  Rus- 
sia.) 

Bolshevist  propaganda,  228. 
Bourgeoise,  170,  225. 

Brill,  Dr.  A.  A.,  59. 

Psychoanalysis;  Its  Theories  and 

Application  (W.  B.  Saunders, 
Philadelphia,  Pa.),  55,  61,  93,  133, 
135. 

British  Labor  Party,  226. 

Butler,  Samuel,  283. 

Byron,  62. 

Caesar  Borgia,  233. 

Calvin,  225. 

Capitalism,  177,  178. 

Carlyle.  258. 

Heroes  and  Hero  Worshipers,  175. 

Sartor  Resartus,  46. 

Cassanova,  270. 

Categorical  imperative,  90. 

Catholics,  264. 

in  England,  225. 

Censorships.  239. 

Cervantes,  283. 

Chautauqua,  the,  272. 

Chauvanism,  223. 

Chesterton,"  G.  K.,  135. 

Chicago,  riot  in,  107. 

Child,  egoism  of,  62. 

Christianity,  primitive,  193,  209. 
Church,  the,  83,  114,  170,  234. 

Cicero,  188. 

Citizen,  the,  248. 

Civilization,  continuity  of,  216. 

Class,  the  master,  177. 

struggle,  43. 

(See  also  Revolution.) 


305 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Classics,  the,  292. 

Clergy  of  Middle  Ages,  230. 

Collective  Mind,  15. 

College  students,  egoism  of,  78,  79. 
Communion  of  the  saints,  83. 
Compensation,  120. 

mechanisms  of,  84. 

Complex  formations,  causes  of,  65. 
Compromise  mechanisms,  71. 
Compulsive  hatred,  112. 

thinking,  71,  102. 

Con9ict,  psychic,  3. 

within  the  psyche,  70. 

Conformist  spirit,  275. 

Conformity,  insisted  upon  by  crowds, 
266. 

Conscientious  objector,  120. 
Consciousness,  57. 

Conservatism  of  the  crowd-mind,  224. 
C-onservative  crowds,  191. 

Conspiracy,  delusion  of,  105. 

(See  also  Paranoia,  Projection, 
Persecution.) 

Constantine,  234. 

Constituent  assembly,  French,  186. 
Constitution,  247,  249. 

Constitutional  government,  235. 
Convert,  the,  86. 

Conway,  Sir  Martin,  17,  181. 

The  Crowd  in  Peace  and  War. 

(Longmans,  Green  & Co.,  London, 
1915.) 

Co-operation,  226. 

Co-operative  commonwealth,  209. 
Cooper  Union  Forum,  25,  26,  265, 
240. 

Counter  crowds,  198. 

Couthon,  206. 

Creative  Intelligence,  298. 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  225. 

Crowd,  the,  6. 


lusion  of  Persecution,  Projection.) 
a creature  of  belief,  31. 


a state  of  mind,  19. 

compulsive  thinking  of,  71,  102. 

de6ned,  5. 

delusion  of  conspiracy  in,  105. 

delusion  of  persecution,  99. 

dogma  of  equality  in,  175. 

— dominant,  35,  177. 

effect  on  social  peace,  8. 

effect  on  the  individual,  8. 

ego  mania  of,  74. 

enemy  of  personality,  159. 

ethics  of,  90. 

fear  and  suspicion  in,  104. 

function  of  ideals  in,  84. 

hates  in  order  that  it  may  believe 

in  itself,  132. 

hatred,  a motive  of  self-defense, 

113,  125. 

homicidal  tendencies  of,  10(1-107. 

ideal  of  society,  267. 

idealism  of,  160. 

idealizes  itself,  43. 


Crowd,  itself  absolute,  161. 

its  resentment  of  educated  man, 

172. 

— — movements  in  America,  53. 

moral,  124. 

moral  dilemmas  of,  88. 

motives  in  education,  271,  272. 

notions  of  equality,  262. 

parental  function  of,  44. 

restrictions  upon  freedom,  25. 

rumor  in,  104. 

self-deception  of.  54. 

self-pity  in,  101. 

— — ' sense  of  responsibility  in,  100. 

transference  phenomenon,  a 136 

138. 

truths  are  a priori  concepts,  141. 

tyranny  in,  101. 

— tyraimy  of,  235. 

unconscious  egoism  of.  73. 

unconscious  motives  of,  51. 

virtues  and  vices  of.  88. 

virtues  of.  164. 

Crowd-behavior,  in  a democracy.  242. 

pseudo-social,  22. 

Crowd-ethics,  267. 

Crowd-ideas,  abstract,  49. 

Crowd-ideas,  moral  significance  of,  35. 

pathology  of.  37. 

phenomenon  of  attention  in,  36. 

ready  made.  26. 

Crowd  man,  a dogmatist,  140. 

Crowd  mentality,  5. 

Crowd-mind — and  paranoia.  92. 

absolutism  of,  chapter  xd,  133. 

conservatism  of,  224. 

distorts  patriotism.  111. 

influence  upon  education,  277. 

orthodoxy  of.  152. 

similarity — to  paranoia,  98. 

— — tendency  to  exaggerate.  100. 
Crowd  morality,  35,  157-158. 

demands  a victim.  106. 

Crowd  orator,  99. 

Crowd-propaganda,  289. 

Crowd- thinking — conservative,  191. 

destructive  tendencies  of,  163. 

finality  of,  44. 

function  of,  191. 

Intensified  by  revolution,  223. 

logic  of,  140. 

not  creative,  217. 

pageantry  of,  215. 

quest  of  '■  magic  formulas,"  150. 

rationalization  of,  150-151. 

— — wanting  in  intellectual  curiosity, 
271. 

Crowds,  claim  to  infallibility,  234. 

counter,  198. 

credulity  of,  139-140. 

dictatorship  of,  183. 

dif^ty  of,  S3. 

dismtsgration  of,  195. 

dominant,  168. 

faith  of,  126. 

function  of  ideas  in,  155-156. 

hostility  to  freedom,  2(X). 

306 


INDEX 


Crowds,  idealism  of,  112. 

illiberalism  of,  276. 

in  modern  society,  7. 

liberty  of,  266. 

Messianic  faith  of,  201. 

permanent,  42. 

phenomenon  of  displacement  in, 

116. 

resist  disintegration,  129. 

revolutionary,  180. 

revolutionary  phenomena  in,  203. 

self-adulation  of,  77. 

self-feeling  in,  170. 

slow  to  learn,  193. 

spirit  of,  298. 

will  to  dominance,  79. 

Curiosity  of  crowds,  271. 

Darwin,  225,  269. 

Day  dreams,  84. 

Day  of  the  Lord,  202. 

Debs,  Eugene  V.,  265. 

Decalogue,  90. 

Defense-mechanism,  94. 

Deists,  264. 

Delusion  of  conspiracy,  105. 

(See  also  Paranoia,  Persecution.) 

of  grandeur,  92. 

(See  also  Paranoia,  Egoism,  Self- 
feeling.) 

— — of  persecution,  68,  69,  92,  99. 

(See  also  Paranoia,  Projection, 
Hate.) 

Democracy,  178,  266,  282. 

crowd  behavior  in,  242. 

— — genius  in,  268. 

in  America,  253,  272,  280. 

law  in.  268, 

lawmaking  power  in,  247. 

Uberty  in,  248,  261-267. 

mental  habits  of,  287. 

not  synonymous  with  liberty,  242. 

Democratic  constitutions,  235. 
Democrats,  264. 

Demons,  95. 

Demon  worship,  97. 

Demosthenes,  62. 

Department  of  Justice,  United  States, 
240. 

Determination,  unconscious,  5. 
Determinism,  psychological  motives  of, 
149. 

Devil,  the,  114. 

Dewey,  John,  Ethics,  by  Dewey  and 
Tufts  (Henry  Holt  & Co.,  New 
York,  1910),  89. 

Essays  in  Experimental  Logic 

(University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1916),  142. 

Creative  Intelligence  (Henry  Holt 

& Co.,  New  York,  1917),  298. 

Democracy  and  Education  (The 

Macmillan  Company,  New  York, 
1916),  288-289,  290.  291. 

Diaz,  194. 

Dictatorship,  222. 

Dictatorship  of  crowds,  183. 


Dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  193, 226, 
229-232. 

Dignity  of  crowds,  83. 

(See  also  Egoism.) 

Disguise,  mechanisms  of,  73. 
Disintegration  of  crowds,  129,  195. 
Dogma  of  infallibility,  234. 

Dogmatism,  140. 

Dominant  crowd,  177. 

Dostoievsky,  270. 

The  Brothers  Karamazov,  233. 

Dream,  the,  34. 

fancies,  58. 

of  Paradise,  207. 

of  social  redemption,  232. 

of  world  set  free,  222. 

Dreams,  57,  84. 

disguise  in,  73. 

Dreiser,  Theodore,  265. 

The  Genius,  265. 

Du  Bois,  W.  F.  B.,  121. 

Duty,  161. 

East  St.  Louis,  riot  in,  107. 

Eastman,  Max,  264. 

Economic  system,  213. 

Economics,  science  of,  185. 

Educated  .man,  crowd’s  resentment  of, 
172. 

Education,  chapter  x,  281. 

— — crowd  motive  in,  271-272. 

of  present  day,  288. 

religious,  153. 

— — the  new,  284,  286,  289. 

— ' — ' traditional,  292. 

traditional  systems,  277,  278. 

Ego,  consciousness,  70. 

(See  also  Self-feeling.) 

mania,  74. 

Egoism  of  the  neurotic,  61. 

— ; — vmoonscious,  73. 

Eighteenth  amendment  to  Constitution 
of  United  States,  236,  265. 
Emerson,  9,  269,  283,  302. 

Emotion,  theory  of,  18. 

Empiricism,  297. 

England,  political  liberty  in,  226. 

Socialism  in,  227. 

Environment,  social,  35. 

Epicurus,  153. 

EquaUty,  175,  262. 

Erasmus,  283. 

Espionage,  in  United  States,  241. 

Ethic,  of  Kant,  162. 

Ethics,  267. 

of  crowd,  90. 

Europe,  present  condition  in,  189. 
Evangelists,  114. 

(See  also  Sunday,  William.) 
Evolution,  212. 

doctrines  of,  210. 

Exa^eration  of  crowd-mind,  100. 
Exodus  of  children  of  Israel,  52. 
Exploitation,  170,  177. 

Extroversion,  303. 

Fads,  224. 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROTOS 


Faguet,  The  Cult  of  Incompetence,  17. 

(Translated  by  Beatrice  Bar- 
atow;  E.  P.  Dutton  & Co.,  New 
York,  1916.) 

■■  — The  Dread  of  Responsibility,  266. 
translated  by  Emily  James; 
G.  P.  Putnam’s  Sons,  New 
York,  1914.) 

Faith,  126. 

Fanaticism,  86. 

Fear,  104,  128. 

Feeling  of  importance,  82. 

(See  also  Egoism.) 

Female  neurotic,  98. 

Fichte,  152. 

Fiction  of  justification,  106. 

Fictions,  20,  128. 

Fictitious  logic,  198. 

Fixations,  phenomenon  of,  94. 

Flaubert,  270. 

Forgetting,  purposeful,  56. 

Fourierists,  204. 

Franklin,  225. 

Freedom,  154,  244,  248. 

in  democracy,  261-267. 

of  speech,  264. 

to  vote,  261. 

Free  spirit,  303. 

French  Revolution,  38,  107,  170,  182- 
183,  192,  194,  219. 

Freud,  Dr.  Sigmund,  30,  34,  59,  117, 

210. 

(See  Analytical  Psychology.) 

Delusion  and  Dream,  55. 

(Translated  by  Helen  Downey; 
Moffat,  Yard  & Co.,  New  York, 

1917. ) 

The  Interpretation  of  Dreams,  12, 

59. 

(Translated  by  Dr.  A.  A.  Brill; 
The  Macmillan  Company,  New 
York,  1915.) 

Three  Contributions  to  the  Sexual 

Theory.  “ Nervous  and  Mental 
Diseases,”  Monograph  Series  No. 
4,  63. 

Totem  and  Taboo,  12,  90,  95. 

(Translated  by  Dr.  A.  A.  Brill; 
Moffat,  Yard  & Co.,  New  York, 

1918. ) 

influence  upon  general  psychology, 

12. 

on  dream  thoughts,  30. 

Garrison,  William  Lloyd,  264. 

Gary  schools,  265. 

Genius,  67,  268. 

German.v,  110. 

and  the  war,  38. 

Socialist  movement  in,  227. 

Gironde,  196. 

(See  also  French  Revolution.) 
Gobineau,  17,  54,  181. 

Goethe,  175,  270,  283. 

Good,  the,  90. 

Goodness,  89. 

Government,  by  crowds,  chapter  ix,  233. 


Government,  functions  of,  251. 
Grandeur,  delusions  of,  92. 

(See  also  Egoism,  Paranoia.) 
Greatest  happiness,  principle  of,  167. 
Greece,  143. 

Greek  literature.  277. 

Hapsburg,  the,  235. 

Hatr^  132. 

in  paranoia,  94,  112. 

Hebrew  prophet,  202. 

Hegel,  152-153. 

Heretic,  the,  123. 

Hero  worship,  81,  82. 

Hohenzollerns,  the,  235. 

Homicidal  tendencies,  105. 

(.See  also  Crowd,  Paranoia, 
Hatred.) 

Homosexuality,  94. 

Human  nature,  evil  of,  284. 

weakness  of.  245-246. 

Human  sacrifice,  112. 

Humanism,  225,  290,  293,  298,  300,  302. 

(See  also  Pragmatism.) 

Humanist,  the,  296. 

Hume,  David,  153. 

Huxley,  226,  269. 

Hypocrisy,  among  crowds,  54. 

IdeaUsm,  141,  144. 

modern,  223. 

of  crowds,  112. 

psychology  of,  148. 

Ideals,  of  the  crowd,  84. 

Ideas,  a priori,  67. 

descriptive  confused  with  casual, 

214. 

no  impersonal,  3. 

political,  moral,  religious,  44. 

tyranny  of,  279. 

Ideational  system,  159. 

(See  also  Paranoia,  Crowd  Think- 
ing.) 

Illusions,  31. 

Imitation  and  suggestion,  theory  of.  33. 
Individual,  the,  IM,  283,  297,  301. 

and  society,  1-32. 

Individuahsm,  153,  262. 

Infalhbility,  dogma  of,  234. 

Inferiority,  feeling  of,  62,  169-170. 

(See  also  Egoism.  Compensation.) 
Ingersoll,  Robert,  225,  269. 

Insanity,  3. 

Insanity  and  emotion,  19. 

(Sw  also  Paranoia,  Psychoanaly- 
sis.) 

Instinct,  11. 

Instrumental  theory  of  intellect,  298. 
Intellectualism.  144,  296. 

and  conservatism,  18. 

Intellectuals,  the,  230. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  265. 

Jacobinism,  264. 

Jacobins,  the,  116. 

James,  William,  2,  31,  153,  207,  241, 
283,  291,  297. 


INDEX 


James,  William,  Essays  in  Radical 
Empiricism  (Longmans,  Green  & 
Co.,  New  York,  1912),  142. 

The  Meaning  of  Truth,  301. 

Pragmatism  (Longmans,  Green  & 

Co.,  New  York,  1905),  112. 

Principles  of  Psychology  (Henry 

Holt  & Co.,  New  York,  1890),  37, 
127,  298. 

The  Will  to  Believe  (Longmans, 

Green  & Co.,  Keprint,  1912),  57, 
175. 

Varieties  of  Religious  Experience, 

(Longmans,  Green  & Co.,  New 
York,  1906),  22. 

Jefferson,  225,  264. 

Jericho,  fall  of  a Revolutionary  symbol, 

212. 

Judgment  Day,  81. 

Julius  Csesar,  130. 

Julius  II,  Pope,  181. 

Jung.  Dr.  C.  G.,  59. 

(See  also  Psychoanalysis.) 

Analytical  Psychology,  85,  303. 

(Translated  by  E.  Long;  Mof- 
fat, Yard  & Co.,  New  York, 
1917.) 

Psychology  of  the  Unconscious,  66, 

138. 

(Translated  by  Beatrice  Hinkle; 
Moffat,  Yard  & Co.,  New  York, 
1916.) 

Justification,  mechanism  of,  106. 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,  80,  115. 

Kant,  153,  161. 

Metaphysics  of  Morals,  90,  162- 

163. 

(Translated  by  Thos.  K.  Abbot; 
Longmans,  Green  & Co.,  New 
York.  Sixth  edition,  1917.) 

Keats,  269. 

Kingdom  of  Heaven,  202. 

Labor,  assumed  triumph  of,  229. 

Law,  in  a democracy,  268. 

Leadership,  271. 

in  America,  275. 

LeBon,  Gustave,  5,  17,  19,  139,  205, 
242,  269. 

on  the  unconscious,  14. 

summary  of  his  theory,  47. 

The  Crowd,  A Study  of  the  Popular 

Mind  (Eleventh  edition.  T.  Fisher 
Unwin,  Ltd.,  London,  191'0,  15. 

The  Psychology  of  Revolution,  180, 

182,  205. 

(Translated  by  Miall;  G.  P. 
Putnam's  Sons,  New  York, 
1912.) 

Lenin,  Nicolai,  206,  227,  233.1 

Leo  X,  Pope,  181,  185. 

Liberator,  the,  124,  125,  264. 

Liberty,  199. 

in  a democracy,  242,  261-267. 

of  crowds,  266,  276. 

Libido,  65,  136,  303. 


Lincoln,  225. 

Livingstone,  R.  W.,  The  Oreek  Genius 
and  Its  Meaning  for  Us,  143. 
Locke,  John,  153. 

Logic,  of  crowd-thinking,  140. 

in  crowds  and  in  paranoia,  198. 

Louis  XVI,  186. 

Lowell,  Percival,  269. 

Lusk  Committee,  the,  103. 

Luther,  Martin,  175,  193,  225. 
Lynchings,  38,  106. 

McDougal,  Prof.  William,  10. 

An  introduction  to  Social  Psy- 
chology (John  W.  Luce  & Co., 
Boston,  1917),  11. 

Machiavelli,  The  Prince,  233. 

Madison  Square  Garden,  265. 

Majority,  as  king,  248. 

tyranny  of,  250. 

Man  in  the  state  of  nature,  209. 
Manifesto,  Socialist,  204. 

(See  also  Karl  Marx.) 

"Man  the  Measure  of  all  Things,”  300. 
Marcus  Aurelius,  234. 

Marines’  Fathers’ Association,  117-118. 
Marx,  Karl,  152. 

Masculine  protest,  62. 

Masochism,  39,  65. 

Mass  meetings,  23. 

Master  class,  177. 

Materialism,  150. 

Mechanisms,  of  compensation,  84. 

of  defense,  94. 

of  disguise,  73. 

of  justification,  40,  106. 

Mechanistic  theories,  1. 

Mediaeval  thinkers,  10. 

Mental  habits,  272. 

Messianism  as  a revolutionary  crowd 
phenomenon,  203,  210. 

Mexico,  194. 

Millennium,  201. 

Milton,  270. 

Milwaukee,  pseudo-patriotism  in,  259. 
Mind,  collective,  15. 

Minority  crowds,  arrogance  of,  257. 
Mirabeau,  183. 

Mob,  6,  165. 

outbreaks,  37. 

Mobs,  107. 

modern,  47. 

Southern,  39. 

Modern  society  challenged,  213. 
Modernism,  223. 

Montaigne,  270,  283. 

Moral  dilemmas,  88. 

Morality,  106. 

of  crowd-mind,  157-158. 

of  the  crowd,  124. 

Motion  pictures,  157. 

Multiple  personality,  5. 

Mysticism  of  revolutionary  crowds,  219. 

Napoleon,  221. 

Narcissus,  stage,  66. 

Nations  as  crowds,  83. 

309 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Negation,  phenomenon  of.  89. 

Nero,  234. 

Neurotic,  female,  98. 

similarity  to  crowd,  71. 

Newcomb,  Simon,  269. 

Newspapers,  45. 

New  York  City,  172. 

crowds  in,  115. 

New  Testament,  202. 

Nietzsche,  Friederich,  153,  269,  270. 

— — Antichrist  (Third  English  edition. 
Dr.  Oscar  Levy;  The  Macmillan 
Company,  New  York,  1911),  81. 
Beyond  Good  and  Evil  (Third  Eng- 
lish edition.  Dr.  Oscar  Levy; 
The  Macmillan  Company,  New 
York),  17,  124,  194. 

— Genealogy  of  Morals  (Edited  by 
Dr.  Oscar  Levy;  The  Macmillan 
Company,  New  York,  1911),  91. 

— Thus  Spake  Zarath^islra,  175. 

(Translated  by  Thomas  Com- 
mon.) 

— The  Will  to  Power,  62. 

translated  by  A.  M.  Ludovici; 
Oscar  Levy  edition;  The  Mac- 
millan Company.) 
Nonconformist,  123. 

Non-crowd  man,  226,  285. 

Obsessions,  134. 

CEdipus  complex,  66. 

Omaha,  riot  in,  107,  116. 

Orators,  25. 

Oratory,  99. 

Orthodoxy,  152. 

Pageantry,  216. 

Paine,  Thomas,  225. 

Paranoia/M,'  67,  92,  93,  94,  102,  294. 

' ■ and  fanaticism,  86. 

— — hatred  in,  112. 

— obsessive  ideas  in,  134. 

— rationalization  in,  139. 

' ' similarity  to  crowd-mind,  98. 
Paranoiac,  84,  163,  208. 

Parker,  Theodore,  269. 

Partisanship,  140,  194. 

Pathological  types,  58. 

Patriotic  crowds,  151. 

Patriotism,  80,  111,  118,  119. 

People’s  Institute  of  New  York,  241. 
Permanent  crowds,  42. 

Persecution,  delusion  of,  68,  69,  92. 
Personal  liberty,  244. 

in  a democracy,  248. 

Personality,  297. 

Perversion,  64. 

Petrarch,  175. 

Petrograd,  219. 

Philosophers,  intellectualist,  296. 
Philosophical  idealism,  148. 

(See  also  Tntellectualism,  Ration- 
alism.) 

Philosophy,  humanist,  293. 

Philosophy  of  “as  if,”  128. 


Platitudes  in  crowd  oratory,  26. 

Plato.  150,  153,  300. 

The  Republic,  143. 

(Translated  by  Jowett;  Third 
edition,  Oxford  Press,  1892.) 
Pliny,  247. 

Poe.  269. 

Pogroms,  107. 

Poland,  107. 

Political  conventions,  27. 

Political  liberty  in  England,  226. 
Politics,  philosophy  of,  233. 

Pope,  the,  62. 

Power,  abuses  of,  185. 

crowd,  will  to,  160. 

Pragmatism,  142,  299,  301. 

(See  also  Humanism.) 

Principles,  as  justification  mechanisms, 
40. 

— as  leading  ideas,  154. 

Progress,  167. 

Prohibition,  239,  265. 

Prohibition  agitator,  88. 

Prohibitionists,  the,  80,  114. 

Projection,  phenomenon  of,  87,  95,  105. 
Proletarian  crowd,  236. 

Proletarians,  263. 

Proletariat,  the,  183. 

dictatorship  of,  197,  229-232. 

Propaganda,  54,  101,  103,  142,  157,  264, 
289 

Bolshevist,  228,  265. 

revolutionary,  181,  189,  208. 

Protagoras,  153,  283,  300. 
Protestantism,  225. 

Prussianism,  258. 

Psychic  conflict,  3. 

Psychoanalysis,  34,  59.  165,  295. 

therapeutic  value  of,  165,  284. 

Psychology  of  crowd,  summary  of 
author’s  view,  48,  49,  50. 
Psychology,  social,  11. 

of  the  unconscious.  12,  51,  56,  57, 

58.  64.  70,  138,  267. 
Psychoneurosis,  92. 

— egoism  of,  61. 

Psychosexual,  64. 

Public  opinion,  4,  46. 

Public  schools,  273-274. 

Puritanism,  264,  265. 

Quakers,  the,  225,  264. 

Rabelais,  270. 

Race  riots,  107. 

— motive  of,  121. 

Radical  crowds,  152. 

Rationalism,  144. 

(See  also  Intellectualism.) 
Rationalization,  144,  249. 

in  crowds,  156. 

• ■ of  revolutionary  wish-fancy,  210. 
Real,  the,  concreteness  of,  297. 

Reality,  criterion  of,  32. 

sense  of,  37. 

Re-education,  294. 

Reform,  “white  slavery,”  98. 


310 


INDEX 


Reformation,  the,  182,  192,  225. 
Reformers,  157,  270. 

Reformist  crowds,  151. 

Regression,  111,  135. 

ReUgion,  201. 

Messianism  and  revolution,  204. 

Religious  convert,  86. 

crowds,  151. 

education,  153. 

symbolism,  66. 

Renaissance,  170,  175,  225,  292. 
Repression,  34,  45,  63,  64. 

Republicans,  the,  264. 

Responsibility,  sense  of,  100. 

Revenge,  220. 

Revival  meetings,  76. 

(See  also  Sunday,  William.) 
Revolution,  chapter  vii,  166,  183. 

as  a crowd  phenomenon,  180. 

psychic  causes  of,  171. 

small  fruits  of,  224. 

violence  in,  167. 

Revolution,  French,  38,  170,  182,  183, 
192,  194,  205,  219. 

■ Russian,  9,  183,  206. 

Revolutionary  creed,  222. 

crowds,  151,  200. 

propaganda,  181,  188,  189,  208. 

Riots,  106. 

Robespierre,  206,  235. 

Rochdale  movement,  226. 

Rolland,  Mme.,  182. 

Roman  republic,  187. 

Romanoffs,  the,  235. 

Rossetti,  270. 

Rousseau,  Jean  J.,  153,  233,  270. 
Rumor,  104. 

Russia,  pogroms  in,  107. 

revolution  in,  186. 

Socialist  movement  in,  227. 

Russian  revolution,  9,  53,  183,  206. 

Sadism,  39,  65,  111. 

Saint  Just,  206. 

Saint  Simonists,  204. 

Salem,  Massachusetts,  163. 
Sans-culottism,  171. 

Saturday  Evening  Post,  272. 

Savonarola,  235. 

Saxon  peasants,  225. 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  241,  300,  301. 

Humanism  (Second  edition.  The 

Macmillan  Company,  London, 
1912),  142. 

Studies  in  Humanism  (Second 

edition.  The  Macmillan  Com- 
pany, London,  1912),  144-147. 
Schopenhauer,  153,  269. 

Schubert,  269. 

Science,  159,  278. 

humanist  spirit  of,  225. 

Self-appreciation,  63. 

(See  also  Egoism.) 

consciousness,  301. 

deception  of  crowds,  54. 

defense,  a motive  of  crowd  hatred, 

125. 


Self-appreciation,  feeling,  170,  223. 

hood,  303. 

pity,  101. 

Senate  of  United  States,  114. 

Servetus,  225. 

^xuahty,  repressed,  63. 

Shakespeare,  270. 

Shakespeare’s  “ Julius  Cassar,”  130. 
SheUey,  269. 

Sioux  Indians,  156. 

Social  behavior,  1,  2. 

environment,  35,  37. 

idealism,  200. 

— order,  how  possible,  301. 

order,  the  present,  100. 

psychology,  11. 

reconstruction,  task  of,  212. 

redemption,  dream  of,  207,  222, 

232. 

redemption,  no  formula  for,  282. 

thinking,  2. 

Socialism  in  England,  226. 

Socialist,  80. 

movement  in  Germany,  227. 

movement  in  Russia,  227. 

movement  in  United  States,  227. 

philosophy,  210. 

Socialists,  the,  141,  204,  260. 
Socialization,  present  bndeucies  toward, 
236. 

Society,  as  “ Thing-in-itself ,”  2. 

Society  for  the  Prevention  of  Vice,  114. 
Socrates,  283. 

South,  lynchings  in,  106. 

Southern  mobs,  39. 

Soviet  republic,  9. 

spirit,  9. 

Soviets,  38. 

Spargo,  John,  124. 

The  Psychology  of  Bolshevism  (Har- 
per & Brothers,  1919),  8. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  16,  226,  238. 

Principles  of  Sociology  (D.  Apple- 

ton  & Co.,  New  York,  1898),  11. 
Spingarn,  Maj.  J.  E.,  122. 

Spirit  of  1776,  264. 

Spiritual  valuation,  271. 

State,  bureaucratic,  238. 

Stewart,  Charles  D.,  258. 

Strikes,  232. 

Stuarts,  the,  235. 

Substitution,  phenomenon  of,  116. 
Suggestion,  33. 

Sumner,  William  Graham,  181. 

Folkways  (Ginn  & Co.,  New  York, 

1906),  11,  181,  169. 

Sunday,  Rev.  William,  24,  42,  76,  172. 
Superiority,  idea  of,  174. 

Suppressed  wish,  40. 

Suspicion,  104. 

Survival  values,  77. 

Swinburne,  270. 

Symbolic  thought,  20. 

Symbolism,  reUgious,  66. 

Taboo,  117. 

Tammany  Hall,  233. 


311 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  CROWDS 


Tarde,  Gabriel,  The  Laws  of  Imitation, 
17. 

(Translated  by  Parsons.) 
Theology,  141. 

Theory  of  knowledge,  241. 

— — • humanist,  293. 

instrumental.  298. 

Thinking,  compulsive,  102. 

function  of.  299. 

instrumental  nature  of,  20. 

of  crowds,  142. 

social,  2. 

symbolic  nature  of,  20. 

Thomas  Aquinas,  153. 

Tocqueville,  de,  democracy  in  America, 
253-257,  208,  271. 

Tolstoi,  270. 

Totem  and  Taboo,  95. 

Tragedy,  psychological  meaning  of,  66. 
Transference  phenomenon,  136. 

Tribune,  the.  New  York,  101,  113. 
Truth,  299,  300. 

Truths,  141. 

Truths,  independent.  3. 

Turkey,  Sultan  of,  234. 

Turks,  the,  107. 

Tyranny,  101,  235. 

— — ■ of  ideas.  279. 

of  the  majority,  250. 

Unconscious,  the,  chapter  iii,  5,  12,  14, 
35,  49,  51.  56,  57,  61,  64, 155,  267. 

desire,  120. 

determinism,  5. 

Unction,  210. 

United  States,  Socialist  movement  in, 
227. 

Universal  judgments,  88. 

(See  also  Absolute,  Crowd-think- 
ing, Intellectualism.) 


Unrest,  social,  213. 

Utilitarianism,  nineteenth  century,  10. 
Utopia,  209,  215,  221. 

Values,  169. 

creation  of,  276. 

Variation,  271. 

Violence,  causes  of,  39. 

Virtues,  88. 

of  the  crowd,  164. 

Vote,  right  to,  261. 

Wagner,  269. 

WaUas,  Graham,  The  Great  Society  (The 
Macmillan  Company,  New  York, 
1917),  14.  16. 

War  psychology,  108,  109. 

Ward,  Lester,  Pure  Sociology  (The  Mac- 
millan Company,  New  York. 
Second  edition.  1916),  11. 
Washington,  D.  C..  riot  in.  107. 
Weakness  of  human  nature,  245-246. 
White,  Dr.  William,  Mechanisms  of 
Character  Formation  (The  Mac- 
millan Company,  New  York),  59. 
White  slavery,  reform,  98. 

Whitman,  Walt,  268,  283. 

Whittier,  179. 

Will,  healthy,  89. 

Will  to  dominance,  79. 

Wish-fancy,  303. 

rationalized,  210. 

Wish,  suppressed.  40. 

Working  class,  18,  204,  227. 

(See  also  Proletariat.) 

World  War,  38. 

Young  Men’s  Christian  -Association. 
240,  259. 


THE  END 


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